Beginner's question...

I'am interested in ww2, only few months ago, and I have a question..... Why, during the Stalingrad battle, japanese army didn't support german army from the east, by attacking east russia (east Russian coast). I really don't have a clue..... Any help????

 

This has been covered from many different angles, the answers lay within.
I quick way of getting some answers is to ask yourself why WOULD they instead.

 

Here´s one thread with some answers...

http://www.ww2f.com/what-if-pacific-cbi/11777-japan-attacks-ussr-not-usa.html

Try the search function for more similar threads,ttivanov...

 

Germany and Japan never really coordinated any military operations together. Since Japan was after raw materials, That portion of the USSR did not offer much in return.

 

Welcome aboard, ttivanov! Good question, and as you can see it has been kicked around a bit. The Japanese had attacked the Russians in 1939-40 and been defeated; among other things this was Georgi Zhukov's first major victory and contributed to Stalin's calling on him in 1941 and beyond. One common misconception is that the Russians denuded the Far East of troops in order to meet the German offensive and were therefore more vulnerable to a Japanese attack than they had been a year earlier. In fact they kept up their strength even though individual units were transferred:

Soviet troops in the far east on 22 June 1941:

17 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division, 3 rifle brigades, 1 airborne brigade, and 12 fortified regions organized into five rifle corps and four rifle armies.

Soviet troops in the far east on 1 January 1942:

19 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 rifle brigades, 1 airborne brigade, 2 cavalry regiments, 1 rifle regiment, and 12 fortified regions organized into four rifle corps and five rifle armies.

Apparently, units sent west were replaced by new formations, so the Soviets didn't really let down their guard vis-a-vis Japan. There are also artillery and tank units listed in the order of battle, what is listed above are the major combat formations, and does not include units assigned to the Trans-Baikal Front.

Source for the data is:

Óêàçàòåëü íà ñàéò "Íåêîòîðûå ñòàòèñòè÷åñêèå ìàòåðèàëû ïî èñòîðèè Âòîðîé ìèðîâîé âîéíû"

Although the Japanese could be formidable fighters, they were basically a light infantry force, lacking motorization or heavy artillery; in some respects not even up to the standards of great power armies of World War I. Their tanks were few in number and comparable to older Russian models like BTs or T-26s.

 

Another thing we have to bear in mind is that Stalin's spy in Japan, Zorge, has informed his Russian principals that his conclusion was that Japanese were not intending to attack Russia from the East. Some sources claim that this was vital. Stalin was moved the well trained units from East to the Moscow's front. Some other sources claim that this was vital for sure but Stalin was so suspicious with any info he had that practically made any info useless and that the movement of the Siberian divisions was not critical. You choose what is near to your conclusions.

 

The little-known battle between the russians and the Japanese at Khalkin-gol (Manchuria) in 1939 was probably the biggest reason why they did not help the Germans.
General Zhukov himself commanded this operation, and basically kicked Japanese butt until they surrendered. Like the other poster said the Japanese were a light infantry force and very poorly equipped for modern armored warfare, so the Russians smothered them with armor during this battle until they screamed Uncle.

It's safe to say this battle was fresh in their minds in 1941 and even when Hitler's forces were pounding on the gates of Moscow, the Japanese never intervened to help the Germans.

Like Slipdigit and Pzjgr said attacking Russia through Manchuria would not have brought them any reward it would merely have brought disaster. That part of Russia was considered nothing more then a snowy desert with thousands of square miles with nothing in it (even the Russians did not know about the oil or natural gas there at the time, and even if they had, the Japanese would have been unable to move equipment there to extract it in any event).

Moreover attacking the russians would have brought the Japanese too far inland to support and the Japan forces would have been quickly cut off from their supply lines and destroyed. (Note that just about everything Japan conquered during the war was within 200 miles of a coastline or large waterway, their supply being primarily by ship).

 

I'm afraid the gentleman hasn't been back here since he asked his first question over a month ago.

 

Let me give you the short version: Between roughly 1938 and 1940 the Japanese and Russians had a number of clashes along the Soviet-Chinese-Manchuko border. Japan usually got thrashed even though the Soviets (unadmittedly of course) took heavy casualties. The result was that Japan had a very wary view of taking on the Russians under any cirucumstances. Their army in 1940 - 41 in Manchuko (Northern China) was relatively small and not prepared to deal with the much larger Soviet forces they faced.
So, the Japanese dug in and turned their attention elsewhere.

 

So they chose to take on the U.S. forces instead? There has to be other reasons, no?

 

even admiral yamamoto who studied in the USA for a long period of time and travelled to various military factories and shipyards etc, tried to dissuade the Japanese goverment from attacking pearl harbour his famous allegedly words were 'if you do you will awaken a sleeping giant' and how right he was as history has proven.

 

The reason to attack Pearl was to destroy the US Pacific Fleet. This would allow Japan a year or so, to accupy as much land as possible a retreave as much natural resources as possible. Attacking Russia had no gain. The land was barren, very little resources, raw materials and very small military targets.

 

The Japanese tanks were probably not a match for the BT series. Another major issue is that the Kwangtung army was not ready for operation and it would take months to prepare the forces for an invasion.

