The Atomic Bomb & Soviet Union

You will have to substantiate the last bit about British policy - no one, Soviets included was more brazen and shameful than the US at welcoming war criminals if they had "valuable" technology and Unit 731 (there is a thread on this subject which we debated recently) was the very worst example.

This thread keeps crossing with the one on the imperfect re-education and demilitarisation of Japan. Before we move on lets look at Unit 731 again!

Have a look at the new Japanese PM - grandson of the "alleged" War Criminal Kishi - good article as well

http://nation.time.com/2013/05/20/sorry-but-japan-still-cant-get-the-war-right/

 

And?

The jet he is posing in is one of the "Blue Impulse" aerobatic demonstration team's jets. As per the standards of several nations, the last three digits of the serial number are often used as an identifier for the jet. So I have to ask what is so important about his posing in Kawasaki T-4 serial number "46-5731"?

If you are so interested in photos of the T-4 "46-5731", have fun
http://www.airplane-pictures.net/registration.php?p=46-5731
http://jetphotos.net/showphotos.php?regsearch=46-5731

I really like this one from 1997


If this was "such" an "outrage", you would think the popular media would have noticed this a wee bit sooner doncha' think.

Your going to have to do better than photos of an old jet.

Churchill looked good in a similar photo

 

An april 1945 report projected casualties of 1,202,005 including 314,619 killed and missing (SIC) in Operations Olympic an Coronet and more,if either of the campaigns lasted more than 90 days .

314,619 killed and missing : why not 314,620 ?

Am I the only to notice that this report is a lot of BS ?


A report projecting 314,619 killed and missing :there is no smiley that is appropriate for such nonsens .

 

It is nonsense and yet it isn't, the were many different mathematical formulas and calculations that went on. Although, sometimes there were simple ones, for instance, we took 35% casualties at Okinawa, so 35% of 766,700 men slated to invade Honshu is 268,345 casualties.

 

Check out the serious media in South Korea - they immediately cancelled the visit from the Japanese Foreign Minister. China (but who cares about them) also sent a protest.

I suspect it would take too long to make a sound bite in American media - but I think Abe might just have known what he was doing??

 

Forgive me if I don't take any media that makes such inane connections regarding a photograph of a jet that has been in the Japanese Self Defense Force's inventory for just under 20 years, as "serious."

If we are going by photographs, the the Iranian's were right and we were the "Great Satan."


and we even turned it into a memorial

 

I don't think my objectives are seriously flawed. I think both sides of the argument has facts that can support each viewpoint, for example, that keeping Russia out of Japan was #1 on the list, or #3. For that reason I agree, knowing what information was available, and when, goes far in trying to understand the options at the time.

 

Well we've made a pretty good case for them being flawed and you really haven't made a case the other way. Normally it would be on you to prove your point. That sort of brings your opinion to question.

Keep in mind also it wasn't so much the treaty of Vesailes but the background. When the armistace was declared the Germans saw the situation as a stalemate all be it one where they would likely eventually loose. They had yet to be defeated, thier armies were still on foreign soil and they marched home under arms to the cheers of their populace. Thus the treaty was viewed as a betrayal by many Germans in addition to being unnecessarily harsh. The idea of unconditional surrender was that the surrendering party was clearly acknowledging that they were beaten and that the victors could do what they would.

 

Now you're playing games. You know everything I have postulated wasn't conjectured out of thin air- it has also been theorized by many historians. You may not agree with them but there are others who believe it. And there has been no playing with facts. Different interpretations and weights given to them yes, but we all agree with them. It's what they imply that we differ.

So you can say that your case is made over and over again but there remains many knowledgeable people who don't agree with you. Therefore neither your theory or mine is 'proven'.

 

I don't think this is really a question of "right or wrong". Further, if the idea was flawed or without merit, then I doubt that the US State Department would have fought throughout much of 1945 to have the preservation of the Japanese Emperor included as a "carrot" to the Japanese. Also, the positions taken here, are very much the positions taken back then.

