How Germany could've won?

I guess the Poland´s solution in the end was what mostly seems the Allied problem, perhaps even the worst end result to Churchill himself. Poland did not get "Freedom" and only false elections, never really help. Naturally the distance is of some kinda problem but still promises are promises.

 

Ok Green Slime, it makes sense.

 

The Allies viewed that they had to show strenght, in order to make Hitler understand that Germany should stop it's expansionism. But you know, Petri, the Allies did not have options after the fall of France. If they could liberate Western Europe and divide Germany with the Soviets, it was already good enough. Anything more would be just profit.

 

Jenisch, remember the Churchill-Stalin eastern Europe division made between the two. Was it put oin a piece of paper or what, but FDR was not part of that team.

 

I suggest checking this link...

http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/YaltaConf

The pertinent part:

" ... the Soviets pledged to allow free elections in all territories liberated from Nazi Germany."

 

There was never a division of territory, just an acknowledgement of "sphere's of influence". Which is something else altogether.

 

Churchill demonstrated Britain’s diminished power by traveling to Moscow in October 1944 to make a sphere-of-influence agreement with Stalin about their degrees of control in postwar eastern and southeastern Europe. At the meeting, Churchill and Stalin made the “percentage’s agreement” describing how much say each of them would have over Romania (90 percent Soviet, 10 percent British); Bulgaria (75 percent Soviet, 25 percent British); Yugoslavia (50 percent each); and Greece (90 percent Britain and the United States). “Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner?” Churchill asked Stalin. “Let us burn the paper,” Churchill proposed. “No,” replied Stalin, who was eager to have a record of Churchill’s readiness to concede Soviet control over so much of Europe. “You keep it.”

 

Yeah sure. Like Sweden's promise to support Finland if Russia attacked prior to the Winter War.

England did what it could with regards to Poland. Remember England was utterly broke by 1945. After the War, there was Coal shortages, Bread rationing (Bread had never been rationed during the war), and unemployment. England could not help Poland, it could barely help itself any more.

 

Stalin was underestimated by FDR and Churchill. Anyway, back to the original subject next, please.

 

The percentages agreement was done to prevent Greece from falling into Communist hands. Notice, also, how Poland is not amongst those listed. This was precisely because Britain had not yet given up hope of a truly liberated Poland.

The Polish Government in Exile did not exactly make things easy either.

There is only so many hopeless causes one person can fight for.

EDIT: Sorry Kai-Petri, your post must have come up while I was still typing (meetings tend to do that).

 

I disagree on other grounds than many of the previous posters (although I agree with most of them as well). For one thing how many of the team were actually German-Jewish? From my research on the topic not that many.

Most of the times I've seen this discussed it hasn't. What it has mean is canceling some of the more onerous parts and not the entire treaty.

 

When did the Germans have Fermi?

 

I meant Germans had an nuclear weapons program and pooled all Axis resources (which was impossible suew to lack of cooperation between Axis ) and know-how including Fermi.

 

I remain to be convinced.

That was not my take from the thread. Certainly North Korea is heavily militerized but they only really represent a threat to South Korea and that maninly because Seol is in range of their guns as is. Then there's the fact that they couldn't have been so heavily militerized without the support of both China and the USSR and to a lesser extent Russia. Currently there military is in very poor shape with the troops more concerned about growing their own food than with training and much of their equipment is apparently inoperable.

No. The lack of ability to build their and equip their own military is also a huge difference. Then there's the fact that while Germany was headed for economic problems North Korea has been living them for decades.

Trade yes but I'm not overlooking it. The problem Germany had was that they had manipulated the currency to the point where no one wanted it at the official rate. This meant that they were reduced to bardering. Unlike the North Koreans they could still produce products that other people wanted but these products were also needed by Germany.

This is problematic too. Germany was already falling behind on it's obligations to the USSR in early 1941. I don't see Stalin continueing to ship things West if he's not getting paided. Particularly if he can use it as a bargaining chip for better deals elsewhere.

Germany needs good relations with Britain and France a lot more than they need good relations with Germany. There is little that Germany has that they can't get elsewhere (all be it at some cost in quality). Germany cannot say the same.

German food production was a bit of a mess. Even if it was reorganized to make it close to optimal efficiency it's not clear Germany could completely support itself, however such a reorganization was probably impossible both politically and economically at least in the 30;s and 40s. Coal isn't going to be that big a trading item. Machine tools were the most desireable German product from what I've read. North Korea can only trade a rather limited amount of arms by the way but they also have a rather large counterfitting industry and are apparently willing to trade their (possibly defective) atomic tech to those willing to pay enough.

 

I'm not with Tooze's The Wages of Destruction book right now, but there's a mention on it about the Germans understanding that even by not invading and keeping the trade with the Soviets, Germany could not survive an attrition air war with the Anglo-Americans.

 

That understanding was quite late in coming. I don't think it even entered consideration during the time period 39-42. Sounds remarkably like an 20/20 hindsight constructed after the fact kind of insight.

 

Page 450 from the book mentioned:

 

The Wages of Destruction, page 124:


With hindsight it is hard to avoid the conclusion that after the defeat of France Germany would have done better to adopt a defensive posture, consolidating its position in Western Europe, attacking British positions in the Mediterranean and forcing the British and the Americans to bomb their way onto the Continent. Given that the Red Army ultimately proved to be the nemesis of the Wehrmacht, this is hard to deny. But what is too often ignored in such counterfactual arguments is the grow-ing awareness in Berlin that, even after the occupation of Western Europe, Germany did not have the upper hand in a long war against Britain and America. The chronic shortage of oil, the debility of the European coal mines and the fragility of the food chain, made it seem unlikely that Germany would in fact be able to 'consolidate' its conquests of 1940 without falling into excessive dependence on the Soviet Union. Even if this were possible, the combined manufacturing capacity of Britain and America vastly exceeded the industrial capacity currently under German control and this, in turn, spelled disaster in a protracted air war. The German army, on the other hand, had proved its ability to achieve decisive victory against what were thought to be the strongest armies in Europe. When we bear this range of factors in mind it is easier to appreciate why a defensive strategy seemed like a second-best in the autumn of 1940. After the defeat of France, the dream of a gigantic land empire seemed within reach, and, given the industrial strength looming on the other side of the Atlantic, there was no time to waste.

 

But I agree with green slime that Tooze might be analyzing the things with hindsight. However, given the way he wrote, I'm not certain if this is the case.

 

Churchill was actually so upset with the Soviet behaviour in Poland in May 1945, that he then asked the Joint Planning Staff to put a plan together to launch an Anglo-Amercian surprise attack on Soviet forces to take place on July 1st, 1945, JPS came back with "Operation Unthinkable."

As you might expect, it pretty much was unthinkable, and deemed, at best, "hazardous".

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/coldwar/G2/cs3/s6_t.htm

So in other words, to hold Stalin to his Yalta promise on Poland, would require the Western Allies to have a total war against the USSR, when the Red Army had an approx. 3:1 advantage, and the war with Japan not concluded. It would get very messy, very quickly.

And there was no indication that the Americans were willing to participate.

The plan also included Polish forces, and rearming 100,000 Germans.