Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

With this point i have to disagree, partially! We won´t know if they had prepared their oilfields and we have to count with it. So i go with the thought of not getting the complete oilfields and will be surprised ( happily) when we get them complet. For me we can go with the plan and should work out a combined air to ground and paratroopers operation.
The idea to use submarines to bring out some of our elite forces is good and we should have intelligence reports on where the important targets for this troops can be.

For a longer absence, i´m not fully into the plannings. Can you please make a clever boy out of me, Colonel Bobimoto?

 

You haven't missed a lot that is directly relevant to your operations. Much of the talk for a while centered on our destroyers, and escort forces, their weapons load outs and the types we need to protect convoys, a little on anti-submarine warfare, and ship types and configurations. I have made it a point not to directly address issues related directly to you if I didn't see you posting. The first such post was the question about converting experienced infantry regiments to airborne forces to give us a credible airborne force for quick seizure of objectives. A little about what we need for airlift capability to employ the airborne forces, but we really didn't get into the subject because we need to determine initial objectives so we can see what aircraft meet the requirements. The submarine issue has only recently been broached and you should be able to catch up on it quickly. I do think we need this capability because there are some targets that we need to seize initially that are hard to get to, airborne forces would be hard to employ or the range from friendly bases is prohibitive.

The Honorable Prime Minister wrote:

The subs would need to stage near their targets in advance, the transit to the target would take some time. The time of year we are discussing commencing hostilities is the time that offers the longest periods of darkness, a plus for us. The submarine needs to make the transit to the jumping off point stealthily, taking whatever time is required. They will lay on the bottom during the day a number of miles off the target location. Well after dark they can surface, listen for a transmission from us as to the status of the operation go/no go, and finish their prep and run in to the target, timed to arrive just before dawn or exfiltrate the area if we call the operation off. We should have adequate control. Given the enemies enemic naval and air forces in the region I'd say our chances of remaining undetected are excellent. If a state of war does not exist, again given the allies relative weakness, I really doubt they would fire upon us for fear of initiating hostilities. They would probably just assume we were transiting the area, though I am sure they would attempt to maintain contact and monitor that subs actions.

General Nishio wrote:

Again, I feel our ability to seize the oil facilities intact is directly related to how quickly we can seize them after the initiation of hostilities. If we outwardly project the image that we are continuing to negotiate and not that war is imminent we gain advantage. They will not prep the oil fields for demolition prior to initiating hostilities because of the very good chance that their could be a horrific accident. Explosives and oil fields/refineries don't mix well and it is unlikely they will risk, accidental destruction by having them prepped for demolition. We may not get them all unscathed because there are too many, but we should at least attempt to get the largest and most important ones. Palembang alone would make us energy neutral. Palembang, Balikpapan, Djambi and Medan would give us two and three quarters the amount of our energy shortfall and allow for significant expansion of our economy, manufacturing and provide sufficient fuel to sustain a reasonable leve of naval operations. These targets at least should be seized rapidly and intact. The problem is the location and distance of Palembang and Medan in relation to our bases. If we can figure a way to get at them on day one or two, with a reasonable chance of success we should risk it and attempt it.

 

OK. I have to re-read some of the stuff. Thanks for the reminder!

 

Just in case you don't already have these sites:
Imperial Submarines
type krs

 

Would any decision's on production taken now have a credible impact on units available for operations on 'X' Day? It was my understanding that for both our primay and secondary objectives we will be forced to employ the assets we currently have or those already in the production pipeline and arriving before 'X' Day.

Some of our secondary objectives might benefit from 'upgrades' to existing types (Better armor/armament) but not until we are on our terciary objectives would we begin to see significant changes in our inventory. Perhaps it would be useful to catalog what we have in the terms of transport aircraft now and expect on 'X' Day, so that we could get a better idea of just how many airborne troops we might be able to employ, then choose which objectives we can use them on.

If we will be able to 'lift' say two battalions, we can then decide what targets are best suited for them.

 

Due to the critical importance of Palembang to our war effort, I believe any risk is worth it. I do also propose that we havea proper invasion force ready on the first day of the war to go into Palembang.

 

To me this opinion is correct! so we should train more of the paras and maybe that we can find a way to land some demo teams to force our enemies to split up their forces. any good opinions on places to land them?

