Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

I too suspect that US ship catains do not have a shoot on sight order for Japanese ships in Dutch/British waters, but rather they will pass the info on up the line for orders.

There must be a tripping point where the US will react, but previous history up to late 1941 has not shown preceisely where it is. So far about a dozen countries have been invaded/occupied since early 1939 and none of them have triggered a US DoW.

I feel that the US would welcome another 6 months or more to further reinforce the P.I., Guam, Wake and Hawaii, should we present such an option.

 

In the book "December 1941: 31 Days that Changed America and Saved the World", Craig Shirley, goes into this. I also heard an extensive interview with him on a radio program, where he went into detail on FDR's preparation for his "Day of Infamy" speech. Actually two versions were prepared one just naming Japan and another seeking a DOW against Japan and Germany. FDR himself decided to go with the Japan only option because he feared lack of Congressional support, because of public opinion, if he sought DOW's against both. America's anger was directed against Japan, because Japan had apparently launched a sneak attack upon us. Even so FDR worried that his military leaders and public opinion would focus on avenging Pearl Harbor at the expense of what he considered the more pressing threat, Europe and the Soviet Union. Churchill feared the same result. The American military leadership knew we weren't prepared and were begging for at least six more months. I think if we avoid attacking America initially, they will delay responding because of military concerns. If we can during that six months avoid a confrontation with the US and in fact act in such a manner as to diffuse public sentiment against us, we can possibly avoid any confrontation at all, I'm not saying its likely, just possible.

 

Re warning. I am talking about giving the American captain enough warning to move his ships out of the way. We would still carry out the other attacks. The Dutch do not have enough to threaten the landings. They had months to prepare for the actual invasion and could do nothing about it. I believe that this will mitigate the risk of a stray shell hitting the Americans. How would congress react if they learned that Roosevelt allowed his ships to be in a combat area?

 

I´m going along with you at that point Bob! The first months will make a 60% to 75% decision how it will end up for us.

 

In this I think you are correct. I would be surprised to see an American declaration of war in the week after the initial Japanese attacks. There's a very good chance it would be longer my guess would be 2 to 4 months but I doubt longer than 6 months.

I'm far from convinced that it is even possible. After all the US was already in an undeclared war vs Germany. The plans for the Pacfic would have resulted in the same situation pretty quickly (i.e. British and Dutch ships using US ports, probalby US ships mixed into allied formations, and such). Even if the above doesn't happen mis id's are likely to result in attacks on US ships and the opinion of the US population is swinging more and more toward intervention. Remember that one of the other questions on many of those surves was something to the effect of: Is a British defeat in the US interest? Even in early 40 the answer was a pretty resounding no. The US population just didn't believe that Germany had the ability to defeat the British. A string of vicories by the Japanese over the British might change this opinion.

There's also the question of does this delay buy the Japanese anything? If the Philipino troops reach decent levels of training and equipment taking the Philipines may be out of the question given the commitement of Japanese troops and logistics elsewhere and a US sub and air base sitting astride the Japanese lines of communication is very threatening. Especially if fuel consumption is on a par with historical (the Japanese burned a lot more then they expected to in the first 6 months). The possibilty of a fuel crunch just as the US enters the war is not a good thing. Historically I believe it took the Japanese several months to get the Dutch fields back into production (I'm not sure they ever reached their prewar levels while under Japanese control). This means that they may not come back on line before the US is in the war.

Do you have anyone specfically tasked with "red team" work? I'm not sure the Japanese did much of this historically but having someone on your side try and figure out what kind of monkey wrenches the opposition can throw into your plans can be quite valuable.

Along this line are you playing against an AI or is their an opposition team?

 

It wasnt just production it was the loss of foreign flagged tankers. To prevent the sabotage is one reason I want to try to quickly seize the oil centers especially Palembang at the start.

 

I seem to recall reading somewhere that the refineries were much more of a problem than the wells themselves. Late war the IJN was burning a fair amount of crude which had a number of negative impacts.

