The Atomic Bomb & Soviet Union

That might sound ridiculous but Stalin knew about the US A-bomb programme much more before Trumman was allowed to know. He must have also known about the number of available bombs at that time. Therefore he wasn't impressed that much by the Trumman's 'revelation'.

 

BIW. No matter what we think in hindsight...the Casablanca conference ended with The Allied leaders stating what was needed was unconditional surrender of Japan..Germany and Italy. Once this was stated. Even if the allied military leaders would like to approach surrender differently towards the end there would be NO deviation. A wrong thing to demand say many thru history, but I'm not going to argue that point. The point is the unconditional term was spoken. From that point there was no turning back. There would be no peace terms as in ww1...As with ww1. Germany never accepted defeat in military terms wholesale. Which some would say lead to the whole world war 2 scenario. An undefeated military in Germany ....on its knees maybe...but not admitting defeat by military means gave the German Prussian mind a reason to start again in some minds...The idea that Japan could make peace and do the same years later after ww2 was to some probably horrendous. Revenge figures highly. And why not to some. I'll keep my own powder dry on that one. But I certainly understand that a miltiary lead, egotistical folk of that period if not directly defeated and disarmed and shown to be so could rise again. Not in a domestic sense but military. And as Scipio says, Japan today still refuses to admit to lots of ww2 actions and atrocities...God knows what they would be like today if their militray was not defeated, And their code of Bushido shamed. In my view forgetting the bombs which I know is hard to do...Japan got off lightly with keeping its Emperor. A mistake. One that their education system and view of ww2 proves to have been a wrong decision.

 

LRusso- Thnx for the book suggestion. I will keep it and will want to read it when I get the time. Right now I feel like it's almost like the Kennedy assassination- almost every person has their own idea as to what happened. Will be good to read about it from some quality research.

Urqh- I hear what you're saying about the lingering effects of the Versailles Treaty, no turning back from unconditional surrender, etc. And I try to put on 1940s glasses to look at things. A question for you, though re: Japan: If putting their Emperor on trial for war crimes and executing him would have turned Japan away from us, made Reconstruction much more difficult, drove them closer to the Soviets, prevented the U.S. from becoming a close ally, not establish extensive commercial ties, etc., would you be willing to do it?

 

In 1945 there were three realistic options to end the war with Japan I think.

1) Nuclear Threat. (+Soviet Union entering war against Japan) Exploding a nuclear device on sea close to Japan or on a unpopulated area was not realistic. More than two billion dollars were invested to Manhattan Project. Joint Chiefs of Staff , Groves , Marshall , Stimson all wanted to see actual damage and result of that investment as a war time gain. Besides there was every chance Japan might not be intimitaded and continue to fighting. Ultra nationalist military members of Imperial Council were not thinking rationally. They might even sent Allied POWs as human shields (their captivity at Japanese hands and bringing those at arms back was also a major incentive.) More over involvement of Soviet Union to Pacific War was one the least wanted things in Allied plans in 1945. Roosevelt might have taken a promiase from Stalin but Soviet Union having a foothold in Japan was not wished at all. The need to finish war before Red Army was needed was a major reason why a nuclear bomb was exploded on a population center : to deceive Japan surrender before Russians came into picture. They did though. Invasion of Manchuria was also big factor in strengthening peace faction in Imperial Council. Detonating an A-Bomb was also a warning to Stalin not to be too ambitious on Europe after the war.

2) Invasion of Japan again not desired by Allies. Operation Olympic would probably be sucessful but probable casaulties might even be higher than estimates. That would not sit well with US public which considered war was well as won and American political establisment. Once battle was joined Japanese were intended to go all the way as militarists wished.

3) Blockade of Japanese islands from sea and air : That might actually have worked in long term. But although Japan would threw up towel eventually , again death toll among Japanese civilians would be disasterous due to starvation , disease and complete collapse of social political order including dissolution of conservative Imperial Monarcy. It would be like inviting communism to Japan like a Red Army invasion of Japan. Again not desirable from Western Allies perspective. Cold War already started in this point. Detonating a nuclear bomb was more about the first move of Cold War than ending World War 2.

 

BIW, mate, what evidence do you have that Japan would turn to the USSR sphere of infuence. Japan would have still been occupied for the time it was by American not Russian troops. The Japanese society would have still benefitted from its US links during this time..so why would they bother then after years of occupation turning into an alliance then go off to USSR.? Removing the emperor would not drive them into Russian hands, the occupation would still go ahead. The surrender would have been enacted differently though. But lets make no mistake, the victors where the USA here, not the Russians, the USA would always do what it was going to do regarding occupation and future alliances. Emporer or no emporer. Germany was devestated in ww2, its leadership usurped and its society drastically changed by force of arms. The West which the allies took responsibilty for did not harbour any wish to join the USSR the East had no choice. Why would Japan be any different from West Germany? The Germans were educated in their conduct of ww2 and made to face the facts of what happened etc, West Germany learned and benefitted...Why do you think Japan would not do similar...or more important...why do you think they should be allowed to think or do different...A question not just to you but to Trueman and Mcarthur.