 

As we have a greater number of high value targets than we do for special delivery methods, it is key we get a full understanding as to how many troops can we airlift? How many can we sealift using large submarines? Knowing this will allow us to determine where we can and must employ these limited assets.

Another possibility would be to employ a small to medium steamer timed to arrive at a port at or near the time our ultimatum expires. Even a small tramp freighter should be able to carry a company sized force that could be used to seize a port or docking facility from a unprepared guard force. Arriving close to our operational start time the vessel could avoid a port inspection before the 'go' signal. They could possibly employ a false flagged vessel (Vichy?) to alieve any local concerns.

A similar action could be emplyed to drop a blocking force at some convienent coastal road. Sailing out in international waters, then dashing into shore to arive again at 'X' hour. They could act as either a blocking force or as a diversion as Marshal Nishio suggests.

 

hmm, thats not a bad idea to use small vessels to deliver them and using a false flagg won´t give me headaches!

 

Thats why they pay me the big Yen!

 

muhahahaha! We should use older and smaller vessels which can carry in maximum a company and set them at beach a little outside of the harbours at some places and we should go inside the harbors at more important targets to take docks and locks.

 

Yes and no. We have basically two months until the day we have tentatively set as our "go" date. We cannot effect major production changes, but in two months we could pump out a few additional aircraft of critical types. Maybe not introduce new types, but concentrate on more effective types. As for ships, no we cannot have new builds in the water and in commission, we could have upgrades completed on existing vessels. Our repair and refit yards are at present virtually empty. We could upgrade a number of our, what I termed Type D-Destroyer Escort (Lg) in my destroyer proposal (and yes I know I need to finish it) the Minekaze, Kamikaze and Mutsuki classes. We could in about ten days per ship upgrade their ASW capabilities and can do several at a time. This would allow us to protect our tankers and supply ships from the get go against British and Dutch boats. We can upgrade a number of our infantry units to the new TOE's pre-commencement of hostilities. We definately have time to temporarily reconfigure some submarines and certain types of aircraft to use in the alternate role. One other thing I had considered, and have yet to mention is the adoption of the A6M2 series on an inter-service basis. By redirecting our engine allocation we can put off/delay production of certain types such as the J1N1 Gekkou and produce additional A6M's. Equip some IJA squadrons with these instead of the Ki-43 and we can escort our long range bombers over Singapore. We have time to do something like this. Not on a large scale but initially even small improvements in our capabilities will help.

In most cases this is correct.

steverodgers801 wrote:

I agree with Steve on this. This one site could more than meet our oil shortfall in regards to our economy. The problem is how to get at it prior to the enemy's having an opportunity to prepare for our seizure effort. Balikpapan is also a critical target. Historically, Palembang wasn't assaulted until mid-February 1942 and Balikpapan near the end of January, both well after the commencement of hostilities on Dec. 07th.

 

First let me finish the Destroyer/Destroyer Escort/Escort proposal.

Destroyers & Escorts:
Type A-major fleet unit, optimized for surface actions. CL used as leader for these units.
Type B-major fleet unit optimized for AA escort work with high value ships. No leader type required for these units, C&C provided by TF.
Type C-general purpose destroyer. Adequate surface, AA and ASW weapons fit, but not optimized for any one area. Sufficient speed to operate with fleet units. Use as leader for Type D units.
Type D-Destroyer Escort (Lg) General purpose armament but of smaller size and lesser speed, than Type C, primarily for fast convoy/escort work. Use as leader for Type E/G units.
Type E-Destroyer escort (Sm). General purpose armament but of smaller size and lesser speed, than Type D, primarily for general convoy/escort work. Use as leader for Type G units.
Type F-Historical Type C/D escorts. Less capable versions of the Type E to be built as an emergency measure. Recommend continued design work, but do not produce at present. 20,000 man hours.
Type G-Escort. Smaller and with less speed than destroyer escort, weapons fit optimized towards ASW warfare. Use as leader for Type H units.
Type H-ASW Patrol craft. Small type optimized for ASW warfare, but with very limited range, speed, surface and AA capability.

