Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

I believe we already have several other airfields in the area, including one on Weno and another on Fefan. To be clear, some of the facilities depicted on my diagram are extant. Others would be new construction. I should make that more clear. Etten fighter strip is in service, I believe, as is the East Yard where the floating drydock is stationed, though not the graving docks depicted. The tank farms are also additions, if I recall correctly. I believe we presently use a station oiler, which seems a waste of resources. The diagram was a very preliminary sketch, but with a little time I can attempt further research and update it.

 

Out of character research question for all of my knowledgeable compatriots. I've found adequate sources for a number of materials required for our industry. We've briefly discussed nickel an important alloying element needed in steel production and also important for the manufacture of electronics, used as the filament in vacuum tubes. I've also identified adequate sources for the alloying metals, manganese, chromium, tungsten and molybdenum.

Takao mentioned one of the Chromium sources here:

Masinloc in the Philippines has the largest known chromium deposits in the world,(though not the largest production). I don't wish to get off track here, but if the United States doesn't immediately get involved, or if we use a blockade to force the Philippines to accept a separate treaty with us. We can trade with them for Iron ore, manganese and chromium. We will control such a large percentage of the world's tin and rubber supply that trading with the Philippines and they in turn trading with the US (if an initial declaration of war is avoided with the US). A similar situation could exist with the Vichy French in Noumea, we trade them rubber and tin, they trade us nickel and chromium, they trade/sell tin and rubber to the US. As Takao stated, they are a major chromium supplier, Tiebaghi, on New Caledonia has the world's largest chromium mine, producing 54,000 t per year. That one chromium source would be worth invading Noumea, but we have other chromium sources, however, nickel was historically in more critical supply for Japan. That is why I stress it as a key reason for carrying out the invasion.
The US is so focused on Germany as the primary threat, they might look the other way in order to keep critical strategic materials, such as tin and rubber, flowing in order to prop up Britain in it's war with Germany. Tin was in such short supply for the US, they were required to substitute silicon in their bronze production to conserve the limited supply. The more trade between our region and the US, the more resistance American businessmen will have towards going to war and disrupting the trade. The US has congressional elections coming up in 1942, if we avoid an initial war declaration, anything we can do to bolster the anti-war sector is a win for us. Takao mentioned that the US might go to war over Noumea's chromium supply, the Allies get most of their chromium supply from Cuba (177,000 t per year) and Africa (390,000 t per year), they also have domestic supplies, Del Norte, CA, Grant's Pass, OR, and San Luis Obispo, CA.
Now that I've given some background, back to my original question. Iron production in China dropped to a 1943 peak of 10,000 tons per year, during the war. This is 1/10th of the pre-war total iron production. Where were the production centers located? Can we retake them and restore pre-war production levels? Are the necessary resources available to increase iron production above the 1931, pre-war production levels?

 

In tin production notice how our own domestic & secondary production went up from 1941 to 1945 while imports went down. Domestic production went from around 1700 tons tons to well over 40,000 tons but more importantly world production went from well over 200,000 tons in 1940-1941 down to 80,000+ tons in 1945 so the US was producing almost half the world's tin production in 1945.We can also get tin from Argentina & Bolivia. I also think some Central American and other South American countries have minor deposits . Now per Chromium Canada also have some domestic deposits. I do have one question was the Chromite deposits in the Phillipines even online in 1941-1945?

http://minerals.usgs.gov/ds/2005/140/ds140-tin.pdf


Now per nickel the US traditionally has produced a few hundred tons from domestic sources along with a few thousand tons from a by product of copper smelting. In WW2 we also wrung out as a by product around 750-800 tons from talc & lead mining. We also have the Riddle,Oregon supplies which most certainly could provide 15,000-16,000 tons a year if really needed but being right next to Canada with it's huge deposits.

and all you'll ever want to know about US mineral production....
http://minerals.usgs.gov/ds/2005/140/

and I discussed US self sufficency(at least in this WW1 scenario) in this thread probably around page 33-34 though some other discussions were involved earlier in the thread
http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/9025/High-Seas-Fleet-Vs-USN?page=1

 

The United States imposed an embargo of strategic materials on us, and cajoled/compelled the British and Dutch to go along. It seems a bit far-fetched that we can all work out trade arrangements for various products. Moreover, if there is a realistic possibility of such arrangements, what does that mean for our rationale for going to war to seize the resources?

 

Admiral Karonada I do agree that any meaningful trade arraignment with the US is almost sure to be an impossibility, but it harms us not at all to go through the motions diplomatically and it might introduce some measure of vacillation within those elements of the US Government that are less keen for war.

If I may ask you directly, what is your opinion on the Noumea operation. Admiral Takao and General Teruachi are skeptical, Admiral Noka and Colonel Bobimoto feel it is critical to our plans. We need a consensus of the majority, or we must move on to more profitable discussions.

