Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

What happened to Nagato and Mutsu ?

I actually believe Shinano is best completed as a battleship if we can't give her a decent airwing size, a 50.000t, 27 knot carrier requiring 2400 men to operate with a 50 plane active wing looks more a liability than an asset. On the other hand a 9 ship battleline, (the four Kongos are best used to protect the carriers), is a powerful fleet in being that will force the enemy to operate concentrated, and, until the Iowas enter service, the US fast battleship force is actually inferior to our battleline, especially with a third Yamato added, so it will need to include some WW1 design ships which will limit it's speed giving our fleet a 3-4 to knots advantage, on paper enough to choose when to fight.

 

Mr. Ambassador, I re-read my post and I am afraid I didn't express my self clearly. I will clarify now.

Here I was comparing old battleship numbers, the older slower types.

Our intelligence reports that the US is building or plans to build a number of fast battleships: North Carolina, laid down 27 October 1937, and commissioned this past April. Washington, laid down 14 June 1938 and commissioned this past May. South Dakota laid down 5 July 1939 and nearing completion, Indiana laid down 20 Nov 1939, Massachusetts laid down 20 July 1939, and Alabama laid down 1 Feb 1940. It is our understanding that there are a further six of the improved Iowa class building or planned, Iowa laid down 27 June 1940, New Jersey laid down 16 Sep 1940, Missouri laid down 6 January 1941, Wisconsin laid down 25 January 1941, and at least two more planned for a total of 12 new fast battleship types.[/quote]

Here I was attempting to compare our numbers in "fast" Battleships.

Nagato, Mutsu, Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna, Yamato and Musashi. All these are capable of 27 plus knots.

Nagato, Mutsu, Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna.

Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna.

Yamato, Musashi.

I hope this clarifies, and I again apologize if the way I wrote my post was confusing.

Thank you also for the fine analysis! So do I understand you support completing Shinano?

 

What date would the Shinano be available as a BB. The US has other B's available and the Colorado class is close to the Nagato class. Here is a list of the US BB's

Arkansas, New York, Texas, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Arizona Prewar Us entry WW1
New Mexico, Mississippi during WW1
Idaho, Tennesee, California, Colorado, Maryland, West Virginia Post war
North Carolina, Washington, South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusets, Alabama Pre WW2 laydown
Plus the 4 Iowa class and 2 A additional Iowas were cancelled in production and 4 Montana class ships were planned.
thats 15 WW1 class BB's; 6 Prewar WW 2 class and 6 WW 2. So while some of the WW 1 ships are obsolete they would be of use as cannon fodder.

 

In order to consider our building needs we will need to consider the role that our various ship types will play. Most of these are obvious, but some might require a little consideration. I believe, in the end, that the purpose to our navy is to allow us the use of the sea to transport our men and materials while denying same to our enemies within our sphere of influence. This is a relatively traditional "Mahanian" way of looking at a navy, but it is the one that I believe best applies to our case. If we are to project military power it will need to cross water. Our enemies will need to do the same should they wish to threaten us. If we can control that water and determine who and what can move there we should be able to more or less control any military situation that arises within that sphere. Places like China are peripheral to the sphere, thus naval considerations do not hold quite so much sway, but if we wish to continue our endeavors there we must cross the East China Sea, so again, we need to control water.

Carriers, obviously, allow us to project an enormous amount of power over a vast range during daylight conditions, but they are expensive and vulnerable. Our discussions have been focusing on the idea that these represent our new "battle line." It is in this area that I would like to remain within a 10/6 ratio of the US as long as we can. (Better is optimal, but we cannot achieve it long term. Even fighting to stay within a 10/6 disadvantage will remain practical for only a limited time.)

