Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

China/RoC Forces continued.....

Now sir, all RGC forces will move to the centralized disbandment point nearest to their present location. These disbandment points will be the Provincial Government centers, which will also be the HQ locations for one each, of the three Japanese Armies operating under JEF-C.

I Province/AoNC- Tientsin
II Province/AoCC- Shanghai
III Province/AoSC- Amoy
Here I wish to break away for a moment and elaborate on a matter I mentioned earlier. At some point after Hong Kong (British controlled) and Kwangchowan (Free French controlled) are seized and one or more of the following KMT controlled cities, Chuhsien, Pucheng, Wenchow, Kanhsien, Kukong, Wuchow, Liuchow or Kweilin are seized, we will need to look at a re-alignment of III Province/AoSC area to accomodate the changed situation. Canton will be designated a Provincial Capitol and we will split III Province and form IV Province with Canton as the seat of government. AoSC will continue to controll IJA operations in both areas, but Chinese Forces will be reassigned to the appropriate province.

Peiping will be the location of the Headquarters of the Army of the Republic of China. There will be a limited number of "National" formations raised. A "National" formation will be controlled by the national, RoC government and can be employed anywhere in China. These should be prestigious units and exemplary personnel from the Provincial Armies can be transferred there for service on a temporary basis. Service with these formations should rate a special award to be worn on the soldiers uniform, be it a patch, ribbon or medal/ribbon. When the soldier returns to his home unit it will be something to set him apart as a superior soldier.
The National Government will run a Military Academy for the education and training of new officers, China wide, not just for the "National" forces. This will be a longer term proposition as we're looking at three to four years down the road before these young men will join the army. We will run a training school for field grade officers also on a National basis, so as to assure a common level of training and doctrine at command levels. In the short term each Provincial Capitol will host an officers training school, run by the associated IJA Army. We will also run an enlisted commissioning program so that soldiers that exhibit superior leadership and combat abilities can move up to positions of command.
We also have a large number of obsolescent armored cars that I wish to transfer to the Chinese to use, These armored cars will be formed into two Military Police units (bn/regt/bde) at the National level for use in protecting the railways and highways of China as a whole.
The 1st RoC Military Police Battalion (expandable to Regiment/Brigade) will be tasked with protecting the major raillines in China. We will equip them with Type 91 Armored Rail Cars (M 2593 Sumida). These vehicles are capable of operating on either roads or rails by switching out the tires.

Type 91 Armored Car So-Mo

Type 91 Armored Car

I realize I am drifting further from my main topic, but we will standardize and improve upon the existing rail system in China that is already quite extensive. One of the industrial "projects" we will implement will be locomotive and railroad car production. We have tremendous deposits of coal in China and coal powered locomotives will prove an efficient logistical system. That combined with increased water transport (more on this later for Admiral Noka and his NLC (Naval Logistics Command) are keys to establishing a solid base for the movement of resources, personnel and finished products within China. If we can manage to avoid war with the United States, and can convince the American public that we have honorable intentions for China. We can possibly import additional manufacturing tools, finished locomotves and rolling stock to support this project, prior to the initiation of hostilities. I do not hold much hope for this latter possibility as time is quite short and once Britain is attacked, this opportunity decreases.

2d RoC Military Police Battalion- This unit (again expandable to regt/bde as additional personnel can be trained) will be equipped with our older Type 92 and Type 93 Armored cars.

Type 92

Type 93

They will be tasked with protecting and patrolling major roadways throughout China. They will be employed in small units, widely scattered and will receive support from the Provincial Government in whose area they are employed.

Now gentlemen, with the exception of these few "National" units, the rest of the RoC Army will be made up of provincial troops. These troops will, be raised trained and employed, the majority of the time, in and around their "home" areas. This will facilitate loyalty and decrease depredations against the civilian population. Local loyalty is built in, Provincial loyalty will be more readily achieved because of the proximity of the government. It is not as if they are serving some far away faceless government in Peiping. Anti-enemy propoganda will be easier because the KMT/ChiComs can be portrayed as outsiders invading and oppressing the locals. We need to take our time and select our provincial leaders with care and an eye towards popularity. The promise of elections within two years will give us time to establish a governmental infrastructure, focus the opposition on opposing the current governor in the upcoming elections and keep the serving governor focussed on doing a good job so as to retain his position.
These Provincial troops will be armed, equipped and commanded by the three (four) Provincial Governments, uniforms, equipment and supplies will flow from us to the National Government, to the Provinces for distribution. This gives us a number of checks and balances.
Provincial troops can be nationalized for service with the "National" Army. The Provincial Governor will release them for a specified period for operations outside their local area. This is similar to what the United States does with their National Guard, the main difference being the National Guard are reserve forces/citizens that train part time after initial military training and our Provincial troops will be full time, active duty personnel. The State Governor's controll the National Guard and call them up and use them as required by their state, but in time of National Emergency they can be federalized for employment of the nation as a whole.

more later...

 

I can find no flaw in your proposed re-organization plan per se. Indeed it seems the only viable way we can turn native Chinese forces into an effective combat force to aid Imperial troops in the effort to render both the Nationalist and Communist power blocks no longer a hindrance to our goals. As such it has my support, but I do feel that your time table is at least moderately over optimistic.

Please understand that this is no reflection of disrespect or lack of confidence on either your or General Nishio's part, but I feel a sober observation of the material at your disposal. As the esteemed Admiral Takao's points out we have had indifferent success in our efforts to create an effective auxiliary ground force able to competently relieve Imperial Forces from the most basic rear area security duties.

If this were not so, we would not need so radical a re-organization in the first place.

