The Falaise Gap

Huh?

 

my grammer is crap dirtydick,look on the other forum , the one i been lifetime banned from, about disabled people.i can only use 1 finger.lee.

 

Patton could read a map, was very aware of the enemy's dispositions, and was aware of Haislip's exposed flank. He also respected the resourcefulness of the Germans and realised the potential problem even before his thoughts were confirmed by messages decoded through ULTRA.

( FWIW, I never learned to type so I'm only typing with two fingers.... )

 

i thought patton would relish the opportunity to destroy or bag these batterd german divisions.they were being sqweezed from every direction.even if what was left of the germans attacked xv corps,was 4 divisions not enough to at least stop these battered units.the2nd french armd div,would surely have engaged as well.lee.

 

"my grammer is crap dirtydick,look on the other forum , the one i been lifetime banned from, about disabled people.i can only use 1 finger.lee."

Wilts,

Your fingers have nothing to do with your grammar and syntax. It is hard to know whether you are making valid points if I can't figure out what you are trying to say. Additionally, Google lists 616,000 hits for "forums disability." Could you be a little more vague? And finally, if you are going to be so petty as to call people names, then maybe there is a reason why you were banned.

So unless your disability includes mental incapacity, then it is no excuse for not making sense. And judging by your other posts, this is not the case.

Good day, Sir!

 

Where do you get that from ? Every single source I've ever read on the subject makes it abundantly clear that the French were interested in one thing and one thing only - the liberation of Paris. After taking the Sarthe bridge at Alencon, Leclerc fundamentally ignored the orders he was given by the Americans. He was taking his orders from de Gaulle who wanted the 2eme Divn to be kept intact for Paris.

So the answer is - no, they would not have engaged ; they were there - and they didn't.

 

syntax,what is this.i will look in a dicsionary later..sorry i upset you sir.the whole point is to find out why the germans in normandy were not destroyed,which imo was possible.not just from the south,where imo bradley and patton were less than cordial to each other,but also from the north,where the same could be said about montgomery and gen.crerar.as to the point about mental stuff,if taking gabapentin,valium and amatriptaline.along with strong painkilling drugs like dihidracodeine,make me mental,then yes ,i have a mental problem,sir.yours,lee..

 

I'm all for that. As for gung-ho Patton ; - ' I am worried about the hole in our line from St Hilaire to Mayenne, and also another gap southwest of Alencon...I am concentrating 7th Armored at Fougeres just in case of trouble...' ( Patton Papers, Aug. 10 1944 ) Blumenson comments : - 'It was odd for Patton to be so conservative in his view....( p.506 ).

On 17th August came Patton's key decision to 'swap horses' ie command of 3rd Army's 'point' to advance on Trun. In the middle of the battle, Gerow took over from Gaffey, handing the Germans another 24 hours to extricate further troops from the pocket.

Blumenson notes that : 'To some extent, this was Patton's fault' ( p.515 ).

There were errors and blunders on all sides over Falaise which has led to much 'armchair generalling'. A fundamental point is that by this stage, those 'battered German forces' were mainly Waffen-SS who were very good at what they were doing.

 

he is a great bookwriter that one.lee.

 

To which "order" are you referring to that Gen. Leclerc allegedly disobeyed? I'm well aware of Leclerc giving a higher priority to Ge. de Gaulle's wishes, but i do not recall reading anywhere that Leclerc went out of his way to disobey a direct order given to him by an American commander. Also, the sources I have on the topic of Operation Cobra contradicts your assertions that the 2DB was just sitting around waiting to make a run on Paris.

Furthermore, the failure to close the Falaise Gap was through no fault of gen. Leclerc, as many postwar literature have attempted to insinuate. This was due directly to a concern of Gen. Bradley and Gen. Eisenhower that the two Allied armies would crash into eachother.

An exerpt from Bill Yenne's excellent book, "Operation Cobra and the Great Offensive"

"Despite the staggering losses suffered by the Germans, the fact that so many survived to fight later is a controversial point in Allied military history.

