The Far East

Not to mention the British Matildas.

 

Hi

Regarding japanese tanks do not make the mistake to think they were built for tank vs. tank battle. They were actualy nothing more than infantry support vehicles. The first tank built for tank battles was the Shinhoto Chi-Ha which saw first combat in 1942.

The fight against tanks was delegated to at-units and field artillery. The type 90 75 mm field gun was able to kill every allied tank with direct fire.

Yours

tom!

 

But Tom, the Sherman was also designed souly as an infantry support vehicle. As were the British "Infantry" tanks like the Churchill and Matilda II that still tore it (Japanese tanks such as the Chi-ha) to shreads.

 

Hi.

I agree that the armour penetration abilities of the japanese tank guns was very weak comparing with the allied guns. But the japanese tank doctrine never thought of a tank vs. tank battle before 1940.

The british infantry tanks were planned and build after the beginning of the german tank development program and so good anti-tank abilities were found necessary.

The US-M4 were developed after the first experiences with modern tank warfare in Europe and so they were planned with good at-abilities, too.


The allied tanks were a step or two ahead and the japanese tanks had never a chance to be equal. The lack of ressources after 1941 prevented the development of good battle tanks. The japanese army was only able to build some prototypes of type 4 and 5 heavy (more than 20 t weight) tanks. These were compareable with the german Panzer IV and Panzer VIE and would have caused serious trouble to allied tank crews.

(Hope my english isn´t that bad as it sounds to me )

Yours

tom!

 

No, the Sherman was not intended to be used as an AT weapon. American docterine stressed that Tanks were not to engage tanks untill December of '43. That is why the Sherman was given an entirely anti-infantry armament. I can't speak for British infantry tanks (Still waiting for an expert on that subject to pop up) But I am sure they were designed along the same idea.

It is also worthy to note that these Japanese infantry killers could have their bottom hulls penetrated by a Soldier with a BAR. And every part of the tank, save for the front, was succeptable to .50 cal machine gun fire. This did not bode well for the crews.

 

major armored engagements involving the japanese were fought at Nomonhan in summer 1939 ( leading to the Nazi-Soviet pact )

And the MASSIVE Japanese armored/combined arms offensives in late 1944 and early 1945 in china.

 

More info! More info!

Please share, Gotthard.

 

Nomonhan is probably the best documented battle in the history of the world. It was the first large scale tank engagement in history. ( khalkin Gol is the river near Nomonhan )

basically the soviet mongolians decided to claim a border area and militarised it with tribal militias.

the japanese went in to clear em with a cavalry group and there was a skirmish with losses.

Japs got tiffed and sent in a makeshift mechanised recon battalion, but by then the russians had reinforced. The japanese unit was massacreed to the last man. the russians called in zhukov at this point and the japanese reinforced .. lotta large scale air battles ensued. while both sides tried to reinforce and figure out xactly where they were fighting.

the japanese attacked again trying to drive the bad guys back over the river but got dominated by russian artillery. so they brought up the pride of the japanese army ( their heavy artillery ) and pounded the russians - who had roughly 14 to 20 times the ammununition and twice the range and promptly kicked the japanese artilleries butts..
the accompanying attack went in and was decimated.

the japanese tanks didnt fare much better and got caught on piano wire.
by then it was getting out of hand. the japs crossed the river and attempted to encircle a russian mechanised corps with an infatry regiment
dont need to tell you what happened.
the japs pulled the tanks out out so they wouldnt get hurt any more
then zhukov went ballistic and did an armored encirclement.. the japs decided to die in place.. division was annihalated and the pride of japans artillery wiped out..

roughly 40000 casualties on each side... very intense stuff i belieave koontz wrote the book on it after 20 years research.. the book gives the name of almost every single japanese soldier in the action.. just an incredible book... best ive ever read on ww2. very very intense like a movie or something but everything is real and the people really die..
incredible book.


late 44 the japanese finally organised armored divisions and launched some serious offensives in china.. ill give ya a site with details. think its yoshis imoperial army site.

