Lend Lease, how accurate is this?

If Prada had made a fighter that side would have sooo won much quicker. At least long before the SS got that white is the new black anyway, and Monty dropped the silly hat thing that is sooo 20s.

 

The P-39 worked for the Soviets primarily because their opponet, the Luftwaffe, was insufficently strong to force the Red Air Force into playing a game not of their choice. That is, the initiative in the air lay with the Soviets by the time the P-39 began to arrive in-theater in quantity.
The Soviets could mount offensive sweeps using superior numbers of aircraft far more frequently than the Luftwaffe by early 1943 when the P-39 began to enter Soviet service (216th Air Division later 9th Guards Air Division). This forced the Germans to respond on Soviet terms; combat below 15,000 feet for the most part. The P-39 was sufficent in this realm to be effective. Its having a radio (many Soviet fighters lacked one at the time) was a big advantage. It also boasted good visibility and reliablity along with more firepower than many Soviet designs. Unlike in US service where the P-39 had too little range this was not a big problem for the Soviet situation.
I think that if the Soviets had faced a stronger more concentrated Luftwaffe the P-39, along with many of their own designs, would have faired far worse than they did. Altitude would have mattered if the Germans held the initiative just as it did in the Mediterrainian and Pacific where combat usually took place at the upper end of the P-39's effective altitude range (12,000 to 25,000 feet).

 

If Prada had made a fighter that side would have sooo won much quicker. At least long before the SS got that white is the new black anyway, and Monty dropped the silly hat thing that is sooo 20s. </font>[/QUOTE]You say that, but Hugo Boss did make uniforms for the Germans and they still lost

 

"This forced the Germans to respond on Soviet terms; combat below 15,000 feet for the most part."

I'd say the opposite, they were well known for getting up high & bouncing Soviet fighters & using their better altitude to good advantage, something the Mustang did on the other end of the conflict. Now it is true that the Germans had to drop down to their altitude to nail em, but they did not have to remain at that altitude. So being forced to respond on Soviet terms is not exactly a truism. The Germans fought on their "own terms" by using altitude to their advantage.

 

Can anyone give me a percentage figure of how much Lend-Lease contributed to the total amount of Soviet equipment? I've seen figures that vary from 5% to 8%. The total amount in dollars is put at between $11 billion and $12 billion, but I can't find an accurate percentage.

 

Accurate percentages can be difficult. One problem is what is your basis? Are you talking total vehicles for instance. Or vehicles in service at a particular time. Are you talking entire motor park or vehicles of a certain class? Then the accounting apparently wasn't all that good in some cases. Also causing problems were losses in route and whether you are including purchases in with the lend lease or not.

 

Don't hold me to all of these figures, since I put them together over the years, and have seen contradictory numbers as well. But, that said here is a "shot at it" anyway.

American aid alone, received by the Soviets not just "shipped", looks like this from October/November ’41 through June ’42 (before the Nazi Stalingrad offensive), NOT counting the military equipment bought outright by gold transfers before the Soviets were included in the Lend/Lease Act. The assets which were in the US had been frozen by FDR when the pact between Stalin and Hitler was announced in 1939, but that money was un-frozen the morning after Barbarossa was launched, and the gold bullion was used to purchase and ship war goods to the Soviets under the Cash and Carry formula devised by Bernard Baruch for the 1937 Act. This meant that belligerents were permitted to buy American goods including arms and strategic materials, but they had to pay cash (gold) and to transport the goods in their own hulls, and since the Soviets fielded some 3.5 million tons worth of their own pre-war shipping they could qualify. At any rate here is that first batch of stuff received between Sept. ’41 and June ’42:

In those nine months alone, goods received totaled:

All aircraft types; 1,285.
All AVF types including tanks; 2,249 (mostly light Stuarts and those god-awful M3 Lee/Grants).
Machine-guns, all calibers; 81,287.
Explosives, in pounds; 59,455,620.
Trucks, all types; 36,825.
Field telephones; 56,445.
Telephone wire; 600,000 kilometers (375,000 miles).

But really the major help came in the form of "non-military" aid. That break down appears to me like this:

No LL food = more soviet citizens required to remain in agriculture and food processing factories = fewer soldiers available and less military output, OR less healthy people = less productive and less combat ready troops. No LL flat steel, trucks, locomotives, railroad etc. = more people in factories to build those and therefore fewer T-34s and fewer soldiers OR less mobility of Red Army and therefore the possibility for Nazis to regroup and perhaps stop the Red Army’s counter-offensives.

These things all tie together in ways some just don’t see. As to the "percentages" of the material sent to and used by the USSR in the three years, and ten months of Lend-Lease aid, these are the approximate percentages of the total materials, both direct military and non-military material made available to the Soviet military and industrial complex that were supplied by American Lend-Lease and Cash and Carry purchases alone (UK and Commonwealth contributions to the USSR have been removed, and these are verified by USSR documents):

80% of all canned meat consumed (SPAM, fish, chicken, Tushenka)
92% of all large railroad locomotives, rolling stock and rails.
57% of all aviation fuel used.
53% of all explosives.
74% of all truck transport.
88% of all radio equipment.
53% of all copper.
56% of all aluminum. (processed from reverse LL bauxite, I think)
60% of all automotive fuel.
74% of all vehicle tires.
12% of all armored vehicles.
14% of all combat and transport aircraft.