 

That's correct urqh!

The timetable for events in August 1945 was set at Yalta and at the Teheran Conference. According to the plan, Molotov unceremoniously informed the Japanese ambassador on 9 August that the state of war existed between Japan and the USSR. Russians entered the Manchuria and took the Kuril Islands. For the Allies there were no the last minute decisions.

 

I am talking about post war conditions and need for imperial / conservative authority and culture of Japan. If Allies went all the way in like abolishment of Imperial Monarcy , dissolution all goverment authority (remember MacArthur's temporary occupation rule benefitted from existence of mid level Japanese bureucrocy / authority a lot to get things moving ) in their surrender conditions things would be bad enough anarchy would be widespread and communism might have been attractive (Comitern and Party Cadres would definetely be ready to grab any chance in anyplace) That was not desirable for Western Allies. The requirement for an Allience with Soviet Union was gone once Hitler put a bullet in his head in April 1945. Stalin at the height of his power and Red Army might not have seen things like that. As you mentioned Allies thought Japan was their responsibilty and while a civil war was already raging in China and Red Army about to invade Manchuria all the way to Korean Peninsula ( we are still living with its results as two Korean states one rogue other internationally accepted and stable) the need to stop spread of Communism became higher agenda in 1945 summer. Simply being a victorious occupier wouldn't solve anything. You need to get things moving , depart trains on time , get visible positive results for native population like distribution of food , create a workable economy and political system , demobilization of army properly etc. or you invite trouble like asymetric warfare , resistance , guerilla activity and political agitation. For that Allies needed existing Japanese civilian cadres and goverment and conservative imperial authority.

Detonation of Nuclear Bombs over Japan was more about making Japan surrender with some remants of stability before Soviet Union became more active in Far East and get a piece of Japan too.

 

This is the standard excuse.

Everything you wrote above could be used in the context of Germany - only the Soviets were even closer and more powerful. The Communist Party simply was not as entrenched as in Europe with 30% of French and 50% of Italian prepared to vote Communist - far, far more dangerous threat.

The US had completely jettisoned the idea of "Allies" when it came to governing Japan - totally an American venture and badly done.

 

Specifically what peace offer - and to whom - did the Japanese make on 22 July?

 

The US never would accept a Japanese peace offer,they only would accept unconditional surrender .

 

I don't think Scipio needs a solicitor but let me try to deal with this question.

Actually, there was no simple request for unconditional surrender but the terms for Japanese surrender were defined in the Potsdam Declaration. Scipio is right; one of the terms stated that:

[SIZE=9.5pt]"stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners".[/SIZE]

[SIZE=9.5pt]Also, the Emperor Hirohito, one of the main Japanese war criminals has not been mentioned but: [/SIZE]

[SIZE=9.5pt]the elimination "for all time [of] the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest".[/SIZE]

[SIZE=9.5pt]The term "unconditional surrender" was mentioned just in one part of the declaration: [/SIZE]

[SIZE=9.5pt]"We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."[/SIZE]

[SIZE=9.5pt]This just meant that the Postdam Declaration a was the final offer of conditions for peaceful conclusion of the war.[/SIZE]

Conditions were actually declared on 26th July in Postdam, near Berlin, Germany.

 

urqh- BIW, mate, what evidence do you have that Japan would turn to the USSR sphere of influence.

BIW- I don't. I was posing that as a rhetorical question for you because I feel that would be a reasonable reaction Japan would have if we were to execute their Emperor in 1945. Meriolu did a very good explanation of their culture (though I'm not sure of the Communist threat at that time in Japan). I will add that I don't agree they were like Germany- they were (and still are) a very hierarchical society where culture is greatly revered and followed. The Emperor was the supreme representation of their culture and history. He was, as you probably know, considered deity at the time. So it would almost be in the same ballpark if an invader came to a Christian country and executed a living Jesus. You don't think there would be tremendous social and political backlash? That's why I was asking, rhetorically, at what cost would you want to try and execute him.

mcoffee- Specifically what peace offer - and to whom - did the Japanese make on 22 July?

BIW- (EDIT- I wrote July 22 in previous posts but meant June 22-sorry). I hope Scipio doesn't mind me taking a stab at this. There are countless historical references in books and online that document that Japan began making peace inquiries at the beginning of 1945. If you google any of the things below you will find it. Here's a smattering I found:

“In an article that finally appeared August 19, 1945, on the front pages of the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times-Herald, Trohan revealed that on January 20, 1945, two days prior to his departure for the Yalta meeting with Stalin and Churchill, President Roosevelt received a 40-page memorandum from General Douglas MacArthur outlining five separate surrender overtures from high-level Japanese officials. (The complete text of Trohan's article is in the Winter 1985-86Journal, pp. 508-512.).
This memo showed that the Japanese were offering surrender terms virtually identical to the ones ultimately accepted by the Americans at the formal surrender ceremony on September 2 -- that is, complete surrender of everything but the person of the Emperor. Specifically, the terms of these peace overtures included:

• 
  Complete surrender of all Japanese forces and arms, at home, on island possessions, and in occupied countries.
  