 

http://www.fetchbook.info/search_Alvin_ ... uthor.html

heres a link to the Coox book on nomonhan



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The definitive account in English of the near war on the Manchuria/Mongolia frontier in 1939. The account is drawn primarily from Japanese sources and thus provides a full view of the chaos of battle from that perspective. The Soviet side is made to seem perhaps too orderly and well controlled by the very lack of detailed information. The strength of the Soviet command, particularly Marshall Zhukov, is also somewhat glossed over. These are, however, minor objections to what is an excellently organized presentation of a very complex set of events.Why should anyone care? The aims and methods of the Kwantung Army are extensively documented, a matter of major importance for any study of China. The policies of both the Guomindang and the Gongchandang are much easier to understand after reading this book.

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Alvin D. Coox's Nomonhan is one of those books that's hard to review. It's packed with information, has good maps, and the author obviously plumbed every Japanese source he could get his hands on, but the text is wearing and somewhat dull, and the iteration of facts gets to be a bit much after a while. It's a real doorstop (1253 pages, including two sets of notes, bibliography, and index) and very long. In addition, you wonder how much the analysis would benefit from a better reading of the Soviet side of things (not Coox's fault; the book was published in 1984, and Soviet archives were not open). All of this notwithstanding, the serious student of WW2 won't find a better or more detailed study of this crucial and little-understood battle.

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The best and almost the only book on the conflist at Nomonhan. This was an epic battle that took place in 1939 between Japanese forces and Russians under the command of Zhukov. In this conlfict it quickly became obivous that the japanese forces were vastly inferior to their russian counterparts. Although brave the Japanese Armor, and planes and weapons were inferior. Zhukov, a military genious, eventually routed the japanese army causing horrendous losses to an army that had hiterhto only known victory against the militarily inferior Chinese. Russia gained a hero from this conflcit, Zhukov. He was able to test his theories regarding the goruping of armor, and his victorious tactics would later be used against the Germans.Nomonhan should have ended the superiority complex of the japanee military. They should have taken these lessons to heart. Unfortunatly the only thing they learned was that they should not try a full scale invasion of russia(this is why they did not help Hitler in 1941). They should have learned that America would have even better technology then the russians and a war with America would be disastrous. Nomonhan is a fascinitating story of two imperial countries facing off for months of brutal fighting in which thousands perished and yet neither country declared war oin the other. This mirrors the confrontations between Russia and China in the 60s and the confrntatiosn between China and India in the 50/60s when it became apparent that the Indians were no match for the Chinese(thus shattering Nehrus nerves).A very long book, very detailed with easy to read amps detailing the campaigns. The classic and sure to be the staple on this subject for decades to come. The other 'Nomonhan' book by Colvin is weak and inaccurate. This 'Nomonhan' is written mostly from the Japanese point of view, thats its only downside.

Japan v. Russia, 1939 (part 1)
Few in the west knew or cared that Japan and the Soviet Union fought a small war on the Siberia-Manchuria border in the summer of 1939. On the ground, these were the largest tank battles since WWI. In the air, large forces were likewise engaged, with the Japanese taking something of a beating. It is difficult to get a fix on actual losses, both countries being notoriously secretive and notoriously apt to over-claim. The only good book in English about this conflict is Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939 (Stanford Univ Press, 1985). Below are my notes from Coox.
(Since they were first posted, these notes have inspired a lively debate on the Russian side of Nomonhan. For that discussion, click here.)

Nomonhan appears to be a village west of the Holsten river (NS at that point) just before it crossed the Soviet claimed boundary (NW-SE at that point). Holsten rises in Lake Abutara a few miles inside Soviet claimed territory, and flows into the Halha river (Khalkhin Gol).

The cry before destroying the colors and committing suicide: "Tenno Heika Banzai!" three times.

Duty is weightier than a mountain / Death is lighter than a feather. -- Imperial Precepts to Soldiers and Sailors, 1882

Summary of JAAF air
The air force involved was the 2nd Hikoshidan, commanded by General GIGA Tetsuji. At the time of the August offensive it consisted of 4 scout planes attached to air force headquarters, 15 scout planes serving with the ground troops, and two combat wings with 125 aircraft:
12th Hikodan with 88 fighters, commander unidentified. Three fighter groups took part in the offensive, all of which later saw combat against the American Volunteer Group in Burma: 1st Sentai commanded first by Maj HARADA Fumio and later by Maj YOSHIDA Tadashi; 11th Sentai; and 64th Sentai commanded by Cap KATO Tateo. A fourth group, the 24th Sentai, evidently did not take part in the offensive.

