Question on Japanese Parachute Landings

On the 16th of Febuary 1942 the Japanese launched an airborne attack on the city of Palembang on the island of Sumatra.

On the 20th Febuary 1942 the Japanese launched another airborne attack on the town of Kupang on the island of Timor.

I'm very intrested in these two Parachute landings that the Japanese made and I thought I would ask if anyone knew what Divisions took part in the Drops and if any veterans are alive today.

Any help would be great

 

Now this is interesting since I did not know the Japanese had any airborne troops.

 

Jet,

some sites for your info request:

http://www.cofepow.org.uk/pages/asia_java2.htm

http://www.usaaftroopcarrier.com/Airborne%20Chronology.htm

1942, 11 January-23 February: The first airborne assault missions by the Japanese. A reinforced battalion, the Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force, seized an airfield from Dutch forces near Manado in the Celebes on 11 January as an amphibious force landed nearby. Troop carrier aircraft used were the Mitsubishi Ki-57, an airplane that resembled the DC-3, though smaller, and a few of the similarly-sized Kawasaki Ki-56s (Japanese-built Lockheed Lodestars). The field was used by Japanese aircraft to extend the range of protection provided to their navy as the Emperor’s forces pushed through Indonesia. On 14 February, after establishing air superiority, Japan’s 1st Parachute Brigade staged two drops on Palembang, Sumatra: one at the airfield and another at the oil refinery. Though the airfield was taken quickly, fierce fighting continued near the refinery for over a day until Japanese airborne forces again prevailed. On 22 February about half of the Yokosuka Force was used to capture the Dutch-held airport at Penfoei, about 20 miles east of Kupang on the island of Timor. The following day the balance of this reinforced battalion jumped into the same location, subsequently moved toward Kupang and captured many Dutch and Australian prisoners. In all three instances a smaller force of airborne troopers surprised and defeated a much larger force of defenders—a hallmark of successful airborne operations. The Japanese military, however, did not realize the potential of airborne warfare until it was too late in the war for the required training and buildup to occur.

http://www.info-indo.com/history/eastindies12.htm

http://www.j-aircraft.com/faq/japanese_paratroop_operations_in.htm



http://www.geocities.com/dutcheastindies/timor_dutch.html



( Maps always make things more interesting, I think!)

http://www.geocities.com/dutcheastindies/java.html

 

Thanks Kai!

I never even knew that there were Japanese Airborne troops nor that they were actually used.

 

I read an RAF pilot personal account of the Japanese parachute landings many years ago.

Im currently trying to find the title again.

In the book he gives an amazing account of RAF ground crew and defence forces rushing out to meet some of the landing Japanese forces...Hand to hand stuff..Hope I can find it and post title..

 

Also Kai, one of the other links on Dutch East Indies site I had bookmarked for a while now:

http://www.geocities.com/dutcheastindies/japan_paratroop.html

 

Near the end of the war the Japanese were actually going to attempt a suicide parachute attack on B-29 bases in the Pacific. The plan was found out via codebreaking and about 200-300 transports were knocked out in Northern Japan.

I can't recall the exact details but it is in Frank's book "Downfall".

Greg

 

The information that you guys have given is great. Thanks Fellas.

 

Why wouldn't they just drop bombs?
Dropping paratroops would expend just as many resources as bombs.

 

Think the opening scenes from the Inspector Clouseau movies, with Kato and the Inspector locked in mortal combat. That's what would happen if those Japanese paratroopers were dropped on those B-29 bases. Each paratrooper would be like a cluster bomb....

 

I am thinking more WKRP in Cincinatti when they decide to drop turkeys out of a helicopter for a thnksgiving promotion:

"Oh the humanity...they're hitting the ground like sacks of wet cement!!"
"I thought turkeys could fly"

 

Who said that nothing could be learned here at ww2f....

 

The Japanese did indeed have paratroops, and even a submachine gun specially made for them. A folding stock Type 100.

