Nagumo manages to launch a coordinated strike against the Americans at Midway

If you'll indulge, I'd like to speculate a bit on what might have happened at Midway if Nagumo had been able, somehow, to get off his strike against the US carriers unmolested. (Which doesn't seem completely impossible. Maybe he never called for the switch to land attack munitions for his second strike. Maybe he waited a little longer for his scouts to report back. Maybe they got their reports right quicker. Maybe the Enterprise group didn't find them and had to return and refuel to try again. Maybe . . . who knows. I suppose that's why this is a what if, right?)

So here's some background for this counter-factual exercise:

With relatively understrength strikes launched from one carrier the Japanese were able to achieve more
decisive results against Yorktown than combined strikes from Zuikaku and Shokaku at Coral Sea.

To wit:

At Coral Sea Shokaku and Zuikaku launched 18 fighters, 33 dive bombers, and 18 torpedo bombers.

The aircraft arrived over target as a cohesive group, and attacked their targets in relatively quick succession, though not simultaneously.

The strong escort succeeded in largely breaking up the US CAP.

Had the attack unfolded in accordance to doctrine, the dive bombers should have attacked first in order to suppress AA fire, thereby improving following attacks, but the opposite occurred, with the torpedo planes striking first.

Results against Yorktown were particularly poor, as the smaller more nimble carrier was able to completely evade the torpedo attack.

Broken down, the attacks look like this:

Yorktown attack: 4 torpedo bombers, 14 dive bombers. 1 bomb hit. No torpedoes. Near misses caused some additional minor damage.
Lexington attack: 14 torpedo bombers, 19 dive bombers. 2 bomb hits. 2 torpedoes. (Confirmed hits only. Additional hits or near misses caused additional minor damage.)

At Midway, two separate strikes from Hiryu looked like this:

1st attack: 4 fighters, 18 dive bombers. 3 bomb hits. (2 additional fighters had been damaged by an encounter with straggling SBDs and forced to return prematurely.)
2nd attack: 6 fighters, 10 torpedo bombers. 2 torpedo hits.

Even though the Hiryu attacks were completely separate, much smaller, and encountered much stiffer CAP resistance they scored virtually the same results. (Albeit with much worse losses to defending CAP.)
Which demonstrates the difference between Nagumo's "A" team and Inoue's "B" team. (Hey, they were learning. For the green bunch they did okay.)

And here's what I think might have happened.

Had Nagumo not given his order to rearm his torpedo planes with land attack bombs he could conceivably have launched a full strike. (Though doing so would have required him to delay recovering his initial strike.) Such a strike would conceivably have involved roughly 36 dive bombers, 36 torpedo bombers, and a significant fighter escort. (Between 18 and 36 zeros, depending on what was available given CAP actions.)

Simply extrapolating upward that distributes six bomb hits and six torpedo hits between the three US carriers. (Or they all plug Yorktown and she goes down like a rock.) But in reality, it seems likely to me that if the strike had been coordinated and properly escorted (CAP? What CAP?) they'd have done much better. (Particularly the dive bombers, which were badly chewed up. Those three bomb hits came from only seven attack runs. Yowza!) So I would tend to guess that in reality they'd have enjoyed hit rates 50% to 100% better. (Lets say 12 bombs.) Which means that at least 2 and possibly all three US CVs will come away looking a bit holier than the day before. More saintly. Martyrdom is supposed to be good for a soul that way, though it's obviously not so great for a body.

Of course, this full strike doesn't really mean Nagumo won't get capped by the American's he's beating up on. It honestly seems quite likely everyone is going to come home and find their flight decks somewhat less useful. But hey, Nagumo might do a little better with the combustibles from his hangers dropping down over TF-16 and 17. Which means he should still get that singleton follow up. Suddenly this looks much more like an even trade. Or maybe even one in his favor.