9th Hikodan with 24 light bombers and 13 heavies, commanded by Maj Gen SHIMONO Ikkaku. The combat units included one squadron of the 10th Sentai (light bombers plus 2 scouts), three squadrons of the 16th Sentai (light), and one squadron of the 61st Sentai heavy commanded by Col MIKAMI Kiso

Japanese ground commanders tended to discount verbal reports of air recon. Photos were rare because cameras difficult to operate.

The 2nd Hikoshidan was worn down by August. In July, the Japanese had claimed 481 Russian planes while losing 14 of their own. In August they claimed 134 while losing 23. On the Russian side, Soviet AF officer A. B. Vorozheikin says the loss ratio was 4 Russ to 1 Jap in May but improved to 1:3 in June, 1:4 in July, and 1:10 in August.

Nomonhan got most of Nakajima's production of Ki-27 fighters. The crews were exhausted and replacement pilots untrained. Flying up to 6 hrs daily. "An air staff officer remembers the drawn faces, glazed eyes, and hollow cheeks of Japanese aviators. Scout pilots . . . were having difficulty with their respiratory systems."

Prior to the August offensive, 52 airmen were killed and 24 wounded, including Col ABE Katsumi c/o 15th Sentai killed by Russian strafing Aug 2. Lt Col MATSUMURA Korjiro c/o 24th Sentai shot down Aug 4 in fight with Russian veterans of Spanish Civil War, undersides of their wings painted violet. He was pinned by the tail of his own plane, his flight suit set afire, and lost all the fingers on one hand, but was rescued by another pilot who landed, pulled him free, and bundled him into his one-seater fighter. In all 80 percent of squadron commanders killed or wounded since fighting began. 70 percent of JAAF pilots had upwards of 1,000 hrs flight time.

The big push, 21 August 1939
In July, Kwantung Army hq at Hsinking urged Imperial Army High Command for permission to launch an air offensive against Soviet- Mongol strongpoint at Tamsag. This was approved on Aug 7.
"Operation S" set for dawn Aug 21. Estimated Soviet air strength 80-90 fighters, 30-40 larger planes. Says Giga had eight groups with 88 fighters, 24 light bombers, 13 heavy bombers, 21 scouts.

16th Sentai light bmr: 6-plane sq took off at 4:20 a.m. Bmrs in two tiers escorted by 50 ftrs flew across Halha for Tamsag airfield 60 km SW Higashi-watashi crossing. First squadron bombed at 6 a.m., still dark but could see outline of airfield, encountered flak returning. Second squadron (?) saw 16 large planes on field, encountered 20 I-16s (Polikarpov single-wing open cockpit fighter) when returning and took some hits. Third squadron could not find target and instead bombed tank formation. From 10th Sentai lt bmr 6 planes saw 10 Tupelov SB twin-engined bombers on airfield NE Tamsang, bombed them and claimed 2 destroyed. Escorting 12th Fighter Wing met no planes.

Second wave attacked 11 a.m. Squadron from 16th Sentai bombed southern airstrip, claimed five of eight large planes. Another squadron same group intercepted by fighters so turned for home and attacked ground installations; lost one plane and claimed 3 fighters. 61st Sentai heavy bomber with 12 planes met eight fighters at southern airstrip and claimed two; on way home claimed three more. 12th Ftr Wing? met 50-60 enemy planes, claimed 27 ftrs and 1 SB bomber, lost 3 own.

In afternoon, supported Jap ground forces by bombing tanks and vehicles near Fui Heights; met enemy planes. 16th lt bmr claimed 6 of 30 I-16s, losing one man killed and two wounded. Escorting 11th Sentai fighters claimed 11 of 40-50 I-15s (Polikarpov biplane fighter) and I-16s. Evening: 10th Sentai squadron bombed 3 ftrs taking off from concealed aistrip west of Hara Heights. Escorting fighters engaged 50 enemy fighters, claimed 9, lost 1 from 64th Sentai. Still, had failed to neutralize enemy air so scheduled followup for next day.