 

Noticed this post which might be of ineterest over on the axis history forum:
Axis History Forum • View topic - Book review Douglas Ford. The Elusive Enemy: U.S. Naval Inte

Sounds interesting ...

 

Let's assume the U.S. would make a serious effort to defend the Philippines. In reality, I don't believe they ever would. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Public both seem opposed to the idea. Even support in the U.S. Army seems weak, save for MacArthur. How would the U.S. maintain and supply the Philippines as an effective base in the face of overwhelming local sea and air superiority? To what end do we need to actually capture the Philippines? If we have destroyed their air and naval bases, their airplanes and submarines, what threat can the ground forces there pose to our intentions? How can they reinforce and fortify the islands sufficiently in six months to make the destruction of exposed assets like runways, tank farms, and dry docks more difficult? They have a massive industrial capacity, to be sure, but it's quite far away. What do they have in the Philippines right now that could trouble us? What could they get there in six months?

Six months would give us time to complete the military conquest of most or all of our major objectives in the Southern Resource Area. Most of the troops and transports we would need to commit to that could be released for other operations. More importantly, any fleet naval assets we would wish to use to provide support would be free to operate elsewhere once the initial invasions were over. There are no allied bases in all of the Pacific that could withstand the concentrated attentions of our carrier forces. Even with the concentration of all the allied carrier assets known or expected to be in the Pacific in one command (the two Lexingtons, Enterprise, Hermes, and perhaps two British fleet carriers) we have sufficient force to overwhelm them for present.

By delaying the Philippines operation, we allow ourselves to concentrate our forces while preventing the enemy from doing so. That is the first thing such a move buys us. It is an asset beyond price.

Second, any buildup the U.S. does in the Philippines we can match in the mandates. Since the Philippines are much more vulnerable to isolation and neutralization without invasion, it's well worth the risk. If the U.S. builds up in the Philippines we can answer it.

So far as I know we haven't designated anyone to this task yet, but we have been working on a plan to win local support from the native residents of the European colonies. If you want to take Indochina as an example, we could probably gain the cooperation of Ho Chi Minh and his party by acceding to his calls for equality and giving the Viet, and various ethnic minorities like the Tay, Khmer, and H'mong some degree of local political control with the promise of more once the war with the West has ended. (Historically Japan surrendered to Ho Chi Minh, against the wishes of the U.S. Partially as a result Japan is seen much more fondly in Vietnam today than China or France, though Japanese actions during the larger war are still condemned in my limited non-scientific survey.)

Giving our "Asia for Asians" rhetoric some teeth and helping to build some genuine "co-prosperity" into our proposed Asian sphere may do little to win the propaganda war in the West, but it will help here at home. Happier workers with newly won rights are less likely to toss wrenches into the oil pipeline we need. I think this is one reason that "belligerent civilians" (read white people) are to be politely sent home with their portable goods, but with the forfeiture of all lands and properties. We will need to retain the use of some of those lands and properties for the duration of the war, but the balance can be immediately ceded to the locals along with promises that all will be handed over after the end of hostilities. We propose a "hearts and minds" campaign to take care of some of this.

That said, counterinsurgency specialists could be very valuable.

 

I earlier spoke against spending time and assets to build major fleet repair facilities at Truk. I believe I was quite mistaken. Even if we hope to delay war against the Americans, they are the sole real naval threat that we face, and improved facilities at Truk will help us defend the mandates in a running war of attrition against the U.S. Navy.

A major facility at Truk with several satalite bases might be ideal.

I might suggest building facilities for light repairs at Kwajalein. We haven't much time, so our building programs need to be fairly selective. Ponape in the Carolines might also make a suitable secondary fleet base.

If we attack the British at the same time as the Dutch, would we anticipate any resistance in the Solomon Islands? If we could seize the Solomons simultaneously would it be worth our while to add them, and possibly other British possessions to the east to our defensive line? Our goal should not be to hold these islands, but if we can make their capture costly in ships by basing aircraft or submarines from some of them it would be to our advantage.

We should work to develop a method for building quick, light, inexpensive airfields and submarine depots on some of these atols.

