Normany Invasion earlier than June 1944?

Yes, successful invasion was possible in 1943. We had several successful amphibious invasions under our belts at this time. Any comparison with Gallipoli is just wrong. Anglo-American forces probably wouldn't have been able to reach the German border, or even the Meuse in '43, but we could have had a very large lodgement area complete with at least one major port. In fact, it would have probably been quite possible to take both Cherborg AND Antwerp (along with the Scheldt Estuary) As new divisions became ready they would have been shipped to France. Our side could have built up at least as fast, if not faster than Germany could and our divisions were better. I should also point out that then the British and Americans would have been able to fight the major battles on terrain that was much more advantagous to us than the coastal area of Normandy.

Let's remember who the chief planner of Overlord was: Montgomery. His legacy is one of never taking a risk and fighting battles designed to make him look like a winner even if it cost more men in the process. What makes us think that they way things were done was the only way, or even the best way, of doing something?

 

Some of the boring logistics details that try and explain why it was not possible to launch an invasion in 1943. Most people just count troops and units without actually considering the logistics of doing anything with them.

HyperWar: British War Economy (UK Civil Series)
HyperWar: British War Production (UK Civil Series)

Divisions formed on paper on a set date does not mean they were ready for war, the date that matters in when they were declared fully operational (even then that is more often a political statement than a true measure of a unit). It is easier to create a division than it is to actually populate it, train the troops and equip them, then to train the staff on how to command larger and larger formations. In 1942 training and equipping the forces was cut back due to supply problems and increases in rationing. Stockpiles were used to maintain supply to the civil populace and industry, this ran the stocks close to what was considered dangerous levels. There was a severe shortfall between what was required to keep the UK going and what was actually being produced and imported. This shortfall caused some drastic measures to be taken that impacted into 1943.

To save shipping space vehicles and aircraft were crated into smaller and smaller sizes, this entailed more rebuilding at the destination before they could be used, more manpower and equipment was therefore diverted from other jobs.

The landing craft program did not get started in earnest until 1943 due to the more urgent need for escorts for convoys, the UK still had a shortfall in June 1944 of landing craft (Infantry and Tank, not many by then though), LST's etc had to be almost completely provided from US construction which also had urgent demands for escorts and cargo ships. It was not just a case of using those in the Med for a cross channel invasion instead of in Tunisia and Italy in 1943 as the ones in the Med were withdrawn for use on D Day as well. The proposed landing in Southern France due to be done at the same time as Overlord was postponed due to a lack of craft.

 

Wait a minute I didn't think this was that kind of forum!

 

No I love Martin...He knows I do....He pointed out again that for others...It was not Monty's plan...It was Morgan and his paltry staff that came up with the idea Monty refused to be involved unless it was expanded. Monty never said come on chaps lets invade Normandy...It was a plan forced on to him. He had to make it work after evaluation not instigate it...that was done while he was still adjusting his beret while being made a cup of char next to his command tank. Without his participation or knowledge...So Yes I love Martin...He sticks to facts.

 

Getting troops across the water may have been possible, keeping them supplied in a lodgement would have been more difficult. The Germans were masters of firebrigade actions, moving troops on internal lines of communication quickly. The allies had tried to see what it would take to control a port at Dieppe, this showed that direct assault would be too costly.

The US forces thought they were much better than the Germans in Tunisia as well in 1943 and look what happened in their first real encounter, this showed they needed more training of troops and command staff. Shipping divisions is not enough, you need the support to back them up and in 1943 there was a shortage of it.

Contrary to your claim that Montgomery never took a risk and he ultimately cost more lives by his careful methods just to make him look good. Montgomery did take risks remember Market Garden, it was a risk with a chance of success, it failed. His methodical build up in NA was because he could afford resources but not manpower, Britain by 1943 was suffering a shortage of manpower especially infantry, this became more accute into late 1944 (many units were disbanded and troops re-mustered as Infantry). Caen which many will cite as a example of his poor leadership was a churning battleground that the majority of the German armoured forces were involved in against the British Commonwealth forces. Both sides suffered heavily. He could have just sat there and done nothing to try and breakout. He will always be dammed for what he did and dammed for what he did not no matter what he did or the results. Pretty much the same a Patton.

