Eastern Front victory conditions

Well, the Soviets were able to stop AGC after Smolensk, keep them under permanent pressure, stopping any german thoughts to attack any further, forcing the Germans to retreat at Jeln'ja. Please read also von Bock's thoughts in his diary entry as of August 7, 1941: He had no idea on how should should sucessfully attack to Moscow! If this guy doesn't know it at this time...

I think all this answers your question. As for Soviet Forces at this time sitting/being build between AGC and Moscow, I have to look it up, but if you play the timetable of a hypothetical "Typhoon" starting on Sept. 10 iso Sept 30, you'll see that the "Rasputiza" would have caught AGC in front of Moscow anyway. Deduct the the big german success of the Wjasma-Brjansk operation (those Armies would be still around Moskow!) and deduct the 2nd German Army (this Army would not be available because of the gap between AGC and AGS).

Not even mentioning the Sovietcounter-attacks against the highly vulnerable southern flank of AGC out of the Kiev-area.

Honestly, I see no "get Moscow"-scenario after Smolensk, unless you play the wargame in a manner to give "all the luck" to the Germans and every disadvantage to the Soviets. The best scenario is an AGC caught in the mud in front of Moscow in Nov. 1941, the worst a cut-off AGC. The truth is maybe very simple: The Soviet Army couldn't be destroyed in the first four weeks near the border and west of Duna/Dnjepr, there was enough Red Army alive east of Smolensk at a time when the original "Barbarossa" plan called for an already almost defeated Red Army. The German "blitz" wasn't able to sack the vast majority of the Red Army in his first run, game over.

Actually, it's a pretty easy scenario: you know when which Soviet Army appeared between August and December, you know the weather during that time, you know the impact of logistics, just don't remove the Soviet Armies in the south and play a "Typhoon-started-early-September-with-Kiev-intact"-game on the Soviet side.

My bet is on you.

Cheers,

 

On top of it all it´s weird to notice that the Russians were not capable of producing so many tanks etc as possible as the factories were on their way to Siberia some time before or at the time of operation Typhoon...Could we say that time was on Germany´s side but they did not know it?? I think Stalin could not let this be out of his calculations, some 2/3 of factories either destroyed or under German power or on their way to Siberia...It would not be until 3-6 months that the factories in Siberia would be working "normally". Unfortunately no monthly production numbers available but maybe somebody can help here?

"Some 1,500 factories that had escaped the German onslaught were ordered to pack up and move thousands of miles eastward, out of reach of both German panzers and Luftwaffe bombers. This supendous undertaking was comparable to moving all the industries of Pittsburgh and Detroit to California, and it was supposed to be accomplished in six months, over a railroad system that included ony four transcontinental tracks running east and west.

Between June and October of 1941, nearly 300 major industrial complexes were evacuated from the Ukraine, along with 136 smaller factories. Close to 500 industries moved out of the Moscow area and nearly a hundred more left Leningrad just before the city was surrounded in September 1941. By Christmas 1941, more than 1,300 large plants manufacturing tanks, planes, artillery and ammunition had been shipped eastward; some 200 of them were sent to the Volga river region; about 500 went to the Urals and the remainder were moved all the way to Central Asia and Siberia. Something like 1.5 million railroad-car loads were required to complete the job."

Notice, that the light T-60 tank was important in the battle of Moscow as Russian tank production was low because the factories were being evacuated at the time!! Still they managed to win this battle!!See the last site below!

http://members.cox.net/mcrowe/Russian%20Year%20Start%20Sequences.html

http://members.tripod.com/~Sturmvogel/SovWarProd.html

http://members.tripod.com/~Sturmvogel/SovWarProd.html

 

Some relevant information coming from "The Atlas of Eastern Front Battles" by Will Fowler.

Hitler repeatedly delayed the progress of Army Group Center, squandering resources and time.

"Hitlers Army" by the editors of Command Magazine said this about Guderian, upon hearing after victory at Smolensk he was to swing south:

Of course, he argued in vain.

"The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" by Will Shirer says this:

Hitler did finally give consent to launch typhoon, but not before the weather worstened and the Soviets reinforced.

