Not a dumb question at all. He didn't have to attack the salient at Kursk and most especially he shouldn't have attacked there after giving the Soviets so much time to prepare defenses. Attacking the enemies strength is not a recommended strategy by most any military historian.
Some time before the Germans launched their attack at Kursk, it became apparent to the German General Staff that the Soviets were expecting an attack, and they consequently recommended to Hitler that the attack be cancelled. Although Hitler himself had serious reservations about Kursk, he decided to go ahead. Both sides suffered enorous losses, but the Sovs could better afford those losses. If the fate of Germany had not been sealed before Kursk, it certainly was after that battle.
So, what should he have done? Could the Germans have allowed the Soviets to build up the defenses in Kursk, drawing men from the reest of their line, and then attack elsewhere?
all i know about that battle was that the german plans for Kursk were sended to the Russians by the spy "Lucy" opertating in Switserland. so the Russians knew exectly where and with how much material the germans were going to attack. making you think what would happend if the Russians didn't hat that kind of information
The risk you run is that they pull the same trick on you after you attack by simply using the troops assembled at Kursk to break through regardless of what is going on elsewhere along the front. There was also Koniev's army group in reserve... Where would the Germans have had a greater impact with their Zitadelle reserves? I think that would be a pretty interesting question.
did the germans need to attack at all in 43?..it is often quoted that the germans attacked at kursk for political reasons to strenthen their postion and hold the axis allies togther. as is well known some german generals inc manstien favoured the option of letting the russians attck first and draw them onto the germans before lauching thier on counter strike..much as the russian did at kursk. others like guderian favoured not attacking at all in 43..but re-equipping all the german untis with new tanks etc and tryin again in 44. if they hadnt attcked at kursk and used it as a double bluff..how long would the russians have waited before launching their offensive..and could the germans have blunted any attack?
The Germans should not have attacked. They should have waited. But Hitler never was one to take advice, especially good advice.
But would waiting have made a difference? I am fairly sure that in 1944, the Allies would have invaded France no matter how the situation looked for the Russians (because this depended on the air and sea rather than the land situation of the German armed forces). Germany would still have been engaged at three fronts by mid-1944.
Waiting would have made a major difference in terms of morale, and a slightly less major military effect would have occurred. If Hitler had allowed his men to wait at least six months, they might have had more tanks, and they would be able to surround and possibly crush half of a Soviet front. All in all, the Western Allies would have landed in 1944, but the Germans would have more divisions to throw them back into the sea.
More divisions, yes, but in the same logistical situation. This situation in its bare essence was such that the Allies could bring in fresh troops faster than the Germans, hence the Germans lose.
The comment about the great advantage of waiting is not entirely true. Not only would the Allies have attacked and then drawn resources, but one of the main reasons the Soviets won Kursk was because they were given time. Hitler's suggestion to wait for more heavy tanks such as the Panther and Tiger gave the Russians ample time to increase their defences and prepare for a counter-attack. Also, the Russians themselves had plans for an offensive and so would have eventually struck. The notion that even if the Germans had waited 6 months would have allowed them to conquer half of the Soviet union is impossible. Kursk wasn't even meant as a mass offensive, in fact it was designed to shorten the lines and take away troops from the Ost Front.
The Russians would have struck anyways had the Germans not attacked in June 1941, but would it have been as efficient as Stalin had proclaimed it would be, or would it be, more or less, completely ineffective. One aspect of history we shall never know.