Decisions at Stalingrad

Without incurring Hitler's wrath, there was nothing he could do. Militarily, he should have not entered Stalingrad at all. Since he did, he should have withdrew as soon as the Russian counterattack began.

 

How come every battle the Germans lost has to be 'blamed' on one particular person. The fact is they got their ass handed to them strategically, operationally, and tactically. Is that so hard to accept??

 

Well it is hard to accept because the Sixth Army was one of the most powerful formations in the German Army. Also initially the Germans had such a huge advantage over the Russians, both in numbers and materiel, that anyone looking at the situation would have guessed the Germans would emerge the victors. This prospect of victory came closer to reality with the depth of some of the German penetrations into the city. Things went very badly for the Soviets early in the campaign. The Germans were humiliated, no doubt, but why? Especially when Soviet intentions were so obvious. Paulus knew that his flanks were weak. The Rumanians knew the Soviets were gathering in front of them. Historians always ask why, thats there job. There is debate among authors and historians about who is chiefly to blame. Many people made mistakes at Stalingrad, but what I want to prove is that despite Hitler's obvious blunders, Paulus could have managed things to a different outcome. I may not be able to prove it, but sometimes that happens in research.

 

The Soviet artillery was used with great effect,in part because Soviet spotter planes roamed free over the city. Where were the Luftwaffe fighters to stop such easy reconaissance of the city?

 

Suppose we could blame Rommel for loosing D-DAY,too?But that's another thread.Hitler nor Paulas knew how big the"counter-offensive" was.Russians were"finished" as far as they were concerned.All of a sudden the oil Germany wanted[needed] was put on hold.Maybe if they took Stalingrad first,then split up....?No-one agrees Goering can share some of the blame?

 

Oh I think Paulus had an idea about how massive the Russian conterattack that was forming was. The Germans were absolutely plastered by massive amounts of Soviet Artillery. Literally thousands of guns, firing with apparently no limitation of amunition is usually a pretty good indication of a large build up. Again, the Rumanians knew something was going on. They sent several reports to Paulus and to the Army Group headquarters alerting them to a massive buildup. It was an accident waiting to happen. Thus far I am inclined to agree with PzJgr, that if Paulus had acted more agressively and with greater speed, he may have found Stalingrad far less organized.

 

"Where was the Luftwaffe?"The Luftwaffe was worn down trying to cover the whole of Russia.Wear and tear,losses etc. all add up.Can't say I've read about spotter planes but had observers hidden everywhere. "Paulus moving faster"?Remember Germany was'nt fully motorised but marched[and horse back]into Russia.Tanks can go but so far before they out run supplies as happened in the Cacusus."They knew how big the counter-offensive was"?Did they know Zhukov was coming with 900 tanks?And Paulus had 180?With no Tigers or Panthers.

 

No, you miss quote me. I did not say that they knew how large the Russian counter offensive was, I said they knew something was going, and that it was big. It did not take a genius to figure out what the Russians were up to. Why do you think Paulus was worried about his flanks? He knew the Russians were going to crush them. As for the Luftwaffe, Richtofen's Air Fleet was present throughout the campaign. They obviously had the power to strike early in the campaign. I am not aware that Richtofen's Air Fleet was moved to another section of the Front, although someone may be able to disprove this. I am also well aware of the fact that Germany was not fully motorized, yet Paulus still moved uncommonly slow. This would (according to some of his fellow officers) not have been uncharacteristic.


Colonel Heim said of Paulus after he took command of the Sixth Army "In place of an agile intellect, quick to grasp the essentials of any problem,(speaking of Reichenau) there was now a brain which examined every aspect from every possible angle, which painstakinglyseperated the wheat from the chaff, which advanced slowly, logically, step by step, until absolute clarity led it , almost laboriously, to the correct decision."

There are multiple other accounts, which I will have to look up later for my books are not with me, that describe Paulus as an "unimaginative" commander. Have you read Beevor's Stalingrad, Goerlitz' Paulus at Stalingrad or Walsh's Infernal Cauldron?


Cheers,
Daniel

 

I think the only reason why to extend the flanks without making sure of the strength against attacks is that Hitler believed the Russian forces were running out of men, otherwise it is easy to see where the attacks would come. As easy as seeing Kursk the point of attack in 1943 summer....

