Prelude to Operation Barbarossa: Field Marshall Kesselring's Opinion

"We were now in the middle of 1941...after the retreat from Dunkirk the British armies could no longer be used on a large scale, while the R.A.F. was not ready for major operations. Our northern flank was protected by Falkenhorst's army and Stumpff's air fleet in Norway, and our southern flank by Rommel's Afrika Korps and the Italians...the intervention of the United States was questionable, or at any rate lay in the distant future.

"Thus the two fronts were much less of an actual danger in 1941 then in 1939. Was it then so necessary to attack Russia? Hitler had again said in his final address to his generals on 14 june that the Russian campaign was unavoidable, that we had to attack now if we wanted to save ourselves from being attacked by the Russians at an awkward time. He reminded us once again of the points which made it seem unlikely that a friendship between Germany and Russia could be lasting, the undeniable ideological anatagonism which was still not basically removed, the measures which Russia was taking on the Baltic coast and on her western frontier which looked very much like mobilization, the increasingly agressive behaviour of her soldiers towards the inhabitants of the frontier districts, troop movements in areas close to the frontier, the intensified building up of the Russian armament industry etc.

"...Hitler's contention that the Russians would sieze the first favourable moment to attack us seemed to me indisputably right. The Kremlin could easily manufacture reasons for a surprise attack...i knew from reports of Luftwaffe engineers who had quite recently travelled through Russia that an extravagant factory and armament programme had begun which we would soon cease to be able to keep up with. Unfortunately Hitler and Goerring thought them flights of imagination. I believe today that only an incorrigible optimist can suggest that Russia would have been content with her status after the end of the war with Poland."

Kesselring: A soldier's Record. PP 93-94

 

Interesting but not surprising. Hitler and Goebels were masters at creating stories to further their own agendas. All others had no choice but to agree and follow...

 

If I recall correctly all those German top rank officers who had fought in the Ostfront in WW1 were definitely thinking they should not attack. And they actually had pretty good results in ww1 I think in the East. Perhaps if Hitler had served in the Ostfront for even a while he might have thought otherwise... Then again it was a decision of politics and a crusade against communism so cannot be sure...

 

maybe,there was another way than Barbarossa,to win the war against Britain,but I doubt it .

 

As soon as Nazis came to power, they were doomed. No matter what they did- Stalin was going to get rid of them. There can only be one true Socialist Workers Government in Europe.
Hitler had no choice but to attack Russia when he did. The only way to defeat Stalin IMHO was to start another Revolution. Although I do not think Russians had it in them for another big fight against each other.

 

One must remember that Hitler originally got to power through the wealthy money men from industry and politics. They saw the communists as No1 enemy and would get rid of them without having a second thought of how bad the guy who would do the dirty job is.

 

that's disputable,because one-sided.
Hitler originally got to power,because millions of Germans voted for him,after he got millions of votes,he got financial support from the industry .

 

that Stalin was going to get rid of them,is a theory that never had been proved (I hope you don't believe the ramblings from Suvurov)

 

"Gustav Krupp saved the Nazi party in 1932. If it had not been for Gustav Krupp, Hitler would never have come to power. During 1932, the Nazi Party had offended many people and had lost greatly in the elections. Many of their big financial supporters had backed away and it looked like the party was going to shrivel up and die. Dr. Goebbels, of the Nazi Party wrote at this point in 1932, "...We are all very discouraged. particularly in the face of the present danger that the entire party may collapse and all our work be in vain. We are now facing the decisive test." Soon after he wrote, "The financial situation in Berlin is hopeless. Nothing but debts and obligations." At this point. Gustav Krupp threw his momentous influence and big money (100,000,000 German Marks) into saving the Nazi party from their precarious position."

The Krupp Bloodline

And then there´s IG Farben etc.

Hitler's Rise to Power

 

Very similar to the smart wisdom shown with the Ribbentrop - Molotov pact, wasn´t it? Stalin spected the bad guy made a great job weakening the west democracies ... and he did it.

The initial success of Barbarossa, and its terrible cost, was a surprise too.

 

I think most of us here on the forum would agree that Russia would have attcked Germany at some point from 1943 onward.

My opinions of Barbarossa have always been the same. There were two reasons Barbarossa failed.