 

... and go from there:

As Gen Albert Wedemeyer said of Casablanca “We lost our shirts … we came, we listened, and we were conquered.”. At Casablanca the British came prepared and with common purpose – the Med. Brooke was largely responsible for this, but he had Pound’s support, and Portal was happy bombing Germany. On the other hand the Americans were unprepared. Marshall, a match for Brooke in the smarts dept. wanted to land in France in 43, Arnold like Portal was happy to bomb France some more, King wanted more resources for the Pacific so he was more than happy to consider a delay on a landing in France, provided he got those resources – he got them. It was hard to say that he couldn’t because the US public wasn’t really sold on Germany 1st, and even much less for war in the Med. – they wanted to hammer the Japanese for obvious reasons.


Much of this is Grigg, the rest is mine:

Apologists for the delayed invasion have made much alleged shortage of landing-craft in 1943. It would simply not have been possible, they say, to transport such a large army to France, with all the necessary supplies and accoutrements, at any time before 1944. Only then did the Allies have the necessary number of ships.

This argument ignores one particularly awkward fact, that the armada which set sail for Sicily in July 1943 was larger than that which set sail for Normandy June 1944. The trouble, surely, was not that the landing-craft did not exist in Europe but that they in the wrong place. If the invasion of Sicily had either taken place earlier, or had been given a less high priority at Casablanca,there could have been quite enough landing-craft in Britain by the summer of 1943.

In the event, there was a landing-craft crisis even in 1944, partly because there was a muddle about moving some from the Mediterranean-this was why D-Day had to be postponed from May to June-but above all because there were too few in Europe as a whole. It was not that the Allies suffered from any general shortage of these vessels, but that a disproportionate number of them were in the Pacific theatre.

The statistics are hard to believe, when we remember that it was supposed to be Allied policy to beat Hitler first. In May 1944 the U.S. Navy had more than 31,000 landing-craft at its disposal. But of these fewer than 2,500 were allocated to OVERLORD. At the second Cairo conference it was decided that two-thirds of the landing-craft, as well as all the warships for OVERLORD should be provided by Britain, the British Dominions, and the European Allies,and towards the end of 1943 the U.S. Navy actually transferred some landing-craft from the Med. to the Pacific.

The British lack of enthusiasm for a cross-Channel attack was undoubtedly one reason why. As soon as it was realized operations in Europe in 1943 would not be of a kind to win the war against Hitler, the pull of the Pacific became irresistible. In September 1942 Dill sent a warning to London that heavy cuts were contemplated in the shipments of landing-craft to Britain, and by, the end of 1942 the U.S. Army was engaged in the Pacific on a scale far exceeding anything that had been intended, the fact that Japan was defeated within months of Germany bears this out. Granted the nature of warfare in that theatre, big military operations there could only mean a big landing-craft requirement.

Along with the switch from Europe to the Pacific production of landing-craft in the United States was scaled down when it became apparent that there would be no cross-Channel invasion until 1944. From having been top in the order of priorities, landing-craft dropped to 12th place as soon as ROUND-UP (proposed allied invasion of Europe in 1943) was abandoned in favour of TORCH.

These facts all point to the same conclusion - that had there been a firm resolve to invade north-west Europe in 1943, landing-craft would have been available for the operation in abundance.


The ships you don’t see - convoys for Sicily departed from Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia, as well as directly from the US and UK. Pretty much all of the ships and equipment coming from Africa had been previously hauled from the UK and US in the build up, under escort, that from Egypt had been humped around the Cape of Good Hope – those convoys weren’t discontinued until late 1943. These are shipping and logistical problems, which were overcome for Sicily, which were unnecessary for Neptune/Overlord. Also the turnaround times for shipping involved in both operations aren’t the least bit comparable. Sicily required a much greater initial assault shipping requirement than Overlord did, but after the main assault, Overlord required 8 convoys a day, which was possible giving the relatively short turnaround time from the UK. I have 1,200 transports and 2,000 assorted landing craft for Husky, unlike Husky, of the total landing craft strength for Neptune, only half of them travelled to the beaches under their own power, again which was possible because of the relatively short distances travelled. Also Neptune shipping numbers were increased with vessels and components solely committed to the Mulberries i.e. block ships, tugs etc.