It is my feeling that at best no more than 30% (possibly less) of the Chinese troops in our service are reasonably loyal to our goals of creating a new China. Another 10 or 15% are actively opposing us as agitators, provocateurs, saboteurs and spies for the Nationalist and Communist Bandit leaders. The greater majority see service under our banner as nothing more than a temporary situation that provide them with coins in their pocket and food in their stomachs. As such they are deeply suspect from a perspective of loyalty.

We must assume that the small minority who actively oppose us will see this for what it is as a threat to their operations and do everything within their power to disrupt our operations. The natural confusion inherent in such a mass movement of people will only aid them in this. For the great majority, we must expect a greater than usual level of desertion than is normally felt. Again the confusion we aid them and the prospect of more being asked of them for their coin will place a greater chill in their heart than already exists.

For those who still show acceptable levels of elan, they will be at least a little apprehensiveness of the prospect of change. This is no particularly Chinese flaw, but one common to all of us. In time they should be even more resolute, but that will depend upon us keeping most of what we promise. I also suspect that new recruitment will be tepid at least at first due to the fact that our past performance was not an inspiration to them to join us before and many will wait to see if there is proof in our pudding. To conscript on a wide scale will only counteract our efforts to win their trust.

To be honest I suspect that it will take at least twice and possibly triple the time frame you expect to have units back to the same force levels they now have.

 

Yes sir, Admiral Takao is correct, in the past we have had minimal success. This is why we feel it is necessary, as a starting point, to give the Chinese a reason to fight. Protecting their families and neighbors was the one thing that could accomplish that. There is virtually no man unwilling to fight to protect their mother, siblings or childeren. Once, they have some success in military operations and time in their new units, additional loyalties will be formed to the unit and their comarades in arms. Eventually, the Provincial and then the National Government may gain their loyalty and respect. We do not feel it feasible to start with inspiring national loyalty and working back down the ladder, not enough time.

I have no way of knowing how close or distant your supposition is from the true situation. I do know there is no strong Nationalist sentiment. Our plan addresses the loyalty issue by trying to use the basic loyalty to family and friend that most men exhibit. if we do have, and I am sure we do, soldiers actively aiding the enemy our plan accomplishes two things. By moving them we remove the soldier from their support network and two, we make it harder to betray us in the future. A man may be able to justify his collaboration, espionage or treasonous act as long as he has no inate loyalty or affections for those being betrayed. With our plan a man that does such a thing betrays his neighbors, endangers his family and risks losing the goodwill and respect of those where his home is. We will, eventually, build national loyalty if Wang Jingwei and the National Government act in a proper manner and we implement our proposed reforms.

We hope that our plan to execute the program will minimize desertion or unauthorized absenses.

Prior to doing anything else current units will be instructed to prepare a listing of all personnel and equipment. Counts will be made. Units will be ordered to a nearby railhead for transportation. They will at this time not be informed of their end destination or reason for the move. At the railhead they will marry up with a smaller Japanese unit that will escort them. A second accounting will be made at the railhead in concert with the Japanese commander. Additionally, date and place of birth, next of kin, and home of record, if not already recorded, will be determined and recorded. Rail movement to the Provicial centers will commence. As a unit arrives at the Provincial center they will move to an area outside of town designated as their bivouac area. A final accounting of personnel and equipment will be made. Equipment will be moved to and assimilated into an equipment pool for eventual redistribution. Personnel will then be divided out by location, transfers noted and an accounting of personnel in the new temporary unit formed for travel. I would suggest 100 man companies, accompanied by ten man armed Japanese detatchments. A formation will be held and all personnel informed by their detatchment commander of the Chinese Army's policy on desertion and unauthorized absenses. Formations will be made prior to embarking, each time the personnel detrain and reboard, and at the end location. Once at the end location formations will be held where we announce the formation of the Republic of China Army and that they will be assigned to their Provinces forces. Personnel will be discharged and re-enlisted in the new force. At this point we will re-verify the personal data on each soldier. They will be paid and allowed to return home for a few days. When they return they will be formed into their new units. Personnel failing to return will be hunted down, arrested and tried by Courts Martial. Initially we will be rather lenient, but we will warn them of sterner punishment in the future.
Basic military re-training will begin at this time and last for four weeks. We figured that because the personnel should have had varying degrees of military training already, four weeks would be sufficient to establish a basic standard. The Japanese transportation escorts will remain as advisors and trainers, RoC personnel will be observed and Japanese personnel will make recommendations to the Chinese leadership as to those that should be demoted or discharged due to lack of ability or competance and those that should be placed in leadership positions. Applicable promotions and re-alignment of billets will take place and we will be ready to begin unit training. Any remedial individual training can take place within the unit by their officers and NCO's or personnel can be transferred out to repeat the basic training. Once at the unit level we need to be rather strict on punishing desertion. We need to be aware of and take into consideration extenuating circumstances, we do not wish to destroy morale by hanging a boy that deserts to be at the bedside of his dying mother. We do however need to identify and severely punish aggregious offenders. I suggest we identify a soldier or two that have no other redeeming characteristics and when they desert punish them by execution. I prefer hanging. I would hold a formation, hang the offender, explain that hanging was chosen because we do not wish to confer the honor or incurr the expense of wasting a bullet on someone less than a soldier. The condemned will be stripped of all rank, and anything that might identify him as a soldier. He will be hanged in front of the assembled unit, we will about face them so as to symbolically turn our backs on a former soldier who has betrayed his oath. Will will order his name to be stricken from the rolls and his name never mentioned again by the unit. He will be buried in an unmarked grave in a burial area reserved for cowards, traitors and deserters. We wish to destroy not just the man but his name, his memory and his legacy. Symbology is a powerful tool.

