How would you have avoided the attack on Pearl Harbor?

I suppose it's a whole 'nother subject of great length/interest, but if Pearl wasn't a good target (due to a "shell-game" of ship-shuffling and intermittent deployment) might the Japanese SKIP attacking the US outright (including the Philippines) and just go for Brit/Dutch holdings? Strategically this *MIGHT* yet again delay a US response until "too late" to interfere.

Personally I think this would have been "smarter"--the Japanese would have their carrier fleet to assist with their Southern Advance, and they could still be ready to stomp the US Navy advance across the Pacific for a "climactic battle" as was envisioned long before the Pearl Harbor strike was dreamed up. Unfortunately or not, the Japanese did NOT really understand democracy and the inability of FDR to actually commit his nation to war (Congress had to do that). There was no real doubt that if American lands were attacked, that was a causus belli regardless of where. The Japanese had to jump in with both feet against the Americans if there was going to be a conflict with them anyway. AVOIDING direct conflict with America could have bought the Japanese some time (though I also think a clash was inevitable). I believe that Japan considered it a given that the Americans would go to war anyway once Japan started moving South, so wanted to hit American naval assets at the outset.

 

The Military Channel has an entire episode dedicated to this "What If" scenario today on TV.
See the Myths of Pearl Harbour Documentary.

Fun stuff. They went right to the National Records office and looked up what the exact plans were that the USA had in place for an unexpected attack on Pearl.
... and the "What If" the USA had followed its own military protocols. Fun stuff. I am really enjoying this show as I speak... = bye!

 

the Gallups show that we were heading for a dec. within six months tops.

That is, if nothing changed, people who didn't want to go to war in December 1941 would demand it by May 1942?

What the polls show is an acceptance by a majority of Americans that we would probably be in the war at some point and that that was better than allowing German or Japanese aggression to go unchecked, but there was little willingness for us to take the first step. It would still take some act by the Axis powers, and not just any act; there wasn't even a cry for war when a U-boat sank the Reuben James and killed 115 American sailors.

A Japanese attack on British and Dutch colonies in the Far East might do the trick, especially since we had enlisted their participation in the oil embargo. Our leadership appreciated that that would likely lead to a Japanese attack, but I wonder how many of the American people had internalized that idea? Did the administration or the news media publicize the embargo as something that would almost certainly mean war? Or would Roosevelt be explaining on December 8 that our action back in August had caused the Japanese to attack someone else, and it was now our responsibility to intervene? It's a valid argument, but hardly as compelling as the "day of infamy".

 

Delay more than a few months and the Philipines become much more of a problem. If enough equipment makes it to fully equip the Philipine army and there's time to train them Japan has problems. Look where the shipping lanes run from the Dutch East Indies to Japan. Mac also did a lot better when he wasn't the one being surprised.

 

Originally Posted by CTBurke
I suppose it's a whole 'nother subject of great length/interest, but if Pearl wasn't a good target (due to a "shell-game" of ship-shuffling and intermittent deployment) might the Japanese SKIP attacking the US outright (including the Philippines) and just go for Brit/Dutch holdings? Strategically this *MIGHT* yet again delay a US response until "too late" to interfere. ....

I'll invite CT to correct me, but I don't think the suggestion was for the Japanese to delay their action, rather that in December 1941 they would attack only the Dutch and British colonies which they were really after. This would put Roosevelt in the position of explaining why we should step in, for which he could make a case, but it's nothing like having the Japanese attack us directly.

Their offensive would likely have gone more quickly with the additonal forces historically used in the Philippines and the carrier force. One likely impact would be a quicker move into the eastern East Indies - Manado, Kendari, Ambon, etc. - which would leave the Philippines isolated. MacArthur wouldn't get any more reinforcements, and we would contemplate intervention knowing that our action would doom our troops and civilians in the Philippines.​

 

I don't think anyone disputes that it would quite possibly have been a trigger for a declaration of war or for that matter that we might have gotten into the European war even without the events of December 7-11. What I, and I think some others here, find perplexing is the presumption of absolute certainty.

If we and Japan were not at war, we would be legally entitled to send ships with whatever cargos we wished to the Philippines, and asserting that right would be one way for FDR to put the onus of starting hostilities on the Japanese. Of course it would likely mean sacrificing the ships concerned, followed by the Philippines and their garrison and people. And as CT noted, it would give the Japanese more time to complete their conquest of the Far East before they had to worry about engaging the Americans also.

Ironically our Asiatic Fleet was in the process of "escaping" to the East Indies on Dec 8 - in our scenario, jumping from a non-frying pan into the fire. They might easily become involved in an incident which could lead to war; after all the American people wouldn't tolerate the sinking of a sister ship of the Reuben James........

 

Which would delay to some extent thier war with the US. Even if it's a month or two it could be significant. The US had at least one ship load of equipment on the way to the Phillipines when the war started. Wait a month and it's distributed to the Philipine army and they have at least some basic training with it. Furthermore if the US declares war how soon can the Japanese do anything about the Philipines? As for getting a declaration of war I believe the US had already offered the use of US port facilities to the British and Dutch in case of war. How long would the Japanese let say British subs operate out of the Philipines before they attacked them in port? At that point you have a Japanese attack on a US facility which may involve civilians getting killed. Plenty of grounds to get a declaration of war given that the US populace is already willing to accept it.​

 

I believe the US had already offered the use of US port facilities to the British and Dutch in case of war

Indeed we did, although I haven't seen if or how the British or Dutch responded to this offer of bases on the wrong side of hundreds of miles of Japanese-controlled waters, with no stockpiles of ammunition, spare parts, etc. that they could use. As you say it would likely provoke a Japanese response. This might be one of the better conspiracy theories - it's of little practical value and would probably mean the sacrifice of the ships concerned, but it might be a device to drag the US into the war.