Ships in service or proposed for each type

Type A:
Fubuki class-nine units (one stricken after collision in 1934)
Displacement (std): 2080 t
Length: 388’ 6”
Beam: 34’ 1”
Speed: 38 knts
Speed (cruise): 14 knts
Range: 5000 nmi
Armament:------------------- Suggested Modifications
6 x Type 3 5”/50 (3 x 2)----- UpgradeType A turrets to Type B
22 x Type 96 25mm--------- 10 x 40mm bofors (5 x 2)
10 x 13mm Type 93 AA -----10 x 20mm oerlikons
9 x 24” Torpedo tubes (3 x 3) plus reload
18 x Depth Charges--------- 36 x Depth Charges (add 4 x Type 94 projectors)

Ayanami sub-class (Fubuki II)-Ten units
Displacement (std): 2080 t
Length: 388’ 6”
Beam: 34’ 1”
Speed: 38 knts
Speed (cruise): 14 knts
Range: 5000 nmi
Armament:------------------- Suggested Modifications
6 x Type 3 5”/50 (3 x 2)----- None. Units built with Type B turrets
28 x Type 96 25mm--------- 10 x 40mm bofors (5 x 2)
10 x 13mm Type 93 AA----- 10 x 20mm oerlikons
9 x 24” Torpedo tubes (3 x 3) plus reload
18 x Depth Charges--------- 36 x Depth Charges (add 4 x Type 94 projectors)

Akatsuki sub-class (Fubuki III)- four units
Displacement (std): 2080 t
Length: 388’ 6”
Beam: 34’ 1”
Speed: 38 knts
Speed (cruise): 14 knts
Range: 5000 nmi
Armament:-------------------- Suggested Modifications
6 x Type 3 5”/50 (3 x 2)------ Upgrade Type A turrets to Type B
28 x Type 96 25mm---------- 10 x 40mm bofors (5 x 2)
10 x 13mm Type 93 AA------ 10 x 20mm oerlikons
9 x 24” Torpedo tubes (3 x 3) plus reload
18 x Depth Charges---------- 36 x Depth Charges (add 4 x Type 94 projectors)

Hatsuhara class- six units
Displacement (std): 1831 t
Length: 359’
Beam: 32’ 10”
Speed: 36 knts
Speed (cruise): 14 knts
Range: 4000 nmi
Armament:------------------- Suggested Modifications
5 x Type 3 5”/50 (2 x 2-1 x 1)
-------------------------------5 x 40mm bofors (2 x 2-1 x 1)
-------------------------------6 x 20mm oerlikons
9 x 24” Torpedo tubes (3 x 3) plus reload
18 x Depth Charges
(as built due to Washington Naval Treaty limitations these ships were lighter, less stable and top heavy. This limits us to the amount of upgrading we can do).

Shiratsuyu class- Ten units (improved Hatsuharu’s)
Displacement (std): 1712 t
Length: 352’ 8”
Beam: 32’ 6”
Speed: 34 knts
Speed (cruise): 14 knts
Range: 4000 nmi
Armament:----------------- Suggested Modifications
5 x Type 3 5”/50 (2 x 2-1 x 1)
----------------------------5 x 40mm bofors (2 x 2-1 x 1)
----------------------------6 x 20mm oerlikons
8 x 24” Torpedo tubes (2 x 4) plus reload
16 x Depth Charges-------18 x Depth Charges

Asashio class- Ten units (1[SUP]st[/SUP] post-WNT class)
Displacement (std): 2408 t
Length: 388’ 1”
Beam: 33’ 10”
Speed: 35 knts
Speed (cruise): 10 knts
Range: 5700 nmi
Armament:-------------------- Suggested Modifications
6 x Type 3 5”/50 (3 x 2)
28 x Type 96 25mm---------- 10 x 40mm bofors (5 x 2)
10 x 13mm Type 93 AA------10 x 20mm oerlikons
8 x 24” Torpedo tubes (2 x 4) plus reload
36 x Depth Charges---------- 36 x Depth Charges (add 4 x Type 94 projectors)

Kagero class- Nineteen units
Displacement (std): 2032 t
Length: 388’ 9”
Beam: 35’ 5”
Speed: 35.5 knts
Speed (cruise): 18 knts
Range: 5000 nmi
Armament:------------------Suggested Modifications
6 x Type 3 5”/50 (3 x 2)
27 x Type 96 25mm--------10 x 40mm bofors (5 x 2)
4 x 13mm Type 93 AA-----10 x 20mm oerlikons
8 x 24” Torpedo tubes (2 x 4) plus reload
18 x Depth Charges--------36 x Depth Charges (add 4 x Type 94 projectors)

