IT was a mirlce the germans did not defeat USSR

I was recently watching a movie form battlefield called "the battle for russia".
I already knew that germans came close to wining but after watching the video i was just shocked the numbers of russians captured and how from june 22 to august the numbers of prisoners. The germans in view were the masters of punching a hole and could grab up sometimes two to five armies at a time. In this viedo i think it said by dec 4 when the final push was on moscow that over 2 million prisoners had been taken. no wonder the germans lost the war they had to feed those commies. If that had been any other nation besides china they would have surrender.

 

that was stalins very poor tactics. he refused to retreat/regroup and his armys at this time lacked any sort of mobility or heavy weapons to defend or counter attack an armoured punch.

All the germans did was pick an area, punch above and below it and encircle the troops.

However I doubt germany could have taken russia, it was just too big with too much resources

FNG

 

:lol:

Seriously though, even though the Germans pretty much erased the Russian 1941 standing army in the first months of Barbarossa, Russian manpower resources and industry backed up by Lend-Lease actually made these losses good by the next spring or thereabouts, and way surpassed the numbers lost in later years of the war. Therefore I don't think you can say the Germans were close to winning the war against the USSR.

 

I seem to recall that the Germans didn't particularly try to feed, or even provide proper accomodation for Soviet POWs. From what I've read it was largely a case of putting barbed wire fencing and a couple of watchtowers around an open space. Then providing occasional tiny portions of watery soup or bread that were completely inadequate for the needs of the POWs.

I recall a former Commissar being interviewed (He survived despite capture because none of his comrades denounced him), describing how starvation was rife and many inmates resorted to cannibalism in order to survive.

 

:roll:

Don't think there was much of that going on, either. Thousands where starved or worked to death. The POW's proved quite useful to the Wehrmacht, especially in "Hiwi" form.

 

In fact three million russian POWs starved in german captivity, however everyone knows that german supply linies broke down in winter 1941 and that these linies, even if they´ve worked, were totaly overstretched and under permanent attack by partisans. So german soldiers had to take food from the russian civilians, where should the Wehrmacht get the food from to feed these masses of russian prisoners ?

Some examples

Battle of Kiew
665.000 russian POWs

Battle of Wjasma and Brjansk
675.000 russian POWs

Battle of Smolensk
300.000 russian POWs

Battle of Bialystok and Minsk
323.898 russian POWs


The Wehrmacht was overcharged

Regards,
Che.

 

I believe it was the intention of the Wehrmacht to "Live off the land" (i.e. appropriate food and animals as they needed at the expense of the local civilians) from the start.

Whilst certainly the German logistics couldn't cater for the huge numbers of POWs they captured and only a foolish General would keep POWs well fed whilst his own soldiers suffered, there can be little doubt that if they so wished the occupying forces in the conquered East could have treated the civilians much better, they could have treated the POWs much better, perhaps they would never have matched the strictly accepted dietary requirements but the degrees of starvation and privation endured by Soviet POWs need not have been as excessive as they were.

The simple fact is that they did not.

 

I don´t think so, cos the Unternehmen Barbarossa should be Blitzkrieg as well. I believe they thought that they could defeat russia to the end of the year. They come to wrong conclusions after the Battle of Suomussalmi in 1940 during the winter war, where a small finish defeated a larger russian force. They thought that if the russian army could be defeated by such a small army, it would be no match for a battleproven Wehrmacht, which defeated a first-class militarynation like french.

Strengh
FIN:
Three regiments and separate battalions (circa 11,000 men)

RUS:
Two divisions, one tank brigade (cca 45,000-50,000 men)

Casualties
FIN:
350 KIA, 600 wounded

RUS:
16,000 - 35,000 KIA or WIA

Reagrds,
Che.



Regards,
Che.

 

While supply problems may have been a part of the reason for the mass dying of soviet Pow's, there are surely others.

Many of the prisoners camps where those Pow's died where located in Poland or in Germany, so there surely were no supply problems there.
In some cases thousands of soviet Pow's died of starvation in camps, while only a few kilometres away western allied Pow's had sufficient food.
Generally the treatment for soviet prisoners was much harsher and executions took place for the most minor disobedience.