I do not favor conscription. The quality of the soldier due to lack of motivation will be substandard. Three years or so down the road, if there is a strong national identity formed, we can revisit the issue.
I do suspect initially recruitment will be minimally effective. We have to address this from several directions. Pay, food and living conditions for the troops needs to be good. Once unit training begins we will get the units out and about in the countryside patrolling. The arrest or killing of bandits, criminals or guerillas will go a long way towards boosting the morale of our men, and aid in the forming of a favorable impression by the inhabitants of the cities and surrounding villages. When we are patrolling we will assist the villagers in civil improvement projects also. We want the villagers to view us favorably as benefactors, protectors and friends. Our actions should quickly turn opinion in the villages in our favor and result in increased recruitment. The cities will be more of a challenge and will need to be the focus of a concerted propoganda blitz. Newsreels and movies with a message will play in theaters, posters showing the ghost of Sun Yat-Sen in the background with a hollywood handsome soldier, dressed in an immaculate uniform, chest thrown out as he marches forward, rifle on his shoulder, his gaze fixed on some distant goal, and the caption "Fighting for Sun's dream of a free China", or some such slogan. Or a dark poster, the central figures lit as if by flames, the hollywood handsome soldier, uniform torn, a trickle of blood, placing his body in front of and shielding with his arms a frightened, attractive woman. Cowering and clinging as if to protect her two terrified children. Around the periphery, in the dark, shadowy, animalistic, sinister looking figures dressed as Chiang and his soldiers, moving in to threaten the innocents with only the RoC soldier standing in the way. Some appropriate slogan, but the imagery is the important thing. They need to see it everywhere and often enough that they subconsciously begin to view the enemy in that manner and the RoC military as the protectors of their lives and dreams.

Units will initially not have to be filled out. We will form them, basing the size of the unit on personnel available. If we only have enough for a company, that is what we form. If we have enough for a division, that is what we will form. All units have expansion, splitting or reduction in size built into their structure. We will be ready to expand when we have the people. Two months, six months, a year from now. The base unit will still be serving and if we have prevented desertion during the re-building process we should at least have what we have now quantitatively.

Thank you for your time sir.

 

Dear Colonel,

i have ever knewn that you are a good man, but now i know that you are a real specialist! I´m very lucky to have you on my side.!!!
So let us go on with the plannings. there is a lot of work to do.

Kind Regards,

Gen. Nishio

 

Thank you sir, a lot of it is that I kept good notes during discussions with you and the staff. I will continue.

We next looked at populations in urban areas and then looked at surrounding rural areas to arrive at an approximation of the military age male population we could potentially draw upon. We then made some informed guesses as to how many personnel we could expect to recruit from each manpower area. We then assigned units we would like to raise per geographical/manpower area. We estimated on the low side and planned for a 100% turnover within the force over a four year period. We assigned the following plan to raise the following units. Units are numbered sequentially, by type, within the RoC Army as a whole, and will bear the name of the recruitment area where raised, and where supplemental personnel will be recruited. We went with sequential numbering to avoid possible confusion between units. For instance if the first infantry regiment from Suchow were named 1st Suchow and the first infantry regiment from Soochow was named 1st Soochow, there is too much room for confusion. So the regiments are actually numbered the 17th Suchow (17th regiment within RoC designated) and 18th Soochow. Units listed in blue are planned for, but will not be raised until the area where they will be recruited is secured/liberated. Units will initially be formed as a company from trained personnel taken from disbanded RGC units. If sufficient personnel are available the unit will be formed as a battalion or regiment. As stated earlier the information as to the location of origin for currently serving RGC troops is not available. Once formed, units will be expanded using newly recruited personnel as they become available. In usage the unit will be referred to as simply the unit number and location name. As an example: The 16th Taichow will initially be formed as a company, but it is not necessary to append the name with "Company". If it were expanded to a regimental sized formation it would still be referred to as the 16th Taichow and it is not necessary to refer to it as the 16th Taichow Regiment. Units will be expanded up to the Brigade level, unless formed as a division initially (these units will be so noted). "National" units will be composed of units from China as a whole and not restricted to a local area. At present we have no plans to raise divisional sized units, with the exception of the "Capitol" division. If divisional sized units are required we will form them on an ad hoc basis by teaming the appropriate number of regiments with a IJA logistical support unit and Japanese heavy artillery and transport units, and will designate them as the (number) Provisional RoC Division. We are doing this to limit the ability of Provincial governors from being able to employ these units outside their local area without the assistance of IJA assets. These units will hopefully become quite competant, we do not wish to create a monster we cannot control. All units regardless of size will be formed as "combat teams", having those assets necessary for independant operations. They will basically be an infantry unit, with attached light AT capability, light artillery support and sufficient support to operate within their assigned AO.
List of proposed Chinese units:
1st Capitol Division (National)
1st Peiping
2d Peiping
1st Peiping Armored
3d Tientsin
4th Tientsin
5th Tientsin
2d Tientsin Armored
6th Chengtin
7th Tsinan
8th Tsinan
9th Luchow
10th Anking
11th Tsingtao
12th Tsingtao
13th Nanking
14th Nanking
3d Nanking Armored
15th Kaifeng
16th Taichow
17th Suchow
18th Soochow
19th Haichow
20th Haichow
21st Sinyang
22d Shanghai
23d Shanghai
24th Shanghai
4th Shanghai Armored
1st Shanghai LAR
25th Hangchow
26th Hangchow
27th Foochow
28th Tsinkaing
29th Wuchang
30th Wuchang
31st Amoy
32d Amoy
33d Nanchang
34th Hankow
1st Hankow Mech.
35th Swatow
36th Sinyang
37th Ichang
2d Ichang Mech.
38th Canton
39th Canton
40th Canton
5th Canton Armored
41st Hong Kong
42d Hong Kong
6th Hong Kong Armored
7th Hong Kong Armored
3d Hong Kong Mech.
43d Changsha
44th Changsha
45th Changsha
1st RoC Military Police Battalion (National)
2d RoC Military Police Battalion (National)
Comments gentlemen?