 

I didn't say it was out of thin air. On the otherhand you don't seem to be able to make much of a case for it.
Let's look at it again.
1) the revenge issue.
If revenge was such a factor why was limiting Japanese civilian casualties seen as an important issue when it came time to drop the bomb? Also when you look at the post war treatment of Japan it's pretty clear that revenge wasn't the highest item on the list by any means especially against the Japanese in general.

As for the Soviets in the early summer of 1945 the US was still strongly encourageing them to declare war on the Japanese. While attitude was shifting I simply don't see it to the point where we were worrying about the Soviets invading Japan. Indeed as should have been clear without a lot more naval assets that wasn't likely to happen, at least as far as any of the main islands were concerned. So that rather reduces both 2) and 3) to minor issues.

Which leave only issue 4) to save lives but it's a consequence of ending the war rapidly as well.

Certainly not proven in any absolute sense but it's pretty clear which position is the weaker.

 

I don't think it's necessary to look at it again- my rebuttals to things you have said are written in posts above. I also think you characterize things in a way that I don't. I'll repeat a couple minor points to clear up some of your misconceptions:

1) I believe that one of the reasons we didn't pursue negotiating with Japan in early-mid 1945 was because we wanted unconditional surrender. While I think some of the reason we wanted unconditional surrender was because of what happened in WW1, I believe it was more of 'those damn Japs bombed Pearl Harbor and we will show them a thing or two' mentality. That is the revenge I talk about- not in deciding which city to hit. It was this revenge that blinded us to better decision-making, in my opinion. I also think it's a bit naive to say we treated them well post-war when we wanted them as a good trading partner and to have a healthy economy to act as a bulwark to the USSR.

2&3) To this day there is much discussion about whether FDR appeased the Russians at Yalta or not, so you will have opinions on both sides of the fence. One thing that it did do, however, and not subject to debate, is that it opened the door for the Soviets to potentially influence what was going to happen with Japan. You state that 'it wasn't likely going to happen'. Well, then you disagree with the Soviets' own war plans then. And I certainly wouldn't call Hokkaido a minor island- it is the 2nd largest island in land area in Japan.

4) The most American lives which could have been saved would have been if we negotiated peace earlier. It isn't hindsight to think we could have accomplished it at that time. It was a failure of policy as I mention above.
That is not saying that saving American lives was not a factor in dropping the bomb- it was. It's just too bad it wasn't considered more 5-6 months earlier.


I'm not sure if we are going to go any further with this. It seems like we are beating a dead horse at this point.

 

This could not be further from the truth. We had seen where "negotiating" had gotten us with World War I, and later, "negotiating" with Hitler. At the time, many considered "negotiating" tantamount to "appeasement."

However, there were two schools of American thought concerning what "Unconditional Surrender" meant. One side believed that "Unconditional Surrender" was to encompass that these are the terms we are giving you and there will be no negotiating them(this is where offering the Japanese the continuance of the Emperor System came in), while the other side the strictly unconditional surrender - no terms, surrender or be destroyed. The ultimate arbiter, FDR, did as he usually did when faced with a major decision, he played up both sides until one finally won out.

Many of the Americans in power, thought that the Emperor was the driving force behind the war. Still others, wanted to concretely establish democracy in Japan, and saw the retaining of the Emperor and impediment to accomplishing this task. Some Democrats and Republicans were bucked at offering "totalitarian" Japan a "soft" peace. Then there were the many newspaper polls that were delivered almost daily to the White House: Only 10%-18% favored working out peace terms with Japan; only 3% supported a Japan governed under the current dynasty(Hirohito); finally, 33% wanted Hirohito executed, 11% wanted him imprisoned, 9% wanted him banished, and 17% wanted him tried with punishment meted out by the court.

Now, as to why didn't we negotiate with Japan. America had long seen that the Japanese had long ago lost whatever power they had enjoyed in the early 1920's, and that the Japanese militarist were the ones in control of the country. Thus, the Japanese "peace" faction was viewed as either a small group of wealthy Japanese who were looking to protect their own interests from destruction when Japan finally fell, or else they were a weak minority of Japanese without the political wherewithal to enact and enforce any deal that was brokered. Either way, neither had the necessary "official" backing that would be necessary to bring about a conclusion to the war.

