Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Dear Colonel Bobimoto,

you know ab it about my plannings regarding China, My point of interest is to know where we ahve the right troops and how long will take it to get them where they needed. The othere question is a inteligence one. Which kind of troops are at the place where we want to start. And At least i want to hear your opinon on my thoughts and this in a private way. PM me please to discuss somethings before i want to place them here.

Thank you in advance!

Sincerely yours,

Gen Nishio

 

An interesting quote over on the IJN board. Not sure what he's basing it on but:
http://www.j-aircraft.org/smf/index.php?topic=13543.0
barbaryan stated:

A book that might be of interst is reviewed at
http://www.j-aircraft.org/smf/index.php?topic=13651.0

 

Im not sure how since the Shinanao was also a converted hull. Even if so, the lack of pilots was as much of an issue.

 

The two unnamed Unryu class carriers(Hull # 5002 & hull # 5005) were cancelled and with their budget and materials being used for the reconstruction of Shinano. Most sources state that this was done in 1943.

 

interesting. Don't think it would have mattered since the lack of pilots would have limited their usefulness

 

You are right Steve, it would not have mattered. IIRC, the Unryu never had a specific embarked Air Group, at least not that I remember, and Air Group 601 that was to have been embarked on the Amagi & Katsuragi, was expended in the defense of Iwo Jima - never having been aboard the two carriers. So having two small carriers with no planes, fuel, or avgas, or one large carrier with no planes, fuel, or avgas is all just academic...Would you rather have one large empty glass or two small empty glasses.

 

Colonel Bobimoto,

first let me thank you for joining us.

Dear Gentlemen,

For the reason that i am a kind of busy with some plannings, Colonel Bobimoto will will set forth the situation we find in China and the strategy my staff and i have developed to deal with it.
Gentlemen, if you have any suggestions or questions regarding this topic, please feel free to bring them to our attention. We will adress them and now please Colonel Bobimoto start the briefing!

Sincerely yours,

Gen. Nishio

 

Excellent, I look forward to the detailed operational plans!

 

Thank you General Nishio,
Gentlemen General Nishio and I have discussed, privately, how best to present the China issue to the council. We had discussed not bringing it before the council until we had a final operational plan or to produce the final plan in the presence of the entire council. I placed the decision before the General and he opted for the latter, which I personally consider to be the wiser course, due to the immense amount of information involved and the possibility of having to rework the entire plan to incorporate any objection(s) by the council. Certain areas will also require "buy in" and coordination by the commanders of other areas, Admiral Noka with regards to his Naval Logistics Command and General Terauchi Hisaichi (steverodgers801), whose Indo-China forces will need to assist/coordinate with General Nishio in the area of the border of Indo-China and southwest China.

Our first decision was to re-organize the Army in order to break up existing control of certain organizations by elements that supported the abortive coup attempt. To start we evaluated all existing IJA/IJN land units and rated their experience, training and capabilities on a scale of zero to 100. We set 35 as the base experience and training level for a Japanese formation with personnel that had not seen combat, but whose personnel had completed initial basic training, advanced initial specialty training and basic training at the unit level. We had to set the basic level at 35 to accomidate the training/experience levels of partner nations and enemy formations that fell below the level of our most basically trained units. Throughout our briefing we will use this scale to indicate the training and experience levels of all friendly and opposition forces.
Next we assigned a seperate value to reflect the combat capability of each unit structure from battalion, regiment, brigade and divisional sized unit. We currently use several hundred different TOE's for our various bns/regts/bdes/divs, many unit TOE's are similar but very few are exactly the same. We wanted less specialization and more standardized TOE's that would offer us more flexability in where they were employed and would offer us a wider selection of units that could be pluged into a slot to replace a battle damaged or severely used and thus fatigued unit and be assured of having a unit of comparable capabilities to use as a replacement. We took the specialized units and formed seperate companies, battalions and regiments to attach to the different bns/regts/bdes/divs as operational requirements dictated. Some examples of units we stripped were light AA weapons, armored or mechanized reconaissance, horse cavalry, heavy artillery, etc. Let me take one unit and use it as an example:

42d Infantry Division TOE

Infantry squads x 324
Combat Engineer Squads x 48
HMG squads x 56
37mm Type 94 ATG x 22
70mm Type 92 Howitzer x 18
75mm Infantry Gun x 12
75mm Type 90 Field Gun x 36
Motorized Infantry Squads x 12
Horse Cavalry Squad x 16
Type 97 Tankette x 7
7,7mm Type 99 AAMG x 16
Construction Engineer squads x 5
various motor transport and logistical support squads x 460

If used in a mountainous, jungle or areas covered with rice paddies, the Motorized infantry would be road bound and of little use, this division could use more light highly mobile reconaissance assets such as cavalry. Conversely, if employed in an area with a well developed road network more mechanized infantry, and tankettes would be more effective than horse cavalry. Another consideration would be fuel supply, in an area where it is difficult or extremely costly to keep the divisional mechanized assets supplied, more horse borne capability would be usefull. Many of our operational areas and all of our Home Island based units at present have a zero threat from enemy aircraft. Why not pool the AAMG's in companies to attach to units where the threat is possible so that they have a stronger AA capability? Other changes involve the intrinsic weapons systems, we plan to add some and delete others to provide for a bns/regts/bdes/divs with more punch using fewer men. The excess personnel are then available to use as replacements or to man new formations. Our new TOE for the infantry squad will increase the capability of the basic squad by about 70%, we are planning on a follow on TOE, based upon proposed weapons or weapons under development that could increase the firepower to 115% of our present capability. We propose to begin upgrading our squad structures with our most experienced units and those slated for the Malaya/SRA operation first. As units are upgraded additional units will upgrade to the new T-41 TOE, then additional changes are planned for in our T-42 TOE, mainly adding additional support assets that we will need time to produce.
Gentlemen, questions and comments thus far?

 

Pooling, motorized Infantry, cavalry, AA and armor and then doling them out where needed seems quite reasonable. Do we not also have Bicycle mounted infantry, and would it be prudent to add them to the pool?

 

Yes sir, and that is within the reorganizational plan. I did not list all specialized unit types, I was just using those within the example 42d Divisions TOE. As I stated we have hundreds of TOE's making selecting the right unit for a particular job problematic. The General and I would also like the capability to pair the basic unit (bn/regt/bde/div) with the appropriate capability level component. There are some of our formations in China that are mediocre infantry divisions with intrinsic veteran armored components, I think that if we have a particularly formidable opponent that requires additional assets to defeat I don't have to chose between the unit with the best armored component or the best infantry component to use. Our plan is to adopt a triangular structure 3 companies and a weapons company for a battalion, three battalions to a regiment, 2 regiments to a brigade or 3 regiments for a division. We will take like assets stripped from the divisions, i.e. a light tank company and pair it with other units of comparable training/experience and form them into an independant light tank bn, for use where needed. We will use experience/training to dictate who is upgraded. For instance we might have a Lt. tank bn with a (40) experience/training level and another Lt. tank bn with a rating of (80) both equipped with the Type 95/37mm Ha-Go Light Tank and want to upgrade to the Type 95/47mm Light Tank. When suffcient vehicles are available I'd prefer to upgrade the (80) level unit, mating the best unit with the best available weapons system. We have an upgrade TOE for the basic Lt. tank bn that includes SP artillery and SP casemated (Stug type) assault guns. Once again we'd be best off to upgrade to the TOE with the new weapons and capabilities with the units that have the most capability.

Your thoughts sir?

 

It sounds quite sensible and scientific. The reorganization should also pay dividends in the area of supply of active units allowing us to employ standard units of supply for field formations based upon a more limited schedule of TOE's. There is little reason to overly stockpile fuel for units with little motorization or armor, or AA munitions for units not threatened by enemy airstrikes.

I am in full agreement that the most combat effective formations should receive first call on new and improved equipment, but we must not let this hinder us in the strenuous effort to raise the training level of less effective units. If this can be accomplished by vigorous training, fine, but in some cases it might require the shifting of personnel to improve the quality of combat formations. This could perhaps take place during combat lulls that naturally occur because weather or season.

