Japanese ability to analyze American aircraft

Back to the question of what factors combined to account for the failure of the Japanese Army and Navy air arms to stay competitive with their US counterparts after 1942, would anyone endorse the idea that the disparity in maintenance routines may have been a contributing (if minor) factor? Specifically, and maybe for example, I understand that, unlike the Americans, the Japanese didn't normally bother synchronizing the engines on multi-engine aircraft. As a result, from the air or ground, before a multi-engine plane became visible, its nationality could be identified by whether it was emitting the uneven "washing machine"-like noise produced by unsynchronized Japanese engines, or the smoother sound of US engines, which were always synchronized. At the least, this must have occasionally deprived the Japanese of the element of surprise and/or surreptitiousness when attacking sea or ground targets or conducting high-level reconnaissance. At worst (and not being mechanical, I wouldn't know), might the failure to synchronize have had some effect on performance? Re the former possibility, the issue is perhaps the auditory equivalent to one of the disadvantages suffered by P-38s flying high-altititude escort in the ETO: with their distinctive dual contrails, the Lightnings could always be recognized from afar, so the Germans knew what they were up against. (This thread has focused on single-engine fighters, but could non-synchronizing have been symptomatic of other forms of Japanese maintenance negligence?)

 

tslothrop, Welcome to the forum!

I can not speak to the area of synchronization, but over all the problems of supply to ever more isolated outposts and generally poorer fuel quality certainly played a role. For Japan after late 1942, everything was beginning to fray at the edges, at an ever quicker pace.

 

That's a very interesting question, tslothrop. Would synchronized engines make the aircraft easier to control by providing more symmetric thrust? I would guess the difference probably isn't much, but synchronization might be more forgiving of inexperienced pilots. Will have to consult the aviation gang. Very interesting question.

 

SymphonicPoet:
Thanks for the response. I'm nothing resembling an aeronautical engineer, but I asked a retired USAAF Colonel/ex-B-29 navigator who says there was some effect on performance, but the most significant factor was loss of stealth (making enemy planes easy to identify by sound). He should know: he was adrift in the Pacific for a week when his Superfort ditched after being shot up over Tokyo. The first plane he heard coming was a Kawanishi flying boat, and the wah-wah of its engines immediately caused him to pull the sea-green side of his canvas tarp over his head and pray he wouldn't be spotted. (He wasn't.) Later he heard a smoother-running PBY approaching and flipped the tarp to the yellow side and waved like hell. (He was ultimately rescued by a US sub.)

 

It's not at all clear that any of the above planes benefited from reverse engeneering the A6M. Knowing more about them proably helped the pilots though.

For the IJN, I believe Shattered Sword makes a case for the loss of the aircraft support personel at Midway being one of the most significant losses. The Japanese didn't change their training regime much either from what I've read. There was a book co-written by Caiden (the Japanese pilot was not happy with it from what I've read) about one of the surviving IJN aces. He got into a battle with a bunch of green F6F pilots over Iwo Jima I think late in the war. He said he was obviously better as an individual pilot but the US had trained the pilots to work as a team and he wasn't able to shoot down any of them and eventually got away when they dropped low enough that AA fire opened up on them and they each went their respective ways. He commented that the team work was something they didn't train for. The original IJN pilot training was also very tough and selective but tended to produce too few pilots. I'm not sure when the Japanese figured out that dog fighting didn't work anymore but energy tactics did. Given the coordination between the two services this would likely have required seperate discoveries by the IJN and the IJA where the US planes were suited to this type of battle even before they made the discovery that that was how to fight the Japanese aircraft.

 

I think you are talking about the Heinkel He 177 which was the only German heavy bomber during the war. Though you may also be referring to the Amerika Bomber project which was supposed to be able to bomb America and come back. Several prototypes were made but most didn't work as well as the German high command hoped. Also I don't think they were actually based off of the B-17 but more of Germany's own intentions for a heavy bomber.

As for Japan, I don't think that it was that they were simply not able to examine American aircraft, but more that they wanted to keep their original principles for aircraft design which ultimately cost them. This can be compared to their stubbornness to develop their tanks further until it was too late.

 

The Japanese also had the advantage of have the German reports of Allied planes.

 

I have no idea how much communication there was between Japan and Germany regarding allied aircraft performance, but I also believe that any information may have been limited. The British with the Hurricanes and Spitfires were I believe limited to the Burma and India campaign, so most Japanese pilots may not have ever come across them. The Europoean theatre was vastly different from the Pacific theatre in regards to principle aircraft used. With Europe primarily a land based campaign with a few exceptions of amphibious and U-boat considerations and the Pacific theatre comprising of island hopping with a much larger emphasis on carrier based planes. I have no idea how many times the Germans may have seen a Hellcat or Avenger to give any additional performance information to the Japanese, but I have to believe it was pretty limited.