Kai-Petri; great info. You seem to have a wealth of websites. Perhaps you should compile a list of your favorites and post them in the ww2 books and publications section. I would really be interested in seeing some of them.

Also, I would say Hitler thought time was on there side, but the opposite was true. It was race against Soviet mobilisation, and the constant delays lost it.

[ 30. October 2002, 09:48 PM: Message edited by: dasreich ]

 

Soviet Tank production (source: "50 let Vooruzennych Sil", p. 265):
1st half 1941: 1,800
2nd half 1941: 4,740
1942: 24,446

or,

Soviet tank production index (Q2/1941 production = 100) (source: G.S. Kravcenko: "Voennaj o ekonomike SSSR 1941-45", 1965, p.42)

Q3/1941: 150
Q4/1941: 190
Q1/1942: 350
Q2/1942: 470
Q3/1942: 520

Cheers,

 

Please compare Hitler’s „Supplements to Directive No. 33 (July 23, 1941) and Halders’ different orders to AGC (July 24, 1941); please read also Hitler’s answer (August 21, 1941) and his subsequent „study“ (Aug. 22, 1941) to Halder’s earlier „Proposal for the continuation of of the Operation of Army Group Center in connection with the Operations of Army Groups South and North“ (Aug. 18, 1941).

There is no doubt that Hitler believed the Russian campaign "will lead to a total defeat of the soviet resistance in 1941" ("OKW-memo about the strategic situation in late summer 1941" dated Aug. 27, 1941). Hitler and "his" OKW were the first (back in late August) to realize that the "Barbarossa"-timetable is screwed up and victory in 1941 isn't possible any more. On Aug. 23, Guderian was instructed by Halder to convince Hitler to dismiss the Kiev-operation during his meeting with Hitler, but at the end Guderian came back convinced to the contrary. Halder called him a "swinger" because of his change.

Army Chief Brauchitsch, CoS Halder and CiC AGC Bock, later also Jodl pushed Hitler to continue the attack on Moscow, even when it was too late. Of course Hitler, being the Head of the Wehrmacht, finally issued the order, but this order was a result of Halder's "brainwashing".

Finally, after having been continiusly“worked through“ by Halder Guderian, Jodl, Bock and Brauchitsch, Hitler finally agreed to prepare an attack towards Moscow (Directive No. 35, Sept.6, 1941)
because the Army Generals promised him that it wouldn't be too late. Hitler believed them, but they were wrong.

If you're looking for a snake in the grass of Operation "Barbarossa", it's Halder. He continiously opposed the general directives as set out in the very early planning of Directive No. 21 dated Dec. 1940. From the very beginning, Moscow was a third prio target. Halder/Brauchitsch had two choices: Obey and act according to the agreed operational plan, change the plan, or resign if needed.

But following a secret "pro-Moscow"-agenda while simoultaniuosly signing orders to the contrary and nodding to every of Hitler's directives, was the worst possible reaction.

"Typhoon" and its failure was the fault of Halder and his Army Staff.

„You might be right with your claims, but we won’t hinder Bock if he thinks that he can make it; you also need some good luck in fighting a war.“
(Chief of Army Staff Halder on Nov. 13, 1941 to Quartermaster of AGC, Eckstein, after E. told him that it will not be inpossible to supply AGC in her advance to Moscow)

Logistical and material facts and restrains didn't count any more for Halder. He relied on "luck".

Cheers,

[ 31. October 2002, 08:17 AM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

I completely agree that the launching of typhoon occurred too late and was doomed to failure. Had Hitler seen the wisdom of hitting Moscow since the beginning, perhaps all the bickering and moving back and forth would not have occurred. At the time Typhoon was actually launched, it would have been better to move those troops elsewhere, even south. But again, it was the constant delays and change of thought that led barbarossa to a standstill. The battle in the Ukraine was an impressive victory, but those troops could have been used securing a much more important target.