Shimakaze class- One unit building
This unit was laid down on 08 August 1941, so has been building for about two months as we speak.
I recommend we complete the build, but at present build no more. I also recommend that we build with
The modified AA fit.
Displacement (std): 2610 t
Length: 424’ 10”
Beam: 36’ 9”
Speed: 39 knts
Speed (cruise): 18 knts
Range: 6000 nmi
Armament: Suggested
6 x Type 3 5”/50 (3 x 2)
10 x 40mm bofors (5 x 2)
10 x 20mm oerlikons
15 x 24” Torpedo tubes (3 x 5)
36 x Depth Charges
4 x Type 94 projectors

Yugumo class-(improved Kagero’s)
We have six units nearing completion (Yugumo, Makigumo, Kazagumo, Naganami, Makinami, Takanami) and two additional units scheduled to be laid down (Kiyonami 15 October ’41 and Onami 15 November ’41) in the near future. I recommend we complete those building, but build no more at this time. Delay the two preparing to build and complete them to a modified design incorporating, simplification, modular and prefabricated construction, and an alternate weapons fit.
Displacement (std): 2077 t
Length: 390’ 6”
Beam: 35’ 5”
Speed: 35.5 knts
Speed (cruise): 18 knts
Range: 5000 nmi
Armament: Suggested
6 x Type 3 5”/50 (3 x 2)
10 x 40mm bofors (5 x 2)
10 x 20mm oerlikons
8 x 24” Torpedo tubes (2 x 4) plus reload
36 x Depth Charges
4 x Type 94 projectors
Note: All ships have their current configuration listed and to the right the proposed upgrades in their armaments fit. The six Yugumo's now building, I propose to complete with the updated weapons fit. I also propose that we immediately begin design changes to simplify, modularize and incorporate pre-fabrication to decrease build time on future Yugumo's. All ships will be upgraded to the new fit when operational requirements allow. Electronics fits, radar, radio direction finding and improved sonar fits will be done as the new units become available and as yard time and operational tempo permits. I do not recommend building any additional "Type A" destroyers at this time.

Type B Destroyers:
Akizuki class-We have four building and a 5th scheduled to be laid down in December.
Akizuki, launched 2 July 1941--Teruzuki, scheduled to launch 21 November 1941--Suzutsuki, laid down 15 March 1941--Hatsuzuki, laid down 25 July 1941.

I propose that we delay construction on the next unit until modifications can be made to streamline and simplify construction. We will more than recoup the delay time with the shorter production time, resources and manhours required. (Historical Michizuki sub-class) As soon as the design changes can be made I propose we schedule these to build up to a minimum of 12 ships. Two per each Fleet Carrier and build additional units at a minimum of two per additional carrier laid down. All building ships to be completed with the enhanced 40mm/20mm AA fit.

As a fall back in case of a lack of shipyard construction capacity or pressing operational needs, I suggest design studies be done on a supplemental, Type B.

--Type XB1-Production enhanced Yugumo hull with 4 x twin 3.9" main battery (8 tubes) and 2 x Type 94 Directors, no torpedo tubes, 40mm/20mm light AA fit, and minimum acceptable ASW fit.

--Type XB2-Production enhanced Yugumo hull with 4 x twin 5"/40 main battery (8 tubes), 2 x Type 94 Directors, 1 x quad mount torpedo tubes w/reloads, 40mm/20mm light AA fit, and minimum acceptable ASW fit.

Type C destroyers: (General Purpose) Production enhanced Yugumo hull with 3 x twin 3.9" main battery (6 tubes), 1 x Type 94 Director, 1 x quintuple mount torpedo tubes w/reloads, 40mm/20mm light AA fit, and moderate ASW fit.

I believe all new Fleet Destroyer production should be this Type. Now as good as the Akitzuki's for AA work, but acceptable capability. Not as strong a Torpedo/surface action fit, but still dangerous and capable. With an ASW fit good enough to get the job done when more capable ASW types are not available. Fully able to work with the battle fleet or as an escort when required.

Type D-Destroyer Escort (Lg) General purpose armament but of smaller size and lesser speed, than Type C, primarily for fast convoy/escort work. Use as leader for Type E/G units.

For the initial set of these I propose we use the 36 ships we currently have in service, of the Minekaze, Kamikaze and Mutsuki destroyer classes.