That percentage list does NOT include the percentage of the high grade plate steel, communications cable, canned food other than meat, medical supplies, vitamins/vitasterols, and virtually every modern machine tool used by Soviet industry during and after the Great Patriotic War. Even though this ends up being between somewhere between only 16 and 19 percent of ALL Soviet WAR Production as in transport vehicles, fighting vehicles and planes, there are some significant individual numbers of non-military goods, and I believe those contributions were the "difference makers" for the Soviets during WW2.

These are rounded off figures of course, and in order to qualify for IMF funds and US loans in the late ‘80s, early 90s the old Soviet files on what was received were opened up since they were only resposible for received not shipped goods. the USSR received over $11 billion gold backed USD valued material. Within 15 years after the termination of lend-lease, settlements were made with most of the countries that had received aid, although a preliminary settlement arrangement with the USSR was not reached until 1972, it too fell through when Nixon resigned.

Initially Truman demanded that the Soviets repay the U.S. for only the non-military supplies, including cargo ships, worth more than $2.5 billion of the $11 billion total, applying the reverse Lend/Lease credits, but "writing off" any of the remaining $9 billion USD debt. When the Cold War erupted, it effectively ended any such hopes of repayment, until finally thawing out completely in the late 1980s with the outbreak of "glasnost". In June of 1990, to qualify for U.S. loans and credits under the still active Johnson Debt-Default Act, the USSR negotiated an agreement for repayment of her remaining WWII, non military material war debts, one year later the Soviet Union ceased to exist, but the CIS did honor the commitment for repayment, as did the new Russian nation.

The "reverse Lend-Lease" credits were for rare minerals, and rare earths. Wolfram (tungsten) ore, bauxite ore, nickel ore, magnesium, and manganese ores mostly which were shipped back to the US for processing into more goods.

 

These example shows how easy it is to confuse the issue:

92% of all large railroad locomotives, rolling stock and rails

Some 2000 locomotives were sent and very few made by The Soviets 1941-45 BUT they had around 30,000 of pre-war stock. Thus the 92% refers to locos entering service 1941-45 not a % of all locos(2000 is less than 10% of the total). The Soviets had 600,000 of their own railcars and recieved 11,000 LL railcars(2% of the total) The 2000 locos were not shipped until mid 1944 thus their impact on the war can hardly be described as critical.
The same applies to the truck totals.

virtually every modern machine tool used by Soviet industry during and after the Great Patriotic War

It is not widely known that most of the machine tools in Russia were supplied via Germany. They recieved massive amounts during the honeymoon period with Hitler and I have seen a source that says the LL totals were dwarfed by the German supplied tools.
I am not getting into a detailed argument here just showing that statistics can be confusing.

 

Points which I had made in the past. Very important in shortening the war and saving lives but not the ultimate determining factor in the conflict. Supplying the tools to Stalin was just another way in which Hitler repaid (or tried to) for all of which he himself received from Russia.

I am unaware of LL presence in the battle of Moscow or Leningrad... (while I have been told that small numbers were present in the besieged city, they were in such short supply that they virtually played no role in the outcome).

Canned meat and motorized infantry were the favorite among the men and still immortalized today in Russian movies, series and books.

 

I got the German Machine Tools total wrong. The Allied numbers were much greater:

The German industry delivered mainly industrial equipment and machines, including about 6,500 machine tools for the Soviet war industry,
Since January 1941, for instance, 4,500 machine tools worth about 65 million RM, that were ready for use in the Soviet armament production

The LL totals were 44,704 and Soviet domestic production was 115,400

Incidently the page where I got the LL Machine Tool totals makes this breathtaking claim:

Lend-Lease was absolutely critical in sustaining the Soviet railroad system. Without the deliveries of rails, locomotives and cars the system would have collapsed.

http://www.ordersofbattle.darkscape.net/site/sturmvogel/SovLendLease.html

Simply not true but how many casual viewers will take it as gospel?

 

Thanks for the info on Lend-Lease. I was asking in regard to the shortfall in Soviet production that was made up by Lend-Lease. I recall that the Soviets put the figure at 4%, but that was during the Cold War and bound to be inaccurate.

 

One of the impacts of LL, especially once the Soviets believed that the west would indeed fullfil their promises, is that it let the Soviet production become much more efficient. They could concentrate on things that weren't being sent. Knowing that the trains and rails were coming ment that they could use the factories that would have produced them to produce tanks. Likewise things like steel and chemicals. If LL provided 4% of the vehicles the Soviets used during the war it doesn't meant that absent it they would only have 4% less.