 

Hey guys, this is a great forum. I'm not sure if this flows from this topic or whether i should start a new topic for this, but this is something that has been intruiging me for a while. Whereas most dictators that were hellbent on annexing large portions of the world basically only had the rest of the world to deal with, in WW2, both Hitler and Stalin had each other to deal with. I doubt that it was at all possible for either of them to trust the other. But first, what I'm wondering is whether this was a matter of simple coincidence, that two dicators came to power during the same period of time, or whether there was a reason for this. As well, do you think that either of them would have been able to succeed in their objectives if the other had not been in power? Germany had to reallocate a huge amount of her resources and men to the Eastern Front, and The Red Army spent all its time fighting the Germans. As well, if Germany had not declared War on the US, would the US have been as motivated to enter the battlefield in Europe so soon after WW1? I'd probably say not.

 

Welcome to the forum Trasher...bout time you posted.

And yes, i think the post is on the subject...and ill be back with a reply as soon as i get back to the lab.

 

So do you think that in 1941 Germany actually could have come up with the resources they needed to attack russia? This ismy issue- the halts around smolensk etc. really don't matter. The logiostical problems the german army faced, as noted by Murray and most sources, began in late June, not September.

For one, it was the russian resistance that led barbarossa to a standstill! Sorry, dasreich, but the theory that the germans lost only by delaying suggests that the red army was not a factor! The german army did not decide to slow down- they were forced to! In official reports, I'm sure they "decided" to halt... but I doubt they had any choice. We should also remember the germans' drastic mistakes in judging the size of the red army- german planning failed ot account for literally hundreds of russian divisions...
Murray- "But Red Army resistance even in hopeless situations continued unabated; the commander of the 18th Panzer division remarked that the germans must reduce their casualties "if we do not intend to win ourselves to death.""
"...the purged, ill-prepared, and inneffectively-led Red Army had already proven adept at prolonged, tenacious resistance, long after logic dictated that its units would surrender or collapse."

And another, it was German resource shortages that brought barbarossa to a standstill. How were the germans supposed to advance on Moscow with no gas? No food? No ammo? These things were not available- it did not matter if the germans stopped and regrouped... the resources simply did not exist within the german war machine.
From Murray...
...OKH's chief logistics office, Major General Eduard Wagner, warned that distances and the time factor would exacerbate the already-critical problem of equipping German forces. Wagner calculated (optimistically) that the Wehrmacht's logistics system could support the forces at a depth of 500 kilometers east of the frontier- a distance short of Leningrad, Moscow, and the Donets Basin.
...they calculated that ammunition expenditures for the campaign would not exceed those of the battle in France."
"Finally, the railroad repair troops, whose support was essential to the success of the campaign, were inexplicably assigned the lowest priority in the move forward."

"The germans' operational pause between the end of July and the end of August did not result from Hitler's and OKH's arguments as to wether the next offensive should target Moscow or Leningrad or Kiev. Rather, the germans halted because of their inability to transport sufficient supplies of ammunition and fuel forward, coupled with the impact of the Soviet Union's mobilization. (126)"

Ahhh, good stuff here... great to get out of conspiracy central in the FFZ!
great discussion, gents!

and where are my manners- welcome, Thrasher!!

 

Since Stalin was determined to die in his capital (just like Hitler did in 1945), he wouldn't have flown to Stalingrad or the Caucasus or the Ural.

But with Moscow lost and Stalin dead, the Red Army would lose its will to fight and would surrender en masse.

 

Crazy; Yes, the Germans did have severe supply problems. They tried to advance solidly on three fronts. Hitler wanted Leningrad and Moscow taken at the same time. The German supply lines were being overstretched, and they began to feel this shortly after the invasion. The Emphasis of the invasion kept shifting from target to target, and at times on two targets. Had emphasis been from the beginning on the seizure of Moscow, such shortages would not have been so severe. And even before going into the Ukraine, it could have been managed to move against Moscow. If the German army had no resources, then how did they swing south? How did an army with no gas and other resources pull off such a huge victory and gain so much ground? The point is, after the foray to Kiev, the Germans didnt have the resources to pull off typhoon. They had little chance of winning typhoon in December, because of the constant change in tactics and targets.
Posted by CrazyD:

That it is. I am having a lot of fun!

Albert; Your right about Stalin and Moscow. This is just one of the reasons why Moscow was a critical target.

Trasher; I think the world would have been in a lot of trouble had Stalin and Hitler not gone head to head. They cancelled themselves out so to speak.