 

What is the 1st Shanghai LAR?

Light Armored Regiment? If so how is it different from our other Armored types?

 

Light Armored Reconaissance sir. Once we finish the Malaya Operation where we intend to make heavy use of tankettes, we will transition those IJA units so equipped to a modern light tank. The freed up tankettes will be useful to equip this unit. The tankettes small size and machine gun main armament will still be useful in urban areas for crowd/riot control and for patrolling roads looking for enemy activity. Their light armor will not be a negative as we will not be using them to fight in a pitched battle as we would a full fledged Light Tank or Tank unit. They will also will not be organized with combat engineers, anti-tank units, medium artillery and such. They will be heavier in light, mobile vehicles and personnel, capable of covering large areas and sufficiently armored and armed to fight their way out of trouble in order to pull back and call in heavier formations. Eventually, I would like to transition them to the wheeeled light armored vehicle we will produce, but only after our IJA LAR units are properly equipped. Wheeled vehicles are less costly in fuel, parts and maintenance, and cause less damage to roads.

 

The basic scheme for organizing Chinese forces looks fine, but do we really need/want to start giving them armored/mechanized forces at this point? Two thoughts, first, we don't have all the tanks, trucks, etc. we need for our own forces, and we have considerable competing needs for production priority. Secondly, the loyalty and competence of the Chinese. I appreciate that we plan to use volunteers rather than consripts, but it will still take time even to develop competent, reliable infantry. I agree that is the right focus, with the IJA providing heavy weapons and technical support where needed. Hopefully in the time new Chinese army will achieve the level of professionalism to start developing armored/mechanized forces and other modern technologies, but for the time being, might we be better off concentrating on our own armored force?

There is a prestige/morale argument for giving them something more than basic infantry weapons, letting them have a few shiny new units to be proud of, if we have things like tankettes that we truly do not need/want for our own forces. This might be an opportunity start educating and training suitably motivated volunteers. However I do not think we should expend technical resources on the Chinese at the expense of our own programs. Besides initial production, mechanized forces require continual supply of fuel, spare parts, etc. which, shall I say, we do not have in excess.

 

I believe both General Nishio and Colonel Bobimoto understand (as they themselves stated) that any Chinese and Korean troops raised and equipped with weapons they currently do no not operate, will do so only with equipment deemed surplus to IJA/IJN needs. In the case of our pilot program it will take 9 months to a year to deploy trained pilots and ground crew allowing for us to replace our older, but still active, equipment.

For Armored, Mechanized and Motorized units this will also need to be so. We understand that many of our own frontline mobile units are deployed with somewhat elderly machines that we intend to replace over the next year, as we do so they then can be reallocated to Chinese and Korean troops. We should also consider the use of captured machines in their TOE. Even if in only platoon or company strength, they give these forces a cache they need at a cost affordable to our budget.

 

It does my heart good to see that our efforts at explaining the various aspects of our plans bearing fruit. Mr. Prime Minister, you are entirely correct in the assertions you made concerning our plans. We will have aircraft and equipment that our forces have upgraded from, that are still perfectly serviceable weapons systems, but may no longer be cutting edge. While we would not want to use them with frontline units, in their original role against the United States. They will be more than adequate and capable when used by our partner nations, against the Chinese or certain Commonwealth troops. We can scrap these weapons systems or make use of them against 2d tier forces or in roles where they still have good capabilities. A example would be that while a certain aircraft would no longer be our first choice as a dive bomber when facing the newest and most capable AA defenses and where opposed by newer fighters, they will prove capable in an ASW role, or in a dive bombing role in situations where no enemy CAP will be present or against units or bases with older or weak AA defenses.

Admiral Karonada, I would like to thank you for your reply. I do not think everyone appreciates how valuable a well thought out critique is. It is indespensible for military planning. If we cannot justify our plans and answer valid points raised in a critique, it only serves to prove our initial planning was inadequate and did not consider as many potential factors as possible. So here is our answer to the valid points you raised and the reasoning behind our proposals.

Admiral Karonada wrote:

Yes sir, we feel we must start as soon as practical. I think we need to reinterate we are only going to stand up units in size and numbers that we can currently support. I would think that these various armored units will initially be stood up as company sized elements, with plans for expansion to battalions and then regiments and finally brigades. With these types of units I also do not favor forming divisional sized units. At present the only divisional sized unit we plan to form is the 1st Capitol Division. This is to serve as a check and balance, we do not want the Chinese to develop the capability to utilize units of this size and we wish to maintain control by having them to rely upon us (Japan) for a number of the elements required when fielding divisions. We may from time to time form Provisional Chinese Divisions for employment in certain operations. We will do this by combining three Chinese regiments or two Chinese brigades under a Japanese HQ with Japanese attachments and supporting elements.

This is true Admiral. This will be partially addressed with our planned reorganization. Presently, many infantry divisions have an armored element. We will be deleting this from the new TOE and reforming them into armored units for attachment as needed. We will have enough personnel and equipment from these "reorganizations" to form additional armored units and still have excess equipment. The best and newest equipment will be retained for IJA units. The Chinese units we are proposing to form will be using equipment that we feel is obselete and while useful in China would just be cannon fodder if employed against Soviet or American Forces. Again the size of the initial Chinese units would be small and should not pose a strain on our ability to provide needed equipment.

