Chamberlain, Versailles and Appeasement (Again)

This is putting the cart before the house,what you say happened after september 1939: before 31 august 1939,the Germans had 6 PzD,in may 1940,they had 10 PzD.

 

????

They told Hitler that they would declare war if he attacked CS and they mobilized .They had 2 divisions and could not defend CZ,neither could France . The only who could defend the CZ were the Czechs and they chosed not to fight to prevent the SD Germans to secede.

Besides, German superiority was not a factor in the British policy :Benej chosed not to fight in october 1939 ,neither did Hacha in march 1939,thus why would Britain and France fight ?

 

You are only speaking with the benefit of hindsight.

Hitler himself did not expect France to collapse as it did. That's why in the lead up to the invasion, the Germans were focusing their production on munitions, (drawing down on tanks, etc). That's why Hitler was talking about using bases in the low countries to bomb Britain, and protect the Rhein. He didn't forsee gaining submarine bases in Brest! Case Yellow, was strictly Belgium, Holland, and Northern France.

The perception at the time, wasn't that German tanks were better than the French tanks. Furthermore, the French had more tanks. What was lacking, was a correct doctrine for their proper use.

Metropolitan France itself, had an army that was on parity (in size) with the Germans. France and Britain together, were clearly perceived as stronger than Germany alone. Even German generals were advising against an attack in the West (too early, most said). Stülpnagel, Brauchitsch, Keitel, all argued against.

It was a combination of bold audacity and luck that allowed the Germans to defeat France in 1940 so spectacularly.

Allied lethargy also played a part. Given their superior strength on paper, they failed to prepare properly.

France poured millions of francs into a wall. It's hard to see what improvements in training, planning, and equipment the Allies made, given the German example of Poland.

 

Some people are unable to grasp the resemblances and differences between 1938 and 1939 (probably because they are under the influence of Winston's rhetoric)

Resemblances : in both cases,B+F (better F + B ) but this DoW would not help CZ nor Poland .

Differences : Benesj drawed the conclusions and yielded for Hitler's demands and saved peace at Münich (not Chamberlain)

:Beck OTOH chosed to fight (for a lot of reasons who are of-topic)

I liked to add that,opposite what a lot of people are thinking (because they do not understand the strategic and political situation of 1938/1939 ) peace or war did not depend on B+F;neither on Germany,but on the reactions of the siates of Central and Eastern Europe to Hitler's demands : as long as they said :yes ,it would be peace, when some one said no : it would be war .

Thus,all the theories that B+ F should,would,could do this or that ,are good for under the bus .

B+F were far away from these countries and were not interested in them,they only wanted to prevent the outbreak of war on the continent .

 

The fact that Great Britain waited 3 days to declare war on Germany after the German declaration of war on Russia proves absolutely nothing in that regard.



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This is utter garbage : Britain had no alliance with Russia,Britain did not care about Russia:when Japan attacked Russia,Britain did nothing,why should it do something when Germany attacked Russia ?

 

THe Czechs had a first waver mobilization of 600k men., I don't know where you got the two division. Idea, I also have the suspicion that you are doing the same thing the allies did,by saying well we cant beat the Germans so they can throw all of their troops at the Czechs. If Germany had to divide its forces along two fronts do they really have the strength they need to gain a three to one advantage??

 

If you quote whom you are responding to, your post makes more sense.

The Allies did no such thing. That's just bland and blatantly incorrect. You seem to be analyzing the situation of '38 and early '39 with all the complexity of "Risk".

Provide any single shred evidence for a single allied leader (head of state or the armed forces) that stated that the armed forces of France and Britain combined couldn't beat Germany during this period.

 

Not correct : Czechoslowakia had 600000 men,but the Czechs were only 58 % of the population : the SDGermans and Slowakians would not fight for Benesj .

Britain told France in september 1938 that for the first months,they only could send 2 divisions to the continent .
In 1939,it was the same : 2 divisions,the first appearing in France when the war in Poland was over,the majority of the BEF was going to the continent in 1940 .

 

If they could beat the Germans why did they just lay down. They had no problems studying how to send troops to Finland a year later. They sat and did nothing while the Germans finished off the Czechs and then sat and did nothing for Poland. The assumptions that the Czechs would be rolled over were based on every German soldier and policeman, trained or not; equipped or not would be used against the Czechs and nothing against the west.