The strategic situation at some point in the future may not permit us the luxury to pick and choose which formations we send into battle. We can do this now because we are deciding the time and tempo of operations, but at some given point this option will increasingly fall into the province of our enemies. We must balance the needs of now with those of the clouded future.

 

Good point sir, and one we have taken into account with our planning. Initially, the least capable formations will be employed in rear areas and will train intensively. We desire to have the Chinese provide security within major population centers, (more on this later) we would establish camps on the outskirts of these cities where we would train intensively, but also be available to support the Chinese forces within the urban area. It is probable that just our presence will suffice to aid in maintaining order and we will not be called upon to actually support the Chinese. Once we have reached a certain level of proficiency with the unit we will move on to limited combat against weaker opponents. Clearing operations against insurgents would be one way to use them or use a veteran unit for an actual assault and a less seasoned unit for mopping up/pursuit operations after major combat is concluded. We will continually use them in more and more demanding situations, resting, rebuilding and retraining between employments until they reach a peak of efficiency.
Another method we would like to use is instead of forming a full strength division or regiment, field a regiment or battalion to serve as a cadre in case we need to rapidly expand. We would draft the personnel, give basic and advanced, individual training and have them drill a couple days a month to maintain basic skills. The cadre battalions or regiments would be capable of expanding to regimental or divisional sized units by splitting, then being brought to strength with these reservists allowing the unit to retain a good deal of organizational experience. I will go more into the mechanics of this shortly, I do not want to get sidetracked just yet, but these trained reserves should allow for rapid expansion, but require limited logistical strain until mobilized.

 

Gentleman, did some digging and according to my "war in the Pacific" game here are the units and locations of the allies.
Australia 2 cl at port moresby along with a base force and 1 BDE and 1 Battalion. Rabaul 1 bat and 1 co. Lae, Salamua and waugo 1 co each. in Australia 1 dd, 1 cl and 1 ca. New Zealand 2 cl.
DEI Ambon, a CD, 3 wh139, 3 B339, 5 Hudson. Koepang 4 Hudson 1 bat, 1 co Dili 1 BF and AA. Medan CD and 2 bat Sabana 3 bat, Palembang 2 cl BAt and base force plus cd. Benkoelen bat, Kendari Makassar, menando each a bat and a bf. Soerbaja bf, HQ 3 bat cd 5 ss, 1 dd, 1 pg 12 pt plus other subs at sea based out of soerbaja. Djoekarta 6 falcons bandoeg 139 wh, 6 falcon. Malang 6 139 wh madioen 12 hawk, 10 demon, pamekasan 1 reg, loemadang 1 reg, sorong recon, ternate recon, Samarinda 8 139 wh, 7 b3339 bt,
balikpappan bf and bat, Tarakan bf,cd bat and recon.

British next

 

Burma, 1 division broken down into bde and bat scattered through out plus additional battalions. 3 bde and 10 battalions total. plus support units. there are also 60 planes of the AVG group at Toungoo. India has a couple of divisions, at least 5 bde and tank units for use in defence and probably will not travel out of country.

at Miri, Jesselton and Brunei there are base forces, Kuching has a bat and a cd.
Malaya Alor Star 12 Blenheim 2 bde and a bf Kuantan 8 Hudson; 9 Blenheim 1, bde, AA and bf; 2 Beauforts; 2 sword, Kuala Lumpor aviation support and RAF HQ, Khota baru 8 Hudson, 7 vildebeast, 2 buffalo 2 bde abd bf. Taiping bde, AT battery and BF Temuloh 3 bat and art reg; Mersing Aus bde and aa battery Johore 6 wirraway aus bde; Singapore 4 Hudson, 14 blenhiem iv 12 vildebeast, 33 buffalo, 6 sword, bb and bc, 2 cl and 9 dd and 1 pg.

 

There 6 air bases on Malaya to hit which can be done in cooperation between naval and land based air craft. The British are not able to sustain long term combat due to the obsolete nature of most of their aircraft and the inability to bring in replacements. There are the two capital ships which can do damage and our forces are more then a match for even the combined non capital forces of the Dutch and British. having our 4 fast BB in reserve and with air assets to cover invasion forces we should have little problem form the capital ships. We can have hunter killer groups composed of DD's and CA's to cover in case the other warships try to make an appearance, The majority of troops in Malaya and Burma are of India or native forces, there are just the two Australian bde in Malaya.