The ships you do see: The naval component required to escort and land Husky was much more powerful than that required for Neptune. The battleships involved KGV & Howe, Nelson & Rodney, Warspite & Valiant could be considered the “A Team” – they had to be, just in case the Italian Fleet sortied. Neptune’s in contrast was only suitable for shore bombardment, that’s all that was necessary – the older BB’s were unsuitable for carrier ops., by this time Warspite was down to 3 turrets, Rodney would soon be in Scapa Flow as a stationary Flag ship, she was worn out. All arguments aside saying that “size matters”, Husky's was certainly the more powerful fleet.


As David Woodward says in Liddell-Hart’s WW2 under the title “Husky: The Greatest Seaborne Assault – Not only did the invasion of Sicily involve the largest seaborne assault that the Allies were to mount during the war, but the planning was made particularly difficult because it was not until the middle of May – when the North African ended – that the planners knew exactly how many divisions they would have.”



1) The swing for the worse in the Battle of the Atlantic caused the suspension of the Arctic Convoys from Mar-Nov. 1943. Badly needed ASW vessels were put to use in the Atlantic, but interestingly, ops. in the Med. weren’t suspended. Despite U-Boat predations, the build-up of logistics was still sufficient for offensive operations. Some 2,590 ships were involved in the Sicilian Landings in July, then the Italian Mainland was attacked in Sept. – both were much further afield than the coast of France, and certainly much more difficult to support, and both tied up a great number of ASW resources. If action in the Med. was suspended in order to land in France in 1943, a good portion of those ASW resources are freed to return to the U.K., to take part in action in the Atlantic until required off the French Coast. Cause and effect? Those U-Boat predations may not have occurred to the same degree, the build-up of logistics likely would have been even greater, giving Invasion France 1943 a greater chance of success.


2) The situation in the Atlantic may actually be a motivator, not a detractor for Invasion France, 1943. Consideration must be given for denying the U-Boats the use of the French Atlantic Ports, a major consideration in the success they enjoyed at that time. Sweeping along the French Coast to deny the Germans those locales for launching V weapons is analogous in 1944.

The Allies enjoyed air superiority in the Med. mid-1943 where they deployed approx. 3,700 front-line combat aircraft between the various commands; 9th, 12th, 15th USAF, and RAF Middle East, Desert A.F. and Balkan Airforce, which outnumbered the Axis about 3 to 1; 300 of those being Italian. At that time Germany had approx. 5,000 front line combat aircraft on all fronts while the Allies had about 23,000 (includes 8,300 Soviet) which includes only what the U.S. had overseas. A year later when the Allies did invade their numbers had only increased by about 72%, and they were virtually uncontested in the air although German numbers had only decreased by about 350. The Allies also used escort carriers to support the actual Med. invasions until airfields were taken and made operable. Those escort carriers could be used on Atlantic Convoy duty instead, or off the French Invasion 1943 beaches if required, depending on the location chosen. You also have to consider the Strategic Bomber Campaign. Those aircraft would have to be committed to tactically supporting the invasion and bombing the Luftwaffe on the ground. The P-47 was coming into service as a bomber escort - now it’s a tactical air-superiority fighter and fighter bomber.

As far as tank quality goes, the Allies were already acquainted with the Tigers, having met them in combat in Tunisia and they weren’t scared away from pursuing Sicily and the Italian Mainland. You have to consider that Germany was in the process of building the bigger and better Panthers and Tigers, while the U.S. stayed with the Sherman and by 1944 the technology gap/number of superior tanks in service, had actually widened. You also have to consider at the time,the Germans were building up their armoured (and air) forces for the Kursk Offensive, Citadel, then they were busy losing them.