Battleships formed our old battle line because they could project a large amount of power over a fairly long distance, though in neither case so great as carriers. They have more capacity to operate at night, which is useful, and they are much tougher, but I see little threat that they could close carriers quickly enough to force a night encounter without being exposed during daylight hours. Thus I think that carriers used with some judicious seamanship can completely neutralize battleships as a threat, which means that battleships can only serve to project power where there are no enemy carriers, relegating them to a decidedly secondary role. They can still be useful for night actions where daylight exposure is not expected or can be minimized, as escorts for capital ships, or for shore bombardment, but they are quite expensive for these roles and other ships might perform them nearly as well, or even better in some cases. I think we need to quit thinking of purely surface units as capital ships and start regarding them as auxiliary warships. I think we should retain the battleships that we have, but I see no need for more. Let the Americans build all they want. They're simply wasting money. (Something I strongly favor in our enemies.)

I think our cruisers, with their strong torpedo armament, can serve as our principal auxiliary combatants. They have a useful gun armament that can be used for shore bombardment (if not so deeply as larger caliber rifles). Their torpedo armament allows them to threaten any warship of any size. They are large enough to have some staying power, so long as they don't attempt a slugging match with a battleship. (And with their greater speed they should be able to avoid such things, though something like Hood in her prime could have been a problem, and the Iowas may well be that problem when they are completed if reports are to be believed. Fortunately, aircraft are still much faster than that.) I would favor building more cruisers eventually, since we will need to maintain this fine force.

But for present, I think the only large combatant that we need to build in any quantity at all is the aircraft carrier. Everything else will be serving ancillary roles. They may well be useful roles, but they are only useful to the extent that they aid us in controlling the seas, which job now seems the province of the aircraft and those ships designed to support them.

I will leave smaller warships for another day. We obviously have great need of many, but it is a separate issue and we are amply supplied with smaller slips to carry out simultaneous programs building both large and small combatants.

These are rough thoughts, of course, but I am a little distracted by my inspection tour. I must say, it is pleasant to be abroad in Korea and I am looking forward to being in Indochina tomorrow, but I do wish either I spoke some Korean or more people spoke just a bit more Engl . . . er Japanese rather. Of course, this very inspection tour demonstrates the usefulness of aircraft. I am in Korea tonight. I will be in Indochina tomorrow. This would not be possible were it not for the aircraft we are discussing. Ships are wonderful, but they're clearly quite visible from above and they just don't move as quickly, which is rather germane to this argument.

Reporting from Seoul,
Admiral Noka

 

I didnt mean we should start building today, but we will likely face losses in the future and we should at least plan for replacing them.

 

I find myself in close agreement with Admiral Noka.

If Shinano could be completed in under a year I might favor launching her as she was designed. That she is only 40% complete and seems to be suitable to conversion to a CV makes me prefer her as such.

I am moderately confident that she could be completed with a second hanger, and possibly with a smaller third hanger. This should give her an airwing of 75 to 100 planes (more with deck parking).

She would not be the perfect CV as she would be more expensive to construct and operate than our previous ships. She would also not be as agile, but her survivability, large airwing (perhaps double that currently om Agaki/Kaga) and room for any CinC facilities we might desire would off-set her liabilities.

Prime Minister

 

I need to make a correction to keep us on historical track, we've discussed this subject a number of times and because we weren't getting too heavily into the specifics of the ship, just her possible conversion I haven't brought it up. Today's date in the scenario is October 04, 1941. We have two Yamato's that are not nearing completion, Shinano and Hull#111. Within the game I turned their construction off until we could decide their fate. Shinano's construction was not historically restarted until June 1942 after the Midway disaster, at that time plans were made to convert her to an aircraft carrier. She was laid down on 04 May 1940, work was suspended in December 1941 after Pearl Harbor @45% complete and in June 1942 (sometime after 07 June 1942) it was decided to convert her to a carrier. So if we are planning from our current game date she is considerably less than 45% complete (on the negative side), on the plus side, if we make the decision to convert now to a carrier it should be easier. Just a rough ballpark guesstimate would be commissioning in mid-April 1944 vs 19 November 1944.
Hull #111 was 30 percent complete at the same time that work was stopped on Shinano. If we use December 07th as the suspension date and 04 May 1940 as the date laid down, we have 581 days of construction to reach 45% complete for Shinano or .0774 percent completed per day. The exact date Hull#111 was laid down is not definitive in the sources I have, just "in August 1940 after Yamato was launched". Yamato was launced on 08 Aug 1940 so we have the earliest date locked down, if we assume #111 was laid down the next day or 09 Aug 1904 (I think this unlikely, but without a better date I have to go with it). If we assume the same day for suspension of construction 07 Dec 1941 and the approximate 30% complete, we have 485 days of construction or .0618 percent completed per day. If I use the commonly reported 40% complete estimate for Shinano our percent completed per day would be .0688, if we apply this same rate to Hull#111 we would get a percent complete of 33.36 which is pretty close to the 30% complete reported so I think the .0688 per day is probably a fairly close approximation, and makes the oft quoted 40% complete for the Shinano as the better number. I would appreciate it if anyone has any more definative data on these two hulls so we can get a more accurate picture.


