When did Germany lose the war?

LJAd is correct, I don't see Britain quitting the war without LL.
What LL supplies do you see as critical in '41-'42?

Yes, and some have the opinion that it couldn't have been any earlier - doesn't make it fact

 

Since the Isles could "feed and clothe" themselves without import (bland but sufficient diet, linen and wool), the only things the Brits truly needed (and mostly received) in the early years were raw materials for their industry like pig iron, steel plate, aluminum ingots, POL, and machine tools. The idea that the Isles could be "starved out" is hooey, the only thing a food and fiber exporting nation could be "starved of" is raw material for its industry. It had internal coal sources for powering its industry, but lacked some of the raw material to feed same.

 

Its not about opinion but facts only. Weather would not permit an early Barbarossa (again Weather is a measurable fact not opinion)

There is a reason why all major German offensive happened in june or later and not earlier in east..

 

Um, no. The weather in April-May was exactly what is was, and is in the historical record. Whether that would preclude an invasion or just cause some difficulties is a matter for interpretation or debate.

Many people have claimed that it couldn't be done, but I've yet to see anyone post any actual data.

I've also seen many people claim that "the weather" in Russia (Or USSR) prevented it, however there is no one "weather" on the Soviet western border, the weather patterns (and thaw) are quite different in Odessa, Lvov, Minsk and Lithuania.

Yes, the main reason is that they needed to finish up in Greece/Crete and transfer assets back up to the Soviet border.
Doesn't mean that they couldn't have done it earlier, had the situation been different.

have you ever been in Poland/Ukraine in April/May/June? Have you driven the roads?

 

Britain lacked? Yes. Empire lacked? No.
The need for steel & iron ore imports has been much exaggerated in some estimates.

There is an excellent and well researched report on the WWII UK supply situation, complete with Ministry figures for production, imports & consumption for most commodities.

http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/British Military Production in WWII .pdf

During 1941-1943 the UK imported some 2.1 million tons of steel, and about 38.3 million tons domestic production. The UK also recovered some 4 million tons of scrap steel in WWII, more than the total amount imported.

View attachment 14702

View attachment 14703

 

Bluntly putting, An early invasion was simply not possible because of spring thaw. flooded rivers simply won't allow any extensive military operations of any scale, particularly mobile panzer operations, in the western SU.

German offensive both in 42 and 43 happened after the thaw only and not during..

And according to you by what time did those assets were ready for Barbarossa??

 

Anzac wrote:

LJAd wrote:

LJAd, my response was directed at ANZAC's statement that prior to Normandy (June '44), the U.S.'s main contribution was strategic bombing and helping Britain in the Battle of the Atlantic. I never directed my comments to the specific time frame of 1941. I still maintain that Lend-lease was a critical factor in the British and Soviet Union's ability to prosecute the war against Germany.

 

In 1941,Britain+the Commonwealth received some 1 billion $ of LL goods,of which 290 million $ of food .2 points:1)although 1 billion is impressive,it's only 3 % of the total LL that Britain received 2)Why did Britain receive that much of food ? Was the food situation that bad ?Or,maybe it was easier for the US to supply food than weapons,etc ..,food being available in stocks,and the farmers lobby would be pleased .
By LL,Britain received in 1941 86 million $ of ammunition,the Commonwealth and the other war theatres some 100 million$,this was 1% and 1.5 % of the total for the whole war .
While the stocks of raw materials were increasing,from 13.1 million ton at the beginning of the war to 14.7 million ton in december 1941,for food and animal feeding stuff,there was a problem.
Stocks were :
september 1939 :10.5 million ton
january 1940:7.5 million ton
june 1940:5.5 million ton
january 1941:10.7million
june 1941:5.2 million
december 1941:13.4 million
On the other hand,it was not so that there was ever a danger for Britains food situation
Source:Hyper War:British war economy :statistical summary

 

"The whole problem was Hitler's incompetence" :that's the biggest myth of WWII :although Hitler was making mistakes,there is NO (I repeat NO) exemple of a mistake of Hitler that was preventing the Germans to win /that was causing the German defeat .
I repeat :NO exemple .