 

Once Japan seized Indochina it completely unhinged the British position in the west pacific and thus Roosevelt had the embargo imposed. With out the oil and raw materials Japan could not continue their war against China. So Japan had a choice surrender or go to war. If Japan was not bogged down in China then going against the Soviet Union could have been an option. It is not understood by most casual readers that the war in China was a major burden on Japan and a wild guess that at least half of the Japanese army was committed.

 

There are a few things to remember when considering German, Soviet and Japanese motivations in the war, the Japanese themselves, and Japanese intervention in any war against the USSR.

- Hitler didn't ask for any assistance from the Japanese, because he didn't figure he needed any; given the state of the Soviet military,defeating the USSR was considered a mere cakewalk. Hitler's intent was that the Japanese keep Britain and the US fully occupied while he tackled Stalin, he didn't want to owe the Japanese anything, he didn't want to share any of the gains from the defeated USSR with his erstwhile Japanese Allies.



- While it can be easily demonstrated that compared to a southern campaign, there would be little for the Japanese to gain by attacking the USSR, by Western standards and perceptions, the Japanese themselves frequently operated irrationally. Usurpation of authority by the military at different levels, but particularly middle grade field officers, political assassination, and what can be described as bizarre ritualistic behavior tied to offensives or that can be summed up as an undue responsibility to preserve honour, completely opposed to such axioms as "discretion being the better part of valour" or "live to fight another day", all figure largely in Japanese operations.


That said, historically, when Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke visited Berlin in April 1941, he wasn't even informed of the impending German attack on the Soviets, almost ready to be launched, much less asked for assistance. Instead, Hitler wanted the British and Americans embarrassed in the Far East to ensure Germany's position in Western Europe during the Russian campaign. Matsuoka bought it, stopped in Moscow enroute home and negotiated the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact with Molotov and Stalin, signed 13 April 1941 in Moscow, a pact that astonished his own government.

The launch of Barbarossa on June 22nd caught the Japanese as much by surprise as it did the Soviets, perhaps in some ways more so. On July 2nd, the Japanese gov't met in a joint military/civil Imperial Conference to reconsider their pact with the Soviets in light of Barbarossa, Matsuoka, author of the pact,unbelievably was already in favour of abrogating it. Matsuoka however had already lost face along with his credibility given the fact that the Germans didn't even confide something of such mutual importance with him, he was sacked, or rather the government resigned, then reformed without him.

A decision was then taken to wait and see for the time being, but to heavily reinforce the Kwantung Army, and to attack the Soviet Far East Army if the opportunity presented itself. However, while the reinforcement occurred, it wasn't until August that the army called off the attack, and that delay was only for 1941. Despite the reversals at the Halha River in 1939, the army was all for it, wanting another go at the Soviets. It's important to understand that the series of events, which led to the border disputes and military action between the Soviets and Japanese in Mongolia in 1939, had not been authorized at the time by the Army General Staff in Tokyo, but rather had been initiated and escalated by field officers. This situation could very well have been repeated in 1941, regardless of Tokyo, with Japanese field officers itching to redeem honour, the Soviets having the Germans on their hands. The Kwantung Army could very well have provoked "border incidents" with the Soviet Far East forces, and all out war escalated.


As it was, the pact was preserved, the Japanese struck south where there was more to gain against the US and the European Colonial powers, and the war developed in the East without the Soviets. Japanese reversals began mid-1942 and it soon became advantageous to both Japan and the USSR to continue maintain their pact, which limited just 1 combat front each, in a manner of speaking if not realistically. The Japanese, already committed, could not assist Germany, when their assistance was finally sought. Likewise the USSR could not risk allowing US bombers on their soil to strike Japan, because they were aware that their war with Germany could be hugely impaired, for little effort on the part of the Japanese.

How so? Some 940 Soviet and Soviet Leased ships (including some 125 from the Western Allies, sailing under the hammer and sickle) routinely sailed unescorted from the west coast of North America, across the Pacific and between the Japanese held Kuril Islands and the La Perouse Straits dividing Japanese southern Sakhalin and the main Japanese Island of Hokkaido, to Vladivostok. This route, which overall handled the bulk of the supplies to support the Soviets, well over half over the course of the war, including virtually all of it the summer of 1941, was maintained by the Soviets themselves. While because of the strictly enforced neutrality, in theory at least no military weapons could be carried, some would argue that it was the food, raw materials, boots, fuel additives etc. that the Soviets shipped on this route that they needed most anyway. For a handful of patrolcraft and destroyers, the Japanese could have closed this route to the USSR. The Persian Gulf route, which would gain in importance, performed dismally early on, the Iranian State Railways required wholesale repair and reno. As it was, planners could only count on moving 5 ships per month, an early target of 200,000 tons/month was not realised, only 44,800 tons were shipped in Sept. 1942, 57,120 tons in Jan. 1943, the Persian Gulf ports unloading time as late as Jan. 1943 was an atrocious 55 days per ship, one vessel waited 124 days. Thus, the Northern route to Murmansk and Archangel remained viable, but had to be fought through, the summer months proved to be unfeasible because of attack in virtual 24 hr. daylight, and the Atlantic convoys required the escort. With just their Pacific supply route closed by the Japanese, would the Soviets be toast before Stalingrad?

 

One factor could have been the army was obsessed with ending the China affair and a chance to get at China from the south and finish cutting China from supplies was deemed more important then a second chance at the Soviets.