The first question to ask the council high command is do we concentrate all 8 carriers on Malaya or do we send a light force to try to hit Soerbaja, the main Dutch base.
I believe that there are 2 possibly 3 primary Dutch targets, Balikpappan, Tarakan and if approved Palembang. Ambon and Kendari are worth first day targets due to their air capacity and would offer nice air bases for land based. We can also seize Miri and Brunei on the first wave since they have limited defence and are oil producers. Kuching on the north side of Borneo also is a good target, it does have defenses, but it also offers a good air base to cover the southern approach to Singapore. In the south Pacific, Rabaul is the essential target, it will allow us to have land based air superiority over most of the region.
One thing we could try is to give the Dutch governor a ultimatum the night before as discussed, allow the Dutch to remain in control as long as they allow us to occupy Palembang and they agree to sell us the materials we need.
tomorrow I will redo my attack force proposal.

 

Out of Character post: Steve the reason you cannot use the standard WitP:AE start scenario is that ours has been adjusted to reflect forces and their positions on 03 October 1941, not December 7th. For instance the two capital ships you mentioned. HMS Prince of Wales did not depart for the Far East until 25 October 1941, arriving at Singapore on December 2d, along with Repulse and the destroyers HMS Electra, Express, Encounter and Jupiter. Repulse had rendevoused with PoW on November 28 near Ceylon. As we are planning to launch our initial assaults at dawn on 25 November the two ships will not initially be a factor. In fact we might want to use a simple expedient such as having a submarine picket line across the northern entrance of the Straits of Malacca to intercept and delay, damage or possibly sink these two ships. There is also the possibility that we might discover and attack them by air on their approach from Ceylon. The point I am trying to make is that some reinforcing units may not have arrived, the allied players may have re-positioned them or any number of other things in the nearly two months before we attack.

 

Further, the allies will have the opportunity to react. Australia could conceivably transport a division sized unit to Port Moresby while we are forming up an invasion force. I have good information that Illustrious and Formidable are in the U.S. working up after repairs. Indomitable is set to commission shortly. Ark Royal is presently assigned to Mediterranean duties and Victorious is operating with Home Fleet. I wouldn't anticipate either of these two units being reassigned immediately, but I could envisage perhaps two or maybe all three of the others venturing to the defense of Singapore. Other heavy units are also available, including several older carriers, a quite large variety of battleships of various ages and speeds, and more cruisers than I care to think on. The British cannot commit their full force, and even half would deplete their commitments in the West more than I would expect, even with the German and Italian navies largely under control, but I would not count on the rosey projections you have put forth.

How well can we hope to keep tabs on major enemy units until the commencement of hostilities? We have good intelligence on movements to and from Pearl Harbor, and I would guess similar intel on San Diego and Bay Area installations and possibly Norfolk as well. (And the Brooklyn, Washington, and Philadelphia yards are buried in heavily urbanized areas that I assume everyone and their brother knows precisely what's going on there.) Until the onset of hostilities with the U.S. we can probably count on some fairly decent intel on most major U.S. naval bases. If it is at all possible I'd love to develop similar assets in England. If we don't already have them in Singapore, Hong Kong, Perth, Darwin, Sydney, and so forth around the Pacific Rim. If we aren't already supplied with eyes this should be a top priority.

But all of this is a diversion. At present we are discussing China, which should require few of our warships but much of our logistical capacity. I suspect our cohorts might be proposing something of a "China First" policy, rather like Roosevelt's "Germany First" assurances my sources tell me he's made to Churchill. (We won't discuss who would be second. I pray we can avoid that eventuality for a time, at least. Perhaps he means Italy second, since they are presently at war with the "Allied Nations.") I would propose that we table discussion of the SRA briefly, bringing it back up when we begin to discuss the logistical needs of China theatre operations, since the needs of the two theatres should not intersect until that point.

