Is Martin van Creveld right with his research about the Wehrmacht, which he desricbed as the most effective army in World War 2, superior in Organisation , Training, Doctrine, Tactics and the "art" of organisation. He even described the moral and discipline of german soldiers as ideal. Is his analyse, which he create in the order of the pentagon right ? Regards, Che.
IMO, probably so. However the differences between these factors in the Wehrmacht and the Allied armies were not huge and were more than made up for by other factors such as superior resources, better logistics and in the case of the Russians vastly superior numbers. Another leveling factor was the poor strategic (and to some extent tactical) decisions that Hitler made and forced his generals to contend with.
As a follow up I noted this post (archived in Yarchive) from nearly 20 years ago. Some people might interpret such ideas as being overly nationalistic or chauvinistic by the authors (or the posters here) however it is a legitimate issue that military historians have debated for some time. I found the Prince Frederick Charles quote interesting because Admiral King was quoted as saying essentially the same thing (to Annapolis graduates IIRC) to the effect that he had no confidence in an officer who didn't know when to disobey orders. This kind of initiative (as seen in the German officer corps) was something that the US military has tried also to encourage and promulgate in commissioned and non-commissioned officers. I recall attending NCO Leadership School many years ago(number one man going into last exercise...but finished second in class :-? ) and discussing these same kind of issues. Many people think that the military wants automotons. Robots who follow orders. This is an especially common misconception about the Marines. Nothing could be farther from the truth. They teach flexiblity. Adapting to changing circumstances while still accomplishing the mission. My point in bringing this up is that the German officer corps was mentioned on more than one occassion as being worthy models in this respect.
From what I gather the German Officers were dramatically reduced in number after WW1 to 4000 out of a maximum of 100K troops which meant that those remaining were either well positioned socially or the cream of the crop from their trench experiences. In either case due to the smaller numbers they received more intensive training that their French and British counterparts FNG
Wow, this is a really touchy subject. I've read both "Genius for War" and "The "German Way orf War". Both are well written and seem well reasoned. There are opposing view points out there, as well. I have read "When the Odds were Even" and "Draftee Division", both of which take on Dupuy directly and make some pretty good arguments for at least the Western allies being as good or better than the 1944 Germans. Dupuy figured the Germans were about 23% more effective than the Western Allies (in 1944), and 168% against the Soviets at Kursk and 88% more effective than the Soviets in 1944 (if I'm reading this right).
This ethic is as old as professionalism in warfare itself. Sun Tzu has a line that goes approximately like this: "A good general knows when to obey and when to disobey an order." He argues that it is not the business of anyone superior to he who is in direct tactical control to determine how a battle is to be fought. The line is probably aimed at the political commissars he also criticizes elsewhere, but the wording is strikingly similar to that of King and the Prussian prince. Also, even though it is not explicitly mentioned as a doctrine, Xenophon vastly improves the flexibility of his hoplite formations during the March of the Ten Thousand by subdividing them into units of 100 men ordered to act upon the initiative of their captains, rather than the standard phalanx formation in which all hoplites act as one. However, during the March it is often the initiative of the commanders of the light-armed contingents that wins battles long before the hoplites even get there.
Good point Roel. I would say though that there is a difference between expressing the sentiment philisophically and actually teaching the concepts of flexibility and adaptability and integrating such ideas into the culture of military thinking and training.
Found this interesting...... The efficiency of the German army, on a unit-for-unit basis, remained higher than that of the Allies. Since 1945 this has drawn the attention of NATO planners, seeking to identify the source of the Wehrmacht's strength in the hope it could be replicated. The Dupuys have sought to quantify it mathematically. Martin van Creveld has compared US and German battlefield performance, explaining German success in terms of small unit cohesion. The German army fostered a strong sense of comradeship: 'buddy groups' trained and fought together and returning wounded came back to their own unit rather than being drafted into a new one, via an anonymous replacement battalion. However, this has been challenged by Omer Bartov on the grounds that casualty rates were so high for so long that the turnover precluded much sense of unit identity. Soldiers joined a battalion in Russia and were wounded or dead within weeks.