The reason we feel we need to form these units now is to provide the core of experienced officers, nco's and support personnel a Chinese armored force will require when we do reach the point they will deploy large, regimental and brigade sized armored elements. They have to learn the theory, techniques and practical application of a certain skill set. The tank driver of today will be the vehicle commander when we expand in a couple of years. The tank platoon commander will command a battalion and the company commanders a regiment after expansion. The wrench turning grease monkey will be a maintenance supervising NCO. We need to start early so we have experienced subject matter experts, if and when we are able to expand and leave China to the Chinese.
As for our own armored force we need to upgrade to more capable vehicles. If the developmental patterns in europe, north africa and America continue, the main type of deployed tank will be the medium tank. Tanks are becoming heavier, more heavily armored and armed. If we look at the current main battle tanks or those which we will most likely face in the near future,
Contemporary tanks:
US Stuart M3-37mm M6-Armor 13-51mm. Light Tank. These tanks are now being shipped to North Africa for use by the British against our German allies, also 108 of these tanks were shipped to the Phillipines last month (September 1941) and will be assigned to the US 192d and 194th Tank Battalions.
German Pz Mk III-37mm-50mm gun Armor (see breakdown). Medium Tank. This is Germany's main battle tank. Intelligence indicates that they may begin switching to the Mk IV, currently used as a support tank and that plans for a heavy tank are being reconsidered due to encounters with Soviet T-34 and KV-1 tanks.
Mk III G-30mm frontal armor-37mm KwK 36/L46.5
Mk III H-30mm frontal armor+additional 30mm bolt on-37mm KwK 36/L46.5
Mk III J-50mm frontal armor-37mm KwK 36/L46.5
Mk III J Special-50mm frontal armor-50mm KwK 39/L60
German Sturmgeschütz III-Assault gun built on Mk. III chassis. Experience in Russia has Germany pursuing mounting the 75 mm StuK 40 L/43 main gun for use in the anti-tank role.
Soviet T-34-45-47mm frontal-76.2mm L/42.5 F-34 gun. This latter had its development accelerated after the Battles at Lake Khasan, and Khalkhin Gol.

Lt. Wiki, front and center. Your presentation on the T-34's development please!

"During the Battle of Lake Khasan in July 1938 and the Battles of Khalkhin Gol in 1939, an undeclared border war against Japan, General Zhukov deployed nearly 500 T-26, BT-5 and BT-7 tanks against the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). Although the IJA Type 95 light tanks had diesel engines, the T-26 and BT tanks did not. Their gasoline engines, commonly used in tank designs by most nations at the time, often burst into flames when hit by IJA tank-killer teams using Molotov cocktails. Poor quality welds in the Soviet armour plates left small gaps between the plates, and flaming petrol from the Molotov cocktails easily seeped into the fighting compartment and engine compartment; portions of the armour plating that had been assembled with rivets also proved to be vulnerable.The Soviet tanks were also easily destroyed by the Japanese Type 95 tank's 37 mm gunfire, despite the mediocre performance of that gun, or "at any other slightest provocation.
"The use of riveted armour led to a problem called "spalling", whereby the impact of enemy shells, even if they failed to disable the tank or kill the crew on their own, would cause the rivets to break off and become projectiles inside the tank.
In 1937, before these battles with the Japanese Army, the Red Army had assigned engineer Mikhail Koshkin to lead a new team to design a replacement for the BT tanks at the Kharkiv Komintern Locomotive Plant (KhPZ). The prototype tank, designated A-20, was specified with 20 mm (0.8 in) of armour, a 45 mm (1.77 in) gun, and the new Model V-2 engine, using less-flammable diesel fuel in a V12 configuration designed by Konstantin Chelpan. It also had an 8×6-wheel convertible drive similar to the BT tank's 8×2, which allowed it to run on wheels without caterpillar tracks. This feature had greatly saved on maintenance and repair of the unreliable tank tracks of the early 1930s, and allowed tanks to exceed 85 kilometres per hour (53 mph) on roads, but gave no advantage in combat. By 1937-38, track design had improved and the designers considered it a waste of space and weight, despite the road speed advantage. The A-20 also incorporated previous research (BT-IS and BT-SW-2 projects) into sloped armour: its all-round sloped armour plates were more likely to deflect anti-armour rounds than perpendicular armour.
After the battles with the Japanese Army, Koshkin convinced Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to let him develop a second prototype, a more heavily armed and armoured "universal tank" which reflected the lessons learned in those battles, and could replace both the T-26 and the BT tanks. Koshkin named the second prototype A-32, after its 32 mm (1.3 in) of frontal armour. It had a L-10 76.2 mm (3 in) gun, and the same Model V-2 diesel. Both were tested in field trials at Kubinka in 1939, with the heavier A-32 proving to be as mobile as the A-20. A still heavier version of the A-32, with 45 mm (1.77 in) of front armour, wider tracks, and a newer L-11 76.2 mm gun, was approved for production as the T-34. Koshkin chose the name after the year 1934 when he began to formulate his ideas about the new tank, and to commemorate that year's decree expanding the armoured force and appointing Sergo Ordzhonikidze to head tank production.
Valuable lessons from Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol regarding armour protection, mobility, quality welding, and main guns were incorporated into the new T-34 tank, which represented a substantial improvement over the BT and T-26 tanks in all four areas. Koshkin's team completed two prototype T-34s in January 1940. In April and May, they underwent a grueling 2,000-kilometre (1,200 mi) drive from Kharkiv to Moscow for a demonstration for the Kremlin leaders, to the Mannerheim Line in Finland, and back to Kharkiv via Minsk and Kiev. Some drivetrain shortcomings were identified and corrected."

continued....