Of course it was still pretty ludicrous for him to be there at all with four flight decks, when he should really have been doing something more productive a little later in the summer with six. But you can't really blame him for the rotten ops plan combined fleet passed down. Just for his indecision in the face of inconclusive sighting reports and bad initial intel. So I'll stop my armchair admiraling there. But it does seem interesting. And the comparison between the results of IJN's CarDiv 2 and CarDiv 5 is pretty instructive. Those Kido Butai kids knew what they were about. Shame they were fighting for the wrong side.

Right, so I've painted a big fat tomato on my nice white shirt. Let the dive bombing from the opposing viewpoints begin.

(But lets try to keep the fuel lines charged with CO2 so the ensuing flames don't get out of hand and everything stays more polite and funny than an actual shooting match. Seeing as this is an exercise and not the real McCoy.)

 

An interesting thought. I believe it may not change things too much though. Nagumo didn't get word of the American task force until 0800 and word of the presence of a carrier until 0830(?). Wouldn't this place the Japanese in a position where they would be in the middle of launching when VT-8 arrives? Of course there will still be time to finish launching before the next torpedo group arrives, I wonder how many spotted planes would be lost to defensive maneuvers had the strike not gotten off completely.


The combination of returning aircraft, launching aircraft, and attacking American aircraft could negate any advantage of a full strike. In the end I would guess things turn out about the way they did, just with a different way of getting there.


Of course my times could also be off and throw my whole post into the gutter.

 

I think Nagumo would have an overwhelming attack on the Yorktown that would sink it. But as events unfold, the discovery of the Enterprise and Hornet would occur after the Yorktown attack would be under way.

A second strike made up of reserves would then sink or damage the Hornet or Enterprise.

The poor showing by the USN in coordinating an attack on IJN carriers would dictate that only one carrier would be hammered.

End of the day; IJN with three carriers, USN with one. IJN would have moderate aircrew and airframe losses and the US losing a lot of airframes but few crews.

 

It's been a while since I read it but as I recall Shattered Sword made a point of the Japanese not really having an interval to launch a well coordinated attack. I also don't see the Japanese attack hitting until after the US one is in the air. That means Yorktown may be lost to the first raid but the Japanese have three carriers taken out in return which makes it one to two. Follow ups raids may reduce it to to 0 to 1.

 

Shattered Sword also mentions the role of the humble ordnance carts, which ensured that no more than 1/3 of Akagi's and Kaga's attack planes could have started switching from torpedos to bombs before the sighting report was received. At that moment Nagumo had available 28 B5Ns and 34 D3As, just over twice the force that crippled Yorktown. The constant maneuvering to avoid American air attacks and the need to land and replenish CAP fighters made it difficult to spot and launch a strike, but perhaps not impossible if Nagumo had put his foot down and demanded that they do it.

The problem as I see it is that the Japanese did not realize that they were the ones in trouble who needed to make a maximum effort to stave off disaster. Of course they were concerned about the situation; they were under attack, Midway needed to be hit again, and they had just unexpectdly detected American ships. On the other hand, they were shredding the attacking air groups, taking no damage themselves, they had hit the American base once, before too long they would be launching a strike against the American task force, and then they would have Tomonaga's planes for a follow-on strike on whatever needed it. It seemed that in a few hours the situation would get better without any extraordinary measures.

Had Nagumo launched his strike, it would have comprised two units each of dive bombers and torpedo planes, able to make coordinated strikes on two carriers as they did at Coral Sea. It appears that the initial sighting was of Task Force 16, which was operating in two formations a few miles apart, as TF17 had on May 8. Even if they only sighted one US carrier at first, the flight leaders might realize they had more than enough hitting power and didn't all need to pile on. So with the usual caveats, my guess is that they would inflict disabling damage on two carriers, probably including torpedo hits.

None of this would spare the Japanese from attack; the American carrier planes were already on their way. The one break Nagumo might get is on his own flagship. Akagi, one of the largest carriers in the world, was done in by a single hit which ignited fires among her parked B5Ns, which would be airborne in this scenario. She would still be disabled for flight operations (the hit dropped her midships elevator to the bottom of its well, and a near miss disabled her steering) but she might be spared a fatal conflagration.