 

Thanks guys. Also, I think that the main German tactic of blitzkreig did not really work well in Russia. Consider this: blitzing worked well in mainland Europe because there are so many large population centers in such close proximity to each other. So when the Germans blitzed, they could basically hop short distances, and not have to worry too much about supplies, since they could restock at the next population center. In Russia, however, the Germans I think tried to blitz with the Red Army because that's really what the German Army was built for. But I think that tactic was flawed in Russia because the Germans had to stretch their supply reserves so thin; if you want to invade Russia, you dont want to try to do it all at once, you'll find yourself half frozen in the middle of nowhere with an angry Red Army/mob surrounding you. Also, you have to consider that invading a communist country, especially Russia is very different from invading a country like France; in a communist country, the multitudes are so indoctrinated by the ideals of communism and are so cowed by a massive centralized govt (especially with Stalin at the head of it) that basically every Russian would rise up and fight. Therefore, my conclusion basically is that the German army couldnt really inavde Russia, take Moscow, and expect to hold on to it as well, especially because of the way the Germans would have treated the captured Russians. Since Hitler hated the Russians with such a passion, it's definately not hard to imagine concentration camps set up in Russia as well. It's also not hard to imagine a German Holding Force in Moscow basically starving to death because to hold Moscow against the rebellions that were certainly going to happen, the German Holding Army would have to be quite large - but such an army would also need a constant supply of supplies (hehe) that they probably could not get from Moscow. And having to truck so many supplies into Moscow from such a distance would probably not be an easy thing to do considering the lack of paved roads, and the fragility of rail lines. So basically what I'm trying to say in this post is that the Germans might have been in a lose-lose situation, if they invaded the Soviet Union, they would almost certainly fail to hold Moscow, and if they did not, well the German Army was also not very well suited to fighting on the defensive, and i buy dasreich's argument that the Red Army was preparing for an attack. So again, I guess it gets back to the question that I asked earlier: did the fact that Stalin came to power and was seeking to spread his "spheres of influence" foil Hitler's victory? The more I think about it, the more i'm inclined to think so; there simply wasnt enough room in Europe for two dictators. Sorry about the rambling post...

 

Where are you getting that Stalin would have stayed in Moscow? Do you have a source for this?

Since Moscow was never in any serious danger- german troops at best made it to the outskirts of the city- we have no way of knowing what Stalin would have done if the germans had surrounded Moscow.

I also don't believe the russians would have lost their will to fight. Many russians hated Stalin, or at least they were terrified of him. So their will to fight clearly did not come from some blind devotion to Stalin. True, the Red Army would have become completely disorganized and for a while would have only been able to fight germans in un-coordinated, random attacks. But considering the size of russia and the size of the red army, this would have still pinned down many german divisions, and given time, the red army could have re-grouped.

But here's another one... Let's say for arguments sake that somehow the germans did manage tokill Stalin. Then what? Do we all believe that all of russia and the whole russian army would have immediately given up and fallen apart? Could another leader, maybe Zhukov, have taken over?

 

Crazy; I would say that Stalin was a great driving force behind Russian resistance, certainly an organizer of it. They people may have hated him, but he was a strong leader regardless. His death would have meant a serious blow not only to morale, but to the ability of the Russians to fight. Im not sure, but I think he says this in his diaries, that he would stay to the death in Moscow.

Trasher; Blitzkrieg was the only way to win in the USSR. A war of attrition, unless your China, cannot win against the Soviets. The problem was they needed the mother of all blitzkriegs, and Hitler kept changing priorities and creating too broad of a front for such a strategy to work.

 

(later, after seeing dasreich and Thrasher's new posts!)
(damn straight, dasreich! I'm not getting into any more of that foolishness!)

Again, I would like to see some sort of source on Stalin staying in Moscow. I have the impression that no major plans were made either way. And, since the situation never occurred, I think it's difficult to figure what Stalin would have done.

OK, lets see...
The germans did manage to swing south. But even then, they were already crippled. The waffling on the plans actually helped the germans here. Because Hitler and Halder kept switching plans, for weeks many of the panzer divisions did not move at all! First, the order to move again on Moscow... once the panzer divisions recieved this order, they would take at least days to prepare to move on Moscow. Then, the order changes ot a move south. Again, days of preparation. Finally, the panzers actually begin moving south. But only days later, they are re-ordered back to Moscow. So in this case, it would seem that in fact the panzers had a couple weeks to refit while orders were changing.