AUG 22: 61st Sentai heavies attacked by 30 I-16s, claimed 6 but lost 1 with entire crew of 5. Fighters met 30 enemy, claimed 3, lost 1 from 1st Sentai to AA. Scouts attached to 23rd Div reported that Soviet armor was endangering Jap positions, so Giga called off the air offensive to support the ground forces. AA shot down scout from 10th Sentai. Capt MOTOMURA Koji, 11th Sentai sq ldr, shot down while single-handedly battling 30 I-16s strafing ground forces north of 23rd Div hq. Though claimed 109 Russ planes in two days, had actually lost air supremacy. Worst losses since outbreak of Nomonhan fighting, say 8 planes first day, 6 the second. Plus 22-24 killed or wounded. Jap airmen exhausted but ordered to keep flying. Soviets reinforced air.

Climax battle 28-31 Aug. Soviet AF reported four encounters with JAAF, downing 4 bombers and 45 fighters. Major battle 31 Aug, when 126 Soviet fighters bounced 27 Jap bombers and 70 fighters, shooting down 22. Japs claimed 20 Russ planes that day, losing 3 planes and 4 men. Altogether, Japs claimed 108 Soviet a/c shot down while losing 29 (and 20 airmen killed and 32 wounded) from 23 thru 31 Aug.

After 5 Sept, major changes in JAAF. Operational strength down from 160 planes on 29 Aug to 141 planes on 5 Sept. The 31st Sentai and 64th Sentai had come up from China in July and August. More reinforcements began to move on 1 Sep.

Giga's 2nd Hikoshidan absorbed by EBASHIT Eijiro's XXXX, increasing air strength at Nomonhan by 50% with 9 new squadrons -- 6 fighter, 1 recon, 2 light bomber -- to a total of four wings (hikodan?) with 34-37 squadrons and up to 325 planes. [Later: my guess is that only three hikodan were deployed at Nomonhan.]

Russians likewise reinforced air units at the front. On 13 Sep, Ebashi gave go-ahead. 225 planes airworthy; fighters and some light bombers deployed to forward bases. Weather improved on 14 Sep.

Maj YOSHIDA Tadashi's 1st Sentai (Ki-27) bounced about 28 Soviet I-15 and I-16 fighters in afternoon, claiming 3. Weather still fair on 15 Sep, and Ebashi sent all Ki-27s and two light bombers groups plus scouts -- total 200 planes -- to hit enemy airfields. 20 Nates from Lt Col IMAGAWA Issaku's 59th Sentai engaged 50 Russ fighters, claimed 11. But one squadron followed Russ to south, was ambushed, and lost six Nates and their pilots, inc. s/l YAMAMOTO Mitsugu. 24th Sentai under newly arrived Capt SAKAGAWA Toshio claimed 13 Russ fighters; Sakagawa wounded but lost ndot planes. Total Jap claims: 39 in air, 4-5 on ground; lost 9, with 8 pilots killed incl 2 squadron leaders, plus three lt bombers damaged.

Russ say six air battles: 1, 2, 4, 5, 14, and 15 Sept, the last being the biggest, with 102 Jap planes engaging 207 Russ. Russ claimed 20, lost 6. Altogether for Sept, Russ claimed 70, lost 14; Japs claimed 121, lost 24.

The aftermath
JAAF casualties 141 killed, including 17 officers squadron leader or higher, w/ highest ranking being Col ABE Katsumi, c/o 15th Sentai. One-third of losses were over enemy lines. Plus 89 wounded. 10% of casualties in May and June, 26 percent in July, 50 percent in August, 14 percent in September.
Russ returned bodies of 55 JAAF airmen from west side of the Halha. In one PW compound, the Russians held 500-600 Japanese prisoners, including a JAAF colonel.

The released [bodies?] included Maj HARADA Fumio, 1st Sentai c/o shot down 29 July, possibly by Senior Lt V. G. Rakhov, who claimed to have shot down a Jap "ace" that day, who bailed out, tried to commit suicide, but was captured alive. As Rakhov told the story, the Japanese prisoner asked to meet the Russ pilot who defeated him, then bowed "in tribute to the victor" (quoting Georgi Zhukov THE MEMOIRS OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV, New York: Delacorte, 1971, p 164).

Also [the body of?] 1st Lt DAITOKU Naoyuki of 11th Sentai. The Russians sent him to Shintan hospital at Kirin, with MPs guarding the train and toilet doors always kept open, to prevent suicide attempts. Tight security also at hospital, where most of the orderlies were actually MPs.