So the situation at noon might be one-on-one, and historically Hiryu got off her next attack - Tomonaga's rearmed torpedo planes - before the Americans launched their afternoon strike. If that went off as it did, Nagumo's resolve in the morning might give him a clean sweep by day's end, although Kaga and Soryu would be no more saveable than they were in real life.

 

i still think it was a mistake to use nagumo's carriers as the main striking force. it should have been kondo striking midway in a mad dash by fast surface units to bombard the attol. he would have fast light carriers to provide cover. nagumo would stay with yamamoto, waiting for the carriers to be sighted.

this way, it would have been kondo who sustained heavy losses (and probably fail to take midway) but nagumo's carriers would be enjoying a battle de lux, much the same way halsey's 3rd fleet carriers had at leyte gulf, and destroyed fletcher and spruance.

 

Halsey's fleet at Leyte operated the same way as Nagumo at Midway - arrived ahead of the invasion force, made a series of attacks to suppress land-based air power, and then stood by to engage the enemy naval forces which were expected to respond. Conversely the Japanese were in the position they hoped to put us in at Midway - the position we would have been in except for codebreaking - sortieing (sp?) only after the initial attack had been made.

 

halsey was so close to the 7th fleet operating area that it was basically one big force covering several avenues of approach. dashing away towards a sighted enemy was risky. midway was a mid-ocean fight so it makes better sense to hold back until you have a clear sighting of the enemy.

 

The switch from torpedoes to bombs was IMO inevitable under the circumstances. Midway turned out to be tougher than expected and the Japanese assumed they were having some element of surprise, meaning the US carriers would not be there yet. What he should have done was to launch everything the minute he got the report of US carriers.

Best case outcome: The US dive bombers hit the Japanese carriers after the anti-ship mission has departed and before the planes returning from Midway get much in terms of rearming. In this case the situation would be similar to Coral Sea. The bombs hit empty hangars. The carriers are mission killed but w/o major fires they can still make an escape like Zuikaku, who took three 1,000lb bombs and suffered no hull or machinery damage.

The Japanese strike would do similar damage to the US carriers. The fight decks and hangars suffer various degrees of damage but nothing fatal. The bomb their dive-bombers carried were rather light anyway and the 242 kilo 'land bombs' had quick fuses. Fine for SEAD but not for sinking ships.

If the Japanese had somehow managed to launch the coordinated strike you propose, they could have sunk more than one carrier but IMO not with bombs. The bombs would be fine for slowing a carrier down but you need underwater damage to sink one or start a really big fire. The latter was difficult aft the lessons from Coral Sea, the former requires torpedoes.

 

I would say that the order to switch from torpedos to bombs was understandable, but they were physically unable to start on more than 1/3 of the carrier attack planes before the initial sighting report of American ships about 15 minutes later; so if Nagumo had made a prompt decision to launch an anti-ship strike, it could have included both dive bombers and torpedo planes. I'd agree that bombs alone were unlikely to inflict fatal damage; Yorktown class carriers at Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz were able to continue or resume flight operations shortly after bomb hits.

Small point, it was Shokaku which was hit both at Coral Sea and Santa Cruz, suffering non-fatal flight deck damage.

 

From what I recall of Shattered Sword that's pretty much what he was trying to do.

 

Yes and no.......Nagumo and his subordinates were trying to get a strike together, but they accepted a lot of delays, each of which no doubt seemed reasonable at the moment, but the net result was to fatally delay their launch and keep the armed planes aboard the carriers. I can't help thinking, suppose Nagumo had been a Halsey, a Tamaguchi, a nautical Patton who would just tell his people "We need to do this now, make it happen!" Instead of just telling Akagi and Kaga to stop switching armament on their B5Ns, tell all four carriers to stand by for a launch order, including preparing at least one shotai (three) fighters each to accompany their attack force. I wouldn't quite say "Launch this instant", that would really create chaos, but at the next lull in the action I would give the order to spot and launch. This would allow a few minutes for launching or rearming CAP fighters, but then they would have to stick it out until the strike got off. Similarly, if the strike couldn't get off before Tomonaga's planes returned from Midway, they would have to wait, and maybe a few (possibly including Tomonaga) would have to ditch alongside screening ships which were present and available. Not sure exactly how long the Japanese took to spot aircraft on the flight deck, but once they did, their earlier launch of 108 planes was accomplished in only seven minutes, so I'm hesitant to say it was impossible to squeeze it in.