 

The answer has already been given to you, and is blatantly obvious.

How long did the Finns resist the Russians?
How long did the Czech's resist the Germans?

 

The British said they would not help the Czechs. SO now its the fault of the Czechs for not fighting after being told that they were on their own

 

Did any one on the British side actually consider if the JU 52 transport could actually reach London. Did they calculate how much in weight it could carry. Instead it was just well the Germans have some planes so I guess that means they can destroy London, we better not fight, its too bad out bombers cant fly from France and attack Germany.

 

Wrong: in 1938 as in 1939,it was assumed that Germany would attack the British cities with MDW,and that there was no defense possible : one aircraft going through would be enough to cause a catastrophe.

But,in 1938 as in 1939 this did not influence the attitude of Britain and France (always forgotten in the Anglo-Saxon historiography): in 1938,F +B were mobilizing and would declare war if Hitler attacked CZ.In 1939,F +B mobilized and declared war when Germany invaded Poland .

 

Split off as it was off topic from Decisive Battles debate.

 

If Chamberlain was so ready to fight for the Czechs why did he decide their fate with out allowing them to attend the conference. Suppose a RN admiral had said we cant fight the German navy because they would sink all our ships. That is what the RAF did, they said well we don't know what bombers can do so well just assume the absolute worse case with out any basis for the assumption.

 

The extreme apologist's for the betrayal of Munich, and yes it was a betrayal of a free and democratic people, really want to have it both ways. The problem however is that neither argument has terribly much credibility. First they argue that forcing the Czech nation to accept the loss of the Sudetenland was a cold calculation of gain over loss that allows the Anglo-French to gain the time to rearm in the face of a aggressor. They also affirm that had they known Hitler would not 'honor' the pact made at Munich, they never would have forced the Czech's to accept such a fate. In effect they were hoodwinked by the all too clever Hitler and Mussolini.

Lets take the second argument first.

A detailed reading of the period shows that Hitler wanted war with the Czechoslovak nation and felt Il Duce's intervention as a lesser victory. His generals feared a European war in 1938 nearly as much as the Anglo-French and the Anglo-French desire to find any compromise that avoided war while providing some measure of face saving was a acceptable, though not ideal, outcome. Hitler was not yet willing to override his internal opposition to war with Britain and France. In the Fall of 1939 this was no longer a factor, especially after the Molotov-Ribbontrop Accords. Both of these became possible after Munich.

Hoodwinked by Hitler, I hardly think so. Yes the Versailles Treaty was a deeply flawed and unfair imposition upon Germany, but Hitler was not content to a gradual relaxation of the terms. He repeatedly violated it in his expansion of German arms and military, so much so that the Anglo-French were alarmed enough to increase their own. Any number of internal events (Krystallnacht, Wild Camps, Nuremberg Laws, Reichstag Fire, etc.) in Germany were well enough known to dispel any delusion these were your fathers Hun's.

Then there is the oft quoted statement that no official guarantee was ever made to the Czech people. This is a lawyer's argument. The Anglo-French were the driving forces in drawing up the post Great War border's. If they felt somehow Poland (and the Danes and Belgian's) had a right to incorporate ethnic German's and the Czech's did not, this is a rather flexible distinction. Further if they truly felt this, then why attend Munich and give this piecemeal destruction their stamp of approval? They could simply stay home and cable Prague 'good luck chum, hope it works out for you". The only reason to engage in this political theater is because they did in fact feel they had a obligation to guarantee the Czech border's drawn up in 1919.

If they were 'fooled' by Hitler, it hardly explains why when Germany demanded the surrender of the now vulnerable remains of the Czech nation they then did not say, as they would in August 1939, that any violation would mean war with the Anglo-French? This hardly occurred in a vacuum and if they had not guaranteed the sanctity of Czech borders before Munich, they effectively did after, otherwise why go through with this farce in the first place?

Last there is "we needed time to prepare" argument. This rather implies that they perceived that war was more likely than not, and if so, how could you be fooled that Hitler would not uphold peace in our time? At best they were grasping at straw's here. It was less the case that the military/industry was unprepared than that the politician's and public was.