 

You understand my intentions completely. As for diplomacy, based upon the negative perception of us put forth by the Roosevelt administration and the British, true or not, the American public is being brought around to the opinion that war with us is justified. They have already been brought to opinion, based upon perceptions propagated by the British and Free French, that operations against and seizure of territory controlled by the legitimate government of Vichy France is justified and necessary. Based upon perceptions put forth by Britain and the Roosevelt administration, the US has been selling war materials to the Soviet Union since, 22 June of this year (1941), despite the fact that they did have a treaty with Germany and participated in the invasion of Poland. Starting this month, by sending aid to Russia through Great Britain, war supplies and weapons are being sent to the Soviet Union on credit.
Can we successfully change US public opinion? On a large scale probably not. However, if we do not try we definitely cannot expect to positively effect our image with the American public. If we manage to change just a small percentage from neutral to positive, or pro war to neutral, we will see some small gains within the anti-war, isolationist sector during the upcoming congressional elections. Any small, positive perceptions we place before the American public now will be the seeds of doubt, from which a peace movement might spring if the war become costly to the US in money and blood. The decision for or against war could come down to a vote or two, and if we do not attempt to portray our cause in a positive light, we may not have those one or two votes. It may not work, but it will not work if we do not try. Popular support on the home front is critical for continued and increased participation by the US, we want to shake that support to whatever degree we can. Optimally, we need to make the American public begin to suspect that Britain dragged the US into the war. British policy aimed at retaining or expanding her colonial empire is behind her actions with regards to us and Vichy France. We want them to think that the UK is extorting aid from the US, just as she is demanding it from other of her former colonies such as Australia, and Canada. We want Japan to be seen as another victim of the continental Europe entanglements that have dragged the rest of the world into conflict. Again, we may not succeed, but it is foolish for us to do nothing and to allow our enemies to control this entire segment of warfare.

 

I mentioned it before, but it would probably help if we dropped our alliance with Germany and Italy. If we want to distance our selves from the Nazi's we shouldn't be in an alliance with them. I like the idea of the Noumea invasion its self, Im just concerned it not be the final straw in persuading the US to get more involved in the Pacific or to increase their arming of the Philippines. The DEI should be our first and foremost priority and then once that is taken care of we can focus on additional lands if needed. Maybe we can even leave the Dutch government in nominal control as long as they guarantee oil deliveries.

 

I am confident that the forces currently tasked to our DEI operations demonstrate that we are employing a proper degree of concentration to achieve our goals quickly and with as little damage as possible.

As for our alliance with Germany, this is a more complex issue. It does allow the west to attach a easily identifiable characterization to us, but while I can easily endorse many acts to change our perception in the non-alined countries, a public rejection of Germany does have real world implications to us. Herr Hitler seems to be a mercurial personality if our envoy to the Reich is to be credited, and as such the subtleties of publicly renouncing them while privately retaining close relations to ensure trade of technical developments and enemy deployments might be lost on him, especially since there is no apparent advantage to the Third Reich.

Can we afford to rely upon our technical research alone, or is it not wiser to at least attempt to try and merge our advances with those of the Reich as it seems the west is doing?

 

Can we really do effective trading with the Reich and how easily can we adopt their technology with our limited industry?

 

Our industry is only limited in some areas, in others we are the equal to the Germans, in some superior.

We have a number of large cargo submarines that can transport, technical personnel, scientists and military liaisons, plus critical items and materials, parts and examples.

 

You certainly may, Belasar-sama. I also am skeptical. The concept of the operation seems to have fluctuated. As I recall it was originally a stand-alone operation, to be executed during peacetime, on the pretext of helping the Vichy French to ressert control. I don't recall that we ever established that Vichy forces were actually available and willing to cooperate with us in this. It was suggested that we ask Germany to pressure Vichy, which they might be willing to do, but it's far from a top priority for Herr Hitler.

Subsequently the plan was reconceived as part of our general offensive. That does remove the concern about tipping off the westerners prematurely, but it also destroys in the eyes of most of the world the pretense of aiding the legitimate French government.

As in other aspects of our operations, there are few negative consequences if the Americans do not intervene. If they do, Noumea will be in the front lines, likely to be the first place they attack or attempt to isolate when they get organized. Its defense will be an all-Japanese operation and a significant commitment. We will also need to take intermediate points like the Solomons or New Hebrides to secure our lines of communication, though we could probably get away with taking Noumea first. There may even be a miniscule chance of Australia staying out of the war if we do not attack her possessions in the first strike.

While I appreciate the value of chromium, nickel, etc. both the mines themselves and the sea lanes from Noumea to Japan will be extremely exposed if we end up in a full-scale war with the United States and Allies.