Minekaze, Kamikaze and Mutsuki class:
Displacement (std): 1367t/1400t/1315t (Minekaze/Kamikaze/Mutsuki)
Length: 337'
Beam: 30'
Speed: 39/37.25-36.88/37.25 knts
Speed (cruise): 14 knts
Range: 3600 nmi
Armament:------------------Suggested Modifications
4 x Type 3 4.7/45 (4 x 1)--2 x Type 3 4.7/45 2 x 1
16 x Type 96 25mm--------12 x 40mm bofors (6 x 2)
--------------------------------8 x 20mm oerlikons
6 (3x2/3x2/2x3) x 24” Torpedo tubes---1 x quad 24” Torpedo tubes no reload
18 x Depth Charges--------120 x Depth Charges (2 x depth charge racks and 6 x Type 94 projectors)

Note: The conversions of these ships can be made relatively rapidly. Type 93 Mod 3 Sonar would be mounted. I propose more numerous 40mm mounts to make up for the 4.7/45 being a single-purpose mount.

If we need additional units in this class I suggest we build the following historical type, preferably the Tachibana's because they are optimized for easier/quicker production. These ships were historically classified as Type-D and Modified Type-D destroyers. They had a top speed of only 27 knts and really were inadequately armed for any type of fleet action. While classified as destroyers they were actually closer to destroyer escorts and that is why I've chosen to designate them as such.

Matsu/Tachibana class:
Displacement (std): 1260t
Length: 328' 1"
Beam: 30' 8"
Speed: 27.5 knts
Speed (cruise): 18 knts
Range: 3500 nmi
Armament:------------------Suggested Modifications
3 x 5"/40 DP (1x1 1x2)-------None
24-39 x Type 96 25mm------10 x 40mm bofors (5 x 2)
----------------------------------8 x 20mm oerlikons
4 x 24” Torpedo tubes-------None
48 x Depth Charges 2 x racks 4 x Type94 Projectors--72 x Depth Charges (2 x depth charge racks and 6 x Type 94 projectors)
Type E-Destroyer escort (Sm)
We currently have 7 of the Wakatake class (2d Class Destroyers in service-Sarawabi lost Dec 1932). I propose upgrading them to inhance ASW fit and remove some armament to make more seaworthy.

Wakatake class-rerate from 2d class DD to Type E DE

Displacement (std): 910 t
Length: 280
Beam: 26'
Speed: 36 knts
Speed (cruise): 15 knts
Range: 3000 nmi
Armament:------------------Suggested Modifications
3 x Type 3 4.7/45 (3 x 1)----no change
4 x Type 96 25mm-----------10 x 40mm bofors (5 x 2)
4 x Type 93 13mm-----------8 x 20mm oerlikons
4 x 21” Torpedo tubes------none (remove all)
20 Mines---------------------120 x Depth Charges (2 x depth charge racks and 6 x Type 94 projectors)

-Shimushu class-four already in service. Recommend building no more units. Upgrade units in service to Ukuru class specifications. 874t StdDisplacement
-Etorofu class-(improved Shimushu) Scheduled to begin building March 1942. Recommend building no units. 884 StdDisplacement
-Mikura class-(improved Etorofu) Optimized for AA/ASW work and some simplification to speed production time. Scheduled to begin building October 1942. Recommend building no units. 955t StdDisplacement, 57,000 man hours.

-Ukuru class-(improved Mikura) Additional simplification and use of prefabrication to further reduce build time (@ 4 months). Historically, these proved to be very durable ships, despite rapid build times. Recommend all Type E production focus on this class. 955t StdDisplacement, 35,000 man hours

Proposed Ukuru class specifications:
Displacement (std): 955 t
Length: 258’ 4”'
Beam: 29.10'
Speed: 19.5 knts
Speed (cruise): 16 knts
Range: 5000 nmi
Armament:------------------Suggested Modifications
3 x Type 3 4.7/45 (1 x 2aft-1x1fore)
10 x 40mm bofors (5 x 2)
8 x 20mm oerlikons
120 x Depth Charges (2 x depth charge racks and 6 x Type 94 projectors)
1 x 3.1” AS Mortar

Type G-Escort (historical Ch-13,28 and 60 classes)
Displacement (std): 445t
Length-167’ 4”
Beam: 22’
Speed: 16.0 knts
Speed (cruise) 14 knts
Range: 2000 nmi
Armament:
1 x 88mm L/45 Type 99 DP gun
2 x 40mm bofors (1 x 2)
6 x 20mm oerlikons
36 x Depthcharges (1 x depth charge rack, 2 x Type 94 throwers)

I was going to use the Type H class to lump all small non-standardized types in such as trawlers, MTB's, converted merchant men etc., but I don't see us producing many more of them for ASW work so I have decided to delete this class.