In retrospect, it seems obvious that the Americans could have closed the Falaise Gap on their own on or about Wednesday, August 16, had Genral Bradley not ordered a halt. *

As General George Patton said, "This halt was a great mistake as I was certain that we could have entered Falaise and I was not certain that the British would. As a matter of fact, we had reconnaissance parties near the town [Falaise] when we were ordered to pull back"."

(Pgs. 149-150)

*italics are mine

As for the 2eDB, "Les Grandes Unites Francais (GUF)" Vol. 5-part 2, records that between the time that Leclerc's 2eDB landed in Normandy on the 1st of August 1944 and the time that Cobra came to an end (BEFORE the entry into Paris on the 24th), the division suffered over 850 casualties, including approx. 140 killed and 650 wounded. Additionally, material losses for vehicles were staggering for a unit which as you say, simply "sat by".

Yes, Paris was the great "prize" for the French forces, of course, and why not? The Falaise Gap was finally closed on the 21st and Paris entered on the 24th. Is it during these 3 days you are referring to? Gen. de Gaulle did make a threat to remove Leclerc's 2eDB from the overall Allied command if the 2eDB wasn't allowed to enter Paris as soon as time permitted. It was only after convincing Gen. Eisenhower of the political importance of entering Paris that Eisenhower agreed. Lastly, as great a prize as Paris was for Leclerc and his division, Strasbourg was a greater prize.

 

You're going to read it now.

Rather than indulge in an endless argument, I'll simply quote verbatim from Martin Blumenson's ( author of the US Official History, Breakout and Pursuit ) 'The Battle Of The Generals - The Untold Story Of The Falaise Pocket' ( Wm Morrow, New York, 1993 ) : -

'On August 12th.....Haislip saw his task as getting to Argentan at once. He instructed his armoured division commanders to skirt the forest and its potential defenders. The French were to go around the western edge of the woods, the Americans to bypass the height on the Eastern side.

In a defiant or thoughtless yet inexcusable gesture of disobediance, Leclerc disregarded Haislip's order. The act was perhaps a sign of what the French call je m'en foutisme - I don't give a damn. It may have been simple inexperience....whatever it was, Leclerc's action turned out to be a most significant error'. ( p.204 ).

In their 1978 book, 'The Killing Ground - The Battle Of The Falaise Gap' ( Batsford, London ) Lucas & Barker refer to actions on the same day as follows : -

'Haislip....ordered that his two armoured divisions , 2nd French and 5th US, were to bypass the forest to the west and east respectively. The French commander then was guilty of an astonishing piece of military bad manners......the French obstruction allowed Eberbach to bring forward elements of 166th Panzer Division to take up strong defensive positions....' ( p.90 ).

In 1982, John Keegan wrote 'Six Armies In Normandy' ( Cape, London ) which focuses on other units than Leclerc's. However, describing the advance on Paris, Keegan writes :

'On August 22nd, Leclerc returned to his ( divisional ) Headquarters, laagered in open country south of Argentan. It had been settling down for another quiet night, the seventh since its relief from the battle for Alencon.' (pp.304/305 ).

It would seem to me that this would beg the question - why would one of Haislip's only two armoured divisions - at the very 'point' of 3rd Army - be 'relieved' with the battle at such a critical juncture ??

But then, maybe Leclerc's relations with the US were somewhat strained. From The Patton Papers ( Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1974 ) ; -

'August 15 : Leclerc of the 2nd French Armored Division came in, very much excited....he said, among other things, that if he were not allowed to advance on Paris, he would resign. I told him in my best French that he was a baby, and I would not have division commanders tell me where they would fight....' ( p.511 ).

 

I guess Paris was as a "price" that also meant something lost. A big city does not live without supplies so in a way I can understand what taking Paris meant to keeping the attack in full speed as well for Ike.

If your main intention was to end the war Paris must have been a bitter victory as well. I am not saying they shoud not have taken Paris but I´m glad I was not there to decide for it.

 

indeed.i recall reading about eisenhour wanting to bypass paris altogether,for fear of having to supply the city.i believe montgomery agreed,this is why 21st a/g never went near the place.4th wilts.p.s i hope you can understand my writing.

 

See? if you pay some attention to these details it gets much clearer, for everyone's benefit. Thanks for taking the trouble, even if it isn't easy for you.

