Breakout from Stalingrad

I'm a bit curious about people's opinion on Stalingrad, once Uranus began. What could have prevented the destruction of the Sixth Army? What could be done, and what was impossible?

Personally, I believe the only hope would have been an immidiate all-out attempt to strike back west, as soon as the extent of the Soviet counter-offensive was realized. At this time the German forces still had some options and mobility, while the Red Army was disorganized by the advance and fighting to close the sack. Of course, the rapid Soviet advance combined with political considerations and inertia in the German high command made this impossible. The window of opportunity for this option closed in a couple of days.

Moving on, I often see the opinion that Paulus should have been allowed to strike out from Stalingrad as the relief attempt under von Manstein approached the city, in order to link up.

This always seemed bogus to me. At this time the Sixth Army had lost any mobility it previously had. In fact, it seems unlikely to me that the ragged and starving survivors could have been coerced into any effective form of force capable of driving back the Soviets dug in around them on the steppe. It's one thing for such a desperate, depleted and exhausted force to stay dug in and defend their "homes", if you will, fighting with incredible determination and desperation to defend their only form of fleeting safety. It's quite another thing to use them offensively.

Opinions?

 

Heartland, you're right on both counts.

The only real chance that the 6th Army had, would have been in the very early days of the Russian encirclement. They still had sufficient tanks, fighting strength, and air support, to enable them to attempt a break out. The Russian forces would not have had time to dig in, or effectively co-ordinate, against a concerted break out attempt.

Of course this would have meant reliquishing Stalingrad to the Russians, and at that time, nobody in the German Army, or the High Command, doubted that the Russian forces outside the city could not be thrown back, and the encirclement broken.

It was only later, as the situation worsened, and Hitler began to realise the truth, that the relief effort was (I believe reluctantly) agreed to. By then of course it was too late. The defenders had been reduced to half starved ghosts, with little ammunition, fuel, and strength, to be able to carry out an effective break out.

It is true that the siege of Stalingrad tied up a large number of Russian forces, that could have been fighting elsewhere, but if a concerted effort by the German defenders to break out, had been authorised in the beginning, the sacrifice of so many German soldiers that could have been used to defend the Reich, could have been avoided.

_________________

Why should I demoralize him (the enemy) by military means if I can do so better and more cheaply in other ways - Adolf Hitler

 

Agreed. The only thing that would have saved the 6th Army was to leave Stalingrad and the heavier equipment and go west!Unfortunately this was not possible as the politics of Hitler could not bear the thought.As well Goering was convinced that the Stalingrad pocket could be supplied by air
( The Demyansk pocket a year earlier was the example they used for excuse )...

To hold Stalingrad I don´t think they had enough forces available but the mistake was done earlier in the summer 1942 as the troops were sent into two directions, the Caucasus and Stalingrad. I don´t know if keeping the forces together would have meant victory but it would have meant bigger forces in the Stalingrad area.And more trouble for the Russians!

 

Correct if the goal was to save the 6th Armee. As big as the Russian offesive was, it meant that the Germans would have withdrawn back to Rostov and the would mean cutting of von Kleist's army in the Caucasus. Though this may sound bad, I believe it is the lesser of the two evils because von Kleist could withdraw towards Rostov and link up with the 6th Army there. Yes, a precarious position due to over ambitious plans of dividing up forces. tsk tsk.

 

I agree as well, it seems that we all have an agreement here. I know of a friend of my dad whos grandfather was killed during the breakout attempt, I'll try to see if I can learn more about his fate.

best regards

 

Indeed, to avoid the anihilation of the 24 divisions inside the pocket (the whole VI Army, half of IV Panzer Army and bits of Romanian III and IV Armies) there was only one choice: to break out though the thin Russian infantry lines with the last mobile forces available. But the hesitation of the High general command made it impossible. All the corps commanders, lead by general Von Seydlitz-Kurzbach agreed that immediate measures must be taken. But general Paulus refused because he was going to obbey the general command's orders. Later, when operation "Winter Storm" was launched Von Manstein yelled Paulus in the phone and ordered him to try a break himself because the other half of Hoth's IV Panzer Army could not advance an inch more. But Paulus had Hitler's orders of not a step back and he knew that his men were not strong enough to go out. Much later, Paulus, when he saw the misery and suffering of his men he decided to try a break out, but Von Manstein refused to accept responsability and help him. At this time, Von Manstein was performing his master strategy and could not do anything to save the VI Army. Operation "little Saturn" of the Red Army had menaced Rostov and even a huger encirclement. Von Manstein was decided to take Kleist out the Caucasus: 450.000 men. 250.000 men inside Stalingrad were going to be sacrificed to save those other 450.000.

 

You mean ?
Yes,if within a few days after Uran started Germans begin a breakout toward Don,they could save themselfs.From positions today it was folly not to do so,but was practicaly impossible for high command then to decide within hours to leave the city they bled all autmn to sieze to the enemy..I mean a month prior to Uran Hitler declares comlete victory and even victory meddals vere already made.
There was a plan to help out Mainstein,but only if he could come close enough.Still mobile and fully armed units were assemeled from entire 6th army to do this,but they had fuel for only 30 kilometers.As Mainstein was stopped earlier they decide that even greater disaster will happen if they try to push through...sissies

First goal of operation 'blau' were the oil fields on Caucaus..As they were stopped in the mountains on road to Baku,Hitler turned on Stalingrad(a route for caucaus oil toward Russia) to deprive the Soviets of the oil he couldn't take.

 

I can understand Hitler's point of view in here. Take in consideration that:

-Stalingrad, since August until November 1942 had costed 100.000 casualties. So, if you go back, those 100.000 men have died for nothing?
-You are completely sure, because you have been told by many people that the pocket can be supplied by air.
-You thrust the men and you are convinced that if they have supplies enough to hold on in the winter, you can save them in the spring.

That was all wrong, but those factors were very important at that time.