 

All this talk about the order to "switch back" to torpedoes...what if the torpedoes were NEVER switched in the first place? The initial plan on the approach to Midway was to retain a ready strike force of torpedo bombers "just in case". The fatal clincher was that they "wiped their brow" too soon, ASSUMING that there was no naval threat in the area worth retaining their torpedoes, and switching out for bombs to help out against land targets. So sticking to the original plan would at least put a small torpedo-armed strike force available.

It's hard to say if Task Force 16 (Hornet and Enterprise) would have been attacked, but since Yorktown had been spotted, probably she would have been swamped on the first try, rather than after multiple tries. Still, that would only be ONE US carrier lost, and no change to the force equation (Yorktown didn't get off any strikes after being hit the first time, and sank AFTER the battle.)

I can't rule out similar damage to the Japanese carriers, either. After all, despite maybe NOT having lots of planes in the hangars as extra combustibles, they were HASTILY busy with fuel and ordnance, there still might be ordnance lying around, fuel hoses strung about, etc. that could start fatal fires. Lack of pumps, no CO2 in the fuel lines, lack of hangar-deck ventilation, and other damage-control measures still make the Japanese carriers more "combustible" for X amount of damage than US carriers, methinks. If Akagi is merely "mission-killed" but afloat, it is still out of the equation, leaving Hiryu the only viable carrier left.

I am NOT one of those who think that the US was just DA__ED LUCKY to have pulled off a victory. I think a US triumph at Midway was a reasonable outcome (that is, the takeover of Midway Island rebuffed, and heavy damage inflicted to the Japanese carrier fleet), but History gave us a DECISIVE triumph instead.

 

Although Yorktown was the carrier attacked, it appears that the initial sighting five hours earlier was of Task Force 16. This is shown in a track chart in Shattered Sword, and it's reasonably consistent with the sighting reports. The Americans were in three formations, each comprising a carrier with 7-8 escorts in a circular screen, two of which, Hornet and Enterprise in TF16, were operating in close proximity. P/O Amari's reports - five cruisers and five destroyers, then two more cruisers and "what appears to be a carrier" - while inaccurate, make it clear that he was seeing more than just Yorktown and escorts.

Of course anything can happen. Even if Nagumo could launch a strike promptly, over the next couple of hours, air groups and ships would be moving in various directions. The Japanese strike force might come across TF17 first, or they might all pile on to the first target they sighted. On the other hand, they would have enough aircraft to launch combined dive bomber and torpedo assaults on two carriers, Hornet and Enterprise were operating within sight of each other, the Japanese knew we had employed two carriers at Coral Sea; and their planes had the fuel endurance to search for additional targets.

 

The main problem is with hindsight that the planes returning from Midway would have had to ditch. In order to launch the strike the returning planes would have had to wait and I believe that means that they would be recovering when the Midway strike hits and then the torpedo bombers would be arriving after that.

 

It's been a while since I read Shattered Sword but I think they made a case for him being kept off balance by all the incoming air raids. It's not clear that they had a time interval in there to get a multi deck launch off.

 

Quick check.

0705 to 0725: B-26 and TBF attack

0753 to 0815: Henderson and Sweeney's DB attack

around 0800: USS Nautilus attacks

0815 to 0840: B-17s and Norris' DB attack

0840 to 0920: planes that had attacked Midway land

0920 to 0937: VT-8 attacks

0940 to 1000: VT-6 attacks

1020 to 1030: USN DB torch three out of four CV

Now Nagumo got a report from Tone's plane around 0740 that did explicitly mention US carriers. At that time he had 30 TB and 34 DB ready for TO. At 0753 the incoming DB were spotted, bombs started falling around 0808. That gives the four CV app. 20 minutes to get 64 bombers and some escorting fighters into the air.