 

Thank you Lt. Wiki. These border battles with the Soviets also had the effect of forcing our Army to re-evaluate our tactics and equipment. We have upgraded a number of weapons systems and are still in developmental stages with a number of others. The reason for my giving this short background is to allow those council members not thoroughly familiar with the current world situation in regards to armored fighting vehicles a little background. It is the opinion of our IJA armored experts, and General Nishio, who recently returned from duty as an observer with the German Armored Forces, that the developmental path of tanks will continue to focus on the medium tank. That this medium or main battle tank will become the standard with a wide range of mission capabilities and light tanks will continue to be of lesser and lesser utility. Further, we have determined that we need to immediately begin to upgrade our anti-armor capability both within our armored forces and within our infantry formations. We have addressed this in our new TOE's. I will now review some of these TOE changes, armored vehicles we intend to delete from our TOE, armored vehicles we hope to adopt and infantry unit anti-armor capabilities we wish to enhance.
First we have the Type 91 Armored Car, So-Mo (M 2593 Sumida) which we have already discussed. We have produced approximately 1,000 since 1930. We have proposed setting up the 1st RoC Military Police Battalion. They would be a National formation and use these armored cars to protect our railway logistical net, China wide, with seperate companies/battalions assigned to different areas. This unit will only take over responsibility for protecting railways in relatively secure areas at first. IJA troops will maintain railway security in areas of high threat. As unit capability increases the unit will be expanded and assume responsibility for even the high threat areas. We wish to expand this unit to eventually reach Brigade size and utilize 3/4's (@750) of the available vehicles, the other 1/4 to be retained in Manchukuo for use by IJA troops. If we do stand up a seperate force for Manchukuo one of the first units I would raise would be a rail security type unit and turn that responsibility over to the indigenous forces.
Next we have proposed turning the Type 92 and Type 93 Armored cars over to the Chinese and forming the 2d RoC Military Police Battalion. This unit also would be a National unit and would eventually be expanded to a Brigade sized unit. The Type 92 could also be referred to as a "Tankette". With 6-12mm of armor, armed with a 13mm Type 2 HMG as it's primary weapon and a 7.7mm Type 97 as a secondary, it would have limited utility within our armored units which we want to structure and use as main battle units. This weapons system is better suited for road security and crowd control, two functions we desire the Chinese to assume from us. First introduced in 1931, we have 167 of these vehicles. The Type 93 is a wheeled armored car with limited cross country ability, but also good for road security or crowd control work.

Type 94 Tankette
12mm of armor and a Type 91 6.5mm machine gun as its main armament (being replaced by 7.7mm Type 92 MG). Introduced in 1935, we have approximately 823 units. These are mostly deployed in the light tank companies within the infantry divisions. I have proposed we delete those companies to increase divisional mobility and reduce logistical requirements. The units are so lightly armored and equipped as to be virtually useless against western light tanks.

Type 97 Tankette
A development of the Type 94, this vehicle has 4-16mm of armor and a 37mm L/36.7 Type 94 main gun. These vehicles were introduced in 1938 and we have 557 units. This is the vehicle I wish to retain through the Malaya Operation. The British have minimal anti-armor capability and the small size and speed of this vehicle should allow us to utilize it in areas the British think inpenetrable to armor. It is small enough to ferry across rivers, use existing bridges without reinforcement, and utilize the narrow curvy trails we will find in that area. Once, we finish the Malaya Operation these tankettes should be declared surplus and replaced in our IJA units. They are susceptable to .50 caliber fire and once we have gone to war with the western powers, we need something with greater protection and armament.

Type 95 HA-GO Light tank
Armor 6-12mm. Armament early 37mm L/36.7 Type 94, 2 x 7.7mm Type 97 MG's (@100 units). Mid-Late 37mm L/46.1 Type 98, 2 x 7.7mm Type 97 MG's. This is a good, reliable, capable light tank. We have produced about 2000 units since 1936 (Total historical production was 2,300 units). We propose that we continue to form and operate Light Tank Battalions for the immediate future. Our Type 95 Ha-Go can meet and defeat the current western light tanks and we do not believe at this time that the western army has the capability to amphibiously land a medium tank. Eventually, we will have to face this capability, especially once the US starts producing its medium tank now in development. The Soviets have their hands full with our German ally, and we will not soon have to face their T-34 mediums. If and when sufficient numbers of our own follow on medium tanks, become available we will upgrade some of the Light Tank Battalions to Tank Battalions with a light tank reconaissance component, but the bulk of the armor being mediums. Others we will convert to LAR units, using wheeled armored vehicles which we have proposed building. The vehicles we propose will be armed with 20mm auto-cannons or 47mm AT guns, be sufficiently armored to be protected against .50 caliber fire. We intend to use our 4 x 4 reconaissance car chassis/drive train and adapt an armored body similar to the British Daimler or Humbar armored cars or the German Sdkfz. 221/222. We do not wish to build the German vehicle due to it's reported poor off-road performance. A wheeled vehicle could be produced that has a fraction of the operational costs of a tracked vehicle, cost 1/4 to 1/3 of what a light tank/tankette costs to produce and in the areas we wish to employ it, would be just as capable.

Type 98 Ki-Ne- The follow on model to the Type 95 Light Tank. It is currently ready to enter production. I would not favor producing it. While the Type 98 has slightly heavier armor and is all welded, it has similar main armament, weight and performance characteristics as the older tank. General Nishio and I desire to concentrate our efforts on medium/main battle tanks and feel we have sufficient light tanks for the forseeable future.

Mediums

The Type 89A and 89B Medium Tank. First introduced in 1932 we have approximately 220 of the A Model and 189 of the B Model (our 89B was the worlds first mass produced diesel engined tank). Armor is 6-17mm and the tank is armed with the 57mm Type 90 low velocity gun. This tank is still useful in certain situations, but is basically obselete. Transfer to Chinese as soon as they can be replaced.

Type 89

next up Type 97 Chi-Ha Medium Tank........

 

This is a housekeeping post.

The rumors that a counter coup has taken place is unfounded. The shots heard in the courtyard were merely extended target practice

Due to outside events our esteemed Colonel has had to step aside for a period to deal with work related matters and will continue his briefing in short order.