Tactically, I have nothing elaborate in mind anyway, never have, I’ve intentionally avoided going to such lengths because I don’t believe it’s possible. I believe in retrospect the generic statement that “France could have been successfully invaded in 1943” to be true, the war shortened, overall a great many lives saved. But in such a wide sweeping aberration from historical fact the preconditions and the results are so skewed that they’re unrecognizable. As far as air strategy in such terms I see a combination of application of the strategic force to tactical purposes, a pre-invasion battle of attrition, forcing the Luftwaffe to play along, battle over the invasion beaches etc. I don’t mean to be coy, the object to varying degrees is to limit and/or destroy the Luftwaffe, limit and/or destroy the Heer, wage economic warfare in key sensitive areas, and ultimately support the army in attaining objectives ala Red Airforce. The USAAF and RAF showed that they had capable commanders to achieve their ends, if the will to go in 1943 was there I believe they would likewise show their mettle and likewise succeed over their German counterparts, German industry, etc. I have a problem with those who'd stand on a soapbox, point out how superior the Western Allied air forces, pilots, aircraft, hardware, commanders etc. were to those of the Soviets, or the Germans, or the Japanese, yet can't support same when pushed to what may appear as a 1943 improvisation. It’s not; it’s a deliberate well-orchestrated offensive with superiority across the board.


In basic terms consider how many aircraft were coming out of factories in the West, 1942-43 should be appropriate, consider the Soviets, then consider what was being produced in Germany and where it was all going, CITADEL, etc., subtract enough for a holding action in the Med. and consider the Pacific the secondary theatre originally envisioned, let USN subs do their magic, that should just about do it. Toss in some RN and USN air over the Beaches and early assault area, a maximum effort - the Western Allies are left with overpowering air strength to attain tactical and strategic goals geared to support an invasion of France in 1943 and into Germany, with many, many more building.

Like I said before, all that was really lacking was the will.

 

Anvil? Why in that case didn't the yanks just say up yours Britain and go immediately for the French underbelly...they would not have needed us Brits would they? Who's lack of will? We acted as an alliance...sometimes. Did America need British hands to hold...Was there no Patton to say lets go for France in the Med now..not later...We don't need the Brits and all that logistic stuff...Lets do it...Perfidious Albion again...Blamed for most things...Including Monty..All his fault the Germans put their panzers in the wrong place to let our allies have a go at them instead of us.

 

Well here goes then....


These are some of the major operations that were planned in 1942-1943

Bolero - Operational name for the buildup of US forces in Britain, 1942 - 1944

Sledgehammer - The plan for a summer 1942 invasion of France, advocated by Stimson, Marshall & the JCS

Imperator - A desparation plan to invade France with 6 divisions and drive towards Pais, supposed to aid the Soviets.
Supported by the US command and rejected by the British, all but 1 division would have been British/CW

Roundup - Plan for a 1943 invasion, to be made by April 1943

Torch - Nov 1942 invasion of Algeria & Morocco

Husky - July 1943 invasion of Sicily


If Stalin was frustrated by the long delay in the Allied invasion of France, this was due to FDR indicating to Stalin (on advice of his military leaders) that a 1942 landing in France was feasable. Churchill was also guilty to some extent of making unrealistic pledges to Stalin before vetting it with the British service chiefs.

The main proponents of these 1942 invasion plans were Stimson (US Sec. of War) and Marshall (Head of Joint Chiefs)
The plans were totally unrealistic, verging on suicidal.

Correct.
There is some good data on LCV's at the Pacific War Online site: The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Landing Craft By mid-42 the Allies had built about 2100 landing craft, of the LCV/LCVP/LCVL types, which carried 36 troops each, and about 200 of the LCM, which could carry a tank or 2 light vehicles.

With about a third of the LCVs sent to the Pacific, and subtracting those that had already been lost, those in use elsewhere, those for training and those still in transit, there are about 600 - 800 available in Europe, enough to transport only 2 or 3 regiments.




