Who is to blame for the failure of Barbarossa ? (2)

Well, Daniel then I don't know what your point is... that weather didn't affect German operations from June to August 1941? Of course it did: sun and no rains meant that operations could be carried out without depending on weather; good roads, visibility, etc.

Hitler is the one to blame for starting it, not necessarily for screwing it.

Oliphaunt, the Balcans campaign did NOT delayed 'Barbarossa' in a very substantial way. Even without this campaign, operarations could not have started before June 15th because snows melted very late that year and the ground took a whole month to dry out.

 

If the Soviet resistance and defence failed, why didn't the Germans reach Moscow?

Simple answer: it didn't fail. Successive defensive lines were breached, the Red Army was in disarray for the early part of the campaign and suffered huge casualties, etc.

Nevertheless. The Soviets did indeed inflict enough casualties on the Germans to wear them down, sap their strength, and then go over to a counter-offfensive. Just because a defensive action fails to completely halt the invader (ala Stalingrad or whatnot), a static defense, does not mean it has failed! What the Soviets needed to do was gain enough time to conjure up more forces and put some sort of plan into effect, an elastic defense. They did just that, and this defence did not fail.

 

One must remember as well that the German troops fought all the way from June 22nd, and reserves were not many for them. Even if the Russian troops were not often well trained or battle hardened they were fresh to the front and considering the Russian way of attacking at the time it would not have given much advantage to use veterans to run against the Germans. Of course it would have been nice to have weapons for all the Russians, well, but at least the Germans had to use their ammunition ( and were running out of ammo ), and I spose the Germans did have severe problems with their guns in the winter weather too ( gun oil ).

[ 27. January 2004, 07:39 AM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]

 

Daniel,

I'm a bit puzzled that yourself and Herr Generale seem to be at loggerheads on this one,

Ever heard of a fighting retreat mate? The Russians led the Germans into a TRAP. Their tactics were brilliant but German supply complacency and lack of foresight as TA suggests is the real blame as the Weather coupled by lack of supplys to counter it killed so many Germans that it made the eventual steamroller ridiculously easy.

Perhaps this will make it clear.

From: (Fort) Levenworth Paper no.5: "Fighting the Russians in winter, 3 case studies" by Dr Allen Chew.

More Germans had succumed to frostbite in the following winter than in all the actions leading up to this point! (140,000* before the winter) vs (250,000 that winter alone!!) You cannot deny that the Winter (as well as logistics to resupply from its effect) had a MAJOR effect on the outcome up to that point.

[* = http://www.cyberessays.com/History/68.htm ]

If you still do not understand the full paper is here: (You only need to read chapter 3)

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Chew/CHEW.asp#3

[ 27. January 2004, 09:42 AM: Message edited by: BratwurstDimSum ]

 

Ach, it's alwas so good to have replies in the drawer who had been posted before:

Please refer to my 13 December, 2002 05:23 posting dealing with parts of Chew's study (incidentally, some parts I'm commenting on are exactely the parts you post):

http://www.ww2forums.com/cgi-bin/ubbcgi/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=7;t=000039;p=4#000087

So by using Turner and not considering other sources who are in contradiction to his point, Chew's study seem to have only limited value. The fact that the study is available for free and online doesn't make it more correct per se.

Cheers,

 

Ach shiza!!

I really think books can just be as unreliable as the internet, only less people know how bollocks a bad book can be whereas the internet, your name can be mud all over the world instantly! I got a book recently where Keegan illustrates a "Russian WW2" infantry division onboard IS2s armed with AK-47s!

But, as this source was from a Fort Levenworth archive ... you think they'd know what they were talking about!

Ok Andy, ball in your court, if you think the 250,000 was unlikely, what do you think ... ballpark? Do you think it was less then than the 140,000 casualties prior to winter?

 

Yep, I think that Mikat's number of 250,000 with "90 percent were second- and third-degree cases" is far too exagerrated. Please allow me to spent some research to disporove it, but some simple crosschecks are telling me that the number sounds waaaay to high.