 

I concur that we should not construct any more Type A Destroyers.

I am not sure that we are contemplating enough Type B (AA) Destroyers. Considering the value we place on our Carriers, and the fact we cannot out build the USA, perhaps we should aim for 3 or even 4 per Fleet Carrier. I see no provision is made for our CVL's. I would respectfully suggest that 2 per ship should be considered. Also that we should consider at least 1 per Battleship (preferably 2) as these are ships we cannot replace and they would likely be the secondary targets of enemy carrier aviation. In situations where we are operating them outside close contact with our CV/CVL's, they would become the primary target.

I concur that the Type C Destroyer becomes our future Fleet Destroyer.

If it is my understanding that our Type D Destroyer Escort would be used as Convoy Escort Leaders or as Hunter-Killer Leaders, then 36 units seem to meet our needs. I also agree with the Tachibana Class should be the follow on. I would suggest however that we lay down one Tachibana per year starting in 1942 pre-emptively to account for losses.

I concur that the Ukuru class (Type E) should constitute our primary convoy escort ship class.

Do we have enough Type G/H class vessels to provide port security? Do we need any for short range convoy escorts? Could we employ them at choke points using a small transport as a tender?

 

I had proposed that we build 12 (which is the historical number built). The problem is they are nearly cruiser sized and require a great deal of time and resources. I would suggest that we immediately build a couple of alternate Type XB1 or XB2, whichever our naval leaders decide upon, for evaluation purposes. They are smaller, cheaper and faster to build, being based upon a production optimized Yugumo hull. The Akizuki's will still be building in parallel. If they prove capable we can switch production, if not we can lay down more Akizuki's past the 12 units. When we get to discussing cruiser production I'd like to revisit the conversion of some our older CL's into CLAA's, to augment our AA capability for the carrier fleets.

Thank you sir. I will leave it to our esteemed naval colleagues to determine when and how many to start production of.

Can I begin scheduling them for dockyard time to begin their upgrades? The sooner we get some decent ASW vessels online the better.

Yes sir. I believe we can achieve respectable numbers of these and unless I am mistaken, this is the type ship Admiral Karonada suggested we use as our workhorse escort type. With your permission I'd like to go ahead and lay down a minimum of 4 per month initially. Another aspect that needs to be considered is captains for these vessels. I'd like to set up a dedicated ASW school, probably at Port Arthur, to train freshly minted Ensigns in ASW work. Then a cruise with an experienced Captain on actual ASW patrols, then give them their own ships.

Very good question sir. The answer is no. I'd like to convert a couple of our under utilized Merchant Shipyards into production of these types (Type G). The H Type which I did not delve into is miscellaneous patrol boats, trawlers, etc. and are really only good for backwater areas or as an interim measure.

 

If the XB1/XB2 class proves viable, then perhaps a compromise is possible. a single Type B and 2 XB's per CV, 2 XB's per CVL/BB?

I would also concur on dock time for Type D's, not all at once though. We cannot totally ignore our immediate convoy/ASW needs.

A dedicated ASW School seems a prudent course to me.

Any idea of how many Type G's we need to look at laying down per Quarter?

 

OK, while waiting on additional input as to the Destroyer/Escort proposal I'll move along to initial objectives in the SRA.