 

I have to add the writing of George Blackburn in his Introduction to The Guns of Normandy the book in which he wrote about his experiences as an artillery officer in the Canadian Second Division fighting in Normandy.

"However, locating material describing what it was like at the cutting edge of 1st Canadian Army from the middle of July until the end of August - in effect the fighting from Caen to Falaise that entrapped the German armies in Normandy - was very difficult. No one has succeeded in accurately describing the ferocity of the battles for Verriere Ridge and beyond. And perhaps no one ever will, for few who served with the rifle companies of the infanty batallions, including artillry FOOs and their crews, managed to survive more than a few days.

Some were casualties within hours of joining units, and, of the few who survived to see it through all the way with a rifle company, none seemingly have been able or willing to write of it....I discovered that for those who had survived the worst of it, memories of Normandy were blurred and disordered bits and pieces....Obviously the same combination of exhaustion and terror that makes it difficult to think or see clearly in the shattering confusion and roar of battle (when a man functions only from habit, drill, and discipline), makes it equally difficult to retain coherent, detailed memories, in much the same way the conscious mind is able to recall only a few disconnected details and a general impression of horror on waking up from a nightmare. And so I could only piece together a composite picture, made up of the fragmentary memories of some who survived in humble thankfulness those awful days, and place these back to back with the frightful casualty statistics.

The official record-keepers of those times were of no help; they seem to have been entirely disinterested in recording such matters. Beyond brief references to the weather, there is little recognition of the conditions under which the fighting soldier existed, which, more often than not, were dreadful. While extremely useful in authenticating personal notes and diaries, none of the sparse unit diaries or post-battle intelligence reports make any serious attempt to describe what was entailed in simply staying alive during those terrible days and nights.

Thsi deficiency in the material set down at the time by those responsible for preserving historical records (on which all official and unofficial histories would be based) has led to inaccurate, irresponsible conclusions bordering on outright dishonesty - even in the the works of our own official historians - regarding the training and fighting qualities of Canadian officers and men in World War II. And these inaccuracies - insulting to the memory of all those Canadians who died facing the enemy while the official record-keeperes sheltered miles to the rear - are being perpetuated by British and American writers and even built upon by some domestic revisionists.

Far from accurately protraying the ferocity of the deadly clashes in battles of attrition reminiscent of World War I, the war historians tend to give the impression that it was some sort of game, played out by cunning generals, with the outcome hinging on the level of "aggressiveness" shown by one side or the other - most particularly on that of the "junior commanders."

(I'll start again in the next post as I don't want to time out!)

 

Part 2 - George Blackburn in The Guns of Normandy

"It is irritating to the point of enraging to read critical analyses of the shortcomings of men and officers engaged at the speahead of operations by critics with not a single day of frontline experience. Well-rested, well-fed, safe and secrue, writing withing the relaxed atmosphere of their homes or offices, with no responsibility for men's lives resting on their decisions...Clearly, when all the sinister mystery is removed from any battlefield as to what the enemy has over theree beyond those trees, or among the silent rubbles of that village, or in the dead ground just over that ridge, any fool can decide what should have been done and the best way of doing it.

And there is something particularly obscene about the works of historians who conduct coldblooded analyses and write without emotion of the accomplishments of units and the "fighting qualities" of men while never giving any indication they recognized and understand the frailty of the human spirit and the resolve of all men, regardless of training and background, when forced to live for days without end in a continuing agony of fear, made manageable only by the numbing effects of extreme fatigue.

I think I would have keeled over in shock had I come across one historian, purporting to describe the battles on the road to Falaise, who once acknowledged that those battles (like those in every major operation extending over several weeks) were not fought by alert, well-rested, well-fed, healthy men, but by men suffereing utter exhaustion, from heat and dysentery and the neverending itching induced by lice and sand fleas, from never being allowed to stretch out and get a night's sleep, and from continuously living with grinding tensions from the irrepressible dread of being blown to pieces or being left mangled and crippled.