For example:
Official german casulty reports (acc. to Halder War Diary):

Accumulated # as of 11/23/41:
155 k KIA, 549 k WIA, 31 k MIA

Accumulated # as of 03/31/42:
232 k KIA, 823 k WIA, 53 k MIA

= Casualties during winter:
77 k KIA, 274 k WIA, 22 k MIA

If the 250,000 "severe" number would be right, that would mean that 70% of all German winter casulties were due to frostbite rather than to the Soviet counteroffensive and the mass of the those wounded would never come back to front. Summer Operation "Blau" was "fed" by returning wounded.

However, for the sake of the argument, let's stick to the number of 250,000 "non battle casulaties": even if severe, they are still no lethal fatalities like the 145,000 killed Krauts until mid-Nov. 1941. If you want to compare the numbers, you have to compare apples with apples: 250,000 (?) frostbite cases in 735,000 casulaties (killed, wounded, MIA) June 22 - November 23 1941.

Frostbite was really tough in December 1941 and Januar 1942, when the Soviet attack was forcing the Germans into retreat and winter equipment was not fully provided. The frostbite numbers for this period are existing, and they _may_ support the 250,000 "severe" cases of frostbite during the entire winter. But the relation between "amputation" or "death" to cases of frostbite are not that dramatic as it seems: The mass of the "frostbitten" soldiers survived or came back to the front after a few days or weeks.

Cheers,

[ 27. January 2004, 03:23 PM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

Good points Andy,

I think though that we have to delve into what frostbite really meant to the German Army.
What are definitions for the varying degrees of frostbite for instance? What constitutes amputation and of what part of the body?

Ok lets dilute that 1/4 mill number to half that = 125,000 say... Even if 50% were to return from medical treatment, I would guess they would be in secondary duties. Many soldiers who were wounded in action for instance went to Guard duty or supply duty instead of front line action until if/when they healed fully. I would very much doubt it if even one of you fingers were missing (say the trigger finger!) that you would be very useful in many front line roles.

The reason this is important is to answer 2 questions.

1) How many were actually never to return to action or returned as non combatants.
2) How many who actually DID return were as effective as the non frostbitten troops?

I don't think the latter would ever be answered

And we maybe looking too far to answer our esteemed collegue's (Daniel) question anyhow. If the 50% number IS accurate then the cold actually accounted for approx 62,500 troops, made combat ineffective. This is equivalent to (as you stated) just under half the 145,000 combat losses inflicted by the enemy prior to Winter 1941.

If the question is "Was the weather a factor in the Germans losing Barbarossa?" then surely the answer is "Yes".

[ 28. January 2004, 04:46 AM: Message edited by: BratwurstDimSum ]

 

I fail to see what 10/20 degrees is worth arguing about.With the exception of the vets,has anyone here actually stayed outside in 0degree temp ALL DAY?I work in it for 8 hrs but ride in a heated truck and sleep in heated house.So cold that to take your glove off[something Germans did'nt have]your fingers freeze.Yes,the Russians had to deal with it too but they knew what a Russian winter is like and about the spring thaw when nothing can move.Hitler thought"Russia is like a rotten structure,good kick and it'll fall down"but he thought wrong.Maybe if he'd just taken the oilfields.Just my 2 cents worth. FramerT.

 

Yep,

during my army time in 1996 first of all I spent some 8 weeks in the forest "playing" soldier of which some 3 weeks in winter time, and one week of those in minus 30 degrees Celcius. I had put all of my clothes on ( that I had with me ) and still it was cold....That was quite an interesting experience. If somebody had been actually shooting at me on top of that....It is a miracle what all man can stand! ( I mean the soldiers in WW2 with this!)

 

That was my point KIA[I think?].Even if it's only 0 degrees,they had to eat,sleep, fight in it with no winter gear.As the original question was"who was to blame",Hitler had a big part in it.Read somewhere that one reason for the invasion was for"living space".Why did'nt he just take the Caucusses[spelling?]and stop? FramerT.

 

Because the Russians simply wouldn't had stopped to attack the German occupied parts until they had recaptured their own land.

Which is a fair thing to do, if you ask me.