The Type 100 submachine gun was developed by famous Japanese small arms designer, gen. Kijiro Nambu. First prototypes of this submachine gun were submitted for Japanese Army trials in 1939, and the new weapon was formally adopted in 1940 (2600th year in contemporary Japanese calendar). This submachine gun was initially produced in two forms, as a standard infantry gun with solid stock and as a paratrooper weapon, with side-folding butt….

…Paratrooper version of this weapon had a side-folding stock, with hinge located on the right side of the stock, just behind the trigger guard. Early Type 100 submachine guns were fitted with adjustable rear sights, 1944-model weapons had fixed rear sights.

See:

Modern Firearms - Type 100 submachine gun

 

I found out years ago that the Japanese had Paratroopers, I was surprised to fined out myself. Something thats not commonly know concerning WWII, nor seen in movies.

Japanese Parachute Troops, WWII Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 9, October 8, 1942 (Lone Sentry)

The Japanese Paratroopers, Special forces one unit was called
"Teishin Shudan"
Teishin Shudan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Japanese marine paratroopers of World War II
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_marine_paratroopers_of_World_War_II

ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE PARACHUTE TROOPS




The Japanese parachute battalion consists of a headquarters staff, a supply unit (which carries 15 reserve aero engines), 3 parachute companies, and flying personnel. The total strength of a battalion is about 670 officers and men. The Japanese parachute company comprises a command group, a supply group, and 3 sections. The section is formed of 2 rifle groups, and 1 heavy weapons group. A rifle group is made up of a squad of riflemen, an antitank team, and an airplane crew. A heavy weapons group has 1 machine-gun section, 1 gun crew, and 1 airplane crew. The organization of the Japanese parachute company as reported several months ago is shown in figure 8.

​

56. Organization of Japanese Parachute Troops: Enemy Air-Borne Forces, WWII Military Intelligence Service, Special Series No. 7, December 2, 1942 (LoneSentry.com)

 

I did a quick search on WWII Forums this has been discussed before that the Japanese had Paratroopers.

The Japanese paratroopers in the Dutch East Indies, 1941-1942

The Japanese paratroopers in the Dutch East Indies, 1941-1942 - World War II Forums

 

I mean no disrespect by this comment. Yes you did know 2 years ago, but with so much WWII info that you know you just forgot.
It's not something thats commonly discussed concerning WWII.

April 22nd, 2008, 03:17 PM
The Japanese paratroopers in the Dutch East Indies, 1941-1942
That is interesting and so true. I did not know that Japan had paratroopers. Thanks JC.
__________________

 

Didn't the Japanese counterattack with airborne troops during the Battle of Leyte (land battle) in October 1944? I'll look around and see if I can find anything on it.

 

Cla68; Yes they did but not on the day you mentioned. Some 350 Japanese paratroopers dropped at dusk on 6 December.

Battle of Leyte - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Japanese Paratrooper Attack on Leyte December 7, 1944
by Justin Taylan

At about 1800 hours on December 6, 1944, a flight of Japanese bombers approached from the west over San Pablo Airfield. The bombers circled
overhead and dropped a few bombs while their accompanying fighters remained high and well out of range. Next, two flights of transport aircraft
aircraft in a “V” of V's” came in slowly over San Pablo at about seven hundred feet and their paratroopers jumped. About 300 men of the Katori
Shimpei Force landed and attacked in all directions.

http://www.pacificwrecks.com/airfields/philippines/san_pablo/12-07-44/index.html


I found also the Maps check this link at the Bottom has many other Battle maps of WWII.






Map of the Invasion of Leyte, 17 October – 30 December 1944


http://secondworldwarmaps.wordpress.com/

 

All below from US Army Military Intelligence Division, Special Series No. 32, 1945, “Japanese Parachute Troops,” pages 23-33

Start

Actual Paratroop Operations

Palembang
Japanese training plans envisioned a 3-month period of practice operations in China prior to commitment of parachute troops against the Allies. When the campaign against Java and Sumatra began, however, it was evident to the Japanese High Command that use of paratroops offered the only hope of seizing the great oil refineries at Palembang before they were demolished by the British and Dutch defenders. Therefore, despite the incompleteness of its training, a parachute battalion was committed to an attack on the airdrome and refineries of Palembang, on the Moesi River in southeastern Sumatra, on 14 to 16 February 1942.