After all the nazis wanted to colonize their new Lebensraum in Russia with german settlers, so somehow the original inhabitants had to disapear.
Something tells me that the nazi officials never planed to led the russian Pow's ever return home....

 

I want to believe you, I really do, but do you have any sources which confirm that most of the russian POWs where in germany during their captivity or at least a source that confirms that the three million starved POWs, died in camps on german ground ?

Regards,
Che.

 

I will give relevant information from Anthony Beevor's books at a later point to support my points.

Che, there is frankly no excuse for the horrific deaths amongst Soviet POWs. The near east, Ukraine and Belo-Russia, where many of the POWs were captured was largely agricultural land, there is no reason if the POWs were kept there they could not have been adequately fed.

Germany "exported" large amounts of food from captured territories, there is no reason why in this case POWs kept in Germany could not have been adequately fed.

The other alternative to official disinterest in the fate of the Slavic Untermensch is that most died en-route.

Either way, it is to say the least regretable.

 

I don´t want to excuse these crimes, sry, if it seems like that. I just have some questions and criticism, if my criticism is wrong and you can confute it, I will change my point of view asap.


Nearly everyone of these 3,3 million starved POWs died in the period of june to december 1941.
So this largely agricultural land, how high was the output of the Ukraine´s farming in 1941 and was it really enough to feed russian POWs, the matter of fact is, where were this masses of food which were keep back for german soldiers in 1941 ?

Regards,
Che.

 

I never said that most were in camps in Germany, however many were.Same in Poland

http://www.jewishgen.org/ForgottenCamps/Camps/BuchenwaldENG.html

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/dachautime.html
(Look under november 1941)

 

I recommend the MgFa (the book of the German Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt) books on that:
Germany and the Second World War, the Volume V/II. present some data on the rations in the occupied territory and the fate of POWs.
2-3 millions are the best estimates right now on the starved Soviet POWs, and about one million in the civil population in the end of 1941. And it was very surprising for the Germans as they planned more starved civil setting the ration so low. I can dig some figures in that if you need...

 