The attrition plan laid out by our forbears may well be our only hope to defeat the U.S., so long as we recognize that our primary capital units to be husbanded against a decisive battle are the aircraft carriers and not the battleships.

 

Have you considered what an acceptable rather than ideal end state would look like? My impression is that in WWII Japan wanted everything and I just don't see the allies willing to put up with that. However if for instance they would be willing to turn control of the Dutch possession back to the Dutch (with guaranteed access to oil of course) and the same for the British possession then they might be able to come to an agreement with the allies. Insist on keeping everything and I just don't see the allies stopping until they've won.

Simply inflicting military defeats on the allies in 41 and 42 doesn't help if you can't convince the allies to quit by mid 43.

 

I would be willing to be the red team. I dont have the technical expertise, but have done a lot of reading and have gamed quite a bit.

 

The key point about repair bases is that they should not be in the front lines or subject to attack, including long-range bombers. IMO Truk is about as far forward as we should go, and I would still limit our investment to facilities for quick repairs to battle-damaged ships or essential upkeep, in either case to get the ships back into action promptly. We might consider the use of submarine or destroyer tenders or repair ships rather than fixed installations for forward area support.

If we attack the British at the same time as the Dutch, would we anticipate any resistance in the Solomon Islands?

At the moment there are minimal assets in the Solomons, so it should be an easy conquest. My thought is to make the DEI our first priority and plan for a second wave - the same amphibious shipping with a new increment of troops - to attack the Solomons if the Americans stay out of it or Mindanao in the southern Philippines if necessary.

We need to consider and make a decision on mikebatzel's suggestion to expand our perimeter to islands like the New Hebrides or Fiji. These islands define a rough line, north of which there are numerous island groups within supporting - or attacking - distance of one another, south of the line mainly empty ocean. If we wish to push our perimeter outwards, that would be one logical limit, and it should be achievable before our opponents can fortify the islands. Alternatively we might confine ourselves to only the most potentially useful advances like the Solomons.

A campaign of attrition might be difficult; for example the current American naval program calls for 17 battleships, 11 aircraft carriers, around 40 cruisers, etc. There will be an element of attrition to our strategy, but I would hope for some early victories, especially if the Americans can be drawn into a hasty attempt to relieve the Philippines or assist their allies in the Far East.

 

One significant real-world question just occurred to me - does the AI actually distinguish between nations on the Allied side? Does it leave the US fleet or MacArthur's B-17s out unless/until some distinctly American asset has been attacked? Is it capable of considering say HMS Exeter to be involved in the war but USS Houston not to be? Or is everything on the Allied side automatically in play when hostilities begin?

 

It is our hope that if we don't galvanize US public opinion against us by attacking American interests, there may be room for a negotiated settlement. If the US initiates war and we can make it costly enough on them the public may weary of the war, since it was the United States decision to go to war. We hope to avoid Japan's early mistake so that we are more formidable when the US does have the strength to attack us. If we can eliminate some of the US's advantages such as keep Australia out of the war or to isolate her, we've removed a huge american base of operations. Without New Caledonia the Solomons campaign could not have gone forward. If we can minimize the effects of the US submarine campaign and maximize our own we can stretch out the war and retain our strength longer. Japan historically went with a short war plan, we're looking more towards a long war plan. If we can obtain the necessary resources and concentrate our military to solve the China problem and use space, time and attrition to slow the Americans, who knows?

 

I'm not sure but I've planned for that by issuing US commanders defensive only orders and let the AI control all other allied units. Once the US becomes involved the AI can handle them all. If the overall situation so changes I had a US team lined up, but that's now an issue. I'm looking at alternatives.

 

I agree, it will take time to construct the shipyard at Truk and we can always expand it if we see the need.

I agree, that's why I proposed the Noumea option. It's French and we can take it without attacking other powers territory. If Australia remains neutral we won't be able to use the New Hebrides but we can prevent their fortification. If Australia does go to war with us we can take them at will. We will undoubtedly go to war with Britain and then the Solomons will be an easy capture. This part of our campaign will have to be dictated by the diplomatic situation.