 

I was only speaking of the Isles themselves, not the Empire, nor the amount of raw iron/steel exclusively. The home islands couldn't be "starved" out in the normal sense of the word, only starved of some supplies and alloys for their internal industry.

 

Don't hold me to this precisely, but it is my believe that the "food-stuffs" supplied to the UK through LL was food-stuffs which they couldn't obtain as easily internally as we (America) could send them. Beef from Argentina for example, it literally took an act of Congress to allow our government to purchase Argentine beef, package it in America, and send it in the LL agreement as lend-lease goods, I believe the same held for some fruits and spices.

 

Well, since you repeated it twice I guess there is no point in discussing it.

 

As you have given no proofs for your claims that" his meddling cost them throughout the war,starting with Dunkirk and moving forward",a discussion would be superfluous.But ,about Dunkirk
a)the original halt order was given by von Rundstedt
b) there never has been a proof that the Germans could capture the 198000 men of the BEF at Dunkirk
c) there never has been a proof that,if B was possible,Britain would give up .
The whole Dunkirk story is a myth.
Btw :you statement that"the whole point of Barbarossa was to get to Moscow before the winter" is wrong .the whole point of Barbarossa was to destroy as quick as possible (10 weeks) the Red Army,as much as possible at the border,this would (in the opinion of the Germans) result in the collaps of the Soviet state,and the Germans could then advance without bitter fighting (only doing the mop-up of the Red Army)to the A-A line (Archangelsk-Astrachan),before the winter .This line is situated 400 km east of Moscow .
The defeat of the Red Army would result in the fall of Moscow,NOT the opposite :if the Germans still had to fight in the autumn, to capture Leningrad and Moscow,they had lost the war .

 

LL was a critical factor in the ability to prosecute the war? Sure, I'd agree with that.

Well according to the data there wasn't any material that the UK could be starved of without Lend Lease, the real critical factor was the loss of shipping following drumbeat.

 

On "British War Econmy" (Chapter 13) I have founf the following figures,which(IMHO) are indicating the relative low importance of LL for Britain in 1941:
Munition Supplies of the British Empire
1939 +1940 :9,2 billion $,of which purchases in the US (Cash and Carry) :5.6 %=0,52 billion $
1941:13 billion $urchases in the US 9.1%=1.18 billion;LL:2.4%=0.31 billion $
1942:19.9 billionurchases in the US:4.7%=0,94 billion;LL:12.2%=2.4 billion
1943:24.8 billionurchases in the US:2.4 %=0.56 billion;LL:24.5%=6.1 billion
1944:24.7 billion;purchases in the US:1.5%=0.37 billion;LL:27.5%=6.8 billion
1945:9.3 billionurchases in the US:1.2%=1.1 billion;LL21 %=1.95 billion
Total :100 billion $urchases in the US :3.7 %;LL:17.3 %
1) till 1943:the Cash and Carry amounts were equal to the LL amounts:both some 2.7 billion
2)the Cash and Carry purchases continued to the end of the war
3)LL started slowly(because in 1941,US was still at peace,with a limited arms industry),but,from 1943 on,it became more and more important .
Also from the British War Economy(proving point 3):in 1941,Britain got
2300 aircraft from Cash and Carry and 100 from LL
8000 trucks from C and C and 5000 from LL
165 tanks from C and C and 786 from LL(this is the exception,but the figures are very low)
1 million ton of food from LL,but,this was only 1/15(=6.66 %) of all the food that arrived in Britain in 1941.
As "the British War Economy" was writing :the help LL gave in the battles of 1941,was trivial.
My intention is NOT to denigrate the US help in WWII,but to relativate the importance of LL.

 

Btwlease:is there any way to avoid undesirable smilies? It is making me crazy .

 

Yes - leave spaces and be careful using the : sign.
If you put a colon befor please it will default to the smile, like this lease
Leave a space between : and please, it won't happen.

 

Do you know what IMO means? It means "in my opinion".

