Patton wanted to take on the Soviets 1945

Hi, is it true that General Patton wanted to carry on with war and push the Russians back to there own border after the allies defeted Germany in 1945, I also read somewhere that some Germans wanted to actually join the allies in pushing back the Russians also, they thought that when the war was over the real enemy in europe was the Soviet threat after peace was declared.

 

Patton had many gifts, his mouth was not one of them.

Many believe that he was sacked because of it.

 

This pretty much says it all.

 

Yes he could run his mouth, upset many with his comments, but I only posted this thread to find out if there was any truth in the comments over Russia, I heard this qoute in the 1970s when I was a teenager and would like to see if verified as true or false, I dont want to condem the guy if these comments are false, his memory is shrouded with verious comments he made during ww2.

 

George S. Patton - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
gets into it a little.
What looks to be a good 5 page bio is here: www.pattonhq.com/pattonbio.pdf
General S Patton Biography | Biography Online
states

but no direct quote.

For details you'll probably need to consult a book length biography.

 

Thanks Lwd, I think there is a book about him in our local library, I will check it out.

 

Not only Patton. The Allies made a study of an offensive designed to liberate eastern europe from the soviets in 1945. However, they concluded that giving the force strength of the Red Army, success in this offensive would be at least improbable.

It wasn't in the interest of the western powers for the USSR to dominate half of Europe, as they did from late 1944 until 1989.

 

I am sure a planning staff did some prelimnary studies, but there never was much chance with a war to be won in the Pacific first. I am sure the Soviets did the same. I am sure somewhere in the Pentagon there is a plan for invading Canada.

 

The only one I'm familiar with is Operation Unthinkable and it was a UK study. Europe in general was not ready for more war at that point. Food was in short supply not to mention men and other resources for most if not all the allies.

 

Liberating Eastern Europe was always a higher piority to Churchill and the UK than it was to the US.

 

watching the film "Patton" makes an interesting perspective on this

I can't give you anything black and white. But I can tell you that Russia and US were mutually working together still after the war to help defeat Japan. Remember, US was thinking they're in it for the long haul, (till what, 47?), and Russia would make it a lot easier on the folks voting back home.

 

The war on the pacific only represented the allocation of a small proportion of allied resources. The US allocated only 15% of their warmaking potential in the war agaisnt Japan (according to Overy, Why the Allies Won, the US allocated 85% of their resources agaisnt Germany and these 85% were freed after Germany's defeat), while UK probably gave a even smaller share.

The plan for invading Canada was never taken seriously. That plan was taken seriously, at least before they computed the force ratios.

 

Oh probably ever since loyalists fled there after 1783.

 

Japan alone agaisnt the US was suicide since the US had over 10 times the industrial potential of Japan. After Germany's defeat, Japan would be quickly defeated, as happened historically.

Relations between the US and USSR were tense after the war: The USSR even cut Berlin's food supply in 1948. UK even considered the USSR as a threat to western civilization, right in 1945.

 

This is the only thing I've ever seen to reflect that, and it seems valid. Fortunately cooler heads prevailed and Patton was removed from command.


It was only in the final days of the war and during his tenure as military governor of Germany -- after he had gotten to know both the Germans and America's "gallant Soviet allies" -- that Patton's understanding of the true situation grew and his opinions changed. In his diary and in many letters to his family, friends, various military colleagues, and government officials, he expressed his new understanding and his apprehensions for the future. His diary and his letters were published in 1974 by the Houghton Mifflin Company under the title The Patton Papers.

Several months before the end of the war, General Patton had recognized the fearful danger to the West posed by the Soviet Union, and he had disagreed bitterly with the orders which he had been given to hold back his army and wait for the Red Army to occupy vast stretches of German, Czech, Rumanian, Hungarian, and Yugoslav territory, which the Americans could have easily taken instead.

On May 7, 1945, just before the German capitulation, Patton had a conference in Austria with U.S. Secretary of War Robert Patterson. Patton was gravely concerned over the Soviet failure to respect the demarcation lines separating the Soviet and American occupation zones. He was also alarmed by plans in Washington for the immediate partial demobilization of the U.S. Army.

