American plans in case Stalin was defeated

Hello,

I already heard that the Americans had a plan to hold major operations in the Pacific, send 180+ divisions to fight the European Axis, and expand significantly their air power in case the Soviets were defeated.

Such plan really existed? If so, can someone provide me a link or suggestion of a book that contains info about it?

Thanks since now.

 

Sounds like a pipe dream....

The Western Allies were worried about the USSR's collapse during the first 18-24 months of the Eastern war (Jun 1941 until early to mid 1943), after that point it was pretty clear that the USSR was not going to be defeated.
In early 1942, the US had a plan to invade Axis held Europe with 48 divisions in the spring of 1943, 18 British/CW divisions and 30 US divisions.
However by July 1943 there were only about 8 or 9 US divisions in the ETO.

So how in the world they could even imagine to send 180 divisions to Europe is beyond me, unless it is 1946 or later.

 

Thanks for the answer freebird.

Certainly, after the critical period a Soviet defeat was unlikely. But, I'm asking about if the Americans had a plan in case the Soviets were defeated, to speed up the opening of a front in order to deny Hitler the time for use the resources obtained and consolidade defenses.

And just to let clear: I'm asking about real American prepations here, like the Plan Orange that existed for Japan, not to discuss alternative history.

 

Other than Operation Sledgehammer, I know of now other real plans to act. Sledgehammer called for putting about 100,000 men ashore in a cross-Channel invasion of Europe, in an attempt to reduce pressure on the Red Army by establishing a foothold on the continent. The plan was to seize the Channel ports or either Brest or Cherbourg in the early Autumn of 1942, then dig in and hold a perimeter while the beach head grows. A breakout into Northern France would then be attempted in the Spring of 1943. A very tall order indeed.

Of course this entire operation was realized as being folly after the results of the disastrous Dieppe Raid in August of 1942. Most US General Officers pushed for this operation, as did the Soviets. Good thing the British were looking at things realistically at this point.

 

A-58, I found that there was Operation Roundup for 1943, and Operation Roundhammer, a revised version of the latter also for 1943. I also found that the Allies really considerate them unrealistic specially 1942. If there was no more official plan, perhaps one can considerate that if the Soviets were defeated, resources and manpower could be diverted from the Pacific and from the Soviet Lend-Lease that could have make an invasion feaible, at least earlier than D-Day.

Source: Planned Operations of World War II

 

Jenisch I believe you are connecting two different trains of thought. First is Operation Sledgehammer an Allied effort to land troops on Europe in 1942 to either prevent a Soviet collapse or exploit a German one. The other is the original American mobilization plan of 200 divisions (20-Pacific, 180-ETO). It was first thought that the war needs would call for a land force of 200 plus divisions to achieve victory, but for a verity of reasons this force was scaled back to just under a 100.

The US needed a large Air Force and Navy to fight two major campaigns, in two different directions, at the same time. Germany, Russia and to some extent Japan all built large land armies, with many 'division' sized formations. Too many for Germany and Japan to adequately equip and supply, and without Allied lend lease, too many for the USSR as well. Germany, Russia and Japan tended to keep a Divisional unit in the line until it was combat ineffective and nearly ( far too frequently, completely ) destroyed before pulling it out of the line to be rebuilt (sometimes) in the rear.

This was a highly wastefull system, but did allow the maximum number of combat formations to be at the front at any given time. Russia was the best at pulling their divisions out before they were totally destroyed to rebuild and redeploy. Germany tried hard to periodicly pull back its mobile divisions (Panzer, Panzer Grenadier and motorized) and some infantry units, but most divisions were fought until they were down to 1/3 or less their intended strength before they had a chance to recover. Many never got that chance. Nearly every Japanese formation fought and died in its original position and was rebuilt from scatch (if possoble).

The US and Britain tended to keep a large supply of replacement troops on hand to contiually feed into its active combat formations so that these formations could continually remain at or near the front. This was possible because both Britain and the US made the deliberate desicion to employ fewer divisions while maintaining over all larger and more combat effective divisional units.

The US probably could reach the 200 division force had it really wished to, but it would require employing many skilled men from its workforce which would impead war production. Call up more lower quality recruits, assign fewer to the Navy and Air Corps, and quite possibly intergrate the armed services in 1942/43 rather than just before Korea. For political, economic and military reasons this course was not pursued.

 

Excellent post Belasar.

Specifically, the American numbers in the ground scene were much reduced by the need to built air fronts, as well as dozens of carriers and other naval vessels for use mainly in the extremely demanding in logistics PTO, that consumed much men to produce and support. Just the USN received about 24,000 Hellcats and Corsairs during the war, against about 50,000 Bf 109s and Fw 190s built. Quiet impressive that only the USN receive half the number of fighters the Germans built, not to mention the USAAF. Hitler was very lucky to have the Japanese as allies, because he would be defeated much quicker if the Americans could direct all this power against him.

 

I have some “staff” experience - enough to know that contingency plans are made for everything, or at least everything someone can think of at the time These plans are usually in draft form and become the basis of more detailed and evolved plans if the current situation warrants.

We, the US, have plans to close our boarders. These plans are periodically reviewed and updated but, since we don‘t really see Canada or Mexico as an invasion threat, this is just a formality.

Point I’m trying to make is that just having “plans” doesn’t necessarily mean a nation is serious about acting on them.


“Among other evils that being unarmed brings you, it causes you to be despised.” Niccolo Machiavelli

 

I don't know about you but I'm watching Canada like a hawk!

 

There was also "Imperator" a plan to land 6-8 divisions (mostly British) in France in 1942, and push to capture Paris.
This was understood as a suicide mission, which was hoped to help the Soviets to prevent an imminent collapse

Not to mention the difficulties of embarking & supplying forces this large to Europe.

Indeed, but both Marshall & Stimson were pushing hard to initiate Sledgehammer.

Those pesky Canadians!
Haven't you annexed them yet as the 51st state?

 

Since the Americans considerated built a "gay bomb", they probably have plans if an enemy built one. LOL!

 

Yes, those evil, insidious hockey lovers must be crushed at all costs!