 

I believe that the US's initial ability to intercede in a timely manner is greatly overrated. If I could ask the good Admiral a few questions, I think the answers will prove my point.

1.) If we do not attack the US directly, do you think there will be an immediate response to our taking Noumea, or do you think they will wait to seek a vote from their congress for a declaration of war?
2.) If they seek a declaration of war, what would be your best guess as to the earliest date this could be achieved?
3.) Will they focus all their strength on a counter-attack on Noumea, or will they attempt to gather their strength to defend US territories such as Hawaii, the west coast of the US, Guam, Wake, or possibly the Philippines against further Japanese attack?
4.) What is the earliest date they could mount a counter-invasion, in your opinion?
5.) Do they have sufficient support ships, AP's, AK's, oilers, tankers, etc. to mount an invasion and support the battle fleet in support of this operation?
6.) Do they have sufficient, amphibiously trained troops to undertake an invasion of Noumea without stripping ground forces from areas we might threaten?
7.) If they did mount an offensive against Noumea, at present could we defeat the enemy fleet in a fleet action?

The answer to six is no! They have two Marine Regiments in San Diego, 2d and 8th Marines (only these two are amphibiously trained) and one Marine Battalion in Pago Pago, Samoa. There are only five partially trained US Army regiments in Hawaii, three battalions of the 298th, at Hilo, Lahaina and Lihue. The 19th, 21st, 27th and 35th regiments on Oahu. That's it in the region without going back to the US west coast or Alaska. Once open war comes, the US will be scurrying to defend all possible locations we might attack. Britain will be pushing them to reinforce Australia. How would the US be able to mount a credible offensive before a minimum of six months? In six months, if we focus, we can have a formidable defensive position in Noumea and be in possession of the supporting locations and well on our way to having them developed.

 

since there are Australian troops in Singapore, there is no way to avoid attacking them

 

True. In the run-up to war we stress to Australia our dispute is with Britain and not them. Upon declaration of war with Britain and the Netherlands we let the United States and Australia know that their territories, personnel and shipping will be respected and will not be attacked unless they intervene.

We will issue press statements similar to this:

This morning, land, naval and air forces of the nation of Japan began combat operations against British and Dutch forces in the Pacific region. We do not take these actions lightly and they are the result of British and Dutch intransigence in our attempts to work out a negotiated settlement through diplomatic means. They have forced us into a position where we have but two choices, watch our nation collapse and see population beggared, or initiate war to remedy the situation. Yesterday, 28 November, 1941, both Britain and the Netherlands were notified by our diplomatic representatives that a state of war existed between our nations.

We did not want war, but now that it has been forced upon us we want to make our position perfectly clear. We do not desire, in fact we ardently wish to avoid conflict with the United States, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines or any other entity not directly involved in enforcing the destructive policies of the British government upon our nation. We will not attack any territory, possession, citizen, ship or other entity of these nations unless attacked first or those entities discovered to be actively engaged directly in supporting British and Dutch military forces involved in combat operations against our people. All ships involved in commercial trade, all civilian personnel, and any military personnel not engaged in combat operations, will be given protection, guaranteed safe passage and provided with repatriation to their home country if so requested.

 

From what we have been able to learn of American war plans, they expect to launch their first major offensive, against the Marshall Islands, approximately 180 days after the start of mobilization. Most of this time would be for conversion of merchant ships into the necessary auxiliary types Bobimoto-san mentioned. They have also identified several ocean liners for conversion to auxiliary aircraft carriers similiar to our Junyo.

These plans are for a purely US-Japan war, and the scale of the fleet train is based on their first operation being a 2000-mile leap from Hawaii to the Marshalls, with no nearby bases or air support other than Wake Island. Noumea is longer in steaming distance, but they would have the benefit of bases in nearby British and Australian territory.

 

Would nearby bases materially effect their need for amphibious troops and shipping?

Do those nearby bases have stockpiles of fuel oil that the British or Australians might willingly loan to American operations to capture Noumea?

To which bases do you refer? What is the status of those bases?

Suva and Savusavu both have good harbors, but both seem lightly developed. Levuka seems almost non-extant and the harbor looks to be both poor and poorly developed. Port Vila in the Franco-British condominium of Vanuatu also seems like a good port, though quite undeveloped. How sympathetic is the local administration there to the DeGaulleist rebels? Ports in Australia and New Zealand are, of course, more suitable, but we can also, perhaps, control traffic to and from these ports somewhat better, and given their indirect relationship to the probable line of American advance we could at least scout U.S. forces longer and more accurately should they chose to stage through these more developed ports.

 

It would take time to develop Suva as a adequate base beyond storage and harborage.