 

My understanding is that one of the problems that British subs had in the Pacfic was a rather limited range. If they sail from say Australia to the Philipines and refuel there they are almost astride the Japanese supplie routes form the East Indies. They can also return their for refueling and repair and possibly build up some small stocks of supplies and such.

I think it was made to make it clear to the British and Dutch that we would support them in a confrontation with the Japanese. I don't know how widely publised it was. If it was or if Japanese agents were allowed to see it then it could also have been aimed at convincing the Japanese that the allies were indeed allies. It's an area I haven't delved into vary deeply.

 

Indeed, it would have been interesting to see what they did.

You are probably right about Oregon & Illinois, they were too short, and would involve too much work, better to prepare a couple of quasi-fake CV's, it's impossible to tell how functional they are from a distance.


However there are some things that could be done to minimise damage.
The US had been analyzing battle damage reports provided by the British, one thing that should have been realized by 1941, the BB's were almost immune to any bomb less than 1000 lb. (Excepting the extremly unlucky hit on the Arizona) but were very vulnerable to torpedoes. The British never lost a BB to bombs in WWII, but had several BB's either sunk or crippled by torps.

Now, consider the results of the attack: Other than the unfortunate Arizona, the 3 remaining inboard (or drydocked) BB's that were only hit by bombs (Tenn, MD, Penn) were all repaired within a couple of months.
The outboard BB's that didn't get under way (Calif, WV, Okla, Utah) were all torpedoed, they either needed 2+ years to repair (CA & WV) or else were written off (OK & UT)

So a reasonably prudent commander (obviously not Kimmel ) could take measures to make sure that the active BB's didn't sit outboard.
As I mentioned earlier, the Utah & Wyoming could be placed outboard to protect the other BB's on the inboard side. (And no reason that Wyoming couldn't continue in the gunnery training role while posted to Pearl)

The USN could also place one of the least valuable cruisers or DD's in the outbound slot, to ensure that the inboard BB didn't get torpedoed.
This would also apply to a sneak attack by an IJN sub instead of a TB.

View attachment 15713

 

"Nix" to Nets: Torpedo nets were discussed as protection for Pearl Harbor battleships, but rejected by Kimmel as encumbering the speedy deployment of the battleships if they needed to get underway in a hurry. Also, though the "depth" issue didn't deter thinking of a torpedo attack, the "arming length" of open water did. As I understand, it was thought that there wasn't enough water/time in the harbor to ARM a torpedo. Notice that the torpedo attacks came from the angle of greatest water width (one of the reasons, I think, that more battleships were NOT hit by torpedoes). Naturally, one's own military judges its risks with the parameters of its own ordnance, and Japanese ordnance was superior. Also, leave it to the "underdog" to try hardest to come up with compensating power (like the extra fins on the torpedoes that made them run shallower), while the "overdog" gets complacent, "secure" in is superiority.

re: ABDA co-operation--I think such cooperation would be sort of the same as "short of war" measures in the Atlantic, using "brinkmanship" in trying to help out without antagonizing into a shooting war. I still think America wasn't really ready to accept WAR with Japan until American soil was directly attacked (note the Greer and even Ruben James' incidents did NOT precipitate war) rather than merely ships at sea. So as long as the Philippines was NOT attacked, a declaration of war against Japan in support of Allies was probably NOT in the making (IMHO).

Even given a few months of "support" from America, I really doubt the outcome of an eventual Japanese assault on the Philippines would have been much different.

 

Craig, good to see you, but you seem to be saying that if someone chooses not to do something, that "proves" that it was impossible or impractical. The downside to nets is what you and lwd both cited, it would add to the time required for the battleships to sortie and create a lot of extra work for the net tenders - every time a BB went out for training or anything, starting whenever the defensive measures were implemented. We can argue that that outweighed the seemingly small chance of the nets saving the day if the Japanese did/were able to launch a torpedo attack in the harbor, but it's still a judgement call.

Similarly, they could have made it standard practice to moor some auxiliary vessel outboard of every battleship, and move it every time the battleship needed to get underway. This also presumes that the "torpedo bumpers" don't have any duties which require them to be anywhere else. I'm not aware of any navy doing this on a regular basis; it seems more like something that could be implemented quickly if they had some short-term warning of attack.

 

> but you seem to be saying that if someone chooses not to do something, that "proves" that it was impossible or impractical.<

Not at all, as far as "proof" goes. Certainly a judgement call. I am pretty sure that if there was any real thought that the Japanese would DARE try to attack Pearl, that the nets would have been in place as a precaution, and the extra deployment time merely a "cost of doing business".

Possibly a line of destroyers could have been moored, not up against the battleships, but near the OPPOSITE side of the harbor ostensibly in the path of approaching enemy torpedo bombers. That is, the masts, etc., of the destroyers would obligate the bombers to fly too high to launch, or otherwise disrupt the approach to make torpedo launching impractical against Battleship Row.

What "we" haven't seen, and I think would be instructive, is what precautions to prevent a repeat performance were in effect AFTER the Dec. 7th raid? How did the Navy adjust? How were ships arranged, etc. once the results and methods of attack were analyzed? How did the Navy schedule which ships would be in harbor at any one time, comings and goings, etc.? Truthfully, I do not know.