Dutch and British troops defending the area were supported by antiaircraft units grouped under the command of a provisional heavy antiaircraft regiment. The regiment consisted of two heavy antiaircraft battalions, each armed with eight 3.7-inch guns; a light antiaircraft battalion, armed with twelve 40-mm Bofors automatic antiaircraft guns; and a light antiaircraft unit, armed with three of the Bofors weapons. The regiment had been well trained in defense against paratroopers. Eight 3.7-inch antiaircraft guns and seven 40-mm Bofors were set up in a perimeter for the defense of the airfield. Four of the 3.7-inch guns and four Bofors weapons were emplaced for the defense of the refineries at Pladjoe, 4 miles east of Palembang; the same protection was set up for the refineries at Soengei Gerong.

Missions of the attack were clear-to capture the airdrome and seize the refineries at Pladjoe and Soengei Gerong before British and Dutch defenders could destroy them. On the whole the operation was well planned and skillfully executed; weaknesses in the over-all strategy were not attributable to any intrinsic defect of the paratroop operation but rather to the inability to bring up supporting troops to hold and exploit the initial gains.

High altitude bombing by waves of medium bombers preceded the paratroop attack, but strafing, which was a prominent feature of later Japanese airborne attacks, was absent from the Palembang operation, and this deficiency considerably enhanced the difficulties of the attackers.

At about 1830, 14 February, approximately 70 Lockheed Hudsons, with Royal Air Force markings for deception, flew over the Palembang area in two waves. About 350 paratroopers were dropped from each wave from a height of about 600 feet; it was estimated that each plane carried from seven to nine men. Equipment was dropped with cargo chutes from one of two planes assigned to this mission; the other was shot down. The troops were dropped about 5 miles from the airdrome in an area astride the Moesi River. Their drop area apparently was chosen to cut the road between the airfield and the town of Palembang. Antiaircraft fire was so effective that the Japanese pilots, some of whom had never been under fire, flew too high, and therefore the paratroopers were too widely scattered and experienced difficulty in prompt assembly.

The paratroopers were dressed in greenish-khaki uniforms and wore gloves and crash helmets. They were armed with rifles, pistols, submachine guns, and light machine guns. In addition to rations they carried cigarettes, money, and water.

Immediately after landing the paratroopers assembled in three groups. The largest group, of about 300 men, apparently was assigned the mission of cutting the road between the airfield and Palembang; two other groups of approximately 200 men each set out to seize the refineries. The group assigned to the operations to cut off the airdrome split into three parties.

One party moved against the only vital road while the other two attacked British antiaircraft gun positions. Each party acted independently of the others. The plan apparently envisioned an eventual envelopment of the entire perimeter of the field and subsequent convergence for the final assault on hangars, shops, and other installations.

The party operating to destroy communications between the town and the airfield captured a Dutch armored car in which a hastily organized crew sped toward the town. On the way, several Dutch vehicles, including a gasoline truck, were seized and overturned to form an effective road block covered by a light machine gun. This road block was organized to prevent withdrawal of the British antiaircraft guns and to interdict the road to such reinforcements as might be sent from Palembang. No attempt to capture the airfield was planned for the first day's operations, which apparently were intended merely to cut communications and facilitate later landings.