Cheers,

 

The darn board doesn’t support tables, I try my best to make it look at least somehow understandable:

ITEM....................................Jul 41..........Jan 42
a) KIA:..................................36.144.....18.074
b) MIA:...................................8.435......7.075
c) WIA:................................120.409.....61.933
d) LOSS of c):.........................30.100.....19.200
e) avg return time of c).............98 days..98 days
f) sick&frostbite.......................17.000 ...127.718
g) LOSS of f):...........................1.100.....10.700
h) avg return time of f):.............21 days...40 days
Irrevocable losses (a+b+d+g):.....75.779......55.049
Casualties in this month (a+b+c+f):.181.988.....214.800

"LOSS" = % Died of Wounds or sickness, discharged, not fit for further front line service (fighting)

Source for a+b+c+f: German Army's 10-day reports (BA-MA, III W 805/5-7
Source for a+c+d+e+g+h: 28-month study by the German Army Ambulance Inspector Report Nr. 1249/44 dated 30.1.1944,
a) and c) are almost identical in both reports

The study made by the Ambulance Inspectory is a comaprison between WW I, France 1940, East Front July 1941, East Front January 1942 and East Front June 1941 to June 1942. For our point, I just picked the July 1941 and January 1942 numbers

Now the following is of interest:

The discrepance in the ratio of irrevocable losses in the casulaties of both months: July 1941: 76 k irrevocable out of 182 k = 41% vs. January 1942: 55 k irrecocable losses out of 215 k = 26 %. So even if high losses in certain months may be a short-time problem, depending on if large numbers of the WIA, Sick or even MIA are returning to the manpower pool, they are "temporary" losses.

The number of “sick and frostbitten” is climbing by 7 times in winter, (17 k to 128 k) - clearly due to the weather and general unhealthy conditions while in retreat. The raise of the average “sickness time” (40 days in January ’42 compared to 21 days in July ’41) is supporting that, too. But the number of irrevocable losses is just climbing from 6.2 % (1 k out of 17 k cases of sickness) to 8.4 % (11 k out of 128 k cases of sickness and frostbite). If MIKAT's 250,000 cases of frostbite (which sound convincing, extrapolating the 128 k January sickness and frostbite cases on 3-4 months) would have been as SEVERE as MIKAT is claiming, the number of 11 k in the Ambulance study is waaaay to low. January's KIA, WIA “look” normal so no “frost victims” in there.

So I don’t deney the 250,000 cases of forstbite during winter, but German sources don’t support MIKAT’s claim that those cases would be up to "90 percent ... second- and third-degree cases".

Hope this doesn’t sound too confusing.

Cheers,

[ 29. January 2004, 08:38 AM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

Bratwurst what fighting retreats have been reading about? I have never heard the Russian tactics in the first months of the war in '41 called brilliant. The Russians did not intentionaly fight in retreat. In fact they were ordered not to retreat most of the time, whatever the cost. Rather they encircled and eliminated by the hundreds of thousands. Who was behind these brilliant Russian manouvres? It certainly was not Zhukov. He was at odds with Stalin about where the Germans were going to attack, and eventually resigned his position and requested a new post because of it. The blood bath that the Soviets were subjected to could surely not be considered a fighting retreat or brilliant, because it wasnt their plan. As for the damn winter again, I have stated over and over; the winter was a factor in the winter! We are discussing the campaign during the months of June, July and August, none of which constitute winter!

 

Off-topic: Daniel, I'm not sure did you get an answer from me to your pm RE: bibliography?

I'm not sure if it came through

Cheers,

 

Daniel,

You make some good points about Russian strategy and tactics in the early stages of 'Barbarossa'. But you forget to state the consequences of it.

The Russian pockets took so much time and efforts being reduced precisely because many units were in complete confussion and didn't know they were surrounded. This is exactly the same case than at Cannæ, many centuries before in which no one knew what was happening and therefore, kept fighting.

True. And finally you get this clear enough. However, to discuss why 'Barbarossa' failed then we have to discuss spring, autumn and winter 1941.

 

Hey guys, first post here for me.

I know that Barbarossa was only supposed to last 10 weeks, but don't most people take it to mean all of 1941? I think this is causing some confustion.

And about the weather. Was it really a mystery to the Germans that Russia was a cold place?? I think some people like to catergorize the weather issue as bad luck to the Germans, while others say that it just reflects bad German planning. As someone else said the weather was the same for the Russians.

If your soldiers don't have coats and your tanks don't have anti-freeze and you knew the place was going to be cold, isn't that your fault??

 

Not if you plan to be done with it well before winter and plan only for winter equipment for the occupation forces (which the Germans did).

Welcomne to the forum, Thekingfish!

Cheers