USA Submarine

This talk of using diesel in subs...I assume then that the USA started with gasoline engines...and Nimitz was on the forefront of making the switch.?
Thanks

 

Interesting link.
I guess there was quite a "learning curve" where USA torpedoes were concerned. I heard tell of one sub commander reported of the firing of 11 torpedoes at a vessel...but only ONE did its thing.
That must have been discouraging.

 

July, 1943 - USS Tinosa, under Lt.Cmdr. Lawrence Randall "Dan" Daspit, versus the Japanese tanker(converted whale factory ship) Tonan Maru 3. He fired a total of 15 torpedoes for 13 hits...But only two exploded. The Tonan Maru 3 was towed back to Japan and was repaired and returned to service. This was the final part in fixing the Mark 14 torpedo, as it had already been proven that the torpedo was running deeper than set, and that the magnetic exploder was defective. Now it had been proven that the contact detonator was defective as well.

However, while Nimitz, in July, 1943, had ordered the submarines under his command to disable the torpedo's magnetic detonator, the submarines under of COMSUBSOWESPAC were under Admiral Christie, who was one of those responsible for the magnetic detonator. As such, he could not believe that "his" magnetic detonator was the cause, and he continued to blame his submarine captains for the problems it was causing. He finally had to be directly ordered to disable the devices by his superior Admiral Kinkaid, Christie grudgingly obeyed the order in January, 1944.

 

I will look three different submarine campaigns waged in three different theaters

1) German Navy : Kriegsmarine started the war against Britain with a small U-Boat (submarine fleet ) They just 57 subs and only half of them were long range ocean going types. After the war Admiral Doenitz cmdr of U-Boat fleet and later commander of Kriegsmarine tried to find excuses for German failures and defeats just like every defeated German military leader played a "What if " game and commented "If we had 300 U-Boats at 1939 when war began we would win the war etc" What Doenitz did not remark is relative small size of German Navy comared to Allies was the result of Anglo-Naval Treaty signed in 1935 between Nazi Germany and Great Britain. According to this treaty signed in London Germans agreed to keep size of their fleet especially number of their U-Boats just a friction of Royal Navy. Both sides were happy. German submarines devestated Allied shipping in Word War I and were close to bringing Allied war effort to its knees. British statesmen and Admiralty did not wish to see that again especially with "No Major War for next 10 years" rule and naval budget cuts. Hitler and Nazi leadership at the other hand wished to keep British neutral and even friendly during 1930'ies did not want to provoke their suspicions about Germany's future intentions and ambitions so they agreed ( Nazi vision for gaining Lebensraum living space was about gaining ground on Eastern Europe at the expanse of Slavs not overseas anyway. So it was logical Luftwaffe-German Air Force and German Army rearmament took priorty over German Navy-They also probably remembered how existence and expansion of German High Seas Fleet raised British suspicion and hostility against Germany before World War I ) If Anglo-Naval Treaty 1935 was not signed and Germany expanded their Navy in 1935 , I do not think British Royal Navy would stand still. They would start a massive shipbuilding programme also especially destroyers and escort vessels at the expense of RAF. They woud also develop their anti submrine defences , deloy new technologies and tactics considering the nightmare they got through during Great War.

 

I'm not sure what the American reaction to the British German naval treaty was from what I've read the French weren't happy about it as it essentially contraviened the treaty that ended WWI which I believe prohibited both submarines and battleships in German service (accepting 2 very old 10,000 ton ones)

 

The Treaty provided for six battleships of the Deutschland or Braunschweig classes, each class was approximately 13,000+ tons standard displacement, but all of these battleships were antiquated with several having been decommissioned during World War I or used as training/target ships later in the war. They were eligible to be replaced (after 20 years from the launch date according to the treaty), but their replacements were limited to 10,000 tons standard displacement. However, while the financial troubles of Germany precluded their timely replacement, the extra time was well spent, resulting in the quite powerful Deutschland/Luetzow "pocket battleships."

I am of the opinion that it was the German "pocket battleships" - not their submarines - the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 sought to forestall. By forcing Germany into building a navy similar to the Royal Navy, the British would maintain their absolute superiority over the German Navy with the forces at hand or those that would soon begin construction. Now, had Germany continued to buildiing her "pocket battleships", the British would have to maintain construction of expensive battleships or design an entirely new class of warship to combat them - an expensive proposition in it's own right.

