P-80 in latest Aviation History mag

Article mentions major technical problems with P-80 in Oct 44. Bong died in one because of this.

If Germans had got 262 together earlier, ( Galland mentioned late 43 & certainly available in numbers to counter Normandy invasion ), Some say allies would have countered by accelerating 'their' jet program.

Based on this article, this does not appear an achievable objective. Meteor too slow,& P-80 not ready for largescale deployment.


Here are Gallands comments circa 1991...

When did you know that Germany had lost the war?
Galland: Very, very early. I had open discussions with Jeschonnek about this, when we were preparing the spring offensive in 1942. Every reserve in Germany was to become active in this offensive. We had to stop our training, by taking out every instructor - fighters, bombers, and especially transports. All were made operational. And Jeschonnek said that since we were destroying our training capabilities, if we did not win this offensive against Russia, then the war is lost.
Caldwell: Jeschonnek said that?
Galland: Jeschonnek said that - officially. Of course, one could do nothing but follow this order, and sacrifice the training organization. Jeschonnek took the consequences and committed suicide. But the war was continued. And the offensive didn't even take place, because the Russians advanced their own. From this time on, I knew that at the least, this war could not be won. But we did fight. We fought because we felt we had to, for better conditions. Unconditional surrender was the very worst thing. I always hoped to split the Russians from the Western Allies. It was our hope in the dark. If the Western Allies had said, "We agree to certain conditions", the war would have been shorter.
Caldwell: Even in the most favorable circumstances for Germany, what effect could the Me 262 have had on the war?
Galland: In the case of the 262, there is no question that many mistakes were made. The design and development of the plane were delayed for a year by an order of Hitler, who wanted to accelerate short-range developments and cancel long-range projects. But this was completely wrong in the case of the 262. Hitler had little understanding of the Air Force at all, and for air combat - none at all. He couldn't think in three dimensions. He was an army man. If everything had been done perfectly, we would have gained 4-5 months development. We would have gained 2-3 months production. We could have had about 600-800 Me 262s ready for combat, on permanent bases, by the end of 1943. This would have delayed the invasion, of course, without question, and would have changed the air dominion of the Allies, but the result would have been that the [Western] Allies would have moved more slowly, and the Russians would have come farther, certainly to the Rhine. There would have been more destruction. And so ultimately, this order of Hitler's that was completely wrong had a good result.

 

Great article, thanks chrome. It's interesting to see Galland's comments on the war. More interesting was his omission that had the war been continued for a few more months, the A-Bomb would have added to Germany's pain, never mind the russians!

 

Well, US only had 2, so if they used em on Japan, one has to calculate how long it would take to build a couple more, & how Germans would react. They may not react same way as Japan. But it is true that it was a headache on the horizon.

 

Did the article say exactly what went wrong with Bong's aircraft and why he did not get out ?

 

Hmm, will go buy it manana. Was broke yesterday.

& as for Galland & bomb, I think he was referring more to time between May & Aug 45.

 

Ok, regarding Bong, article mentions on takeoff the plane lost power & crashed. This was AuG 6 45. A friend mentioned Bong didn't listen to ground crew before taking off, but have nothing to verify that. Ground crew might've been covering their asses, or the story could be bunk. Dunno, wasn't there.

A fuel pump failure which resulted in an engine flameout in Oct 44 killed test pilot Milo Burcham. All were recalled for various fixes it goes on to say.

Also covers XP 59, barely over 400 mph, therefore not pursued, XP 83 which had range, but was too big & only had marginally better performance than piston engined fighters.

& XP 84 Thunderjet which was not ready for testing til Jan 46.

 

Thanks for the information !

 

You bet. This friend of mine is on board of directors of 8th airforce. Dunno who told him the story bout Bong, but he said Bong came off arrogant to the technicians. Again, just hearsay.

Bong said he would have got 80 kills if he could shoot as well at the beginning of his career as he did at the end of it.

 

Considering that the P-80 went from drawing board to flying aircraft in 143 days I would say it was a proverbial rabbit from the hat trick that it worked so well.
As for Bell's P-59 a more innovative team might have salvaged that aircraft into a real performer. Thinner smaller wings and a pared down fuselage would have worked wonders. Sweep would have not necessarily been necessary.

 

So well? Um perhaps a read of the article would be advisable. It didn't work well, had major technical bugs as late as Aug 45. & engines were British, which were not exactly straight from the drawing board, the developement of these went back to the 30's.

It did hit around 500 mph, which is it's one impressive achievement. In a flyoff comparison to the 262 after war, it took 2nd.

 

Swept wing not neccessary, hmm. Well perhaps, but it was copied by all nations in jet design after the war, so would have been a pretty "good" idea me thinks.