How did an army with no gas and resources pull off the early victories they did?- they used up all their supplies! The germans did stockpile supplies for the invasion of russia. But they only planned for supplies for a couple months. So the gas and resources needed for a couple months had been planned for. The victories at Kiev and in the Ukraine essentially used up all the supplies the germans had stockpiled. The best indicator of the supply problems was the first couple months. The germans had planned for a couple months of campaigning; if they had allocated enough resources, why do we see major shortages appearing as early as June? The germans drastically underestimated their initial estimates for supplies. When we talk about the german divisions swinging south, we should note the strength of said divisions. If they were down from 200 tanks to 60 (10th panzer I believe), of course less gas is needed- because less forces are using it. We need to remember that the germans, while achieving some tremendous victories, also lost many men and much equipment. So this creates a catch- in their present state, the german divisions needed less supplies (but still more than german could provide)... but one of the supplies they needed were replacements... and said replacements would mean the divisions once again needed more supplies.

Let me try and simplify this (mostly for myself!)... all with made-up B.S, numbers!

lets say the germans had 200 barrels stockpiled for the 2-month invasion, and they could produce 20 more barrels a month. Upon actually invading, they find that 200 barrels will only last one month, and thier army is consuming 30 barrels a month.
So after one month, not only are the germans nearly out of supplies, but they are not producing enough to re-supply.

My main idea- I'd agree completely that the germans had no chance of succeeding at Typhoon in December... but I'd argue as well that the only way Typhoon would have even been possible would have been if the germans had attacked russia a month earlier (May 41) and dedicated ALL their forces to taking Moscow. And even then, EVERYTHING would have had to go the germans way, luck and all.

Thrasher, good stuff. That's basically my idea as well, the whole idea of a lose-lose situation.

(geez, wish I had more time right now!!!)

 

Had Moscow been the emphasis since the beginning, perhaps the Germans wouldnt need the luck they didnt have late in 1941. The German plan called for a decisive battle, not a see-sawing campaign based on the whim of Der Feuhrer.

Exactly my point. Those supplies could have been used elsewhere.

 

Dasreich, the problem with having the "mother of all blitzkreigs" is that the army would leave the supply trucks in the dust, stranding themselves in the middle of nowhere. And then, after the Germans actually managed to capture a city, they would be stuck there with no supplies anyway. You're right, the Germans could not have fought a war of attrition against the Russians, they simply did not have the time, resources, or manpower, but that's why i called it a lose-lose situation; the only way to take Russia would be to fight a war of attrition, not to blitzkreig.

 

The Germans had the ability to fight such a war, they just didnt utilize it to its fullest potential. The key to beating Russia was to keep the Red Army off balance until critical targets had been taken. In essence they did super blitz, only in too many directions at the same time. If you look at how the Germans advanced in 1941, they went after expanding Germanys borders away from Berlin more than going after schwerpunkts. Of course this is only my opinion, but the constant change in targets and directions for the Wehrmacht signified this pattern of Barbarossa.

 

"The Germans had the ability to fight such a war, they just didnt utilize it to its fullest potential."

Did they? I'm not sure about that. The Germans were fighting a war on two fronts, do you really think they could have fought a war of attrition on the Eastern Front (esp. considering that their whole armed forces were really built for blitzkreig attacks and attacking, not holding and defending) while fighting another war on the Western Front? I highly doubt that.

"The key to beating Russia was to keep the Red Army off balance until critical targets had been taken."

Yes, but what about after the critical targets had been taken? The Germans could not have held on to those targets for enough time to actually do anything with them: refer to previous posts.

 

In 1941, there was only one real front. North Africa was a sideshow, and the Western Front was under no real threat of invasion. Two fronts only became a problem after Operations Torch, Crusader, and the buildup of Overlord.

Once critical targets like Moscow, Leningragd, and Stalingrad are taken, the Russians would have taken such a hit that the Germans can afford a little time to refit their troops and pursue the likely broken Soviets. Again, the problem was going after all 3 at once. One at a time starting with the most important is the way to go.