Iraqi Army vs. Afghan National Army

Which Army makes greater progress, considering facts like training, morale, equipment, etc.

ANA

- Desertion, difficult recruitment, total Manpower with 50.000 personnel

Small Arms

* AK-47 Assault Rifle
* AK-74 Assault Rifle
* M16A2 Assault Rifle
* RPK LMG
* PK MG
* Dragunov SVD Sniper Rifle

Tanks

* T-55 Main Battle Tank
* T-62 Main Battle Tank
* ZSU-23-4 anti aircraft weapon
* scud tactical ballistic missiles

Armoured Vehicles(800+)

* BMP-1 ICV
* BTR-80 APC
* M113 APC
* Humvee (213 in service, more than 800 vehicles to be delivered in the initial transfer)[28]

Other Vehicles

* Tata Motors SK1613/SE1615/SE1615TC 4 1/2 ton trucks (50+)[29]
* 2 1/2 ton trucks (100+)
* Jeeps (120+) Flag of India - likely Tata Motors Sumo Jeep or Mahindra Jeeps
* Ambulances (15+)
* Other Technicals of various origins:
o Ford Ranger pickups
o Toyota pickup trucks

Heavy Arms
*RPG-7 Anti-tank weapon
* Browning M2 heavy MG
* SPG-9 Recoilless Rifle
* 82mm Medium Mortar
* D-30 122mm howitzer
* M114 155 mm howitzer

Mil Mi-24 'Hind': (6)
Mil Mi-17 'Hip': (7)
Aero L-39 Albatross (3)
Antonov An-32 'Cline' (3)

Not so much A/c, but more then I will ever have

Iraqi Army

Virtually all of the equipment used by the former Iraqi Army was either destroyed by the U.S. and British during Operation Iraqi Freedom or was looted during the chaotic aftermath shortly after the fall of the Hussein regime. Four T-55 tanks however have been recovered from an old army base in al-Muqdadiyah and are now in service with the 1st Mechanized Division.

On February 2, 2004 the U.S government announced that Nour USA was awarded a $327,485,798 contract to procure equipment for both the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi National Guard; however, this contract was canceled in March 2004 when an internal Army investigation (initiated due to complaints from losing bidders) revealed that Army procurement officers in Iraq were violating procedures with sloppy contract language and incomplete paperwork.

On May 25, 2004 the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) stated that they would award a contract worth $259,321,656 to ANHAM Joint Venture in exchange for procuring the necessary equipment (and providing its required training) for a minimum of 15 and a maximum of 35 battalions. The minimum bid would begin to be delivered immediately and further orders could be placed until the maximum of 35 battalion sets or September 2006 after the first order was fully delivered.

In May 2005, Hungary agreed to donate 77 T-72's to the Iraqi Army, with the refurbishment contract going to Defense Solutions to bring the tanks up to operational status for an estimated 4.5 million dollars US. After a delay in the payment of funds from the Iraqi government, Iraq's 9th Army Mechanized Division received the tanks at its headquarters in Taji over a three day period starting on November 8, 2005.

On July 29, 2005, the United Arab Emirates gained approval to purchase 180 M113A1 APCs in good-condition from Switzerland, with the intent to transfer them to Iraq as a gift. Domestic political opposition successfully froze the sale, fearing that the export would violate the country's longstanding tradition of neutrality as well as perhaps make Switzerland a target for terrorism.

173 M113s, 44 Panhards, and 300 Spartans donated by Jordan, Pakistan and UAE. 600 Dzik-3 (Ain Jaria) APCs were ordered in Poland (option 1200) for delivery by Jan 2007. 573 Akrep APCs for delivery by Jan 2007. 756 Cougar APCs (option 1050) for delivery by November 2008.

713 M1114s and 400 M1151s purchased for IA with delivery complete by end July 2006.


Iraqi insurgency

Based on Bush administration expectations that coalition forces would be welcomed as liberators after the overthrow of the Hussein regime, prewar planners had only been expecting minimal if any resistance from Saddam loyalists.