 

The Type 97 Chi-Ha will be the tank that our IJA forces will initially standardize on. Going forward we will be working towards having our tank units equipped with medium or main battle tanks. Light tanks will continue to serve in the reconaissance role within these units, but the medium tank will be our primary weapons platform. RoC forces will standardize on the light tank and as our light tanks are replaced they will be passed down to these units.
In it's original configuration the Type 97 was/is equipped with the short barreled 57mm/L18.4 Type 97 main gun. This is not an adequate weapon for an front line tank. We currently have 1134 of the Type 97 57mm in inventory (Total historical producion of the Type 97 Shinhoto Chi-Ha mounting the Type 1's 47mm turret continued into 1943 with an additional 1888 units produced for a total of 3022 units of the general type). We have an enlarged, improved version of the Type 97, the Type 1 Chi-He ready to begin production. The Type 1 was designed to address shortcomings in our armor discovered during our border clashes with the Soviets in the summer of 1939. The General, his staff and I propose that we take the following actions.
1) The Type 97 production continues, but with the Type 1's three man turret and 47mm gun, substituted for the existing turret. We will continue production so there is no lapse in our tank supply.
2) Existing Type 97's will be retrofitted with the new Type 1 turret or cut down and rebuilt with a casemated superstructure and no turret. An AT version mounting the Type 5 75mm/L56 and an assault gun version mounting the 150mm Model 96 howitzer. The old turrets and armor removed from the chassis will be recycled, reforged and reused.
3.) Existing light tank production will shift to the Type 1 and existing Type 97 production will be swapped to the Type 1 gradually to prevent disruption of the supply. The Type 1 is a slightly enlarged Type 97, longer, more heavily armored, mounting the new turret and gun, has a 70hp increase in power and all welded construction making it a superior AFV. A casemated AT version mounting the Type 9 88mm/L45 gun will be produced.
4) Development of a 75mm gunned, medium tank, based upon the Type 1 will be accelerated.

It is my hope that this additional information as to the needs and future plan for our Imperial Army forces will illustrate that we can afford to re-deploy our older light tanks with our Republic of China allies. In our planning we are looking at approximately six months before RoC forces are capable of taking over a number of routine peacekeeping and policing functions from IJA forces allowing our forces to be redeployed to areas of greater need. RoC light armored forces will aid in keeping MSR's open and to rapidly respond to other situations that may crop up, this would be a late spring 1942 time frame. Within a year we hope to have them sufficiently capable to take over all but major combat operations and to be capable of forming a portion of our forces involved in major operations (Fall 1942). By the spring of 1943, or one year and a half out, they should be capable of conducting most military operations independantly and will form a major component of our largest operations. Then finally, by the fall of 1943, they should be capable of conducting all operations, supporting elements, air and heavy artillery provided by us, and our ground forces simply providing area reserves.

Gentlemen, your comments please. We would like to make any necessary modifications so as to get council approval and begin implementation as soon as is practical.

Thank you.

 

How will the tank fare against British tanks. There are several regiments in India and we could face them. Also what about a amphib tank for use in beach landings.

 

You might want to check your numbers on the "Chi-Ha". I believe that the 1,888 is not just for the for the Shinhoto Chi-Ha(most sources give numbers around 930), but for all of the Japanese AFVs that were based on the Type 97 Chi-Ha chassis (ie. "Shi-Ki" command tank, "Se-Ri" ARV, "Ho-Ni"-I-II-III SPGs, Ho-Ro SPG, "Ho-K" engineering AFV, etc.).


Although the question I do have is: Has any one looked into Japanese industrial & logistical capacity(in-game) for this time period to see if in-game Japan is capable of doing all that is being asked? As we are essentially rebuilding and re-equipping our navy, air force, and army, as well as putting the "hurry up" on essential technologies. Not to mention constructing several large military bases around areas we control and/or expect to control.

 

Good questions sir. The Type 97 Shinto Chi-Ha has capabilities superior to the German Pz-III mounting the KwK-38 L/42 50mm gun and comparable to those mounting the 50mm KwK-39 L/60 gun just now seeing service with Germany's forces. The ability to get the first hit is critical in tank on tank warfare, as our crews are currently well trained and should fare well against current British/CW armor that they will likely encounter. The Type 1 has a better hp/wt ratio and will have even better mobility than our already very mobile armor. The trend is towards heavier and more heavily armed tanks within european armies and rumored developmental programs within the US would seem to dictate that we push for development of a larger, more heavily armored and 75mm armed vehicle for deployment in the long term. Short term the Type 07/Type 01 should prove capable of supporting our operations. The Type 97/75 L/56 SPAT version we have proposed can defeat any armor we are likely to meet in the forseeable future. (SPAT is Self-propelled anti-tank and is the casemated version I have mentioned several times in the past)

More importantly, concerning your area of operations. After Malaya we should be able to shift significant light tank forces to your AO. Light tanks will actually prove superior in the jungle, limited road network type of terrain your initial operations will be faced with. By the time you have taken Rangoon we should be able to re-equip your tank units with the Type 97/Type 1/Type 97/75mm SPAT to allow for you to secure upper Burma and push to the Indian border. We have not planned past this point (securing Burma), as we have had no orders to conduct planning for potential/alternate objectives such as India, Australia, etc. I do think this type of planning needs to be done as a contingency. The changing war situation or opportunities could require operations we are currently not envisioning conduction. It would be much better to have a plan on the shelf to be pulled down, dusted off and modified, than to try and throw a plan together quickly at the last minute and as a result have an operation fail.

As for an amphibious tank, it is my opinion that the resources should not be spent. We can land tanks from our current Daihatsu landing craft. Our expansion phase will only last 6 months or so at which point opposed amphibious landings should be rare. This time frame is too short to allow for development of an amphibious tank and still have a useful mission for it. (Japan did develop an amphibious version of the Type 95 Ha-Go light tank, the Type 2 Ka-Mi and a version of the Type 1 Chi-He, the Type 3 Ka-Chi. Both tanks arrive too late to be used for their initial purpose).