1.)We need to eliminate/neutralize Singapore. Air strikes from carrier division 1 (Akagi-Kaga) and carrier division 2 (Soryu-Hiryu) should hit Singapore at dawn, additional land based air from Indo-China will follow up and continue the supression. I request we designate the A6M2 as an inter-service aircraft, ramp up production, and re-equip some of our veteran IJA fighter squadrons with this aircraft. It's range advantage over the Ki-43 will allow us to escort bombers over this target and decrease aircraft losses.
2.) Carrier division 3 (Shokaku-Zuikaku) will sortie out of the Palaus and strike airfields on the south and east coasts of Borneo. Amphibious task forces will follow in trace and assault the Balikpaupan and Samarinda area, co-located on the southeastern coast of Borneo. Enemy forces are the IV KNIL Bn and Balipaupan Base Force at Balikpapan and the Samarinda KNIL Bn and Samarinda Base Force at Samarinda. I would recommend that we attack with sufficient force to seize the objective quickly before demolition of the oil facilities can occur. Balikpapan produces 3000t of oil per day and Samarinda another 1000t, this equals approximately 1/2 our daily shortfall (-8110t). There is also a refinery located at Balikpapan capable of refining 3000t per day.
3.) Carrier division 3 will continue east into the Java Sea then turn north-northwest and strike Palembang, an additional amphibious task force will follow and land near Palembang. Enemy forces at Palembang are the South Sumatra Garrison Bn, and Palembang Base Force. If sufficient long range transport aircraft can be allocated we can support this landing with airborne forces from Indo-China. If not I suggest we seize one or more of the small ungarrisoned islands off the northwest Borneo coast, between Singapore and Borneo. Serasan and/or Soebi-besar, possibly Groot Natoena. We could use small, submarine landed detachments to seize the islands and then marry them up with seaplane tenders AV's. Amphibious transport aircraft can land there re-fuel and carry on to the objective. If this is necessary it will move the assault date for this target to D+1. Palembang is our most important target, it produces 9000t of oil per day and has refineries capable of processing 10200t of oil daily. Enough to completely cover our oil shortfall (-8110t). Oosthaven located approximately 200mi south of Palembang is an important secondary target, it's port facilities and an oil pipeline running from Palembang to Oosthaven make it important to our long term needs. We need to look at this subject more indepth to determine if we try for it during initial operations or relegate it to secondary landings.

3.) Djambi, located approximately 100 miles north of Palembang is the third highest oil production location after Palembang and Balikpapan at 2500t oil per day. It's proximity to Singapore makes it problematic for taking during our initial efforts. This would be an excellent target to seize, if possible, with airborne or Special Submarine landed forces. I think it requires further discussion.

4.) Miri and Brunei, in the Sarawak region on the north coast of Borneo. While carrier divisions 1 & 2 are pummeling Singapore we can hit these two targets with amphibious landings and airborne drops out of Cam Rahn Bay. They are defended by the 100th Royal Navy Base Force at Miri and 107th Royal Navy Base Force at Brunei. We should be able to take these quickly. The Brunei landing force should immediately turn east and seize Beaufort. Oil production at these locations are oil 1500t day at Miri and 100t per day at Brunei. Miri also has refineries capable of refining 1500t per day.

5.) The 4th largest oil production facility is at Medan on the east coast of Sumatra, on the Straits of Malacca, north of Singapore. We can't get to it with surface forces until Singapore is reduced. This would be a prime target for submarine landed troops. If we seize Kota Bharu, see #6, we can re-supply or reinforce by air. Oil production 2100t per day, refineries located there capable of refining 2000t per day.

6.) Kota Bharu, a key British position. If we seize Kota Bharu we can cut off all British forces north of there from Singapore. We need the airfield to help neutralize the rest of the British bases in the area. We should make our major amphibious landing against Singapore here. Strike across the peninsula and take Taiping. Initially while carrier groups 1 & 2 are striking Singapore, land based air will strike Kota Bharu, Taiping, George Town, and Alor Star, suppressing their airfields. Carrier groups 1 & 2 after their initial airstrikes should fall back to a position north of Kota Bharu to provide support against enemy surface forces attempting to disrupt the landings. Land based air will take over the suppression of Singapore.

I await the council's input.