 

P-40s, P-38s, and B-17s certainly appeared fairly early in both theaters. Of course the Japanese and German planes were so different that what worked for one might not work for the other. There were a few confrontations between USN CV planes and the Germans but not many. Later on a number of other bombers and fighters saw usage in both theaters but by then I'm not sure how much use the intel would have been.

 

When it came to designing new aircraft, the Japanese compromised their aircraft design principals fairly early on in the Pacific War - OK, I'll admit that the IJA did this far quicker than the IJN, likely because the IJA was introducing several new designs at the time, while the IJN's A6M Zero was already in full production, and it's successor was barely a design on the drawing board. However, for those models that they did have in full production, it took sometime to complete the transition to upgrade the aircraft with armor, self-sealing tanks, etc. since they were having problems producing reliable high horsepower engines to offset the weight increase of the aircraft. Thus, it would not be until mid-'44 when the A6M Zero was finally given self-sealing gas tanks with the introduction of the A6M5 Model 52c.


The Japanese were not "stubborn" in developing their tanks. As for the first few years of the Pacific War, their enemies had little in the way of "superior" armor( a small number of M-3 Grants), so there was no pressing need to develop their armored vehicles. Further, the Japanese Army was not heavily motorized, so supplying a large armored force on the move was simply out of the question. Nor was the Japanese heavy industry, at the time, capable of producing large numbers of medium or heavy tanks - Germany produced almost 1,400 Tiger I heavy tanks between '42 & '44, the Japanese produced slightly over 2,000 of their medium(14-15 ton) Type 97 "Chi-Ha" & "Shinhoto Chi-Ha". So not only was there no pressing "need", but there was also no capacity to produce such tanks.

 

I see your point and now thinking about it, I agree.

 

I already read Japanese messanges with the Finns regarding this. The Finns were telling to the Japanese about the new Soviet fighters, their basic data and characteristics. The Japanese for instance, were well aware of the IL-2 by the summer of 1941.

 

Interview with a Ki-43 pilot: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-eBmnpCO18

 

I believed I mentioned it, but even with the info, Japan would still only have a limited ability to do anything about the info. Limited industry and a lack of trained pilots meant that most pilots would not have the ability to do anything with the info even if they were taught it.

 

Poppy,

My understanding of current scholarship is that Yamamoto Isokuru was the leader of the pro-war faction (General Staff clique) opposing the faction that favored peace with the U.S. (Ministry clique) in the IJN. His cautions about overwhelming U.S. advantages was jibe directed against the Army, which in his opinion didn't understand total war.

 

With regards to the OP;

Yes, the Japanese did analyse American aircraft. But that wasn't the issue. The Zero was a competent aircraft throughout the war. One real issue was one of Pilot Quality.

The Japanese had their very best pilots on the aircraft carriers. They were the very, very best. Ever hear of the axiom; those that can, do, those that can't, teach? That was the way of the Japanese. Because their best aces were all on the carriers, once those carriers were engaged in warfare, each pilot loss was irreplaceable. There were no "old dogs" teaching the young'uns the ropes at pilot school. Once the aircraft carriers were sunk, or their airarm destroyed, the quality of their replacements went rapidly downhill. There wasn't a shortage of pilots, even late in the war, but of skilled pilots.

Contrast the American system; many Aces were rotated back home to teach the new guys already at Pilot School. This means they are learning their skills from the very best, and not just some tired old never-was. Those American aces coming back, had real, recent experience, and important knowledge to share.

And Japanese industry during WW2 was nowhere near good enough to keep pace with the USA. They failed to maintain qualitative standards on even basic equipment.

 

they captured an intact and flyable b-17 in the south pacific in early 1942, according to saburo sakai, but it was brought to japan immediately and sakai and the rest of the lae wing did not benefit from the find. they devised their tactics purely on combat observation.

 

I often wondered if the 'Rita' (Nakajima G8N) was influenced by American B-17s. Outwardly, there are similarities.

http://www.aviastar.org/air/japan/nakajima_g8n.php

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0n8V1YCCC-s

 

Outwardly, there are also similarities with Nakajima's previous outings in the bomber category, the Ki-49 and the Nakajimia G5N.

Personally, I always thought the G8N looked like a Martin B-26 Marauder on steroids.

 

I'm a bit confused by this part: The Zero was a competent aircraft throughout the war.

The Zero didn't really have potential for performance upgrades like the BF 109 or Spitfire or even the P-38. Zeros were easy meat for late war allied fighters and their tactics.