As the story was told, two coffins were carried into the hospital the day before a six-hour "trial," after which guards were forbidden to go into the officers' rooms. They duly shot themselves, Harada supposedly after being given a loaded pistol and a Japanese publication describing his "heroic death in action" (quoting Japanese sources).

JAAF Master Sgt MIYAJIMA SHIKO, Ki-27 pilot of 24th Sentai, bellied in 22 June, wandered 4 days without food or water, captured by a Mongol patrol and imprisoned under harsh conditions for 10 months, returned to Japanese forces in 1940, tried, and sentenced to two years and 10 months for "desertion under enemy fire." Released 31 Dec 1942. (quotes Hata Ikuhiko, interview and article)

Gen Giga in August 1940 made commander of a bomber basic training school, then retired in Oct 1941 at age of 56 and spent most of WWII as a farmer.

unit citations to Col Noguchi's 11th Sentai for air battles in May, Lt Col Matsumura's 24th Sentai for combat in June. Also to all three wings and to a squadron of 16th Sentai.

Russ I-16 fighters used 82 mm rockets to attack Jap ground positions, and some claim of using air-to-air missiles against Jap planes. I-16 saw service on Western front until 1943, and in Spanish service under 1952. Says it was replaced at Nomonhan by the retractable-gear I-153 Chaika fighter-bomber, much more powerful than the I-15.

JAAF had trained only 1,700 pilots in 30 years; losses at Nomonhan crippled it. By December 1941, army flight schools graduating 750 pilots a year.



http://www.ipclub.ru/arsenal/angar/WWII ... eneral.htm

anyone knows russian this site dominates on jap armor

 

This cross section of vehicles of the Imperial Japanese military should be an eye opener. Japan was not quite so "armor less" as most people might believe. In fact, Japan had at it's disposal a wide variety equipment. People tend to use Soviet or German tanks when making comparisons of armor power, protection, and quality. It should be remembered that each started the war with much smaller tanks and firepower. The difference in development was application and terrain. Japan's conquests, with the exception of China, were mostly jungle which did not favor large armor formations. It was felt that there was less need to develop a large armored force or heavy tanks. Armor development was hindered by steel production and military priorities. Armor Tactics were generally under developed as a result. Considering the thin armor protection that Japanese tankers had to put up with, along with cramped fighting conditions, Japanese tankers acquitted themselves well in combat.

After WW1 Japan showed an interest in tanks and obtained a variety of models. These units included the British Heavy Mk V and the Medium A. Japan also purchased the very popular FT-17 which they called Ko-Gata Sensha. In 1927 they purchased it's successor, the Renault NC-1 from the French which they called the Otsu-Gata Sensha. Sensha means battle wagon. Both of these models were still in active Japanese service in 1940. Additional units and parts came from the takeover of French holdings in South East Asia. Japan produced it's first home grown tank in 1922 which was a multi-turret design and weighed 22 tons. Later, the Japanese purchased some Vickers 6 ton tanks and the Carden-Loyd tankette and used these as a basis for further developement on their part. Major Tomio Hara designed a bellcrank scissors suspension which paired the bogie wheels and connected them to a coil spring mounted horizontally outside the hull. This suspension became almost a standard on many Japanese models and can easily be seen on the Type 89 medium tank. By 1937, Japan fielded 1060 tanks in 8 regiments. Even with the success of the tank in China, the Japanese still did not see the tank as a battle winner. Tanks were rarely allowed independent action and were largely tied to infantry units in the French system of tank deployment. The standard thought was to use them as moble pillboxes. In the period between 1931 and 1938 the Japanese built nearly 1700 new tanks and this made them the 4th largest tank producer in the world. The peak of Japanese tank production was in 1942 but declined afterward owing to war material priorities. Once the grave mistake was realized as to the true potential of the tank, the Japanese were completely unable to catch up.