Notes: The date for the stopping of construction on the Shinano's hull are ambiguous from the sources I have, variously reported as in mid-1941, December 1941 or after Pearl Harbor. None are specific as to the date, but a December date is quoted more often.
-The level of completion of the hull is also not very precise. Some sources say 40%-others 45% and 50%.
-The date of restaring contruction as a carrier is also not very precise, just "after Midway in June 1942".

 

A minor aside: as I landed at Tan Son Nhat in Saigon I noticed rows of small square concrete revetments. I have not found definitive information on the origin of these structures. Other forces beside our own have, of course, used the facility, but it's a striking reminder of the ungentle military history of the region into which we are now inserting ourselves. And also of just how many armies have thrown themselves against the rocks in southeast Asia to meet only terrible loss. Like the Kinh of Indochina we are a people made of stern stuff, and I am entirely confident that if we fight with courage and act with justice we can defeat the Western powers that have so long had their way here, but it will be a long, bloody, and terrible endeavor; one we should enter only at last resort as any other solution that does not require us to bow abjectly and completely to China or the West will yield a better harvest.

 

Japan's industrial capacitywas so inferior to that of the US, the only way she could have avoided losing the war would be if the US
quit. After Pearl Harbor, that possibility no longer existed. While the US was blessed with Spruance and Nimitz, even the dim
lights of an Admiral Kimmel could have prevailed once the US started pumping out one aircraft carrier per month. Japan (and Yamamoto's)
only hope was of a negotiated settlement, which Yamamoto himself destroyed, unknowingly (he thought the destruction
of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor would convince the American public that war with Japan was hopeless). Yamamoto was one
really lousy psychologist.

 

I believe "inferior" could be applied to all other participants industrial capacities when compared to the US, not just Japan's. We will not attack Pearl Harbor and intend to use the American public's isolationist sentiment to avoid war with the US for as long as possible. Britain, the Netherlands and Australia, lack the military and material resources to really challenge us without US intervention. If the US does enter the War it will be because they choose to, not because we forced their hand. In which case we need only make it so costly in lives and war fighting materials that the American public lose the will to continue the fight. (Historically, the US public was reaching that point in early 1945, then along came the bomb, even with Pearl Harbor).

I basically agree with this statement, except I really don't think Kimmel was the dim-wit you seem to think he was.

 

Out of character: I can think of several countries that have either defeated the United States or forced a stalemate. I flew carefully around one last week. I'm sitting in a second this very moment. Both have vastly inferior industrial capacities and had even smaller industries then. One or two other significant conflicts show the potential of coming out that way. There was a time when the United States was perhaps willing to fight a long war in a far away land with little direct interest at stake and without vast psychological impetus. That time probably predated instant communication. The war we are contemplating does not. Pearl Harbor provided one heck of a kick in the seat of the psychological pants. We're not going to make that particular mistake.