 

General strategic plan.
1.) Begin process to bring our economy to a full wartime footing. (Japan did not do this historically until 1943.
2.) Immediately cease production of DB-601/HA 40 engine type and swap production over to Nakajima Sakae HA-35 engine.
3.) Adapt the Ki-61 airframe that we are producing the DB-601 for over to a radial engine. (Actually done when the HA-40 engine plant was destroyed resulting in the Ki-100, the Ki-61 is nearing pre-production test flights, Dec. 41. The historical re-engineering took place between 19 Jan 45 and 1 Feb 45 so we're only talking a 12 day delay in introducing the aircraft).
4.) Adopt stingent communications opsec standards. Begin electronic disinformation campaign.
5.) Build up naval base at Truk. Construct repair shipyard at same. Re-base Kido Butai to Truk.
6.) Begin propoganda campaign within US to strengthen isolationist factions. Our initial action should be a letter to isolationist Senators that we request to be read into the congressional record and simultaneous publication in the Sunday newspapers that have an isolationist bias. This letter should contain an explaination of our recent political difficulties and reassurances that we desire peace and an Asia ruled by democratic governments. Begin dismantling Manchukuo Army, replacing those units with less experienced units, Japanese and Chinese, allowing our most experienced units to be re-deployed and removing the political threat posed by the Kwantung Army faction.
7.) Pressure Germany for complete sharing of technological research/developments. Pressure Germany to have Vichy Government lodge protest with the US over British and Free French seizures of Vichy French territory. (Vichy France and not Free France is the government recognized by the US as legitimate.)
8.) Establish Republic of China government, with down the road promise of independance along the lines of the US/Philipines, Tydings/McDuffie act. Present this action to the American public as such. Form CDF and CNDF units, (Chinese Defense Forces and Chinese Naval Defense Forces). Hopefully, these organizations will free up Japanese land Forces for redeployment and be able to take over ASW functions in the Yellow Sea from Japanese Naval Forces. Stress to the Chinese people that once these organizations are up and running we will begin withdrawl of Japanese Occupation forces.
9.) Begin establishment of industrial and shipbuilding facilities in major Chinese cities, Shanghai, Haichow, Tsingtao and Tientsin to start (once the shipyards are functioning concentrate on merchant and escort hulls). We insure that the Chinese constitution that we have them write, guarantees the rights of foreign property ownership. This protects our investment, ties their economic well being to ours, we portray it to the western powers as protecting their economic investments, we gain additional, valuable war production and pacify the Chinese people with jobs.
10.) Begin propoganda operations within China to convince the Chinese people that we are setting them on the path to an independant, self-governing country. Push the idea that the new government is the rightfull descendent of the Sun Yat-sen movement.
11.) JEF-China begins combat operations to clear and hold coastal regions of JEF-North and JEF-Center. Propaganda to western press that this is to allow for security in these areas, free from communist and warlord (Chaing) interference. Upon securing these areas begin setting up local governments, turn policing over to Chinese forces, hold local and District elections. Above all else avoid attrocities.
12.) This item we have not reached agreement on. Seizure of Noumea, New Caledonia and Kwangchowan (on the China coast near Hainan) from Free French Forces in conjunction with Vichy French Territorial troops. I still think we can focus attention on the south Pacific and isolate or force a diplomatic agreement with Australia. At the very least it could force a withdrawl of Australian forces serving with the British in the Far East for redeployment to protect Australia from a perceived threat. This will also focus US attention away from mainland Asia and towards the South Pacific. We will portray the action in the US press as aiding our French allies in regaining territory illegally seized, remove all combat troops immediately and return Kido Butai to Truk, to act as a counter to US intervention (unlikely). When time to execute the SRA plan comes, we pull Carrier divisions 1 & 2 and move them secretly to Formosa and carrier division 3 to the Palaus. The US will hopefully not detect their movement and will still think them deployed to Truk.
13.) Establish Republic of Korea, use a Tydings/McDuffie act, type of agreement. Establish a KDF and KNDF military organization. Tout this progress towards democracy in the US.
14.) Establish OEAS Organization of East Asian States. Have Japan, China and Korea as founding members. Invite the Philipines and Australia to join. Offer to let the US join in a non voting advisory capacity for the Philipines.

Gotta go, will finish up later...

 

SRA Objectives,

Will we have enough Airlift, Submarine Sealift and trained troops to make 2 assaults at the same time?

Despite our 24 hour notice, is it possible that command inertia within enemy force's could allow us to catch British/Dutch surface units in port on X Day?

 

Palembang is isolated enough that if we can take the facilities intact we should be able to hold it.
With our naval superiority and being able to establish an airfield we should be able to get reinforcements in. THe British fleet is easily available at Singapore, most Dutch units are at Soerbaja which is reachable, but there is a certain risk of detection, but there are only a few light cruisers and destroyers so the threat is minimal. The Dutch sub force is a greater threat. We could use some minelaying subs to block the harbor entrance.