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I was just pointing out with perfect clarity of fact that the coast of Normandy was a lot softer than the "soft underbelly" of Italy in the fall of 1943. That was a fact. Churchill's and the British obsession with Italy and the Balkans was a problem that kept us from seeing other opportunities. What Dieppe proved was that we weren't going to be able to go into a port and capture it from the front. However, the back door was often open and ports were captured that way with no great difficulty in 1943 and 1944. so there's no reason to believe that they couldn't be captured in an operation such as this. If we had the resources to land at Anzio in terrain so favorable to German defense, why not land in a more important place before Rommel had time to re-energize the defence? We would have had better air cover and the Germans would have had to ship reinforcements across France on lines that were vulnerable to interdiction. Most of the armor we fought against wouldn't have been available then and we'd have faced mostly horse-drawn infantry with our fully mechanized forces. We would have started with less, but the enemy even less yet. A landing in France in the fall of '43 would have been a terrible problem for the Germans. I do believe that there was a window of opportunity presented to us in 1943 that we could have seen in time to get our duwks in a row and exploit. By waiting until Spring of '44 the enemy was much more prepared than 9 months earlier. By that time the eventual OVERLORD plan was fully justified.

While I never should have used the word "never" it still remains that Monty was mostly overly cautious and threw away some good opportunities. Fortunately, for him and the Allied forces we were opposed by Adolph Hitler who made our task immeasurably easier.

 

Ah - this would be the same Montgomery who is criticized for so rashly undertaking Market-Garden. Yes, that makes perfect sense.

In other words, this is degenerating into yet another dreary Monty-bashing exercise.......so to introduce the 'too-cautious Monty' argument into a 'why didn't we invade in 1943' argument seems disingenuous. The main figure who feared 'another Somme' on the Second Front was in fact Churchill. Montgomery ( him again ! ) doesn't appear on the Overlord scene until December 27th, 1943 when he was briefed by Eisenhower about the COSSAC proposals ( of which he was unaware ). Again, regrettably I wasn't there so I've had to rely in this instance on Carlo D'Este ( Decision In Normandy ).

As for 'our' divisions being better than the Germans.....



...what happened at Kasserine ?

 

Martin, if you start planning early, then you need high profile, of proven ability, someone who's not tied down in North Africa - Brooke or Marshall - they both wanted the job.

There's no need for a "it's 1943, let's invade France tomorrow" attitude, that won't work, we can all ackowledge that can't we?

 

You mainly focuss on the Normandy landing. But don't let us forget the Provence landing too. The Provence landing would have been impossible before D-Day precisely because of tactic reasons (British units being transferred to England, other units still pushing the Germans and the Italians around. Same for the Free French expeditionnary corps fighting in Italy and recruiting and training in North Africa with men that weren't ready to land in Provence in 1943. Same for the Americans, they gained their combat experience in North Africa and were not ready.
Besides, early 1943 the Germans were still in Sicily, Corsica etc.. and the Luftwaffe was still operational in that theatre at the time.

With the Provence landing in the back the Germans might not have retreated so fast, There would hav ebeen no allied front in the south nor would the Resistance have liberated all the places they did and the Elster collumn (if any) could have easily made its way to the north , bringing large reinforcements to Normandy at strategic moments. This, High command could not afford.

 

Ok Martin, like I said in an earlier post, I never should have said never. Yes Monty tried one fling at being adventurous and unfortunately for his troops it didn't pan out too well. However, don't take my word for it, his caution and slowness are well documented. However, in defense of Montgomery, he was great at the set-piece battle-that I will give you. And you are correct that Churchill and the British government was even more cautious than Monty. In fact, Churchill was fairly luke-warm about invading France at all until Germany was about to collapse. A big reason for this was indeed Britain's need to avoid horrendous casulties. While OVERLORD was a masterpiece of planning and organization, the time involved getting it ready also allowed the Germans time to reinforce their troops which led to some pretty horrendous British casualties in its own right. My central point is that an opportunity existed to land in France (albeit with fewer initial forces) and gain a large lodgement area, complete with at least one port, at a time when Germany would have been hard-pressed to find any significant amount of troops to counter it. The big problem the COSSAC and OVERLORD planners faced was to get Allied troops off the beach, get a lodgement and then get a port(s). In 1943 this very well could have been done easier than in 1944! After that, we could reinforce faster than the Germans could.

The only real problem with the 1943 plan would have been the weather, but I can't find any reference to what the weather was in the Channel in the Fall of '43.

