Operation Barbarosa starts in April instead of late June

What if Operation Barbarossa starts in May as designed instead of in June? Would this extra time before winter lead towards occupation of Moscow and possibly the oil fields in the south? What if it started in April? I think that it may have prolonged the war effort and shifted the soviets into the urals. However, I am still hard pressed to believe that the Soviets would have surrendered.

 

If it was only this, it might make a big difference, maybe not.
If the Germans had been smarter in a strategic sense they would have a much better chance

 

1)april was of course impossible
2)may :the result would be the same,because the fact that Moscow was not captured,was not caused by a shortage of time .Moscow only could be captured if the Germans could defeat the SU in a quick and short campaign,and,they failed to do this .
3) the Ural was excluded :the farthest line in the German planning was the A-A line .
4) The oilfields in the Caucasus were no goal in 1941.

 

Why? Where's your conclusive proof that it couldn't be?
(I've asked this on a previous thread with no response)

Basis for this claim?

 

1)the weather in april was preventing an attack
2)Look at the planning of Barbarossa :the Germans planned a quick and short campaign (some 10 weeks),because
a)they had the strength for a campaign of only 10 weeks :the SU had to be defeated BEFORE september,and,it was not
b) the longer the campaign,the stronger the SU would become :the SU could mobilise 30 million men
It is very clear:
the SU could send more men to the front than it was losing and the Germans were losing more men than they could send to the front . Consequence:the longer the campaign,the stronger the Red Army,the weaker the Germans .
Thus,time was the crucial factor and time was running ag

 

A problem:time was running against the Germans .
Every week,the Germans lost 31000 men and only replaced 18500 men
Every week the Russians lost 155000 men and replaced 210000 men
Thus,ev ery week there were 13000 Germans less and 60000 Russians more .
You get the picture?
And the results were even worse ,because sickness cases and accidents are not included .
Principally,it was a question of manpower .If the SU had the chance to mobilize its superior manpower,Germany was doomed.

 

May really wasn't possible for a number of reasons. Bear in mind the scale and scope of the planning, preparing and deployments of Operation Barbarossa in the context of:
The Campaign in France ended in June/July of 1940 for the Army leaving 10 months before Barbarossa
For the Luftwaffe the Campaign in France was followed by the Battle of Britain and major operations in the Balkans and Greece which diluted it's strength, personnel (pilot attrition) and machines.
Operation "Otto", the German Railroad's plan to increase its freight capacity to support the deployments for Barbarossa wasn't completed until 15 June 1941.

 

Haven't we done this one before?

My understanding is that the road and ground conditions were such that the initial German advance might actually have been slowed down. If so each additional Soviet defence line would have been stronger. The logistics system might have been a bit better because it was shorter but additional demands on artillery supplies and wear and tear on trucks, wagons, and horses would probably have offset this.

 

Actually, things would be much worse for the Germans. Since this gives the eisenbahntruppen (railway engineers) no time to upgrade the Polish rail system there will be even more of a bottleneck in moving supplies East than they historically was. This will mean the Germans will be in even worse shape logistically and probably will find their offensive stalled at Smolensk or near there simply because of lack of supplies.

 

Op didn't really specify, but I'm assuming that it would be done if the Germans hadn't gone into Crete and/or Greece in April/May.

Although without involvement in the Balkans they would be better able to prioritize operations in Poland.

 

As everyone knows (or should know) :the Germans attacked on 22 june 1941 with 2.7 million men,thus,I fail to understand ,as Freebird was suggesting,that the presence or absence (on 22 june 1941) of a few thousand of men transported by glider and of a few thousand of men jumping from an aircraft with a parachute,would be essential .

 

I guess if we go back and assume the whole Balkans Campaign never happens that there could be significant effect upon Barbarossa. That would mean that the Italians never invade Greece igniting the whole thing and that the British are able to wrap up North Africa in 1941 before Rommel gets established. The British would likely have been able to do just that if their strength weren't diluted when they had the Italians on the ropes.

 

So consensus is............Germany was doomed no matter what......

The only way that they have a chance in my opinion is a long string of what ifs. They would need France and England to stay out of war in September 1939 and then quickly attack the Soviet during the spring of 1940 while leaving France and England out of it.

 

The only chance they had was if they could eliminate the SU in a quick and short campaign .

 

Declaring war on the US directly after Barbarossa failed didnt exactly help their long term prospects for success.

 

The Balkans campaign didn't pull many railway engineering units off work they were doing in Poland in preparation for both the campaign in Russia and to clear Poland of "undesirables" for the post war Nazi utopia. Most railway engineer units were laying double tracks to the Russian border as well as track elsewhere for the SS.
Starting earlier means these tracks are not finished and this would have put a huge strain on the Wehrmacht's logistics system that didn't exist several months later.

 

Attacking the USSR was a doom sayer, no matter what direction nor time. That is the best overview that can be taken, there is near to no possible way the outcome can be changed.

The spring rains of '41 lasted too long, the Balkans had to be protected as the right flank covering Hitler's only oil producing area in Romania. Then the earlier than normal fall snows and rains coupled with the inability to alter the rail gauges for logistical transport made the whole deal a "no-go". This was a gamble of the "nth degree", if it took longer than Hitler's projected "time scale" for the USSR to collapse and surrender it was doomed.

Of course Hitler was a "gambler", and until this moment in time he had beaten the odds. Reality set it right.

 

No army since the Mongols have ever managed to conquer Russia. Napoleon failed and I think even starting Barbarossa in April would still end in defeat for Hitler.
Hitler constantly interfering and changing the axis of advance historically denied the Germans victory, supply shortages were also a big factor as much as manpower issues were.Assesment is Hitler would have failed anyway. In layman's terms Russia is simply too big attack and occupy especially it's population. All the Russians have to do is to trade space for time and use Scorched Earth tactics as they did against Napoleon in 1812.