Most action centered around the road block where British and Dutch troops attempted to silence the Japanese machine gun. This was a necessary preliminary to removal of the block and withdrawal of the antiaircraft guns which were being strongly attacked by paratroopers assigned to this mission. Japanese snipers who had climbed into trees immediately after landing kept up incessant fire; these finally were liquidated by the British who even turned a 3.7-inch gun against them in a rather unconventional utilization of direct fire. The Japanese crew that manned the captured Dutch armored car finally was killed; and by the afternoon the machine gun covering the road block was destroyed by fire from a light mortar brought up for the purpose. A Bofors gun seized by the Japanese early in the operations likewise was neutralized, and the paratroopers defending it were killed. Only two of the British antiaircraft guns could be moved by the time the road block was cleared, and a flat tire on one of these necessitated its abandonment after it was made unusable.

At 1000 and again at 1400 hours on the 15th two more drops were made near the airdrome. These reinforcements provided sufficient impetus to enable the Japanese to push on to the field which they fully occupied on the 16th.

The attack on the refineries was a complete failure. Sixteen Japanese planes had been shot down by the antiaircraft defenses around the installations. A small number of paratroops actually landed within the enclosure of the Pladjoe refinery, but a British anti-parachute squad had preceded them and, with the aid of some Dutch troops, effectively engaged the Japanese and brought the situation under control. All the parachutists dropped over the Soengei Gerong refinery hit the ground outside the enclosing fence of the plant and were liquidated by the alert ground defense units. All in all the parachute attack on both refineries failed to halt the demolition work already begun so that when a seaborne Japanese force took Palembang on the 15th both the refineries were badly damaged.

The attack as a whole gave evidence of careful planning, and the paratroopers apparently had been carefully trained for missions of this type. Serious tactical mistakes were committed, however, and these precluded the success of the attack. Failure to strafe the airfield was perhaps the most serious blunder. The bombing of the field from high altitude destroyed a number of British planes and damaged several installations on the field but left the antiaircraft guns virtually intact, and the defending personnel sustained few casualties before the paratroopers hit the ground.

All Japanese equipment, aside from that carried by the individual troopers, was carried in two planes. One of these was shot down, while the other circled widely and dropped its cargo apparently indiscriminately. Great difficulty and delay therefore were experienced by the Japanese in finding their equipment and assembling into combat groups according to plan.

Intervals between individual jumps were too long, contributing to the excessive dispersion of the paratroopers, although the relatively high altitude from which the jumps were made was primarily responsible for this weakness.

Japanese troops frequently have shown the ability to profit by past mistakes, and proof that the lessons of the Palembang attack made a lasting impression soon was afforded in the attack on Koepang in Timor, where the well-timed and well-executed attack showed that the mistakes of the earlier venture had been corrected.

Operations at Koepang in Timor
The attack on Koepang in Timor came 21 February 1942, one week after the Palembang operation. Five transports dropped parachutists over the southernmost tip of Timor as a feint to distract attention from the real attack on the Koepang area.

The objective of the main Koepang attack was to secure a position astride the Allied line of communications. A flat drop area was chosen that was partly covered by high palm trees, 15 to 20 feet apart. The area was 1½ miles from the most advanced Allied defense positions and about 5 miles from the fixed defenses of the main line of resistance.

Paratroops were dropped at about 0830 on two successive days. Troops dropped the second day reinforced the first echelon, and a seaborne invasion of 18,000 men was timed to capitalize upon the success won by the paratroopers. Each day 20 to 25 Douglas-type transports, escorted by bombers and fighters, came over the area in two waves. There was no aerial opposition, and virtually no wind was blowing. Heavy bombing and strafing of ground defense installations were conducted from low level until the paratroopers hit the ground, and the paratroopers fired submachine guns while descending in a further effort to pin down or liquidate defending personnel.

About 350 men were dropped from an altitude of about 300 feet each day. The jumps were made from the bellies of the transports; the troopers apparently were carried along a static rail by the slip stream of the plane until a catch in the tail released the rip cord. Each plane carried 15 to 25 men, apparently organized in groups of six to eight men each. Section leaders had parachutes colored blue, while platoon commanders used red chutes.