 

You are correct, I went back and checked my figures. I must have fat fingered the calculator. 503 in 1942, 427 in 1943 totals 930. Good catch.

 

Another very good and valid question. The game has Japan's historical industrial capacity and logistical capacity built in. The difference will come in the choices we make. Historically, Japan thought it would be a short war so they did not bring their economy to a full, wartime footing until late 1943. I am planning on beginning the expansion in October 1942. Japan managed to dramatically increase it's output in 1943 despite a lack of fuel and resources caused by events in late 1941-42 and the effective US submarine campaign. One thing I have pushed for and I think you have supported is a dramatic increase in our anti-submarine capabilities. Japan waited until 1943 to start addressing this also. After significant losses had already taken place. I have pushed for our initial objectives to be seizing and securing as many of the oil and refinery assets in the region on the first several days of the war. Fuel and oil are the greatest limiting factor on the ability of our industrial capacity to be fully developed. The historical focus was on eliminating the ability of the US to respond militarily. No Philipines, Guam, Wake, Pearl Harbor attack, (think of the resources allocated to these operations) just a focus on seizing the resources that will enable our economy to prodce at full capacity and to expand. No melting coins taken from British banks in Hong Kong to meet our nickel needs, seize the mines in Noumea.
Shipbuilding-We will be doing nothing that was not done historically. The difference is that the historical planners planned short war. Bloody the Americans and seek a decisive naval battle. Things develop differently, in 1943 streamline ship production and focus on escorts. We plan from the start on implementing these, because we are planning on a long drawn out conflict.
Aircraft-Initially, we will only be producing what Japan historically produced. We will expand the Japanese aircraft production capabilities and focus on fewer types, not totally rebuild the airforce. Chances are our aircraft production over the whole time period will not be that much different from historical levels. A slight increase due to greater access to raw materials and an earlier expansion. The big difference will be instead of thousands of aircraft expended in suicide attacks or swept from the air due to inexperienced pilots, we will have trained aviators. Something Japan again did historically, just implemented too late. Again, 1943.
The Army-We are looking at new, more efficient TOE's. Most of the Army changes are organizational and standardization changes. They do not require much industrial capacity. Japan again began to focus on improving it's land forces in mid-43, by that time the materials required we mostly sitting on the bottom of the ocean.
If we can decrease our losses early, it is the same as increasing our sources and shipping. Keeping America out of the war for a time could also help in this area. Hopefully, we have an adequate plan. Only time will tell here. But that is the point of the exercise, can we manage it?
We are constrained by Japan's historical shipping, industrial and resource base as of October 1941. Any expansion of industry, resource sources, what we build, and what we have the capacity to build will depend upon decisions we make. I can't expand a factory faster, but i can do it earlier. I can't make new resource sources, but I can control which sources we seize and have available. I can't change what shipping we have in October 1941, but I can control which ship types and how many we build, limited only by our shipyard capacity. For instance, if we concentrate on fuel efficient ships, that were historically available, we can, by conservation, increase our overall fuel availability. If we plan the usage of our shipping better, we achieve an increased capacity simply by being more efficient. Again, if by focusing on ASW early we save 75,000 tons or so of merchant shipping per year, how is this different than building 75,000 tons of additional shipping? It's not it is the same. We also have that 75,000 tons of resources those ships were carrying that our factories can use. If we have factories operating at 75% capacity because of resource shortages, and by decreasing losses of shipped resources we can operate at 90%, we have in effect increased our industrial output by 15% without building or expanding a single factory.
If we reach a critical point in late '43 as happpened historically, where we need to further expand our industrial base, there is the possibility that we will not have the ability to do so domestically to the degree required. That is one reason I have pushed for starting to build some seed industries in other areas. We can expand there, closer to the resources, if need be.
I would say my view here is more regional centric than the historical Japan centric view. I think this is a view also held by Noka, based upon statements he has made. I think we see the potential in the improvement in the lot for all the asian peoples instead of just the advancement of Japan and our indigenous countrymen.

Look at the historical production numbers:
Aircraft 1941-5,088 1942-8,861 1943-16,692 1944-28,180 1945-8263
Merchant ships 1941-210,373 1942-260,059 1943-769,085 1944-1,699,203 1945-599,563

Now keep in mind these numbers especially the 1943 to 1945 numbers are WITH the huge losses to US submarines of raw materials being shipped to the Home Islands. The 1945 figures are for basically seven months, again with the restrictions imposed by submarine losses but with heavy strategic bombing damage added. I think it illustrates we have the capability, it's just a matter of when we determine we will use it.

 

Handled properly our armour should be all right(relying on the infantry successes to force an Allied retreat). Expected enemy armor early on will likely be the M-3 Stuart and Vickers Valentine tanks. Better enemy armor such as the M-3 Grant/Lee and the Churchill should not be expected to arrive until, at least, the middle of 1942. The British should not be expected to bring a sizable armored force into battle until late 1942 or early 1943.

 

Speaking in terms about our larger Chinese strategies I feel it is prudent to at least plan for the movement of General Terauchi's forces into North-Eastern India to a line running along the Assam River.

Basically we hope to isolate Chaing Kai Shek and his warlord bandits though a series of actions, Propaganda aimed at the west showing our more benign efforts to rebuild China, re-organization of Chines forces loyal to the Empire in order him to deny local support, and combat operations in Southern China aimed at closing the northern terminus of his supply line from the west.

These alone may achieve our desired goal, but it may also require the closing of any reasonable southern terminus and this would seem to require Imperial forces deployed to the Assam region of India. As a side benefit this would also allow us to conduct anti-British efforts in India aimed at fanning any disaffection present in that colony of the British Empire.

I would not welcome any further move into India unless the local population rose up into insurrection or the British were to abandon its defenses.