The Soviets probably could have taken Hokkaido, the question is would they keep it, or would the Americans let them keep it. FDR was dead and buried and Truman was now in power, and the Americans were quite dissatisfied with the Soviets going back on their word regarding Poland and Eastern Europe, So I highly doubt that the Soviets would "keep" the island. More than likely, they would strip it bare and ship everything not nailed down back to Manchuria.

As has been said many time before, there were going to be no negotiations with Japan. None. Zero. Zilch. Nada.

They would either accept the terms, if, and that is the real crux of the matter, any were offered, or they would be destroyed. If there was one thought common to all of the American "players" at the time, it was that they did not want to go through this all over again a few decades from now. Japan was going to be defeated now, and she would, in no uncertain terms, know that she had been defeated. The Americans were not about to repeat the "mistake" made during World War I.

 

Why should "keeping Russia out of Japan" being bad ? Or being relevant ?

The FACT is : there was a war against Japan;the aim of the US was Unconditional Surrender;now,they had a weapon of which it was claimed that a) it could kill a lot of Japanese b)that it possibly could shorten the war.Thus,the US used this weapon .

 

You are just re-hashing what happened over and over again, e.g. "we weren't going to negotiate with the Japanese because...." or "they saw the Emperor as ..."

Yes, there were many reasons why we didn't negotiate- we are not in disagreement. That doesn't mean we shouldn't have negotiated.

The worse that would have happened is that there would have been no agreement. On the other hand, maybe an agreement could have been achieved. And if it was, the war would have ended 4-5 months earlier and many American lives would have been saved.

Furthermore, do this for me. Assume we didn't get the bomb for another 6 months. And in August-September the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Hokkaido.

If Russia had taken over Hokkaido and did what they did in Europe, that is split it up, don't you think people would be second-guessing the events which would have led up to them doing so? And the 2 questions they would be asking the most would be: 1) Why did FDR invite them, and 2) Could we have ended the war sooner, before Russia got to Japan?

You want to tell me with 100% certainty that we couldn't end the war sooner? You can't say that. You know why? Because we will never know if we could have ended it sooner because we didn't try. All the obstacles you have mentioned existed- but they weren't enough to stop us from trying, if we wanted. You can say we didnt want another Versailles; You could say we didn't want to leave them with potential to start over; The Emperor this, the Emperor that....and we will still never know what would have happened if we opened the door to Japan earlier, because we didn't want to.

As I mentioned before, I think we pretty much have 'drunk the well dry' on this topic. I've appreciated all the input- it's been very enlightening.

 

Note that "unconditional surrender" was not imposed only on Japan nor was it stricktly a US initiative. The big 3 had agreed on it well before any peace talks were in the offing. That alone pretty clearly indicates that it wasn't a case of revenge on the part of the US.

It does however indicate that those in power at the time didn't think it was a good idea.

This is hardly the case. Opening negotiations can have significant moral implications. For instance even if the negotiations are secret the Japanese governement could take heart in them thinking that they had a chance of coming out of the negotiations with some of the things they proposed. I.e. it would make them less likely to accept unconditional surrender and could even prolong the war. If the negotiatins become well known there are also moral implications for friendly forces.

But was this likely? And without the bomb they may have thought with some justification that this would lengthen the war rather than shorten it. What is the cost then? Then there's the question of why if the Japanese were ready to negotiate they didn't try to open official negotiations. In WWI for instance it was Germany that opened the negotiations.

I don't think Hokkaido was very high on the lists of things people were serious about at the time. Furthermore lacking the bombs we might even have welcomed a Soviet invasion in that time frame as it may have pulled some pressure off of Olympic if that was to go through. If it was a serious consideration in the immediate aftermath of the war we could have demanded a Soviet withdrawl and they could hardly have forced the issue given the relative naval strengths.

There is very little that can be said with 100% certainty. That doesn't mean that the likely answers are not well known.

Likewise we'll never know if it would have lengthened the war, which by the way I think a more likely event.

Didn't want to or didn't think it was a good idea to do so? You see as explained above your basic premise was wrong. Negotiating could have had some significant negative impacts and the powers that be at the time didn't think it worth the risks.