 

Not sure why I remember 2 instead of 6. Perhaps it was because the Germans actually kept 2 old battleships. The Deutshland's were impressive cruisers for the time but by the late 30's there were a fair number of cruisers that were arguably a match for them one on one and most were faster. On the other hand the British tended to prefer building more smaller cruisers as compared to other nations. Still a pair of their larger light cruisers would be more than the Deutchlands could handle most of the time and the German ships didn't have a huge amount of AAA either. I'm not sure that the Germans wanted to buidl more of the panzershiffe either, indeed my impression is that the design of the twins was well under way when the treaty was signed.

 

Good documentary on US Subs in the Pacific.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ4KmpdHUVs

 

The Germans initially kept six of the Braunschweig and Deutschland class pre-dreadnoughts, but rather than have to replace them all at once they modernized two during the 1920s and the rest were scrapped or converted to other uses like depot or target ships. This is a fairly common solution to the problem of "block obsolescence". The first three pocket battleships replaced the decommissioned ships, and a second increment of three would have replaced Schliesen and Schlieswig-Holstein had plans not changed under Hitler.

 

That makes sense. Thanks.

 

IMO the Deutschland's were much more sensible ships than the treaty heavy cruisers and Hipper was a step back, if you give them DP secondaries, (the Germans had a 128mm DP under development though they finally debugged it pretty late) and some Bofors (or the Army's 37mm that were magazine loaded) they would still be excellent designs in 1940.

In a long range gunnery fight they clearly outmatched any first generation treaty cruiser and could probably outfight any similarly sized second generation one, by which I include Nachi, Zara, Algerie and Wichita and possibly Baltimore (though she was some 2000t larger and 10 years younger). The only ships they had to fear one on one were battlecruisers/fast battleships and third generation cruisers and "cruiser killers" like Dunquerque, Salem or Alaska but, barring the battlecruisers, none of those existed at the time of their design.

The RN with it's preference for small cruisers would have a lot of problems countering half a dozen of them, two Deutchlands operating as a pair may give even the unmodernized HMS Repulse trouble, and sending the fast Battleships to chase pocket battleships would expose them to a lot of wear and tear and leave only slow ships to counter the likes of Bismark and Littorio (is we assume six Deutchlands the twins never get built but Dunquerque that triggered new battleship building does). Avoiding just that scenario may have been one of the reasons of the naval treaty.

 

Now, the Naval aspect of WW2 is really a weak area for me. I always thought a big part of the Naval treaties of the 20's and 30's was to avoid the costs of a Naval arms race, at least for the British. The treaties themselves were not uncontroversial at the time.

What would've been interesting was if the French hadn't been so adamant against the British attempt to abolish the submarine in the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty...

 

I'd give the edge to a Baltimore fighting a Deutschland indeed I'd give the edge to a Brooklyn or Cleveland especially once equiped with radar. 6 guns is just a bit short for what I'd want in a long range engagement. I should clarify that I don't give these ships a great deal of an edge and wouldn't be surprised at the Deutschland winning a fight vs one of them. The slower speed would also mean that they couldn't dictate range or even evade. Still all those are much newer ships. The Japanese cruisers would be a very intersting match up as their turret armor was so light even the secondaries from a Deutschland would have a chance of taking them out. The type 93s would be a serious factor. A hit on or near them could doom the Japanese ship but a hit by them on the Deutschland would also likely end the fight in the other direction.

 

Most of the "Treaty" cruisers had gun houses, or main turrets that lacked proper armor. IIRC, the New Orleans(CA-32, commissioned February, 1934) class heavy cruisers were the first "Treaty" cruisers that actually had decent turret armor. Although, this additional turret armor did not help the Astoria, Quincy, and Vincennes at Savo Island.

 

Most of the 'old school' Admirals in the 1920s and 30s thought of subs as 'toys' with no real strategic capabilities. They were later assigned the role of Fleet 'scouts' and not to be used as a stand-alone, offensive weapon. German U-Boat successes in WW 1 should have shown how deadly subs could be!

When the early sub Captains complained about the early torpedoes, they were told, "You are not shooting them correctly"........ "It's YOUR fault" in essence! This came directly from the Bureau of Ordnance.

Some early WW 2 Capts decided to set up the torpedoes to run shallower and I think that it was Dudley "Mush" Morton who found out that hitting the ships with a deflecting shot usually worked. A square-on hit would crush the firing pin, but a lighter force, deflecting shot usually worked! It was only after tests were done with live torpedoes being shot against rock shorelines in Hawaii and Australia, were they proven to be defective and solutions quickly implemented.