In the game: I'm all in favor of devestating the U.S. Pacific fleet . . . after they decide they want to start a war with us. We may well lose this. It's surely possible. But unless we want to go home from China with our tail between our legs and give Stalin everything much west of Honshu we need to do something. And whatever that might be we'll need oil. And oil can be got only from the U.S. or the Dutch colonies. Ergo . . . war it is. I see no other viable choice under the present foreign regimes.

 

A part of what we are trying to accomplish is to prove the theory that Japan's war could have been fought more wisely. To be honest should our efforts allow us to keep the US from reaching a point where they are able to launch a final assault against the Home Islands by mid-late 1945, then we will have accomplished this goal and I personally will be well satisfied.

 

First I would like to apologize for my recent non-participation, I had a son home on leave for the holidays and spent most of my time with him. (The other one got out a couple months ago and he lives here, well he's still got IRR time left but hopefully won't be called back before that's done, so I actually had both at home for Christmas. Not something that's happened a lot the last eight years). I have been keeping up with new posts and replying where necessary. Now I'm ready to get back to work.

We have covered battleships, fleet carriers, CVL's, near term carrier conversions, destroyers, destroyer escorts, and smaller escorts. If I understand it the Council has reached a general concensus in all these areas. The sole exceptions being the fate of Shinano and Hull#111. I have sent the shipyards orders to begin preparations to build two more Shokaku class CV's and to plan on laying down a third when the shipyard capacity is available.

Now to Japanese Heavy Cruisers. We have 18 Heavy Cruisers in service, two Furutaka's, two Aoba's, four Myoko's, four Takao's, four Mogami's, and two Tones. On the plus side due to their powerful torpedo armament they are very powerful ships, on the negative side they have weak AA armament, are somewhat top heavy which limits how much we can rectify that problem and are of an older technological era the oldest being laid down in 1922 and the newest in 1935. Our intelligence reports that the United States is laying down a new heavy cruiser class, the first ship being laid down this year. They are apparently improved Wichita class vessels and will be well balanced ships with good armor, main gun firepower and a good AA fit. They still will not mount torpedo tubes so we retain an advantage there. We have plans to lay down a follow-on class, the Ibuki's, construction to begin in the first quarter of 1942. Do we go ahead with these ships? Do we build to a modified design, incorporating a stronger AA fit? Do we build another design? Or do we completely forego new heavy cruiser construction?


Next up, Light Cruisers.

 

If my memory serves, in our initial discussion's, the general opinion was that, except for CV's, we lacked the resources to construct ships greater in size than perhaps Light Cruiser's. Further, that as a class, the task of a Heavy Cruiser could in most cases be acomplished by a Light Cruiser, especially our's with their heavy torpedo armament.

It is hoped that our increased industrialization, coupled with a more prudent resource allocation and delivery program, would allow us greater freedom to build then the situation we currently find allows us to.

Even if we do not lay down another Heavy Cruiser for the duration of this conflict, it would be wise to have an agreed upon design waiting in our vest pocket so to speak. Conditions we can not yet foresee might force us to lay down such a vessal, or we might find we indeed have the capacity to do so.

Such a vessal must be a balanced design, that if possible, be economical to produce in time and material's

I gather from Col. Bobimoto's breifing, the Ibuki class share many of the flaw's that our current Heavy Cruiser's possess, Top heavy and weak in Air Defence.

I say keep the Ibuki design in reserve, while proceeding with a new (or revised Ibuki) design that meet the criteria above. If the need is great enough, proceed with the original Ibuki design, otherwise hold off untill we have a better design.

Once we do, decide then whether or not to put this class into production based on the needs of the time.

Prime Minister

 

I fully agree with your thinking in this area sir.

Sounds like a wise plan to me sir, perhaps Admiral Noka, Karonada or Takao might provide us with the characteristics desireable in such a vessel. Provide me with the design requirements and I will see to it that we have a such a design waiting in the wings.

A wise course of action, in my humble opinion.

 

Would it be possible to do somework on the CA's to reduce their weight. As far as design since we have decided that the CL's will be built for AA work then we need to think about surface combat as the main function of the CA.