 

The reasons we didn't, are the same reasons that we shouldn't negotiate with the Japanese, and they far outweighed any reasons that we should negotiate with them.

However, had the Japanese "officially" offered the US a deal that they "could not refuse" to end the war - which is what a few of the American politicos were afraid of - the US possible would have accepted. Still, under no circumstances was the US going to come "begging" to the Japanese.

LWD covers this fairly well. WORST case scenario; there is no deal, the Japanese are both morally and physically uplifted that the Americans have come "begging" for peace - as this is a sign that the Americans can no longer continue to fight the war - and with renewed vigor, the Japanese continue resisting even harder than before - costing many more American lives, and extended the end of the war longer than it would have been without negotiations. Thus, negotiations with the Japanese are not the be all and end all of a quick close to the war.

Your operating under the belief that the Americans wanted to end the war quickly so the Soviets would not join in prior to the Trinity Test. However, this is not the case. Prior to the successful Trinity test, all were in agreement that a Soviet entrance into the war was necessary to draw off some of the Japanese forces that were defending the Home Islands - Thus making Operations Olympic & Coronet easier & less costly battles

Then, we are also "assuming" the Trinity detonation was either a "fizzle" or has not happened. - Thus Truman & Co. still need the Soviets to enter the war in the hopes that Soviet attacks will draw off Japanese forces that will be defending Kyushu and Honshu. We must also "assume" that Operation Olympic - the invasion of Kyushu has gone forward.

As it is, this "what if" is incomplete for the answer you are expecting. Just off the top of my head - How many US casualties were there(more or less than expected)? Did the Soviet attacks draw off some Japanese forces as intended by the Americans? Now, if the Soviet attacks did succeed in drawing off Japanese forces and American casualties were lighter than expected, I cannot see any American "hand-wringing" over a Soviet entrance into the war.

As I have stated previously, the "Why?" would not be questioned, the reason was well understood by all. As to 2.), there is always the Monday Morning Quaterbacking, but provided that the Soviet entrance worked as the Americans expected, I don't see to much "hay" being made of this. After all, there was some "bellyaching" that we, the Western Allies, did not take Berlin, but that was mostly muted in light of the cost in lives.

Of course, I can't say, with 100% certainty, that we couldn't have ended the war earlier, when I am 100% certain that we could have ended the war earlier...We "could" have surrendered shortly after Pearl Harbor, and that would have ended the war then and there - think of all those lost ships and men that could have been saved had we done so...

But that would not solve any of the existing problems, nor would it prevent the "war" from reigniting a later date. Therefore, a negotiated surrender, while ending the war, would not solve any of the existing problems, nor prevent the war from reigniting at a later date, thus, all the American casualties of the Pacific War, up until that point, would have been a meaningless effusion of blood.

That being said, the Americans and Japanese were "negotiating", if it can truly be called that, but the process was taking months.
http://www.upa.pdx.edu/IMS/currentprojects/TAHv3/Content/PDFs/Operation_Super_Sunrise.pdf

 

Thank you for this thread all. Once again some good food for thought on a subject i once saw as black and white. I had always imagined that although there might have been a number of benefits from its use, the decision to use it was simply because of the fact of its existence at a time of war and was therefore pretty automatic. No matter what hand wringing was caused by its use i had always imagined the political blow back of not using it would have been much greater for Truman.

I cant think of any other effective weapons which were developed and not used off the top of my head (exception for bio and chemical weapons where there was a legitimate fear of reprisal).

Like i say, interesting points to churn around my brain.

 

FASCINATING document- thanks for the heads-up! I spent all morning reading it. And coincidentally I contacted one of the persons mentioned in it a few days ago, before I saw this article, as he is still alive. I wanted to pose some questions to him.

It addresses many of the issues we discussed here in this thread. I think it also gives lessons on how to have more productive negotiations in the future, though with communications so much better nowadays you would hope the same mistakes wouldn't happen.

Looks like the opportunity was lost on both sides, eh?

A happy holiday and very healthy and prosperous New Year to all. I look forward to future discussions on here filled with like knowledge and insight.