Paratroopers wore green uniforms, which buttoned up to the neck, and rubber boots. Most were armed with submachine guns or light machine guns. All wore compasses strapped to their wrists, and a radio-telephone set was carried by one of the paratroopers. Rations consisted of rice and dried fish.

Naval Parachute Operation
The only operation in which the Japanese naval paratroops have been employed was the attack on Menado airfield on the northeast tip of Celebes Island. Two battalions, known respectively as Yokosuka 1 and Yokosuka 3 Special Naval Landing Forces, had been trained for parachute operations in the fall of 1941 at the naval air station at Tateyama. Each battalion was organized into a headquarters company, three rifle companies each of which had one machine-gun platoon, and an antitank unit. About a week before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the two battalions sailed to Takao in Formosa, whence Yokosuka 1 proceeded to Davao preparatory to its attack on Celebes.

On 11 January 1942 Nell twin-engined bombers, which had been converted to transports, flew over the Menado airfield in formations of five. The transports were preceded by bombers and escorted by Zeros. Headquarters company and two of the rifle companies jumped from altitudes of 900 to 1,000 feet. The troopers, in addition to rifles, were armed with submachine guns, light and heavy machine guns, and 50-mm grenade dischargers. An antitank unit also was dropped the same day, but its guns had been flown in to a lake near the airfield by seaplanes. By the time these guns were ferried ashore and brought up the battle of the airfield was over; about ten Allied tanks encountered in the operation had been destroyed by other means.

The paratroopers completed investment of the airfield which they held without further opposition after about 5 hours' fighting. Native defending troops fled, and the small Dutch regular force was annihilated with the exception of about 30 who were taken prisoners. The plan for the attack was predicated on the coordination of the paratrooper attack with landings from the sea, but the airborne attack succeeded so quickly that this proved unnecessary.

On 12 January the third rifle company was dropped from another wave of planes, and these troops joined those of the other two companies in taking up guard duties around the captured airfield. They remained at the field until 24 April when the unit was divided into small detachments to take other islands. During the latter operations chutes were left in storage and the troops were landed from surface craft. By November 1942 Yokosuka 1 left Macassar where it was assembled for transport to Japan. Its strength was heavily depleted by malaria and other endemic diseases. Yokosuka 3 also returned to Japan about this time, with its personnel much depressed because they had not been used for paratroop operations for which they had been trained.

Hunan Operations
At 1600 on 21 November 1943 Japanese paratroopers attacked Taoyuan, Hunan, as a phase of their Tungting Lake campaign. Extensive reconnaissance of the area of operations was carried out prior to the paratroop attack, and just before the appearance of the troop-carrying planes the objective was subjected to a heavy and sustained strafing.

Equipment was dropped first as 16 planes flew over the drop area. Low flying bombers then heavily bombed and strafed Chinese positions, while about 60 paratroopers bailed out from what appears to have been a considerably higher altitude than prescribed. All the troopers landed close to their objective; the leader was nearer than any other of the group. As soon as he had landed, he fired a flare apparently intended as a signal for fifth columnists in the city to join the attack.

The paratroopers collected their equipment and assembled in about half an hour. No casualties were inflicted on the paratroopers by the Chinese defenders, yet no attempt was made to develop the paratroop attack, leading to the conclusion by observers that it was intended primarily as a training exercise.

On 6 August 1944, Japanese parachutists were dropped from transports over the Hunan area. They were in plain clothes, but wore badges consisting of a white sun on a blue background with characters reading "Peace and National Reconstruction Army." They were equipped with small arms and carried a sum estimated to be equivalent to $200,000 to $300,000 to be used for bribing the local populace, especially officials. They could speak several Chinese dialects. Each man carried a small bamboo box containing emergency rations.

Interim Operations
Japanese transports of the type hitherto used in paratroop operations were observed from time to time during the course of the New Guinea campaign, but it is generally believed that no airborne operations were intended, and the planes had been assigned other missions. No Japanese airborne troops were reported in action again until 26 November 1944.