One other thing that could have been made, even if not enough men, would be to put Germans and other axis forces next to each other instead of weaker forces in important places and next to each other. I guess this was done in WW1 (?). This would have strengthened the front against attacks by Red Army on 19th Nov, though cannot be sure at all it would have stopped the pincers.

Here´s something on the German intelligence on Stalingrad in autumn 1942. It is by Glanz according to the source.

http://www.battlefield.ru/library/battles/battle12_03.html

 

An interesting point:

Making Paulus move his HQ into the pocket:

By Nov. 21st, the Rumanians were either surrounded or in headlong retreat. Paulus's own headquarters at Golubinskaya was threatened by the onrushing Red Army, and he evacuated his staff a mere two hours before it was over-run. Flying to his alternate command post at Nizhne-Chirskaya, Paulus saw for himself just how completely Russian armor had routed the Rumanian forces. It was obvious that it was just a matter of days before the 6th Army would be surrounded and cut off.

Paulus radioed OKW, urgently requesting permission to withdraw 6th Army 100 miles to the west before the ring closed around his troops. The Fuehrer dismissed it immediately, ordering Paulus to assume a "hedge-hog" defense, and to await further instructions. Hitler also ordered Paulus to move his headquarters yet again, this time to Gumrak, just 10 miles from the Volga. Now deep inside the developing pocket himself, Paulus again requested permission to withdraw his army westward.

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/stalingrad/uranus.aspx

 

Sounds lovely. But the Soviet forces within the city were never broken and annihilated. That's why all available troops were in the city instead of the flanks —by OKW's orders.

I think you won't be able to prove it. Paulus had little to do with his own defeat. The strategic position was so badly against him that even if he performed incredibly well as the intelligent and capable staff-officer he was, the battle was doomed from the beginning.

I'll explain this more carefully.

But where to if I may ask? If we take a look on a map we can see that rivers Don and Volga make the frontline completely unfavourable for the defender. The Don and Volga stepes cannot be defended, as simple as that, and the banks of the rivers were too long and therefore needed a lot of men —which were not available— to defend them in all their lenght. A strong mobile reserve, hedgehog positions and defence in depth were needed to defend such a front. But mobile defence in depth was too risky for the vital communication lines of Army Group 'A' in the Caucasus. Marshal Von Manstein clearly saw all this and understood that disaster was imminent. He only had to choose the smallest one: whether withdrawing VI and IV Panzer Armies from the Volga, thus threatening the flank and rear of Army Group 'A' or losing VI and IV Panzer Armies at Stalingrad, thus delaying the Soviet attacks and pulling back Army Group 'A' from the Caucasus.

They knew something was going on before their eyes, but they did not know what was it or even less how big it was. At operation 'Uranus' the Soviets used one of their most incredible tactics: the maskirovka. Complete secrecy, precise and hard work. Paulus and all other commanders knew that there were Soviet troops at both Stalingrad's weak flanks, but no one could realise that 800.000 men, thousands of guns, tanks and planes, pontoon-bridges, trains and lorries full with supplies were there. The Soviets disguised all so damned-well that German reconaissence patrols and planes never knew a thing.

Soviet planes above Stalingrad? I don't think so. Soviet artillery was devastating because friendly front units and observers in the German rear passed information quickly and effectively —being under less threat of snipers and stragglers.

Not at the point we are talking about. And when we speak about the air lift, colonel general Hans Jeschonnek, chief of staff of the Luftwaffe, was responsible in a great way of convincing HItler that the Luftwaffe could handle the situation.

Not true. Read the what I posted above.

Certainly not in the flanks and within the city, Soviet artillery was never as big in number and power as the German —even if slightly more effective.

When you say build up and massive together with the phrase "passed reports" may apply to German offensives, not Soviet ones. Operation 'Mars' preparations were going on in the north before Moscow and the German High Command were more worried about the situation there.

No, no and no. In July 1942, the German VI Army lost its XL Panzer Corps and it slowed down Paulus. He now had only two Panzer divisions to break the Don line, encircle marshal Timoshenko's forces and reach the Volga. This deprivement of mobile forces limited VI Army operations to a slow, infantry frontal attack against Stalingrad. And even in that situation, Paulus managed to use 16th and 24th Panzer divisions to surround 5 Soviet rifle divisions before the city. But he lacked enough forces to sweep this pocket and continue his advance at the same time. Not to mention that the lack of communications and adequate logistical planning took momentums away from the Panzer units over and over again when they had to stop for lack of fuel. This certainly slowed Paulus down.