 

Light cruisers-We currently have 17 light cruisers, two Tenryu's, five Kuma's, six Nagara's, and three Sendai's. The oldest was laid down in 1917, the newest in 1924. The two oldest are showing their age and I would recommend we convert them to fast transports. The next five I would like to see converted into an AA escort configuration to protect Kido Butai. It will mean that much of their torpedo armament will need to be landed, but we will retain some for emergency situations. They will fill the gap until our Type-B destroyers of the Akizuki class can join the fleet. (The Akizuki's are essentially comparable to light AA cruisers). These five converted cruisers and the Akizuki's should prove comparable to the recently launched US Atlanta class or the British Dido class CLAA's.

I recommend retaining the remainder in their current configurations at present, but upgrade their medium and light AA fit as the weapons, operational requirements and yard space permit.

We have three light cruisers building, two Agano class, Agano which should be launched later this month and Noshiro that was just laid down in September of this year. There are plans for laying down two more Agano's. We also have the Oyodo, which was laid down in February of this year. The two classes share a common hull design, the Oyodo being an enlarged version, but in my opinion neither are a fully adequate design. The Agano's have a particularly weak surface armament and the Oyodo is being built with the aft portion dedicated to the operation of float planes. Agano is so far along that it will probably be necessary to complete her as planned, Noshiro has been building for a month, scrap her and restart with a Oyodo hull, and temporarily suspend construction on Oyodo so she could be completed to a more adequate configuration. I'd go with the overall Oyodo design, but sacrifice the large aircraft compliment for an aft triple 6"/60 turret. The US has seven Brooklyn class light cruisers, capable, well armored ships, with very good anti-ship armament, two St. Louis class (improved Brooklyn's) and nine Cleveland class building, with more on order and two nearing launch.

Finally, we have three Katori class training cruisers in service and a fourth, Kashihara (laid down 23 Aug '41) building. These are very poor designs, capable of only 18 knots and weakly armed. I recommend scrapping the Kashihara and starting an improved Oyodo, and re-designate the other three as CL(E) escort cruisers and use them as escort leaders. We should not expend a great deal of resources upgrading them, just add ASW weapons and some medium and light AA weapons.


I await the Council's recommendations.

 

I was not suggesting that they need additional AA capability for escort work, simply an adequate AA fit to protect themselves. I am not really sure what could be done to decrease the topweight, which I am sure will still increase once we are able to field electronic sensors now being developed. Hopefully our more knowledgeable naval experts can provide us with more information in this area.

 

Tenryu Class, I hate to lose a warship to auxillery duties, but Lt. Wiki's personal breifing leads me to discount these ships as being capable combat vessals in almost any configuration, so I approve of their conversion to fast transport's if this is the wish of our senior naval commander's.

Kuma Class, As we already have agreement in the matter of CLAA conversion's, this meets with my approval, again with the consent of our Naval commander's.

Nagara and Sendai Class's, Agree with the air defence and any radar improvement's we can make as time, space, technology and resourses permit.

Agano Class, Lt. Wiki's private breifing informs me that the Agano would be a less than ideal opponent for a enemy ship of her class. Would it be advisable to re-configure her to a CLAA type ship? I have no problem switching her 6x6 inch guns for lighter and more rapid firing weapons. I would wish to hear the thoughts of our naval commander's. By all means, Scrap the recently started sister ship.

Oyodo Class, I have stated in the past that I have limited faith in Seaplanes launched from our Cruiser's or Battleship's as an adequate scouting arm. By all means make use of what we currently have, but go no further down this road. I fully support this class with the additional 6"/60 turret. Again I would welcome the council of our naval officer's here.

Katori Class, I must confess this was something of a surprise to me and cannot fathom the thinking of so many "Training Cruiser's". Converting the three existing units to escort duties seem wise considering their slow speeds. I can see no use for the fourth hull except as perhaps a CVE.

Are we not forgetting the Yubari or has she been re-classified as a destroyer?

 

can the Katori class be upgraded in the engine and guns.