For a multitude of reasons, this ideal scenario has not materialized and now the New Iraqi Army faces an insurgency which has caused more coalition casualties than during the war itself. An increase in size as well as an increased sophistication in the nature of the attacks has seriously weakened the efforts of the New Iraqi Army to maintain internal security.

Equipment

The Iraqi Army continues to face significant challenges securing an adequate weapons supply because its equipment plans have never matched the threats it has faced.

Poor weapon registration

A 2006 report by the SIGIR notes that out of the 370,000 weapons turned over to the US since the fall of Saddam's regime, only 12,000 serial numbers have been recorded. The lack of proper accounting for these weapons makes small arms proliferation to anti governmental forces such as insurgents or sectarian militias much easier.

Infiltration

The Iraqi Army is widely known to have been infiltrated by a multitude of groups ranging from local militias to foreign insurgents. This has led to highly publicized deaths and compromised operations (perhaps the most prominent being an Iraqi suicide bomber detonating his vest inside a US military base near Mosul killing more than 20 people). Infiltration by elements not primarily loyal to the Iraqi Army presents an ongoing danger to the lives and operations of the entire army.

Inadequate intelligence gathering capabilities

The Iraqi Army currently has no formalized apparatus for the collection of military intelligence (similar to the DIA). Currently it must rely on intelligence provided by the United States for the majority of its operations. Developing a professional intelligence corps to augment the effectiveness of the Iraqi Army remains an ongoing challenge.

Lack of adequate logistical support

Insufficient advisory effort

As of October 2006, there are approximately 4000 US combat advisor's embedded with Iraqi units out of 130,000 US soldiers stationed in that country. Defense analyst Andrew Krepinevich argues that the roughly twelve advisors per Iraqi battalion (approximately 500 troops) is less than half the sufficient amount needed to efficiently implement the combat advisory effort . Krepinevich argues that officers try to avoid taking on advisory tasks because the potential for promotion is much lower due to the US Army's culture of promoting officers that have served with a domestic units over ones that have served with foreign forces.

Ineffective leadership at the Ministry of Defense

The current Minister of Defense, Abd al-Qadr Muhammed Jassim al-Mufraji, has limited experience and faces a number of hurdles impeding his effective governance. Some of the major problems include inheriting a staff that is notorious for favorism, corruption, and deeply divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. He rivals with the Minister of the Interior, Jawad al-Bolani, National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubai, and Minister of Staff for National Security Affairs, Shirwan al-Waili. He has been criticized for not being able to stand up to the Badr Organization and Mehdi Army members which dominate his own party. In addition, as a Sunni he faces inherent challenges working within a Shiite-dominated government.

Iranian influence

An estimated 150 Iranian intelligence officers, plus members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Command, are believed to be active inside Iraq at any given time. For more than a year, US troops have detained and recorded fingerprints, photographs, and DNA samples from dozens of suspected Iranian agents in a catch and release program designed to intimidate the Iranian leadership. Iranian influence is felt most heavily within the Iraqi Government, the ISF, and Shiite militias.

Lack of military medical services

All military hospitals under the Saddam regime were looted and abandoned during the 2003 invasion of Iraq; as such, the Iraqi Army currently fields no military hospitals. There is only one military prosthetics facility in the country and virtually no mental health or burn treatment services. Wounded Iraqi soldiers are expected to receive treatment either at civilian hospitals or if possible, at Coalition medical facilities. Corruption practices spurred partly by over-taxation at these civilian hospitals significantly drive up costs to the soldier. Due to overwhelming red tape within the Iraqi military compensation system, it is commonplace for the soldier to end up bearing the financial brunt of medical expenses.





Source primary: wikipedia^^

Regards,
Che.

 

What a lame thread

 

My concern with the afghan army is dedication. When Canada leaves I dont want the afghan army to get destroyed with mass desertions as a result. I think that can be helped if we give them something they want to fight for, give more aid to rural areas, and develop gurialla style warfare.

btw, im a huge advocate of guerilla warfare capability in today's armed forces