How we come to know what we know

Now I have a question for the knowlegeable rogues on this forum. Why is it always mentioned that the T-34 and Panther had sloped frontal armor but not the Sherman? The Sherman in it's original configuration had it's glacis, 2"(51mm) armor inclined at 55 degrees, the final versions had 2.5"(63.5) to the Jumbo with 4"(101.6mm) inclined at 47 degrees. The T-34 had frontal armor of 1.77" (45mm) inclined at 60 degrees, the Panther 3.15" (80mm) inclined at 55 degrees. The hull sides of the Sherman were 1.5" (38.1mm) at the verticle to 2.5 (63.5mm) with the applique armor over the ammo storage bins. The Panthers was 1.57" (40mm) verticle on the lower hull to 1.96"(50mm) inclined at 60 degrees on the upper hull.
Why is the T-34 often touted as goundbreaking when it's frontal armor is inclined at a similar angle to the M4 and slightly thinner? While the Panther did have thicker frontal armor, it's sloped armor is touted as a major advantage when it's frontal armor is sloped at the same degree as the Sherman's?

 

CrazyD,

It is impossible to conduct the type of analysis you suggest without access to the entire data set and the supporting documentation. Based on what has been shared by kenny so far, it is my firm opinion that the data sampling technique is flawed to the point that the application of more sophisticated analysis models would be useless.

As previously mentioned, the author of the survey provides a percentage for tank "targeting" in the N. African campaign, but nothing specific to the same topic from the ETO. This is a glaring omission which at the very least makes me wonder what the hell is going on with the survey. We should not be left guessing when it comes to the percentage relevant to the theater which saw the largest commitment of armor by the Western Allies. Basic logic says something is wrong with the survey. Either the necessary data could not be collected to produce the percentage for tank “targeting” in the ETO, the sample size was very small (a factor that produces a set of problems all their own), or something else interfered. Regardless of the reason for the omission, it brings into question the validity of the percentages presented thus far.

To conclude, I am sorry that you find this type of discussion not to your liking, but I assure you what I am saying is quite legitimate from a statistical standpoint. Perhaps you would prefer to accept the numbers as presented in the study, but my own experience with ORO reports has lead me to view their results with caution.

Duckbill

 

Yes and Yes

Duckbill

 

Not so. The reason why the ETO tank target % is ignored is because it has no bearing on the table as it is structured. The N. Africa number is used because it applies specificaly to the number (24%)
I let you prattle on about it because I wanted to see how far you would go in your knee-jerk desire to dismiss any data not sourced by you.
Suffice to say you have made an a*se of yourself and I will now give you the information you seek in the style you delight in when talking down to posters here.
Check this source. Page 44 of OR0-T117.

 

Your link is not working at this moment in time.

You say the ETO tank target percentage is ignored.... and that is enough for me. The contents of a specific table is irrelevant. Why was this information ignored? Why didn't the author include it? Does he given a reason?

As mentioned previously I treat the quantitative contents of ORO reports with circumspection for good reason.

Duckbill

 

Duckbill and Black6-

As you seem to be the two leading witchhunt on the Sherman I direct this at you. I understand you have issue with the thickness of the armor on the Sherman and the comparitive weakness of its guns (even though the 76 was pretty potent with the right ammo.) Our crews weren't protected enough, we should have had the Pershing by D-Day, our tank destroyers should have had better guns...the list goes on. We all know that these were not decisions made by the Sherman, they were made by folks stateside (for the most part, B. Cooper will have you believe that Patton put the brakes on the Pershing.) The Sherman, in all its greatness, could and did take a bigger gun. Powers that be decided on the 75 and 76 (among others) and nixed the 90 (all but one.) The Sherman did eventually get more armor too, did it not. If you are going to find fault then direct it at the people you know made these decisions. The Sherman, with all its great attributes, was also versatile. Need wider tracks, put em on. Bigger gun, what is the limit? More armor, there it is.

I find that many of the attackers of the Sherman want to take the Sherman at its weakest and shoot it full of holes (couldn't help that one.) Of course they will compare it to the Panther at its best (those two weeks, or was it one.) They will also forget that during the latter part of '44 the Sherman was getting the better of the Panther in tank v. tank fighting.

I say direct you "anger" where it belongs and don't fault the Sherman for the tough job it had to do.

 

My copy of the letter is from The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, edited by Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., et al.

What is your source's source?

Then your interest in the opinion of one of the best American armored commanders of the war is nil. Yours is a rather self-limiting approach to studying military history, but that's your decision.

The numbers thing is hardly an indication of my "expertise" in statistical analysis. A long time ago I studied statistics for a couple of years in graduate school, and earned a minor in the subject. Trust me when I say there were and are many, many people with a great deal more expertise in statistical analysis than I will ever have. On the other hand, I achieved my goal by learning enough to be somewhat proficient in the field of quantitative history.

Duckbill

 

There is no anger involved. Identifying the limitations of any weapon system is fundamental to understanding its combat effectiveness. This in turn allows us to better understand the evolution of tactics, the operational art, and strategic implications. By the spring of 1944, the M4 medium tank was under armored and under gunned compared to the larger German tanks and tank destroyers. Nothing any apologist can say will change that simple fact.

Duckbill

 

Well, statistically speaking, one of the larger game changers here is engagement rate. That is he who shoots first wins alot more often. I am a bit limited here in putting up equations but, if you calculate this empirically being on target first gives you about double the straight probability of a kill in an otherwise equal engagement.
That is, if a Sherman even with a fairly low probability of a kill hits its opponet first before that opponet can return fire its probability of destroying that target roughly doubles.