 

I think everything you wrote is a correct analysis of the situation. We have plans in the works to address a number of them and those we haven't discussed yet have been considered. Such as the oil issue, I think we need to hit all the most major oil production centers initially, as close to simultaneously as possible and with enough force that we can overrun them before they can be seeriously damaged. We need to do this even if it means we temporarily bypass targets that pose a threat to us militarily. We will have the Kido Butai as an additional asset if we don't attack Pearl Harbor, we will also have the troops, ships and some of the aircraft used to invade and neutralize the Phillipines, Wake and Guam. We still need to retain sufficient aircraft in position to strike US airfields in the Phillipines if the US chooses to intervene. We can use the carriers to neutralize British and Dutch airfields that we don't seize initially. We have to get the oil production and refinery facilities undamaged or at most slightly damaged.
As for US public opinion that has been discussed and we intend to be more effective at propoganda than Uncle Joe Stalin.
-We have proposed selecting and sending a number of charismatic, attractive, fluent english speaking Japanese officers to the US as attaches to our Embasy in Washington. We will use them to speak to groups, newspapers, radio hosts, etc. and present the face of Japan that we wish to portray and push the message we want pushed. The Chinese have a powerful lobby in the US and we seek to undermine this. We cannot sweep under the rug our past indescretions in China but we can explain them away and paint Chaing-Kai-Shek as a bandit warlord, a plunderer of the Chinese people and a usurper of the true heir to Sun-Yat-Sen's leadership of Republic of China's. (there is actually a good bit of truth in each of these assertions)
-We get business leaders on our side by stressing our long history of opposing the communists and paint many of our efforts in China as being the result of out attempting to prevent Mao-Tse-Tung's communists from gaining power in China. We can also accentuate Chaing's prior communist affiliations.
-Since there was (in our timeline) an attempted coup, a number of assasinations and the attempt to kidnap the Emperor. We paint these people as a radical element within our government that we have eliminated, it was this element that we will paint as responsible for our past indiscretions and the new government will represent the true spirit of the Japanese people. It is this Japan that fought alongside the British and Americans during the Boxer rebellion, it was this Japan that aided the allies in WWI, it was this Japan that served alongside American troops in Siberia after the communist revolution in Russia. We stress that we wish to make ammends for our recent ill-conceived acts and rejoin the democratic nations of the world and become the United States of the Pacific. (this will figure in later when we issue our own version of the Monroe Doctrine and The "Roosevelt Corollary").
-I propose and we seem to be in general agreement that: The indigenous people of most areas welcomed the Japanese as liberators, initially. We are going to play upon this. I propose that when we invade, we treat the local peoples well. That we tell them that our occupation is temporary, while we give them the opportunity to draft a constitution and set up a functioning government, then at a set point in time (probably two years) we will grant them the status of an independant state within the Commonwealth of East Asian States, or some such body as we should set up. Japan of course will dominate. I further propose we invite the Red Cross to observe, Missionaries to return, etc. All this our representatives to the US will insure makes the newspapers.
-I propose we court isolationist politicians in the US, provide stories to isolationist leaning newspapers and radio hosts.
-I have proposed but we have not decided upon getting Vichy France to request our aid in retaking New Caledonia from the Free French. We will first have the Vichy French request diplomatic help from the US in having the Free French restore the legitimate government to New Caledonia. The US will do nothing because of the Free French/British alliance. FDR personally dislikes the Free French leader Charles deGaulle and the US recognizes the Vichy government as the legitimate French Government, so we limit Roosevelt's options. After a couple of weeks we move on New Caledonia, notifying the US and Australia that we are acting on behalf of, and at the request of the Vichy French. We assure them that if they don't interfere we will assiduously respect Australian and US territories. We then take Noumea in concert with Free French forces. We land, leave a token force and withdraw to Truk leaving all allied territories surrounding New Caledonia unmolested. We then approach Australia about a seperate non-aggression and trade pact. We make sure our offer and actions appear in American newspapers. We're the good allies that helped out the French when Washington did not because of British pressure. We acted responsibly within our stated goals, used a minimum of force and withdrew immediately. We then extended the olive branch to New Caledonia's neighbors the Australians.