 

I would like a contingency plan for the taking of Fiji, depending upon how Australia and the US react. Fiji can be neutralized by air, surface and submarine forces in the meantime, from New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. Another reason that we need Noumea.

 

The proposition of the Noumea operation has proven to be a vexing issue to the Council, the most troubling since we decided the fate of Shinano and her unnamed sister. As the members of the Council may recall I was forced to act to break the impasse created by a divided Council, with no clear majority evident. I would rather not have to repeat this so soon, especially since I was compelled to endorse a course of action I did not have full faith in, and if done so again others might have similar regrets on this issue.

At present we have three options before us are.

One) Strike before our X-Day operations as a stand alone endeavor.

Two) Strike concurrent with our X-Day operations as a part of our overall strategic plan.

Three) Not attempt to seize Noumea and its surrounding islands at all.

At this present none of these options strikes a harmonious chord within the Council and adoption of any one of them seem to offer discord to one faction or the other. Perhaps, however, there exists a fourth option that could answer both the various objections to, and the arguments for, going ahead.

Please indulge me as I encapsulate our agreed strategy to this point. On X-day our forces will drive with dispatch to land and support attacks upon targets in the DEI and the Maylay Peninsula. After any Anglo-Dutch naval units have been dealt with, and land based air units landed at forward airbases, the various fleet units will withdraw to replace aircrew, planes and fuel. This pause in fleet operations is designed also to allow us to gauge the response of both the United States and the Commonwealth nations of Australia and New Zealand.

Our hope of course is that America will remain at peace and Australia & New Zealand will accept our not targeting of the Solomon's and New Guinea in our initial attack, along with a promise not to do so in the future, as reason enough to seek a accommodation with the Empire that would leave us at war with only the British and Dutch. If America goes to war we move to isolate the Philippines, If the ANZAC's side with the mother country, we move on to the Solomon's and New Guinea to isolate Australia and New Zealand.

The option I propose is that we make Noumea, and its surrounding islands, a integral part of our Commonwealth nation follow up plan. This would seem to answer General Terauchi's concerns that we concentrate fully on the DEI and Malaysia. This would seem to allay Admiral Karonada's concern about a secure logistics supply line as we would be securing this at the same time. This may also ease Admiral Takao's concerns about the American's seeing this as line in the sand, since we will have a better understanding of America's thinking when we reach the post DEI/Malay pause to resupply the Kido Butai. Lastly this would satisfy, I hope, Noka's and Bobimoto's concern's that not to take these islands would prove a strategic opportunity lost.

The only downside I can see is that it would put off our securing these islands for a period of 3 to 6 months. Less time to build them up, but I am doubtful that the Commonwealth can build them up beyond our ability to seize them or time enough for the US to circumnavigate the political hurdles of concluding a agreement for basing rights with a government they officially refuse to recognize. If the US declares war at the outset and moves to occupy these islands as we are securing the SRA, then we will have more pressing concerns to address.

 

Honorable Prime Minister,

You propose an admirable solution, so I almost hesitate to suggest amendment, but I might make one small recommendation: If there is a possible weakness it rests in the possible speed of a U.S. response. Our line of advance to Noumea is long and exposed. I can believe that the United States could move on it and make it too costly for any attempt we might make with as little as three months time. Perhaps considerably less. Phone calls and telegrams move nearly instantaneously. The U.S. has many ships and many more troops. They could have many soldiers dug in on Noumea very quickly if they could but secure the cooperation of the DeGaulleists, which issue I do not doubt. However, they would be exceedingly unlikely to do so without first recognizing the DeGaulleist government, which seems unlikely so long as a state of war does not exist between the U.S. and either Japan or Germany. And even after reaching such an agreement it would take time to send troops.

Thus I believe I can support your proposal with this small provision: even though we might not move immediately against Noumea, given it's peculiar strategic and tactical value we should have forces on hand and ready so that we might take Noumea before it could be reinforced should we learn of any enemy moves to that end. Second, we should carefully monitor all American infantry and shipping movements, which seems only prudent anyway. By holding the Noumea force in reserve we allow flexibility into our planning. We could assign a different task should the need arise, possibly even abandoning Noumea. This force could serve as an emergency reserve should one of our other initial operations falter. If it is ready, forward deployed to Truk with sufficient forces on hand, we could act very quickly. It's a risk, of course, since after the outset of hostilities we could well find ourselves exposed to Australian interference, but if we chose enough and fast enough ships we might be able to move quickly enough to outflank any Australian response, if I might use the vernacular of our Army members.

What say you, gentlemen? I do not wish to sow discord amongst our members, but to make the best paint for the finest illuminations we must carefully stir the paints and pigments of our thoughts before we reach enlightened consensus.

Respectfully,

R. Adm. Noka Shijin, Interim Imperial Japanese High Council