Now, the Sherman clearly has a much higher engagement rate and a much shorter time on target generally than its opponets in otherwise equal conditons. This becomes a huge force multiplier that is not obvious.

 

Agreed in principle. The only provision I would add is that the Sherman's target has to be within effective range of its gun in relation to the that portion of the target that can be engaged. That is to say, from the front a Panther must be quite close to be in the effective range of a 76mm gun. From the rear or the side, the effective range is much greater. If the M4 is out of effective range, the probability of penetrating the hostile tank is much lower. However, it could immobilize the tank by knocking out a track, cause its crew to abandon the field (or their tank) by hitting it with WP, or with a lucky shot into the turret ring, etc.



Duckbill

 

This is not completely correct. The Sherman need only be within range to actually hit the target. A "soft kill" can often be effected simply by scoring a non-penetrating hit on an armored target. That is, the target tank crew panics and does something like withdraw or, fails to react properly for several seconds while more hits (penetrating or not) are scored.
Most tank crews would have a degree of panic from being hit, particularly if they never have been before or, if they have been in a tank that was knocked out with them surviving.

In any case, the formula holds and the first person on target is gains a huge advantage to be the winner of the fight, penetration or no. And, as noted earlier, that is likely to be the Sherman crew.

 

I have no idea which was the best tank of WWII, nor do I think it to be of much significance from a purely historical standpoint. In fact, I've been somewhat bemused by your assumption that I was hostile to the M4 medium tank. I am not.

As previously mentioned, understanding the limitations and advantages offered by the tank in combat are essential to understanding how armored tactics evolved, their impact on the operational art, and the ultimate effect, if any, on strategy. You will note that a balanced view is implicit in this approach.

This is very thing that you are missing -- balance -- objectivity. This missing link is what sets “fan boys” and apologists apart from those who are truly interested in military history. They lack the ability to view their chosen subject with objectivity, and they come in almost any shape or stripe you can imagine. The sad fact is that they know very little, if anything, about military history, but can wax on for hours about hull numbers and where certain types of tanks were destroyed. Or in your case, rant on and on about how unfair and stupid are those who dare say anything negative about the M4 medium tank.

Perhaps you might read something about how history is “done.” I would be happy to recommend some books on the subject that you might find useful. At the very least you would be exposed to the necessity for balance and objectivity. Let me know.

Duckbill

 

While I have not seen a formula, so to speak, I agree with your assessment. More than a few tank crews elected to get the hell out of Dodge after a few anti-tank rounds bounced of their armor. It is a valid point, and yet another variable that must be considered when examining the relative effectiveness of any tank in combat.

More importantly this point of yours represents one of those highly important intangibles (is that the right word?) that often makes the difference between the "Quick and the Dead."

Changing the subject slightly, your previous remarks relevant to what I took to be turret traverse speed brought to mind a strongly worded request by MG Lutes for M4 medium tanks with the 105mm howitzer. Essentially he said send all the 105mm tanks you can, but if they don't have power traverse, we don't want them. Clearly he had heard loud and clear from the users in the front lines that it took far to long to get on target with the non-power variety when split seconds made the difference between life and death. Our friend BG Irzyk made an excellent case for the advantages given the M4 medium over enemy tanks by its high speed and accurate power traverse.

Duckbill

 

Then you have not actually seen Eisenhower's letter to Rose and White, and consequently do not know exactly what he said in his missive.

Duckbill

 

Criticism regarding the technical shortcomings of a piece of equipment is hardly "anger", a witch hunt" or "attacking". The vehicle was not perfect, nor was it the best the Allies had or could have offered and crews died that would have otherwise lived. It's a case of bureaucracy kills I guess. In this case I look at comparative analysis as a means to justify Allied casualties relative to the enemy as if thats just how business gets done and its just accepted. I personally don't accept it and understand full well what goes into developing new equipment, testing, procuring it, fielding it and then adjusting to new situations. There was a failure in the Allied military bureaucracy to field a better piece of equipment for their armored forces regardless of how the Sherman stacks up against enemy equipment. It didn't stack up well against enemy means to destroy it...did it? People who are "fans" of the Sherman and sing its praises are basically accepting the loss of all of those who died because of its shortcomings. You can call Belton Cooper a whiner, but he has a very valuable and relevant perspective on the Sherman that lends an integral piece to the overall picture of the vehicle as a whole.
As far as comparing the Sherman to enemy vehicles I haven't done that in this thread because quite frankly the performance of enemy vehicles SHOULD have been inferior in light of all of the comparative advantages the Allies possessed in 1944. Pointing out any advantages or superiorities in performance should be balanced against shortcomings for proper perspective.

edit- I replied too early as I see much of this was already said. And kudos to Slipdigit....

 

Losses during Goodwood.

23rd Hussars had 60 personel casualties from 684 over the 3 days of Goodwood. 26 dead and 24 wounded.
Day 1. 26 tank casualties, 24 dead and 30 wounded.
Day 2. 4 tank casualties, 1 dead and 2 wounded.

The first day (18/7/44)was by far the most intense period of action for the unit. Before or after they never faced such a concentration of A/T weaponry. Thus the figures represent the most extreme scenario for tank/crew losses.
What stands out for me is how the first day gave casualties more or less matching the ORO reports that say the average was 2.25 casualties per penetrated tank. For the whole of 18/7/44 29th Armored Brigade (11th AD) had 126 tank casualties and 281 personel casualties.