Commanded by a lieutenant general. Divided into two sections, Administration Staff and General Staff. 300 Officers and enlisted men assigned.
Infantry Division Commanded by a major general. In strengthened divisions, tankette companies were assigned. Each tankette company had 80 - 100 men along with 10 - 17 tankettes. Their primary use was reconnaissance and front line transport. Further included was 20 light and 48 medium tanks. 80 trucks were included in the train.
Armored Divisions Four tank regiments and one recon regiment. 13,000 personnel and equipped with 1,400 tracked, 800 wheeled vehicles. Anti-tank support included eighteen 47 mm cannon and sixteen 20 mm AA/AT guns.
Cavalry Regiment Commanded by a colonel. Anti-tank support for the unit was four 20 mm anti-tank rifles and two 37 mm cannon. A variant called for six anti-tank rifles and no 37 mm cannon.
Reconnaissance Regiment Commanded by a colonel. This unit was largely motorized but included horse units. Normally 188 horse were assigned. The unit included motorized (by truck) infantry, 7 light armored cars or tankettes. Other vehicles totaled up to 61 of various types and use. For anti-tank support there was four 37 mm guns.
Cavalry Brigade Tank Unit Included 2 companies of light tanks. Each company had 3 platoons. 10 tanks per platoon. 80 trucks and 6 reserve tanks were also added.
Independent Mixed Brigade Tank Unit Three light tank companies. One medium tank company. one light armored car company. A total of 20 medium, 65 light tanks and 25 armored cars. 970 men.
Cavalry Brigade Anti Tank Unit Three firing platoons each of two 37 or 47 mm cannon plus an ammunition platoon. Total strength was 140 officers and enlisted.
Tank Regiment 800 to 850 men assigned. 85 to 95 light and medium tanks.
Infantry Regiment Commanded by a colonel. The regimental anti-tank company's total strength was 115 officers and enlisted divided into administration, observation, two firing platoons, and one ammunition platoon. Four 37 mm cannon were assigned. A variant was to have the anti-tank company merged with the infantry gun company. In this case the company had two anti-tank guns and two regimental guns assigned. A strengthened anti-tank company had 130 officers and enlisted and had three firing platoons and six anti-tank cannon.
Infantry Battalion Commanded by a major. Strengthened battalions would have four 37 mm anti-tank guns along with eight 20 mm anti-tank rifles included.
Battalion Gun Company Commanded by a captain or a first lieutenant. Strengthened units Included four platoons (96 men) of 20 mm anti-tank rifles. Each platoon had two rifles.
Airborne (Parachute) Battalion Total strength was 600 to 700 officers and enlisted. This included an anti-tank squad (mines, grenades) and an anti-tank gun section. This section's weapon depended upon transportation space.
Independent Anti Tank Battalion 500 officers and enlisted assigned. Usually this unit was motorized. Eighteen 37 or 47 mm cannon and 67 vehicles.
Infantry Rifle Company Commanded by a captain. Strengthened units would included a heavy weapons section. The section included two 11 man 20 mm anti-tank rifle squads. Each squad had one anti-tank rifle assigned.
Independent Anti Tank Company 250 officers and enlisted assigned. Eight 37 mm cannon. Usually horse drawn. A motorized unit would have 180 - 200 officers and enlisted personnel. Eight 37 or 47 mm cannon would be assigned.
Independent Tank Company Usually a detachment from a regiment. Consisted of either light or medium tanks.
Independent Armored Car or Tankette Company 130 officers and enlisted. 17 tankettes or armored cars divided into 4 platoons.
Armored Train Unit 500 officers and enlisted.