Your point about the support for England in the polls. I tend to think it is focussed on Britain's struggle with Germany. I don't think the same support would be shown for England in regards to it's colonial holdings.

-My proposal. We are currently working out the details on this and due to real life issues I haven't been participating in the discussion like I should, but I did initially broach the subject. When we capture enemy troops we treat them well and repatriate them, in the case of Indians to India, Australians to Australia, British to North America, etc. all on a parole type basis where there commander when he surrenders them agrees that they will take no further part in the war unless relieved of their oath by the Government of Japan. In the US we paint this humanitarian gesture as our concern for the health and welfare of these troops and our inability to feed them because US trade sanctions have reduced our own people to the verge of starvation. Hit them with both barrels here. I say that when we grab a large haul, like in Singapore, we actually render military honors to the enemy troops, let them march off with their colors to ships transporting them to their destinations . We make them see us as honorable troops, chivalrous soldiers, etc. We should even film it so people going to the movies will see it in the news reels! Then when they get back to where we send them they will retain this impression and this will spread it to those they interact with, including reporters that will inevitably interview them when they return from the war zone. The suggestion has been made that we only repatriate some of our prisoners, because we need labor. I think we can obtain all the labor we need from captured Chinese. I think the good will we can gain from handling the prisoner issue should not be underestimated. Just figure the 100,000 troops captured at Singapore. Figure each man has parents, maybe wives, girlfriends or children, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, neighbors etc. and they have people they interact with. Figure each man has talks to 3 close people (I'm sure this is on the low side), we've reached 300,000 people, minimum. I think that our biggest impact will be upon the people of India and Australia, their opinions may help sway public debate in those countries and possibly to a rift with Britain. Another factor to consider when looking at the prisoner issue is that military men, especially westerners, still consider themselves soldiers while held in captivity, they will try and avoid aiding the enemy and are required to continue their resistance and attempt escape, if possible while being held in captivity. The Chinese are basically armed peasants and lack this tradition, in fact are used to being exploited and oppressed. Given halfway decent treatment they will labor with only minor problems.

Now to specifically to addess the two quoted questions.
We do not have a dedicated "Red Team", it is a good idea. Our council members have been good at looking towards possible problems with our planning. Would you be interested in the job?

We have a moderator, who at present shall remain unnamed, who is to make judgement calls as to the probable consequences of our actions. The AI will handle most resolutions. And I had an opposition team lined up to handle certain other aspects that were outside the capability of the AI. Unfortunately, it was my older son, the one whose friend and fellow Marine we buried today. Actually, he was supposed to be buried yesterday but the VA jacked his family around. Anyway he's deploying next week, I'll let you know where once he's there. (OPSEC) The guy he was going to have helping him I don't know well so I'm looking at other options. This is my original plan that I posted earlier in the thread:

 

I must disagree about going no further than Truk. We hold the Marshall Islands and have good airbases already established. By leaving the Philippines alone we will force the Americans to abandon or reinforce them. If they choose to reinforce our subs, based in the Marshall's can begin picking away at convoys west of Midway. Combining that with air searches and attacks, any efforts to reinforce should meet with disaster. Hence my "white elephant" remark earlier. I am a firm believer in the idea that the best time to attack is when your enemy is the most most vulnerable. By forcing them to run a gauntlet of air and submarine attack, we could possibly break unit cohesion and moral before they ever reach their destination.

My thought on Fiji was based on looking at the game map. It is essentially straight down from the Marshall Islands, so my thought was not extending forward, but creating a "wall of defense" in the downward direction.

As to the thought of the Dutch sabotaging refineries and wells before we can secure them, there should be a couple SNLF units rated for para duty (I believe the training was done rather quickly). Perhaps we could use them to secure a couple of the most vital of these, timed with our landings nearby?

 

I may have misread Carronades post Mike but I thought he was speaking of going no further than Truk with a Repair Shipyard facility. I do agree with the run the gauntlet strategy you propose and since we already control the Marshalls I would be loathe to abandon them.