On this date a small operation occurred on Leyte. A Japanese convoy was scheduled to enter Ormoc Bay on 28 November, and the airborne troops apparently were expected to carry out demolitions sufficiently extensive to prevent American planes based on Leyte from striking at the ships.

Around midnight of 26 November three transports flew over Leyte. One fell a victim to American antiaircraft fire near San Pablo airfield, and all personnel were killed. Another crash-landed south of Dulag, and 15 lightly armed soldiers scattered throughout this area without attempting to perform any mission. The third plane crash-landed in the water off Dulag; two of its 16 occupants were killed that night by American ground forces and the others ultimately were hunted down. No paratroopers were dropped during this abortive attack, although it is possible that succeeding waves of transports would have flown some over the area had the venture met with even partial success.

Leyte Operations (6 December 1944)
The most recent employment of Japanese paratroopers also occurred on Leyte, where they were assigned missions that would have had important implications had the attack succeeded.

American planes based on Leyte were interfering seriously with Japanese aerial operations from their fields on Luzon. Of greater immediate significance were the shattering attacks by planes from the Leyte airfields on Japanese convoys attempting to land reinforcements and supplies in the Ormoc area.

The Japanese accordingly determined to regain the Buri, San Pablo and Bayug airstrips, while secondary attacks were delivered on Dulag and Tacloban to paralyze American air operations from those strips. Aside from the primary objective of gaining possession of the most important Leyte airstrips, the paratroop operation, timed for 6 December 1944, was designed to destroy or cripple so many American planes that no serious air opposition could be interposed to the landing of reinforcements in Ormoc Bay from a convoy due to arrive on 7 December. The importance of striking a major blow on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor was not overlooked, but this apparently was an accidental circumstance, for the timing of the attack doubtlessly was governed by the desire to synchronize the operation with the arrival of the convoy.

Two separate, but nonetheless highly coordinated, operations were planned. The major effort was to be made against the Buri, San Pablo, and Bayug airstrips. These were to be seized with the aid of ground troops expected to break through from the west to synchronize their climactic assault with the airborne attack. Smaller groups of paratroopers were sent against the Dulag and Tacloban strips in what must have been regarded as suicide missions. Troopers who took part in this secondary attack were ordered to destroy as many American planes as possible and to hold the strips at least until midnight of 7 December.

The first echelon of 30 Topsy twin-engine transports, in three formations, was to take on 409 paratroopers at the Angeles field on Luzon.* These planes were to take off at 1530 and be over their targets by 1840, 6 December. The transports were to rendezvous in the air, and as they approached the San Pablo field they were to form into three formations of 11, 9, and 10 planes respectively.

The 11- and 9-plane formations were assigned the mission of attacking the northern side of the San Pablo field. The 10-plane formation, assigned to attack the eastern and southern parts of the San Pablo field, was to split into 4- and 6-plane groups. The transports were provided with an escort of Oscar fighters, and Tony and Frank fighters were committed for the temporary neutralization of the American fields to prevent air interference with the paratroop operation. Medium bombers were assigned to bomb and strafe the Buri and Bayug fields just before the paratroopers were dropped, while other bombers were ordered to attack antiaircraft installations on the San Pablo field.

Almost all transports of the first echelon were to drop their combat personnel over the Buri, San Pablo, and Bayug strips. Two planes each were to carry the troopers assigned to the subsidiary attack on the Tacloban and Dulxag fields. The first echelon combat personnel comprised 25 headquarters officers and enlisted men, two companies of 100 and 98 men respectively, a work (engineer) company of' 97, three special platoons, and a signal unit of seven men. Fourteen men of the second company's 98 were attached to the work company.

Two follow-up waves over the area of the major attack were planned, one 5 hours after the initial attack with 270 men in 21 planes, and the second at H plus 12 hours by 80 men. The second wave was to carry the main strength of the third company, the heavy-weapons company, and additional headquarters and signal personnel, while the final wave was to carry the remnants of the total force. These reinforcement waves were ordered to help in the final mopping up of surviving elements of resistance, after which a defense of the seized airfield was to be organized. Transports used in the first wave apparently were to fly to the Yamashiro field to pick up the personnel of the second and third echelons, but so many planes were shot down in the initial attack that dispatch of the ensuing waves was precluded.