 

I wanted to clarify that my info was based on the game, for source. I wanted to give all an idea of the OPFOR We can assume that the opponents will make adjustments also. As far as Rabaul due to the lack of an air force in the area I am not too worried. Hollandia is also suitable for an air base and we can use our carriers once they are done with their initial assignment if the need is their. We can also use some surface ships to blockade Rabaul if needed until we are ready.
according to the game only the Hermes was in the Indian with the Indomitable coming in later. The Warspite is undergoing work at Bremerton. In order to reach Singapore the British have to come down the Malacca straits and that is very vulnerable to our air assets at Bangkok and we can as mentioned put a sub picket up. They can also come via the south end of Sumatra, but we can make any excursion towards Singapore a risky one with our Bettys and Nell's. Soerbaja is available which why we may want to consider hitting it at the start so as to put doubt in the allies minds.

 

Thank you Admiral Noka, for understanding the situation and keeping the discussion on track. First to finish with the unit expansion subject. As I stated earlier we will be using a triangular structure for our new TOE's. When it is necessary to expand our forces we have the option of standing up an entirely new unit or expanding an existing unit. General Nishio, myself and the General's staff favor the second option where possible. Regiments can expand into divisions, battalions into regiments. We favor new units being formed to be battalion sized elements that can be trained up, seasoned and then expanded.
So here is the general scheme.
-Each of the three battalions of the expanding regiment will form the basis for one of the three regiments in the division.
-Each of the three companies in each expanding battalion will form the basis for one of the three battalions in the regiment. -Each of the three platoons in the company will form the basis for one of the three companies in the battalion. Platoon leaders will become company commanders.
-Each 0f the three squads in the platoon will form the basis for one of the three platoons in the company.
-Each of the three teams in the squad will form the basis for one of the three squads in the new platoon.
-Three of the four men in the fireteam will become fireteam leaders in the new squad, the fireteam leader (4th man) will become the new squad leader.
A combination of reservists and new personnel fresh from advanced individual training, will be used to fill out the unit to TOE strength. Any officers or staff NCO's that do not show competency or promise during the initial stages of training as the unit begins retraining to standard, would be replaced with outside personnel. Using this approach you retain a level of competency and experience within a unit that would take time to attain if the unit was formed from scratch. Now at first it may seem that all this information about unit structure, capabilities, expansion SOP, and experience are unrelated to the topic at hand, however, we feel it is necessary that it be understood in order to understand why we have made certain decisions with unit reorganizations and deployments. A good example would be if we have opted to employ three regimental combat teams instead of one division with three regiments. The division would be the more capable unit, if training and experience are equal, because all elements have experience working with one another. If we are intending to engage an objective that we greatly overmatch and we have expansion plans, the regimental option may be better. If we expand the division into three divisions, the original unit and the other two new units will be unavailable while taking in replacements and equipment, then training backup to standard. We will also be required to provide supply for three divisions, unusable from the day the reorganization begins until they are ready to be deployed again. If we select the regimental option we could pull one, or two or all three regiments from the line and expand them. If for instance we just pull one, while it is expanding and training up, we have two other experienced regiments available for combat operations, We will be providing supply for 5 regimental equivalents (3 in the division and two independant), instead of 9 regimental equivalents if the division is upgraded. It also allows us more flexibility for upgrading units to match our industrial output. Using a weapons system from the earlier 42d Division TOE; the division rates 36 x 75mm Type 90 Field Guns. If we split the division we need to have 108 of these guns available for issue. We have the original 36 and will require 72 new guns. We would need to have these guns available in our pool or we will have to form the divisions understrength. If we expand a regiment, we can do so everytime we have 24 guns in the pool, the 12 guns in the regiment we are expanding plus 24 new guns to bring it up to the divisional 36 guns TOE. The concept should give our generals greater flexability to manage their forces and keep the most capable units with the most effective TOE's available. I will next go into our weapons choices for the new TOE's and how they effect the units combat fighting capability. One benefit I have not mentioned is that on the divisional level we will be dropping from 324 to 300 infantry squads per division, thus gaining the better part of a battlions worth of infantry for each upgraded division for use elsewhere.

Your thoughts gentlemen?