Everyone tends to forget just how awful some aspects were. I had to be reminded of my bout with disturbed bowels by an ex major of the Royal Regiment of Canada. His recall of one man's dysentery-induced expulsion aroused my own memories of the convulsive cramps and feverish, shuddering ague brought on by that damnable scourge that struck the Canadian Army around Verrieres before the drive down the Falaise road began, which worsened as time went on to the point where it came close to putting some units out of action when supplies of medicine to treat it ran out. Yet dysentery, if mentioned at all by historians, is touched on only in passing, as though of no more consequence than some monor irritating inconvenience like lice or mosquitoes.

What a hellish nightmare it must have been for foot-soldiers with dysentery just to drag themselves over hill and dale, let alone dash here and there for cover when on the attack, and then dig in on the objective to meet the inevitable counter-attack. I wondered then and I wonder still how men found the will to move out from cover and risk death and crippling wounds day after day until they were wounded or killed. I saw them do it when they were so stunned by fatigue they scarcely flinched when an 88-mm whacked an airburst above them. And I saw them do it shortly after some opening rounds of a fire plan fell short, causing a few, overwrought with tension, to cry like babies.

Armchair strategists writing of those days - whether British, American, or Canadian - have all spent too much time wondering why they were so slow getting down past Falaise to meet up with the Americans. They should have spent more time wondering how men ever summoned up the necessary moral courage and physical stamina to get there at all.

Those base-wallahs who since the war have dared to criticize the Canadians for not closing the Falaise Gap sooner - inferring from what seems to have been slow daily progress a general lack of aggressiveness - were obviously not around at the time to see and experience what it was like for the troops at the cutting edge of the Canadian army. And while lack of first-hand experience in a writer may be forgiven, no such tolerance can be extended to those pretending to be historians who purposely ignore the evidence provided by the awful casualty rate among the Canadian divisions, which on the road to Falaise and beyond rose to twice the American rate and two and a half times the British rate (a rate the British considered unsustainable, causing them to set up a new category, 'Double Intense,' for measuring the intensity of battle).

By mid-August the nine 2nd Cdn Division infantry battallions were 1,900 short of establishment in their fighting strength of 5,040.

continued

 

George Blackburn in his introduction to his book The Guns of Normandy

"As in World War I, some staff officers and field commandres, to escape criticism, blamed the fighting men for failures. Thus we have the ridiculous declaration by Lt-General Charles Foulkes, CO of 2nd Division, that "at Falaise and Caen, we found that when we bumped into battle-experienced German troops, we were no match for them."

"Bumped into"? Foulkes infanty brigades were never out of contact with the best troops...from when 2nd Division entered battle, south of Caen, to Falaise and beyond. And it was the German elite SS units that were shreded, defeated, and herded to their destruction in the Falaise pocket - not the other way around!

But historians have lent status to such myths, thus guaranteeing their perpetuation by writers following behind, while largely ignoring the fact that the greatest failure in Normandy was the tanks, not the heroes who manned them....Every man in every armoured division, from the Officers Commanding down to the lowliest driver, within hours of arriving in Normandy, was aware that in any confrontation with German tanks, few Allied tanks would live to fight another day....Suppression of the facts may have been justified at the time to prevent demoralization of the Allied armies, but the irrefutable fact that our tankmen were equipped with grossly inferior weapons which which to push through the German Panthers and Tigers on the road to Falaise should not have been ignored by our historians. To have done so is inexcusable."


I am working on an integration of the accounts of Operation Totalize from the perspective of two Canadian artillery histories, the personal account of George Blackburn FOO with the 4th Field RCA , the personal account of Denis Whitaker Lt-Col with the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, as well as the analysis of Terry Copp in his book Field of Fire. I should have it to post in a day or two. A different perspective than I have seen discussed thus far. M

 

That's a very fair point, Macrusk - in fact, Blackburn's book ( which I have to say I rate very highly ) is one of the few I've read which highlights the effect of sheer exhaustion on the ground troops. It's amazing how often this is overlooked, even by planners. Think of the Schlieffen Plan to start WW1 with a fast march on Paris : great idea, unfortunately it failed to take into acoount that a) other people may resist the assault and b) even German troops cannot march and fight endlessly without rest.

( However, reverting to Falaise, I'll be naughty and mention that there does seem to be a question mark as to why Canadian armour seemed rather tardy in swinging North-east out of Trun toward the Poles at Coudehard.... )