Was the Desert War a mistake for Germany?

The thought occures that the war in the Western Desert was basically a sideshow for the Germans.

What I wonder is, the western allies ultimately gained a lot of experience driving the axis out, was it a mistake for the Germans to go in at all. Would they have been better off leaving the Italians to it?

Anyone any thoughts?

 

Well, there are two ways of looking at it:

Politically and Militarily.

Militarily - Well...
Admittedly only a small amount of the German Armed Forces were involved, but they still could have been useful elsewhere. More importantly, a lot of resources were lost in the Med, en route to the Afrika Korps. It also, as you say, gave the British and American forces some valuable experience in fighting the Germans, and the kind of weaponry & tactics they were up against.

On the other hand, It was desireable to try and prevent the British having a Mediterranean base. Had the Germans decided that it was not such a sideshow and sent more sizeable forces then who knows, they might actually have been able to kick us out of North Africa and turn the Med into an Axis lake. And of course gained oil resources, a new route to the USSR, lots more territory to police, and lots more racially/religiously inferior* people to bully, kill, and generally turn into resistance fighters.


* This reflects the Nazi view only, not mine.


Politically, they could not afford to let their Allies get kicked around so damn easily. The same thing happened in Greece.

 

personally I think the allies learnt nothing in North Africa.

When you read the battle reports from North Africa and then the reports from Itlay and Normandy it's the same problems coming up again and again.

Lack of communication between sub units on the ground and no combined command and force control for air, armour and infantry.

Added to this a rigid senior command that produced complex plans and demanded that company commanders followed them dispite them falling apart upon contact with the enemy.

With additional lack of sponteniaty with the commanders declining to make their own decisions, exploiting fluid situations which only they could see and having a tendancy to dig in at every possable opportunity.

Most of the victories in North Africa were only possable due to superior material or overwhelming material/supplies.

FNG

 

We did achieve better communications between land & air, plus we learned (eventually!) not to simply charge our tanks at the enemy, because AT guns make that suicide.

Plus we gained valuable lessons regarding equipment (the need for the 17pdr, for example).

It is true that the British Army was not perfect, and that it did continue with some very bad habits, but compare the army that fought in 1940 to the army that fought in 1944.

 

N.Africa

There were no prizes for coming second!

 

What were the total casualties sustained in the desert war? by both Axis and Allies?

Sources never seem to agree on this one...

 

It's been mentioned that a small amount of German forces were down there, but you have to remember they wer'n't just fighting the Allies- they were also fighting the desert (which always wins). Number can mean nothing in a desert war.

I wonder if some of their plans (like Babarossa) had gone much better with 'The Desert Fox' running the show.

 

North Afrika.

Possibly not, they did come second in the Western Desert. :roll:
and the desert is neutral!

 

His mind was tactical, he would probably have messed up an operation the size of Barbarossa for the simple reason that he couldn't 'zoom out' as far as such a situation would require.

 

Maybe not an entire operation, but something smaller?

Technicaly the desert is neutral, but the sand get everywhere (literally) and destroys both men and machines. Can't fight it so it always 'wins'.

 

North Afrika

The sand SB? tell me about it, don't forget it was shared out between ALL the Western Desert forces, flies were worst!

 

My readings tell me the British were VERY well-suited to desert warfare and--at times--quite innovative in their tactics.
The British were always known for their navigational prowess at sea... and the North African desert was a sea of sand. They seemed quite at home in that element and showed an uncanny knack for warfare in that element.
The LRDG (Long Range Desert Group) comes to mind as a quite effective--yet smallish group--that excelled at nipping at the Nazis heels, quite often many miles behind their line., They were renowned for their ability at harassing rear-supply areas, and no-doubt tied-up a great many Africa Corps troops in the process. I've always been a big fan of the stories surrounding the LRDG and the skill and courage of their troopers.
Can't forget the SAS either. Their origin dates back to the North African Campaign and their efforts--like those of the LRDG--were not lost on the Africa Corps. Superb soldiers, innovative and... able to navigate the desert with uncanny precision.
As to coordination of infantry, tanks and air-support, the US Marines in the Pacific were keenly aware of close cooperation as a necessity in combating suicidal Japanese troops. The US Marine Corps was a BIG believer in close air-support in their Island-hopping campaigns.

Tim

 

WD campaign was a complete sideshow for germans. Their forces were small at best. This shows lack of strategical thinking of Hitler. With somewhat larger force Romell could sit on the Canal, thus making big problems for british.