Not to mention that sending Hoth southwards weakened the entire German attack, consumed a lot of fuel and time making it impossible that when IV Panzer Army was re-directed northwards arrived on time to a link-up with Paulus before the withdraw of Soviet LXII and LXIV Armies.

No, they didn't know. And it was Vasilievski the one in charge. Zhúkov was building up his own operation in Moscow.

Or more important than tank models: fuel.

You did. Remember?

Von Richthofen's IV Air Fleet only comprised two Flying Corps and one was in the Caucasus, trying to support the attacks of half million men.

And are you also aware that Paulus was deprived of a whole Panzerkorps and that had fuel very limited, as well that communications on the Don steppe were awful?

At Stalingrad what was needed precisely was an analysing and intelligent man with full-strategical view, not a crazy diry nazi who led bayonet attacks with his pistol and monocle —like Reichenau.

And yes, I have read those books.

 

One interesting question was mentioned in one book. What if Hitler had started pulling the Army Group A forces in order to help the 6th Army in early December instaed of the new year??

Could Hoth now have the background forces to enable him to drive on?

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http://216.198.255.120/diary/caldec.html

10th December 1942

At a conference with Hitler, Zeitzler tries to get the Führer to release the 17th
Panzer Division from its positions behind the left wing of Army Group Don. The Führer
had ordered this unit, so necessary to the attempted relief of Stalingrad, to these
positions over Manstein’s objections, for fear of a massive new Soviet offensive.( So now Hitler fears Red Army offensives...)

13th Dec

Hitler, optimistic for the prospects of Hoth’s group,
now releases 17th Panzer to Von Manstein, but by the time they can arrive on the
scene, four days later, the Russians have already fought the offensive to a standstill.

17th dec

The 17th Panzer Division, with only forty-four tanks, arrives near Verkhne-Kumsky
to assist Hoth’s forces which have been unable to even cross the Mishkova river, let
alone break through to Stalingrad.

24th Dec

Tatsinkaya airfield, one of only two airstrips within about a hundred and fifty miles of
Stalingrad, comes under Soviet artillery fire, and the transports are hurriedly flown off.
Owing to Göring’s orders not to abandon the airstrip until they come under direct fire,
more than a third of the Ju-52s are lost. Inside the Stalingrad pocket, the Russians
try using a psychological approach to warfare. Loudspeakers are set up to blare into
the German lines a repeated recording:
"Every seven seconds a German soldier dies in Russia. Stalingrad : mass grave."
Seven seconds are then loudly ticked off, and the message is repeated...and repeated
...and repeated..

31st Dec

General Biryuzov, the chief of staff
of the second Guards Army was invited by General Pavel Rotmistrov to a New Years
Eve party at Kotelnikovo (Rotmistrov's quarters.) On a candlelit table was a real feast.
All kinds of cheese from France an Holland, French wines butter and bacon from
Denmark, and tinned fish and jams from Norway. All these delicacies were in packages
stamped " For Germans Only". Generla Rotmistrov apologized "Not all my men can read
German, so when they found this stuff they took it all. But we'll have to give the
candles back to Hitler, so that he can light them in mourning for his 6th Army.

[ 26. February 2004, 01:01 PM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]

 

Directive #41 April '42 from Hitler;The best way to defeat Russia is to destroy her Armies in the south AND CUT off her oil from the Caucasus.The Volga will be cut above Stalingrad,not in it.Quote from Walsh's"Infernal Cauldron". So like I said in previous posts"the oil issue was put on the back burner". I guess know one saw those"sub-human"russians being able to move entire factories out of bomber reach either.It was the OIL which would come back to haunt them. Frontal assaults on cities is not Blitzkrieg.

 

There is a distinct difference between knowing that the Russians had 900 tanks to the Germans 180, and saying Paulus had a pretty good idea the Russian counterstroke was going to be massive. Goerlitz' and Beevor's books both mention reports from the Germans to OKW about the potentiality of a massive Russian counterstroke. I was not refering to reports on German offensives.

Why should I take your word over what I have read in books?

 

Certainly don't know a thing about how Russian offensives were planned and built. Never heard of what I mentioned, Maskirovka...

 

Just curious as to why you contardict other sources I have read and expect me to take your word over thiers. You just speek as if you know everything there was to know about everything concerning the Second World War.


Cheers,
Daniel