Obviously I have no proof what would have happened if things were done differently, and guess what? Niether do you. All we can do with conjecture is offer our opinions and discuss them. That is what this is, by the way: a discussion board.

I don't believe that is completely accurate. Von Rundstedt and Kluge suggested a momentary halt to consolodate because of their fear of an allied breakout, but it was Hitler who issued the halt order at 1231 pm on 24 May. The order was as follows:
At the Führer's orders the attack to the east of Arras with VIII and II Corps, in co-operation with the left wing of Army Group B, is to be continued towards the northwest. On the other hand, forces advancing to the northwest of Arras are not to go beyond the general line Lens-Béthune-Aire-St Omer-Gravelines (Canal Line). On the west wing, all mobile units are to close up and let the enemy throw himself against the above-mentioned favourable defensive line.
The field commanders felt differently, Halder wrote:

During the following days (after the halt order) it became known that Hitler's decision was mainly influenced by Goering. To the dictator the rapid movement of the Army, whose risks and prospects of success he did not understand because of his lack of military schooling, became almost sinister. He was constantly oppressed by a feeling of anxiety that a reversal loomed.

This from the same Fuhrer that had, prior to the attack in western Europe, lambasted his Generals for "constantly obstructing his boldness and enterprise".

During the Dunkirk evacuation Halder wrote:

Brauchitsch (Commander in Chief) is angry. The pocket would have been closed at the coast if only our amour had not been held back. The bad weather has grounded the Luftwaffe and we must now stand and watch countless thousands of the enemy get away to England right under our noses.

Guderianlater wrote:

The operation would have been completed very much more quickly if Supreme Headquarters had not kept ordering XIX Army Corps to stop and thus hindered its rapid and successful advance. What the future course of the war would have been if we had succeeded at that time in taking the British Expeditionary Force prisoner at Dunkirk, it is now impossible to guess. Unfortunately the opportunity was wasted owing to Hitler's nervousness. The reason he subsequently gave for holding back my corps – that the ground in Flanders with its many ditches and canals was not suited to tanks – was a poor one.

 

1)Never believe what Guderian was writing afterwards,the same for Halder (there are serious doubts about Halder's diaries:that he" corrected" them after the war
2)The German historian Jacobson writes the following in "Dunkirchen (1958)"(P 95 and 203):Hitler thus approved,what Rundstedt proposed
3)The same Rundstedt(aided by Blumentritt) declared after the war :"The blame for this rests only on Hitler and not on my."This is only a lie,to put the blame on Hitler .
4)As there are no informations on the German strength at Dunkirk,also not on the British strength,any claim that the Germans were on the point of capturing the British,are unproved and unfounded :we don't know how many German tanks were still operational,after a long march,starting on the German border on 10 may,the same about the infantry and artillery.And,about the British:it is a total mystery.
5)Jodl wrote the following in his diary on 25 may:Fuhrer ....leaves decision to AGA.
War diary of AGA(on 25 may):Hitler"expressly left the manner of handling the fighting by the 4th Army to von Rundstedt"
Source :the Blitzkrieglegend (K.H.Frieser)
Thus A:who gave the initial order:it was Rundstedt
B:could the Germans capture Dunkirk,without the Haltorder:IMHO :not ,because,they could not when the Haltorder was cancelled
C:would Britain have given up if Dunkirk was captured on 24 may :there is no indication for this claim .
Conclusion :the whole story of the"Miracle of Dunkirk" only is a myth.

 

Hi USMCPrice!

Clarke thinks lend lease really kicked in about '43, when the worst for the Red Army was over, & Glantz goes further saying that even if the SU didn't recieve any LL at all, that the Soviets would still win, but take up to 18 months longer.

Others like Keegan think it was vital in the Soviets continuing the war.

So it's pretty hard to get a handle on it one way or the other.

There should be a long thread about it on here somewhere, see if I can dig it out.

Here's a heads up for you on Wiki on the unmitigated mess Hitler made of operation Blue....

Case Blue - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

If you don't like Wiki, here's some back up from 'Hitler: The Pathology of Evil By George Victor' page 209/10....