From Italian point entire campaign was falioure. Sending mostly infantry without adequate mechanised transport into the desert (like in 1940) was idiotic political decision by Mussolini. Italians could fight (they proved that in A.O.I.) but inadequate transport of supplies and men proved fatal for their entire first campaign and is basicly the root couse of their destruction by significantly smaller mechanised british force in Wavells offensive.

British got few valuable lessons. Need for bigger guns on the tanks, elastic command structure, air-ground cooperation... Some of the lessons were a bit misleading and led to mistakes like replacing Shermans with cromwells in normandy, inapropriate tactics used in Cean area... In general evrybody learned much from the campaign.

 

I think the biggest problem with the Germans strategic interests in the region comes down to logistical support, long supply-lines and a lack of sufficient support in-theatre.
Rommel was always pleading for more men, materiale and tanks, artillery. They may have been able to hang-on much longer with better prioritization and men/arms with which to wage war. If Rommel had the resources of the British for instance, he might have been able to operate and plan on a much grander scale. The Russian front tended to be Priority One and gobbled-up resources at a fantastic-rate.
Still, the North African campaign is one of my favorites. Tanks cutting wakes through seas of sand, and a certain esprit-de-corps among the opposing sides. THe African Corps, the Desert Rats and their legendary feats. I recall a bood by... (I want to say Robert Christ?) titled Chariots of Steel or something like that. Anyway, this gentleman was a T/C in M3 Honey light tanks. The stories shared always captivated me. IN one instance after a firefight with Mk3 panzers, he described shells from the germans'main-guns embedded in the front glacis armor. Did not penetrate, just looking like so many warts. (Sometimes their duels took place at overly long-ranges...)
I also believe chivalry was not quite dead in those early years. My readings reflect the compassion with which POW's were treated by both sides.

Tim

 

Afrika Korps.

Tim mentions chivalry in the desert, I have an Afrika Korps commemoration plate, around the rim are the words 'Ritterlich im Krieg' if I remember correctly, translates as 'Chivalry in War'.
Note, as on this badge Swastika has changed to Cross.

 

The Desert War cannot be viewed as a limited land campaign - the battle was for the whole mediteranean theatre. The naval and air conflicts over the supply lines in the Med (Malta etc) were a key part (possibly the deciding part of the conflict). Also the role of Italian forces is often understated - their navy remained threatening despite the RN gaining a clear upper hand - their airforce was a huge danger to allied shipping and their army, despite much propaganda to the contrary, were a very significant part of Rommel's command - - the proximity of the Italian military was indeed one of the reasons that Germany didn't send more significant forces - the region being mainly an Italian concern albeit under German supervision. All in all the "Med" campaign tied up (and destroyed) significant Axis forces, led to the invasion and defeat of fascist Italy, opened up the whole Med for other operations, put pressure on the Vichy French in the region to tow a more helpful line, provided a much needed testing/training gound for the allies, gave the Germans a bloody nose at a key point in the war, provided a much needed morale boost for the allies (esp Britain), showed the Soviets that they weren't fighting the Nazis alone and preserved much needed British assetts (for the war effort) in North Africa and the Med - not least the Suez Canal and all that that implies for links to the far east theatre. Yes it was worthwhile ...

 

It only makes sense if the German strategy in 1941 was to knock the UK out of the war, while avoiding war with the Soviet Union and the US.
As it was, it was a huge mistake for the Germans. At a time they should have been using everything they had to beat the Soviets, the sent an entire Panzer Korps to help the Italians hold onto some colonies of marginal value. Hitler then compounds the error by sending more troops when the allies invade French North Africa, instead of sending them to Russia. In the end it cost them three panzer divisions (10, 15 & 21) and two motorised infantry divisions (90 Lt and 164 Lt) plus the equivalent of at least one more division (PzFJ Hermann Goering, the Ramcke Brigade, 999 Afrika division and Special Group 200), plus all the resources, particularly air assets used to suuport and supply the troops in Afrika. It also destroyed the closest thing the Italians had to well trained and equipped troops (XX Motorized Corps).
The campaign gave the US an "easy" introduction to the war and allowed the allies to fight the Germans without an invasion of mainland Europe.

 

no only mistake is that germany have italia as ally

 

However, they do come in handy as occupation forces

 

Re: Afrika Korps.

"Chivalrous in War", to be exact. Sorry if this comes across as pedantic... It's my job.