Patton said to Patterson: "Let's keep our boots polished, bayonets sharpened, and present a picture of force and strength to the Red Army. This is the only language they understand and respect."

Patterson replied, "Oh, George, you have been so close to this thing so long, you have lost sight of the big picture."

Patton rejoined: "I understand the situation. Their (the Soviet) supply system is inadequate to maintain them in a serious action such as I could put to them. They have chickens in the coop and cattle on the hoof -- that's their supply system. They could probably maintain themselves in the type of fighting I could give them for five days. After that it would make no difference how many million men they have, and if you wanted Moscow I could give it to you. They lived on the land coming down. There is insufficient left for them to maintain themselves going back. Let's not give them time to build up their supplies. If we do, then . . . we have had a victory over the Germans and disarmed them, but we have failed in the liberation of Europe; we have lost the war!"

...On May 18 he noted in his diary: "In my opinion, the American Army as it now exists could beat the Russians with the greatest of ease, because, while the Russians have good infantry, they are lacking in artillery, air, tanks, and in the knowledge of the use of the combined arms, whereas we excel in all three of these. If it should be necessary to right the Russians, the sooner we do it the better."

Two days later he repeated his concern when he wrote his wife: "If we have to fight them, now is the time. From now on we will get weaker and they stronger."

Goto:

http://www.natvan.com/national-vanguard/assorted/patton.html

Of course as the son of a wealthy family, and married to an equally wealthy family the very idea of "Socialism/Communism" would have been abhorrent to the man. Then one must remember his oft spoken desire to die in battle, not behind a desk. He wished to die in the "last battle, killed by the last bullet fired". He didn't want the war (or war itself) to end.

 

I hear they had called him "Old blood and guts". Then some soldier said " yes, our blood his guts" referring to his callous use of men. I think that's what I heard.

 

The problem is that Patton had some very wild ideas which was well-known to the Army and he was also used to drive his bargains very, very hard. Above all else, Patton was a good soldier and would NEVER violate the political mandate from his superiors. There was never any danger that Patton would go off starting WWIII on his own no matter how much he itched for it.
However, there was a delightful little anecdote from D'Este's biography that Patton ordered a corps to cross to Elbe by field telephone after a Russian representative demanded him to cede Austria to the Red Army. The Russian officer visibly blanched and the request hurriedly withdrawn. Actually, no one was on the other side of the phone.
D'Este's wonderful biography of Patton should be very useful in that respect. Patton was all about theatrics. The quote "Let's keep our boots polished, bayonets sharpened, and present a picture of force and strength to the Red Army. This is the only language they understand and respect" contradicted the idea that he wanted to fight the Red Army, since the emphasis is on "presenting a picture of force and strength". He is arguing to adopt a posture of strength to impress an adversary, not going into action against the enemy. The subsequent communiques, in my opinion, are characteristic exaggerations on Patton's part and meant to emphasize the position of weakness in which he saw the Red Army.

 

Patton was aggressive in attack and had a somewhat archaic sense of battle glory, but was no more bloody in the use of his troops than say Clark in Italy or the 9th Army in Hurtgen forest attacks. He can atleast claim to have gained ground in his attacks.

 

Of course his diary entry and letter to his wife a week or so after that public statement to the diplomat contradict that position as well;

On May 18 he noted in his diary: "In my opinion, the American Army as it now exists could beat the Russians with the greatest of ease, because, while the Russians have good infantry, they are lacking in artillery, air, tanks, and in the knowledge of the use of the combined arms, whereas we excel in all three of these. If it should be necessary to right the Russians, the sooner we do it the better."

Two days later he repeated his concern when he wrote his wife: "If we have to fight them, now is the time. From now on we will get weaker and they stronger."

Pick your poison, Patton was a "loose cannon" by then, and while he would never have the power or influence to "start WW3", his opining to Gay that he was not going to retire, but resign his commission might indicate that he didn't want to be "muzzled" by the Army or the politicians.

 

Too many knocks to the head during Polo is a popular theory.