Hitler: The Pathology of Evil - George Victor - Google Books

It says in part.......What made Stalingrad so important to sacrifice 6th army? The initial plan drawn up for the '42 campaign, drawn up by the high command at Hitlers direction, gave first priority to invading the caucuses in the extreme South.it included advances in the Stalingrad area to protect the northern flank of armies in the caucuses, capture of Stalingrad was not included. Hitler ordered its capture later, when the 6th army was meeting little resistance, at first, was advancing rapidly near Stalingrad. He told Paulis that Stalingrad was necessary to aquire the caucuses with its oil supply, with out its oil he could not continue the war. It was true that Hitler anticipated running low on oil, but Stalingrad was UNNECESSARY for capturing & holding the caucuses. The caucuses armies flanks could be be protected by maintaining forces near Stalingrad, not necessarily in the city.........

Makes a good read.


And in 'The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean By Thomas B. Buell'

The Second World War: Europe and the ... - Thomas B. Buell, John N. Bradley, Thomas E. Griess, Jack W. Dice, John H. Bradley - Google Books

Hitlers directive 41 Operation blue was continually changed by him & Beull calls it 'jumbled, unclear & embarrassingly amateurish' and Hitler 'increasingly interfered with operations down to corps level.'

Buell says after sending Hoth down South to assist Kleist on the Don, [which Kleist didn't need because of feeble Soviet opposition] Hitler missed the opportunity to take Stalingrad before the Russians were ready if he wanted to. Hoth is then called back to Stalingrad & he & 6th army are given new orders in directive 45 to go & take the city.

Hoth at that stage probably didn't know if he was coming or going.

Historian Col Eddy Bauer says that Hitlers repeated departure from his original plan by intervening personally, sometimes in fits of his well known megalomania, and other times in fits of weakness, as a result of alternating states of euphoria and depression possibly brought on by Morells drugs.

When Stalingrad seemed on the verge of falling, Hitler addressed the party faithful in Munich...'I wished to get to the Volga at a certain time, it happened to be named after Stalin himself I wanted to take it and let me tell you, for we are modest, we have it!' Not quite.

The Werhmacht's chance of defeating the SU was slim, especially after '41, but being lead around by the nose by Hitler made defeat virtually certain.

Oh, I take Bock, Guderian & Hoths word that they said they could move on Moscow in August [& also that Guderian promised Hitler that they would take it,] as 100% truth.
But weather they could make good on their promises is something that no historian or armchair General like you or me are ever going to find out.

And what makes you refer to something Iv'e never stated ?If you can show where I said that the capture of Moscow 'will' result in Soviet Capitulation i'd be much obliged not to mention bloody surprised, over to you.

After Vyazma/Bryansk where the Red army lost over 650,000 men in perfect tank weather, Koniev reported to Stavka 'we have no way of stopping the German mobile forces, we haven't enough AA or anti tank guns' Zhukov reported 'we wont be able to stop a determined attack on Moscow, he had about 90,000 men & 150 tanks left.

File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-289-1091-26, Russland, Pferdegespann im Schlamm.jpg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-140-1220-17A, Russland-Mitte, PKW im Schlamm.jpg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1981-149-34A, Russland, Herausziehen eines Autos.jpg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Do you think the above 'may' have thrown a bit of a spanner in the works?

Correct, & any sort of chance they 'may' or 'may not' have had of doing that went out the window the moment Hitler sent Guderian on his 500 mile round trip to Kiev & back.

I refer you back to Buell's book, The Second World War: Europe and the ... - Thomas B. Buell, John N. Bradley, Thomas E. Griess, Jack W. Dice, John H. Bradley - Google Books he states that despite the weather, Barbarossa could have started earlier if it was urgent, but as Hitler thought the campaign would be over before the bad weather set in, it wasn't considered to be important.

Not according to the commanders & men on the spot, & as for Guderian, well that's been discussed already with Guderian moving over 500 miles to Kiev & back to Bryansk taking out the best part of one million men & six armies, when Moscow was a little over 200 miles in the first place.