Granted, today we know far more how unprepared Germany was for war in 1938 than the Anglo-French did at this time, but certain realities were inescapable. The quality and size of the Czech forces were a known factor, as were her defenses (man made and natural), defenses absolutely vital to any independent Czech nation. Loss of these defense's would place one of the best Arm's manufacturing firm's (Skoda) within easy striking distance of a threat they so desperately needed time to rearm to counter. Is this logical?

The Czechoslovak Republic provided that which Britain could not in the short term, a well armed (for the period) and well motivated troops, on the continent. The very thing they were lacking in the main. Granted direct support would be difficult without say Yugoslav agreement, but far more likely than direct support to Poland a year later. In effect they discarded a army in the hand for one in the future. Is this logical?

A European war between Germany and a Anglo-French-Czech alliance would be a potential nightmare for Berlin. The two countries Germany could reach sat behind respectable fixed defenses, Britain behind its ever present moat and Steel walls . Blitzkrieg was still unproven and attempting it though fortified and broken terrain did not offer much chance for success even to its most ardent proponents. Hitler would have to respect the possibility of Polish intervention in his rear as long the alliance had a foot hold on the continent, as such how much force could he hope to bring to bare on the enemies he already has? The alliance would move heaven and earth to make Polish intervention a reality, likely offering some or all of East Prussia as inducement, especially if it seemed they might lose. Poland for her part would not feel safe if Germany prevailed, so probably her joining the alliance sooner or later was more likely than say American intervention.

Opposing Hitler in 1938 would have kept the balance of manpower and industry firmly in the Allied favor from the get go and denied him considerable growth in both areas. It would also have imposed the economic blockade more than a year earlier than historically. A blockade infinitely more effective since so long as the Czechoslovak nation remained in the fight, Romanian oil would never reach Germany in any meaningful quantity.

Britain did not enact conscription untill 3 months after the fall of the 2nd Czech Republic and only after Hitler begins drooling over Poland which kinda makes the great 'we gotta sacrifice Czechoslovakia to prepare to oppose the Hun' defense seem less than compelling. Certainly the rather swift ejection from France, and Norway, once battle commences in earnest gives rather harsh proof that all their efforts to buy time were in vain and guaranteed the Czech people the longest nightmare period under the Nazi jackboot than any other free people of Europe.

The Anglo-French debacle in 1940 was not brought on by a lack of arms or the quality of arms, but from a failure of doctrine and leadership. Germany did not outnumber her opponents, she out thought and out fought them. In this case time gained did very little good and considerable harm to the Allied cause. A potential regional war was elevated to a world war.

As I believe Owen said, this period is a terribly complex one and provides a excellent example of how half measures and irresolution is a potential pratfall of democracy. We have had more modern ones in both Syria and the Ukraine, and doubtlessly, we will have more in our future.

 

Nice summary Belesar.

We think of this as a complex subject.

Imagine the confusion of the politicians of the day. All trying very dearly to divine what was going on in the mind of one man, and what his next actual move would be in practical terms.

No wonder that historians cannot pin this one down. The other sub topic that rivals this one for number of different possible scenarios is undoubtedly the causes of the Great War. I have not yet seen even two historians that fully agree on the larger aspects, let alone the detail of it.

Funny how some history is quite clear cut, whilst another is impossible to pin down, however well sourced, or whichever eminent minds of the day have given it thought.

 

I think the poster above may have been a little harsh toward Ljad, when accusing him of having read only a single volume, and then sugessting that given his posting history, his knowledge of the subject left a lot to be desired.

I think an apology may well be in order. When the so-called 'greatest minds' of the day cannot really agree on the reasons for appeasement, (or the other issues raised by this topic), the conclusions of our band of posters should not be viewed as The Last Word, however well intentioned and widely read some here are.

Maybe this subject matter has been a little, should we say, over analyised? Maybe an old source or two can clarify. Sometimes, a new book on a subject is simply rehash, and adds nothing but blather. History of this nature is often big on opinion, and short on documentary evidence to back it. Primary source material can be very lacking when civil servants have gone out of their way to obscure, rather than clarify. Gaps are filled with assumptions. Arguments arise as a consequence, so the issues are never really solved.

I believe that is the case here.

 

I have doubts when the statement that the Czechs refused to fight and that if they had then there would have been military assistance so the Czech are to blame