Report on Bombing Accuracy, Eighth Air Force, 1 Sept. 1944 to 31 Dec. 1944

This is a newly digitized report by CARL:

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cgi-...OT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=3339&filename=3346.pdf


Dave

 

Hi Dave,

Thanks for posting the link to this document.

I am in the process of reading a downloaded hardcopy version.

Are you able to shed further light on the people who prepared the document and who may have read it at the time?

This may well be listed somewhere on the site but I cannot find it.

So far, the document certainly suggests that 'accuracy' (hitting a target within a broader area) and 'precision' (actually hitting the target of itself) was as problematic for the Americans as it proved for the RAF.

What really interests me is just how well and how broadly understood was this matter within Eighth Air Force.


Thanks,

Michael

 

That's a great document, thanks for posting.

I've read a similar report (had to pay for it, covered with "do not copy" messages) which indicates that the sample does not represent 100% of the bombs dropped, only those which fell within a normal distribution. Thus, "Mission Failures" and bombs dropped outside the expected normal distribution were excluded, meaning the percentages were lower than indicated.

 

Bombing accuracy as a general topic for the 8th AF needs to be set in context of a.) target weather, b.) Results applied against Primary targets, and c.) against secondary targets.

The USAAF was not near as accomplished as the RAF in blind bombing techniques and only when coastlines or other distinctive features existed which supplied excellent radar returns were bombs delivered within postal zones of the planned targets in 8-10/10th cloud cover. September 1944 was the last month when good visibility over the targets could be expected in that survey - and hence high expectations for Norden driven results. During early October weather over the continent became increasingly disruptive to standard USAAF methods and more Pathfinder/H2X led missions became the rule rather than exception.

mid October, 1945 through February 1945 would be a bad period to exemplify daylight 'precision' attacks.

 

When you know that only the formation leader in Eighth Air Force raids actually aimed his bombs and all the rest merely dropped their bombs on seeing the bombs leave the formation leaders aircraft, you realise that the word 'precision' is not really applicable to these raids, its area bombing by a different method.

 

Redcoat,

With a bomber stream that may have been a mile wide and 2 miles or more long, dropping bombs all at the one time would have left a damage pattern the same dimension on Terra-Firma.

The Norden bomb sight may as well have been left at home.

 

Perhaps a little harsh judgment but a degree of truth.

The policy of establishing lead crews based on skill and achievement paid significant dividends with respect to bombing accuracy.

Further for a target like a refinery, the target MPI assigned to the lead bombadier was normally a critical 'target within a target' (like a catalytic cracking unit). He was expected to put his bombs on that specific high value target and the trailing bomb squadrons were expected to pound everything around it by dropping on his drop.

There are many examples illustrating the value of both the lead crew selection process as well as improvement of BDA following such strikes - again related to visibility and the correct guess of the meterologist when calcuating headings from the IP to the target to reduce adverse drift issues from crosswinds to the bomb track

 

To be fair to the Eighth Air Force, it was probably the only tactic they could use in such large tight formations, can you imagine the choas that would occur if each individual bomber tried to aim its bombs.

 

That was the doctrine of early 8th (and all other USAAF) Bomber Command. Each Bombadier acquired his aiming point and worked the bombsight.

That was 'defeated' because a.) the conditions of a level bombing run over Europe were not the same as Arizona training, and b.) the pilot's discipline in keeping the B-17/B-24 on a straight and level run weren't solved until the AFCE (Automatic Flight Control Equipment) autopilot, slaved to the Norden, was installed, and c.) lead crew selections weren't yet made to upgrade the 'bomb aimer' skills.

Following the installations of the AFCE slaved to the Norden and taking control away from the pilots, results improved immediately. The addition of placing the better bombadiers up front with the best navigators and pilots meant improved location of the IP for the direct bomb run along the mission briefing rehearsed path.

Included in the briefing were 'interesting' features easily seen to enable the bombadier to do a preliminary wind drift calculation to assist in offsets to the subsequent Aiming Point of the target.

Combing all these features did in fact provide for some spectacular bombing results in clear weather. Absent these circumstances many fields adjacent to a 1000 x 1000 meter target like a refinery of a marshalling yard were well and truly 'replowed.

 

There seems to be a misconception of what 'bomb on leader' really meant. It did not mean that there was one leader for the entire bomber stream with all bombers dropping on a single cue. I'm much more familiar with 15th AF procedures than 8th AF, but I don't believe they were much different.

In the 15th AF under visual conditions, each bomb group would fly a formation of 3 or 4 sections with 9-12 a/c per section (typical). Each section would have a lead (and deputy lead) that would aim for the section.

Under non visual conditions, the number of H2X aircraft available would dictate the number of leads. When H2X first appeared in the 15th in April '44, it was generally 1 Mickey ship per bomb group, and it would be the bomb aimer for the group. By early Summer, most missions would have at least two Mickey ships per group, usually 1 overall lead in the "A" section, and 1 in the "C" section, each providing aim for the a/c immediately following. As the number of H2X ships in theater increased, each section would have a Mickey ship.

Yes, it was bomb on leader, but in much smaller increments than seems to be the general perception.

 

Absolutely correct. Remembering that a 'normal' raid by 8th AF was 10+ Bomb Groups per each of the three Bomb/Air Divisions - and that each Bomb division was tasked a Series of targets - often widely dispersed... it becomes clear that the bomb aiming, while relegated to lead crews/pathfinders, was rarely more than two squadron in a Group strength formation.