Tanks and Anti-Tank units in operation. Japanese general practice and notes:
1. Attack: When available, tanks were brought up with secrecy to assault positions. They were then attached to front line battalions and jumped off at the same time as infantry. Infantry was warned not to stop if tanks are destroyed but to continue to advance. Tank missions were the breaching of enemy wire and the destruction of hostile elements.
2. Pursuit: Tanks are sent in to block the enemy's retreat.
3. Defense: Anti-tank cannon units were placed in forward positions and carefully sighted and hidden. If time permitted and the base's defense was well established, anti-tank obstacles and ditches were used also. Pressure sensitive mines covered suspected paths. Specially trained personnel called anti-tank squads or tank fighters would use magnetic mines and attach them to enemy tanks. The use of mines would either require manual attachment or the use of ropes to draw the mine across the path of the tank. Squads would climb upon the enemy tank and destroy the guns with hammer and picks. Smoke grenades were used. Vision slits and openings would be attacked. Wooden poles and metal spikes were driven between the spokes of the wheels. If the attack was at night, available 20 mm guns were located forward of 37 or 47 mm cannons. Friendly tanks were employed only if necessary. Japan considered their tanks were best used against enemy infantry and not against enemy tanks. Bullet splash technique was employed by machine guns and rifles at short range. At least one squad would attack each enemy tank. Defensive combat was distasteful and little is written in their manuals to cover it. Their 1938 manual on Combat Regulations referred to it as "active defense" and all efforts were made to renew an offensive. The Japanese did form strong points, fortresses, and bases. However, with the exception of fortresses, these spots were considered temporary. These points did have strong anti-tank emplacements.
4. Withdrawal: Withdrawal was considered justified only when executed as an order from the High Command. Withdrawal was unconsidered in the face of the enemy.
5. Mechanized forces: The value of mechanization was fully appreciated by the Japanese Army. After a run in with the Soviet Union in what became known as the Manchurian Incident, Japan greatly improved their armor and it's employment. Though inferior to most western powers, mechanized units operating in China were employed with success. Mechanized units were well trained in pursuit and exploitation. Tactics called for envelopment using night marches, assembly in darkness, and an attack at dawn. Mechanized units avoided going into a defensive mode as it nullified the unit's power... mobility. Armor units acquired considerable battlefield experience in small scale tank actions and were not to be taken lightly.

Tank units in the Japanese Army 1st. Tank Group (Division)
Nickname: "Taku" (Development) Formed in December 1941 in Manchuria.
Renamed a Division in June 1942.
This unit operated in Manchuria until the final days of the war in which it was transferred to mainland Japan.
2nd. Tank Group (Division)
Nickname: "Geki" (Hit) Formed in December 1941 in Manchuria.
Renamed a Division in June 1942.
Moved to the Philippines in 1944 and was destroyed as an effective unit in March 1945 by the Americans.
3rd. Tank Division
Nickname: "Taki" (Water Fall) Formed in June 1942 in Mongolia.
Ended the war in China.
4th. Tank Division
Nickname: "Hagane" (Steel) Formed in July 1943 in Japan directly from tank school and operated much like the German Panzer Lehr Division.
Ended the war in Japan - never saw combat.

http://mailer.fsu.edu/~akirk/tanks/ this is the link to all that blather - easier to read.

 

Man thats a long text.......

Thanks for the info..

KBO

 

its fairly deceptive. a japanese tank division was ALL ARMOR they had mobile artilley and SP guns.. some rocking APC's and 4 times the tanks of any other countries tank divisions. the 1st division was involved in the chinese offensive in 1944-45 sorry for the scribbled text - youll really have to research it yourself but this gives you a fairrly decent start.

 

This site is interesting.

http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/r ... nt.asp#nom

 

excellent post - many thanks

 

Reading the Osprey book on 'Japanese Island Defences' I have discovered a possible reason for the lack of Japanese/American tank vs tank actions:

The Japanese realised that their tanks were a wee bit lacking compared to American designs, and that tank vs tank engagements would not go their way. So tanks were used as pillboxes, dug into the ground. They did have an exit ramp, for emergencies!
The few tanks that were kept mobile as a reserve force intended to push the invading Yankees (sorry Greg & all other Southerners ) out into the sea were typically used in small counter-attacks, and were dealt with by infantry AT weapons and AT guns.

 

no wonder they had a hard time conquering china, if the had used tanks, china would be more easier captured. Instead, on most areas and battles, only infranty were used, this gave the nationlist a better advantage to counter the japanese...

Wonder how would patton fair if he was allowed to attack the japanese in china with nationlist help, the japanese will be completely pushed in a matter of weeks...

 

Well, as a pointer just look how well the Soviets faired when they joined in against Japan.

Decent armoured formations went through like a hot knife through warm butter...

 

the japanese had a unique way of transporting infantry into battle with tanks.. they tied 50 gallon fuel drums to the rear of the tanks like sleds and the inf rode in on those... quite an exciting way to go into battle i would assume =)

 

The Americans experamented with this as well, and found it inneficiant.

 

The problem with transporting infantry on tanks, as the Russians found out, is that tanks will attract fire, which then gives heavy casualties amongst the infantry.