1. German intervention in Greece on the 6th april 1941, which delayed Babarossa for several weeks.

2. Failure to capture Moscow before winter and whilst defences around the city were weak. Historians will argue that the fight would have continued even if Moscow had been taken, but I feel moral would would have dropped so much that the Russians would have quickly capitulated.

 

A (very) traditional POV,but
1) Barbarossa would ,in any case,have been delayed by the weather conditions.
2) About Moscow :there is no proof that the capture of Moscow in september would be possible
About a Russian capitulation after the fall of Moscow :that's only speculating;one could argue the opposite :the fall of Moscow causing a stiffening of the Russian resistance .
Whatever:the fall of Moscow would follow the collapse of the SU,but not the inverse:the SU would not collapse due to the fall of Moscow .

 

I know of the money from Krupp and his likes ,but
1) that money came in 1932 only
2)in 1932,the nazi's were the biggest party,having arrived at that position without the money from Krupp a.o.
3)that the nazi's had financial troubles,is a fact,but,it's going to far,to say that Krupp saved the nazi's from a desaster.
4) whatever:the political situation was that in 1932(the nazi's and the communists had together the majority in parliament),that there were only 3 options
a)a military dictatorship:advocated by von Schleicher,but rejected by the army
b)a government of the left,including,one way or another the communists
c)a government of the right,including one way or another the nazi's
Btw:I find the figure of 100,000,000 RM as suspicious ,much to high .

 

about 'the Krupp bloodline':I should not use it as a serious source:it's full of illuminati,occultists,occult world government and such things .
more serious is Overy'war and economy in the third Reich',who states:
Krupp supported Hindenburg as presidential candidate in 1932.
Krupp only withdrew financial support for the DVP in 1932,because it had failed to halt the rise of the nazi's.

 

Too true Kai-Petri. Not only Krupp, and I.G.Farben, but the American industriallist Henry Ford Sr. (from the twenties on), and Wall Street investment bankers as well.

And while the Krupp Bloodline source might be slightly tainted, the book The Arms of Krupp by Manchester isn't. Nor is Anthony Sutton's Wall Street and The Rise of Hitler.

 

I think this article proves the point about the defences around Moscow

Soviet commander admits USSR came close to defeat by Nazis - Telegraph

 

The way in which Hitler became Chancellor is not simple and had a good deal of luck involved with it as well. This site has the story right, even if the English is not so great: Strona profesora Iwo Cypriana Pogonowskiego

The pivotal point where history really could have been different was the 1932 election, Hindenberg and Hitler had struck a deal where if the Crown Prince ran for president they would both withdraw. The deal was that Hindenburg could retire and Hitler would be appointed Chancellor under the new president. In this scenario I don't see the Nazis taking over the country because there would be a strong and relatively young president in a 7 year term. There would be no enabling act signed, no merging of the two offices. If anything there may have been a modified restoration of the monarchy which was favored by many powerful people at that time.

 

I afraid you are simplifying quite a bit.

German intervention in Greece had NO impact on the Eastern Front. Had Germany invaded a few weeks earlier they would have been hampered down by Russian rains. With virtually no paved roads the German mechanized infantry and panzers would have been out of the picture.

Many including Stalin expected Moscow to fall. For this reason virtually all of importance to the party were evacuated to an alternate capital and the city was booby trapped. The war would have continued just as it had when Napoleon captured Moscow and just as it had when the British had captured Washington DC in the war of 1812...

 

German intervention in Greece did have an impact on Barbarossa.

Airbourne troops were supposed to be used in the opening days of the invasion of Barbarossa, but after losses in Crete, Hitler forbade further large scale airborne operations.

Many transports planes were also lost during the invasion of Greece. In fact all losses in Greece had a later impact on Barbarossa.

Also, it is well documented that Stalin refused to leave Moscow, even when the Germans were 20 kilometers from Moscow.

If the German had moved on Moscow earlier, quickly encircled it and linked up at Noginsk as per the original plan...they might have captured Moscow and Stalin!

 

nice controversial. I guess you might answer better than me.

Operation Barbarossa: The Ultimate Strategic Miscalculation

In short, Barbarossa failed for secondary targets, the target was completely disrupting railway communications in Russia ... Moscow. IMHO, he is wrong.

A map is better than my words:



Anyone is able to quantify what delay did for German logistics have to change the Russian gauge to the Standart gauge? Should the Nazis prepared a few trains to use the Soviet railways immediately? Would it have been worth it?