As for our divisions being better than the German's, it's pretty much a fact in most cases. German divisions had already been fighting a long war and few of those divisions were at anything near full strength-especially in the Fall of '43. All of our infantry divisions, with the possible exceptions of the Airborne, were fully motorized and had far superior mobility. German divisions were dependent on the railroads to travel long distances quickly and these railroads were vulnerable to interdiction. Yes, they still had an advantage over some of our divisions in experience but that would have evened out quickly. Kasserine was many battles in the past and the major lessons had been learned. In armor our Sherman was the equivilant of the Mk IV, the Panther was not yet issued to most divisions. The Tiger heavy Pz battalions were all in the East. Panzer Lehr, Hitler Jugend and others hadn't been created or were totally unready for battle in '43.

Fortunately, we had an ally in Adolph Hitler in 1944. Who could have predicted that he would have kept so many troops in the Pas de Calais area until just before Normandy's collapse? Or, who would have thought he would order Operation LUTTICH and delay an orderly retreat from Normandy? Had he let competent Generals run the battle our casualties would have been much higher yet in Europe.

 

Are we forgeting Mulbury and Pluto? Are they ready for fall of 1943? Can a lodgement by adequately supply without them? Capturing a port is one thing, making it function for supply puposes are another. Can a allied landing be supplied for months over a beach from landing craft during a winter in the channel?

 

... the Allies had known since the Dieppe raid of Aug 1942 what would be required for an effective amphibious return to France. Can you say that they were incapable of planning for successful lodgement, building Mulbury and Pluto if required, or planning on capturing/rebuilding a port if not, within that year i.e. by the fall of 1943? I say they were more than capable.

 

the weather in the channel in the fall of 1943 was bad and impredictible (as a women ),and the same in the summer (remember DDay was planned for 5 june,and there was a lot of damage o the Mulberries,a few weeks later,because of a summer storm)

 

Knowing what was needed and having it ready within 12 months time are two different things. It took 2 months to capture Cherbourg, and months to make it anywhere near operationanal after that. If you land in the fall of 1943 then you must attempt to fix it during the winter, not an easy task. I am not saying its impossible, but is the risk worth the reward. There is no surity that they get any closer to the German frontier during the summer of '44 before supply limitations force a halt. If anything Germany may pull more troops from the east to create a western line which then allows the USSR to take more of Germany before the collapse.

 

The idea for Mulberry dated back to WWI; it was Churchill's. Mountbatten resurrected it in the spring of 1942, Churchill encouraged it, but like most of the "gadgets" employed, development languished i.e. was delayed by OVERLORD, not the other way around - ready for 1943 is not a problem, IF required.

As far as capturing Cherbourg is concerned, consider all the major Breton-Poitevin seaports - which historically were expected to handle much of the supply coming directly from the US. The Germans prevented their immediate capture; Patton took St. Malo after 2 weeks hard fighting, Brest after over a month, but failed at L'Orient, La Rochelle, and Saint-Nazaire which were bypassed but left under siege, capitulating after the German surrender in 1945. It can be said that this was in part responsible for some of the US Army's later supply problems,but to what degree is speculative given the breakout.

In 1943, defensively these ports were a shadow of what they'd be in June 1944, in Oct. 1943 Rundstedt reported their defensive value as "insignificant", they had no landward defences. It wasn't until a visit by Jodl to the defences between the Scheldt and the Seine in Jan. 1944, that all the major seaports received concrete defences on their landward sides, and Rommel would fill in the rest as best he could. In these terms, the risk in 1943 is worth the reward.

 

I do not question that the idea was there only the practicality of having all the components ready by a earlier date. If I may offer a analagy, You ask your wife on the Monday before Thanksgiving to have dinner ready after the end of the first football game and before the beginning of the second. Then on wensday afternoon opine that perhaps half-time of the first game would be a better time. Naturally you will be ordering take-out pizza now and eating alone

 

Let me see, planning Mon-Thu - i.e. 4 days, then Wed. afternoon move it up a couple of hours? Yep, could be a problem - but Papa John's ain't so bad.

Good thing a Thanksgiving in Canada would be Mon-Mon - i.e. 7 days, that change on Wed. means ... the pemmican may still be on hard side, but still edible!

Ultimately it all comes down to one thing - RESOLVE. For a variety of reasons the British would/could not be ready for a 1943 return to France, regardless of benefits, but given singular purpose, making it happen was within the realm of possibility.