The transports of the first echelon arrived over the major objectives about 15 minutes later than the orders directed. Eighteen planes, out of an estimated total of 51 transports and bombers, were shot down, but nevertheless between 200 and 300 paratroopers were dropped after preparatory bombing and laying of a smoke screen. About 20 plane-loads of troopers were dropped in the vicinity of the San Pablo and Buri fields, but unfortunately for the Japanese these fields were not operational at the time, and there was little opportunity for destruction. As the paratroopers descended they sang and called out phrases in English such as "Kill a Yankee!"; "Go to Hell, Beast!"; "Have done, all the resistance"; "Lay down arms, surrender quickly; if don't shall die!"; "It is resistless, so that get away from here in this night; do what I say, must help your life. If don't shall die all these captives!"

Harmonicas, jewsharps, and other instruments were played as signals by the paratroopers immediately after landing. For liaison purposes headquarters was identified by the sound of a harmonica. The 1st Company had a pigeon whistle as its identification medium, while the 2d and 3d Companies were identified respectively by the sounds of wooden clappers and flutes. The work company was identified by a "flute with a bass sound," while the striking of a gong distinguished the heavy-weapons company.

Two or three L-5's were burned on the seized fields, but others were left intact. The Japanese ran about firing into washbowls and other nonmilitary objectives, while gasoline supplies and ammunition dumps were left untouched. To be sure, a jeep was burned, and a truck upset, but no important demolitions were executed. Elements of a Japanese infantry division had begun an attack on the field from the west the day before, but their premature attack had been frustrated before the paratroop assault, and only scattered remnants of the force eventually succeeded in joining the paratroopers.

The next day, 7 December, the paratroopers, driven off the San Pablo field, retreated to a pocket of resistance near the Buri airstrip where they held out for several days, along with a few survivors of the infantry division. A battalion of another division launched an attack to reinforce the airborne forces, apparently in accordance with the master plan, but the paratroopers already had been liquidated to all intents and purposes before this abortive maneuver was begun.

Meanwhile the secondary attacks on the Dulag and Tacloban strips completely miscarried. Two transports flew over the former installation; one dropped about five paratroopers and then crashed, while the other crashed about 4,500 yards northeast of the field. Over Tacloban two medium bombers converted to transports lowered their flaps and wheels preparatory to landing, but one was shot down, and the other crashed. Follow-up drops, at least over Dulag, must have been planned, for a captured order designated missions for three platoons, personnel of which were to rendezvous at two assembly points after landing. In addition to destroying aircraft and liquidating defending personnel, one platoon was ordered to destroy Nanuki bridge and thus halt any American advance from the south. Signal and radio units were ordered to set up communications facilities in the assembly area where the commanding officer was to set up his command post. Only the preliminary phases of this ambitious plan were attempted, however, in view of the losses sustained by the first echelon.

By 12 December, 6 days after the beginning of the attack, all paratroopers had been liquidated. Of 215 Japanese dead around Buri, about one-third were paratroopers, while 125 paratroopers were found at San Pablo. It was first thought that the paratroopers were a loosely organized group of picked fanatics who had had little or no special training for an airborne operation. It was later learned, however, that they belonged to a well-organized and trained raiding regiment and had rehearsed the Leyte operation in considerable detail. The aircraft came from a raiding flying regiment which, like the airborne troops, was based on Luzon.

The attack was a complete failure, for a Japanese convoy attempting to put into Ormoc Bay was smashed by planes from Tacloban on 7 December, while American amphibious forces landed on the very beach which the Japanese had selected for this disembarkation.

*Another less reliable source gives the number of transports in the first echelon as 39, loading 463 paratroopers.

End

Regards