• 
  Occupation of Japan and its possessions by Allied troops under American direction.
  
• 
  Japanese relinquishment of all territory seized during the war, as well as Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan.
  
• 
  Regulation of Japanese industry to halt production of any weapons and other tools of war.
  
• 
  Release of all prisoners of war and internees.
  
• 
  Surrender of designated war criminals.”
  

In April and May 1945, Japan made three attempts through neutral Sweden and Portugal to bring the war to a peaceful end. On April 7, acting Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu met with Swedish ambassador Widon Bagge in Tokyo, asking him "to ascertain what peace terms the United States and Britain had in mind." But he emphasized that unconditional surrender was unacceptable, and that "the Emperor must not be touched." Bagge relayed the message to the United States, but Secretary of State Stettinius told the US Ambassador in Sweden to "show no interest or take any initiative in pursuit of the matter." Similar Japanese peace signals through Portugal, on May 7, and again through Sweden, on the 10th, proved similarly fruitless.

By mid-June, six members of Japan's Supreme War Council had secretly charged Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo with the task of approaching Soviet Russia's leaders "with a view to terminating the war if possible by September."
On June 22 the Emperor called a meeting of the Supreme War Council, which included the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the leading military figures. "We have heard enough of this determination of yours to fight to the last soldiers," said Emperor Hirohito. "We wish that you, leaders of Japan, will strive now to study the ways and the means to conclude the war. In doing so, try not to be bound by the decisions you have made in the past."
By early July the US had intercepted messages from Togo to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Naotake Sato, showing that the Emperor himself was taking a personal hand in the peace effort, and had directed that the Soviet Union be asked to help end the war.

 

No I think it might be useful (if we have not done it before) to compare the Allies treatment of Nazism in Germany with the American treatment of nationalism in Japan.

However jumping back to the legality of America's use of the Bomb, I found this in AJP Taylor's English History 1914-1945

By the end of march 1945, Scientists on the Manhattan project had forecast that they would be ready with viable nuclear bombs in the Summer.

With no consultation Truman decided to use them.

This was contrary to the agreement reached at Quebec in August 1943 that atomic bombs should not be used without British consent.

At the last moment someone realised. Churchill (who by now was on his way out) was contacted and without consulting the British Chiefs of Staff, or the War Cabinet or Atlee gave his approval on 2nd July. Thanks old boy!

On 26th July Atlee was sworn in.

The first bomb was dropped on 9th August.

Truman then reneged on sharing nuclear secrets.

 

Asking or requiring unconditional surrender means that the loosing side can't attach any conditions. It doesn't mean that the winning side can't. Thus while the final conditions imposed may end up similar the process is different. Unconditional surrender means the loosing side acknowledges that they have been uterly defeated (this was one of the problems with the way WWI ended, the Germans didn't feel like they had reached that point and they felt the emposed conditions in the final treaty were not only unfair but renigging on the original cease fire agreement).

By the way BIW, this forum has a quote function. It makes it much easier to read and tell who said what if you use it.

 

22 june is irrelevant . Nobody was waiting for /or asking Japanese peace proposals .The only thing the US wanted was that someone would tell the Japanese people on the radio that the war was over,that Japan had surrendered,inconditionally . And,sadly enough for Japan,this person appeared on the radio only after H + N .

Japan was in no position to make proposals. this was only a sign of arrogance,Japan still was thinking it could talk to the US on the same footing . If Hitler had made peace proposals,no one would be willing to read them and,for Japan,it was the same .
US wanted a Japanese going to Canossa and signing publicly the act of surrender .

 

Some of conditions of surrender were in fact conditions of occuparion and among them these that requested punishment of war criminals. Unfortunately, many Japanese war criminals got away with it which was interpreted as the absence of guilt.

 

You're right, the actual date is not important- because what is important is that a peace offer was brought up by Japan on numerous dates since January.
Regarding the need for unconditional surrender, you and others have brought up good points about it. I guess my point can be summed up with the following question:

If the atomic bombs weren't ready and dropped by August 9, and we didn't have a peace treaty, Russia would have invaded the northern Japanese island of Hokaido after Manchuria (this is a generally accepted theory and is in Russian documents, I believe). Then they would have in all liklihood worked their way down towards Tokyo, splitting Japan in the exact same way as they did in Europe, and Japan would have been divided. This threat of Soviet aggression was recognized when FDR got them to agree to help us fight Japan.

So the question is: If you believe the above could have happened, was it worth the risk of Russia controlling part of Japan, and turning it into a divided country, because we wouldn't even discuss peace with Japan?
Or, to put it another way: Was the possibility of losing part of Japan worth our insistence on unconditional surrender in the way we proposed?

If you believe that it was worth the risk, then we'll have to agree to disagree. If you believe that it wasn't worth the risk, then you have to ask yourself why we didn't even talk to them, and why the heck did FDR give Russia the green light for Japan at Yalta, when Japan was already suggesting peace?