Their mistreatment of POWs and locals was one of the major reasons for their defeat outside Moscow. With partisans, which were essentially upset civilians with basic military training in the rear areas, the Germans could not get much-needed supplies through easily at all.
Another reason for their defeat was the timing of the vicious Russian Winter and the German offensive against Moscow. Had the Germans attacked Moscow directly after capturing Smolensk and had the dreaded 'General Winter' not struck as early, the Russians would not have had as much time to organize their defences, and the Germans might, I say MIGHT have entered the suburbs of Moscow.
One more reason (at least I think so) was the decision on Hitler's part to have essentially half of Army Group North encircle Leningrad, while a quarter would attack east, an eighth would head to Moscow, and the rest would protect the rear areas from partisans (just estimating). Had the Army Group North entered and taken Leningrad before Zhukov got there (September 11, two full weeks after the Germans first came within striking distance of Leningrad), the Russian nation would have been shocked by the fall of the 'Cradle of the Proletarian Revolution' of 1917, and the Communist party, notwithstanding the demands of Stalin, would have been shaken. Plus, the major aim of Operation Barbarossa was Leningrad, thus most of the Germans were directed to the north, between Moscow and Leningrad. This last part was just my belief. I was going on what I think would have happened. Taking Leningrad would certainly have been what I'd have done, even if it meant heavy losses. It would have freed up massive forces for the capture of Murmansk, one of the major arrival points of American aid, the capture of Moscow and the move into Siberia.
Not all the blame can be put on the military commanders, though. It was Hitler's most obvious mistake of attacking Russia in the first place. And not all the mistakes took place on that front either. If Hitler had taken a few divisions from, say, Norway or France and sent them to North Africa to reinforce the Afrikakorps before 1942, he may have been able to capture Egypt and the vital Saudi and Iraqi oilfields. This would form the southern arm of the proposed pincer movement through the Caucasus and Middle East. Had the Russians in the Caucasus been under attack from the north and south, they would have been engaged on two fronts, much like the Germans were later on in the war, but on a much smaller front. The Germans take Baku, the largest oil-producing centre in the Caucasus, they take Grozny, and the Soviets are only left with Siberia to supply them with oil. Using the forces stated above from my theoretical capture of Leningrad, they move east and take these oilfields in northern and central Siberia, with aid from the central front, which would have by then at least encircled Moscow.
And the effects would not have been just on Russia. America and Britain would have been affected too. The defeat of the Allies should not have been based merely on the destruction of the three arms of their armed forces. With their domestic oil sources taken away from them, the Russian tanks, trucks, trains, ships and aircraft would have had to rely on American and Canadian oil (I think the oil in alberta was found then, i'm not sure), which was necessary for their own operational plans. Bound by the Lend-Lease Act, the Americans would have given the Russians at least some fuel to keep a certain number of their vehicles and ships in motion. This would have put a strain on the American plans in the Pacific, plus their convoys operating in the Atlantic, which required vast amounts of fuel in itself. It would have limited the distance the Americans could have moved through the Pacific before running out of fuel itself. With no more petrol to move their shisp, the Americans would have been unable to push their strategy of island-hopping, and the Japanese, finally without the threat of the American navy for good, would have been free to take back however much the Americans took (assuming this all happens before the Battle of the Gulf of Letye, in which the vast majority of the Japanese Imperial Navy was sunk). And with their own sources of fuel, the Japanese could make a swift sail west and land in America. This part is incredibly unlikely, so please excuse me. They reach the Texas oilfields, and before the Americans are defeated the Japanese take one million prisoners.
Without America to supply them at all, the British and their Empire lay open to attacks from the Japanese as well as an invasion across the Channel by the puny Kriegsmarine. Whatever forces the Americans managed to put on the Isles make valiant attempts to push the Germans back to the sea, but without fuel for their tanks and aircraft, the infantry are sitting ducks (excuse the cliche). The same happens in West and Southern Africa and Asia. China is defeated, India conquered, and the Germans and Italians and Japanese meet up at the Iranian frontier and somewhere in Siberia.

Sorry for being so long-winded, there was just no possible way I could've explained it any shorter. There may be a few holes in this thesis, as this all is based on two events that never occurred.

 

One more thing. The Japanese actually had a tough decision to make. To opt to head south for the oil in the Dutch East Indies or to go for the (much less significant) oil sources in Siberia and aid in the destruction of the Soviets, although the Japanese, with all their tactical skill, wouldn't have made it much farther than the eastern tip of Kazakhstan (a large country in itself).
The theory I put together above (however stupid and highly improbable it may seem) did not include a Japanese invasion of the Far East Soviet Union.

 

Hi misterkingtiger,

the big flaw, obviously, is the Japanese landing in Texas, defeating the American army and holding on to the oilfields.

The actual landing in Texas - maybe, but certainly not with enough forces to capture the whole state, and not with enough logistical ability to reinforce and resupply the invasion force


In the worst case scenario, Germany uses garrison troops from France, Norway, etc and manages to capture the Middle Eastern sources of oil. The problem then is how do they move into the CCCP? The DAK troops will be busy being garrison forces all over the Middle East, and trying to prevent the British forces in India from simply taking it all back. If the Germans ever managed to get hold of the Iraq/Iran area, they would never be able to hold such a vast area for long - especially not if they try invading Russia from there as well. And if Comrade Stalin decides to 'assist' his British allies by 'liberating' the Middle East rather than throwing the Germans out of Russia...

 

Its like i said, this entire theory is based on two events that never happened; the capture of Leningrad (which Hitler actually said, in Directive No. 21 was vital before attacking elsewhere: 'Only after the fulfilment of this first essential task, which must include the occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt, will the attack be continued with the intention of occupying Moscow, an important center of communications and of the armaments industry.') and the reinforcement of the
Afrikakorps, which was also planned. It's amazin how plans change when you got an insecure man like Hitler controlling a nation.