 

I was only discussing new production during the three years and ten months of its (L/L) existence, which allowed the USSR to concentrated on other items. In that light then Soviet production of locomotives was less than 100 new units (BMZ was overrun early in Barbarossa), while importing nearly 2,000 locomotives in the Soviet gauge from America. Also in new production of rails, and rail cars the same qualifier applies. Without the L/L imports the other would have been needed none the less for the war to progress as it did.

Railroad rails:
(excluding narrow gauge rails used in the north/south Persia corridor)
Soviet Production; 48,990 rails
Allied Deliveries; 622,100 rails
Total; 671,090
Allied Proportion; 92.7%

Locomotives:
(all steam types between 1941-45)
Soviet built; 442
(which includes the 359 remaining from pre-war production)
Allied deliveries; 1966
Total; 2408
Allied Proportion; 81.6%

Rail cars:
(all types)
Soviet Production; 2635
Allied Deliveries; 11,075
Total; 13,710
Allied Proportion; 80.7%

gleaned from:
Accounting For War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defense Burden, 1941-1945, by Joan Beaumont, and Mark Harrison.

It was the Soviet production which was replaced by L/L imports I was referring to, not total units in use pre-war included. Only new production during the L/L years since Lend-Lease was the basis of the query.

 

A couple of questions...
On the railroad issue how much of the existing Russian locomotives/rolling stock was needed just for say maintaining their industry? How much of their existing locomotives(30,000)/rolling stock(600,000) was destroyed during the Blitzkrieg? What LL may have done was provided the Russian replacement stock/replace former railspurs for when they started to push the Germans back in mid 1944,in other words absolutely necessary for offensive operations while the majority of existing supplies was maybe needed for keeping their industries going.. Remember even till mid-1944 the Germans still held lots of Russian territory and it still was a long way to Berlin.There are sometimes misconceptions like "Germany was doomed after July,1941 or December,1941" going around for there was still alot of hard fighting ahead the Soviets blunted the Germans offensive capabilities in late '41,early '42 at the earliest(mid '43 at Kursk at the latest) BUT it took two more years to destroy German defensive capabilities which was necessary to end the war. So IMHO LL wasn't needed for the Soviets to stop Germany but it ceratinly was needed to finally defeat them,i.e. to finally push them off of Soviet Territory.

Now as far as trucks just what percentage of the motor pool did they provide? How many of Russia's trucks were destroyed during the initial stages of Barbarossa? It doesn't matter what Russia had if it was destroyed early in the war.

On the rest of LL just how does Russia replace all that steel,copper,avbiation fuel,explosives,and aluminum if there is no LL?

 

in june 1941 the Russian operational forces (without the Stavka reserve )disposed of 1O6691 trucks
In december 1941 :152383
For the Stavka reserve:same dates :20232 and 2977

 

This is another question that a general answer to can be misleading at best. For one thing it depends on what you mean by motor pool. Apparently the US built trucks tended to be more numerous closer to the front. Also if you want to determine the impact on the war the US built trucks tended to carry heavier loads, be much more mobile off road, and more reliable. All of which are good reasons for them being closer to the front. I'm afraid this whole issue is one that doesn't lend itself to simple answers and also one where how you define the problem can have a huge impact on what the answer is.

 

Axis History Forum &bull; View topic - US/UK lend-lease to Stalin

On the face of it, the figures look impressive: 1,911 steam and 70 diesel electric locomotives, 11,155 rail cars. However none of this was shipped before the second half of 1943, no locomotives were sent before 1944, and only 20% of these amounts (in tonnage) was shipped - i.e. you then have to add sailing time, debarkation time, transit time to the front, etc - before 1 July 1944.
Additionally, a lot of the US locomotives were too heavy for Soviet tracks so could only be of limited use except where the railway was rebuilt. All in all, the lend-lease rolling stock allowed a faster Soviet advance, but it certainly didn't influence the survival of the Soviet Union. One more influencial lend-lease contribution which I didn't find mentioned on this board was the equipping by the US of large portions of Soviet tracks with an automatic signalling system. This boosted the efficiency of the existing rail network by allowing higher average speeds

No matter which way you cut it there is no way these Locos were 'critical' to the Soviet effort.

For info on truck numbers then this thread has more information than you will ever need.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=79&t=158313&hilit=Automobile

 

But then even if the tanks,locomotives and such weren't that important or as important as we once thought it's still awfully hard getting around the Soviets doing without the copper,aluminum, rubber, explosives and aviation fuel made availaible through LL.
The problem with things like this is what I call "unintended consequences" ,example if the Soviets are delayed from conducting offenses say because of lack of transportation then manpower problems become more of a problem. One very big reason the Soviets needed to liberate some of their German occupied Homeland was to secure more manpower.

 

Another consideration is the impact of small numbers. If you need say 100 truck to accomplish your mission and you have 99 then you are in trouble. If someone gives you 2 now you can acomplish your mission even if one breaks down. My impression is that the Soviets seldom had enough of anything so even small amounts of necessary items could have an impact disporportunate to their quantity.