Most important battle of the Pacific war.

Ok, just for the sake of avoiding a Midway-Coral sea debate, ill make the choices land battles only.

 

I see that so far the Battle of Guadalcanal has gotten the most votes. I see where you are coming from, i mean, if the Japs had taken 'canal then Australia wouldve been nearly surrounded. However had the Americans surrendered on Bataan and Corregidor in late 1941 or in Jan-Feb 42 then Guadalcanal wouldnt have needed to happen! The Japanese probably wouldve invaded Australia in August 1942.

CvM

 

Wont somebody post with their opinions and why they voted the way they did?

 

I voted the Canal, mainly because it represented the first concerted effort of the American surface forces to turn back the Japanese on land and sea. I think of the Phil' as an outpost, that was destined to fall.

 

I voted Guadalcanal mainly because I think it was one of the major turning points in the Pacific. Up until then there was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing between the Japanese and Allies, with the Japs still managing to re-supply their forces elsewhere without too much loss.

After Guadalcanal things started to deteriorate for the Japanese. New Guinea was where their southern march was stopped, but it wasn't a decisive reversal.

The Phillipines always seems almost a side show to the direct line of attack against Japan, so that's why it didn't get my vote.

____________________

In war there is no subsitute for victory - General Douglas MacArthur

 

I find it somewhat funny that someone with a MacArthur quote in his sig can call the Liberation of the Philippines a side show.
There is an old saying, "Never leave an enemy strongpoint in your rear."

Luzon was different than other islands late in the war. It could not have been by-passed.

CvM

 

Just caught this line "The Philippines were an outpost destined to fall"

That brings up a good debate. Imho, they couldve been held. Only If Roosevelt was willing to devote the energies needed to do so. The defenders of the Philippines 'fought with what they had' and held off the full might of the Japanese army for 6 months.

CvM

 

I agree with what JOL and Sniper said about the canal--and that is why I voted for it.

 

I refuse to vote!!! I do not see the battle of Midway there! Or is it hidden under the nickname of Wake island?

 

Fried, that why i said 'land battle' because otherwise everyone wouldve voted for Midway

CvM

 

I voted 'Canal because it was the first major setback for the Japs.

 

From what was listed I would say New Guinea-

Australia could have faced major problems without us clearing that up. I can see the fall of the Phillipines as being up there too.

 

Canal, by the time most of the other major land battles took place the Japanese Naval power had been greatly reduced to the point where defeat for the Japanese was inevitable.

 

If you weren't limiting it to land battles I's day PH was clearly the most important. For land battles the question becomes what makes it important? The Philipines may have given the Japanese missimpression as to how easy things would be. The Canal while a land battle went a long way to recking the IJN air force and did result in the loss of a lot of ships and burning a lot of oil. New Guinea was a bleeding wound for the Japanese and arguably there first serious land defeat.

 

Tarawa

Although costly, probably a waste as well, filled with mistakes/learning experiences, it showed/proved that no matter what the Japanese did, with plenty of time & material, it wasn't enough to stop the inevitable.

Nothing like your best effort getting swept away to take the wind out of your sails.

Re-think the "Brick wall" defense theory.

 

Pearl Harbour...The Japanese proved that the battleship was obsolete, help the naval procurement board building ships change the carrier construction from number 7 on the list to number 1...

Not allowing the Battleships to leave port, and sink at sea secured the lives of 2000 men per ship, allowing the oil reserves of the Pacific to remain intact, allowed the battle of Coral sea, and Midway, as majority of US tankers where in the Atlantic at the time. Would have tied the Carriers to a more defensive role for a lack of fuel to home waters, thus not contributing to the helping of Guadalcanal...

History shows us how the German and Japanese had their hands tied for lack of fuel, so might the USN had their Pacific supply been dealt a blow...i will leave a quote and the url if anyone has doubts as to the blunder the Japanese missed at pearlOil logistics: in the Pacific war | Air Force Journal of Logistics | Find Articles at BNET.com
A Lack of US Oil Tankers

It is interesting to note that only one ship located on Battleship Row on 7 December received no damage at all. Yet, had the Japanese sank or severely damaged this ship, its effect on the Pacific Fleet would have been almost as great a loss as sinking an aircraft carrier. That ship was the fleet oil tanker, USS Neosho. (93)

The lack of fleet oilers, like Neosho, hung like a large cement albatross around the neck of Navy planners contemplating operations in the Pacific before and after the Pearl Harbor raid. (94) This dearth of oilers was a key vulnerability of the Navy. The Japanese Navy, who had just seen how it would have been impossible to carry out the Pearl Harbor attack without tanker support, should have targeted these ships that were so crucial to the Navy.

In the years from 1925 to 1940, the quantity of most surface combatants in the Navy had doubled in size; the size of the auxiliary force had not. Although there had been an increase in the number of fleet oilers, they were all kept busy ferrying fuel between bases. (95) On 7 December, the Pacific Fleet had two oilers in Pearl Harbor and three at sea and six others in ports on the west coast; only four of these were capable of at-sea refueling. (96) This shortage of tankers effectively limited the radius of the Pacific Fleet. (97) It was also a key reason so many ships were located in Pearl Harbor on 7 December. Kimmel was unable to keep less than half his fleet at sea without starting to deplete the oil reserves at Pearl Harbor; his limited supply of oilers could not keep up with the deficit. (98)
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Because of this lack of oilers, the fleet could not have even exercised its primary war plan (even if most of its battle line was not at the bottom of Pearl Harbor). The total capacity of the Pacific Fleet's oilers was 760,000 barrels of oil. In the first 9 days after Pearl Harbor, the fleet had expended 750,000 barrels of this sum. Thus, the fleet was tied to its oil supply at Pearl Harbor, (99) and if the Japanese had attacked the oil storage and the associated oilers at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, they would have driven the Pacific Fleet back to the west coast. (100)

If the Pacific Fleet had been forced back to the west coast, would it have been effective in opposing the Japanese? The short answer is no, especially if the Japanese began targeting oilers. To give an example, the USS Lexington was dispatched from California to assist in the search for Amelia Earhart in July 1937. First, the Lexington had to top off its bunkers on the west coast. (101) It then proceeded on a high-speed run of about 30 knots to the Hawaiian Islands. Here, it had to refuel again from the fleet oiler USS Ramapo off Lahaina Roads, Maui. The result was that the Lexington did not arrive in the search area off Howland Island until 11 days after its departure from the west coast and could not even have done that without the support of the Ramapo. (102)

Ships sortieing from the west coast would be adding 2,000 nautical miles to their patrols into the Pacific just to get to Hawaii. (103) This number would have to be doubled, obviously, because these same ships would have to get back to the west coast if no oiler support were available and the oil storage at Pearl Harbor no longer existed.


bf109 Emil

 

i will agree with.das. us diggers put a stop to the niponese on the kokoda
trail
to me that wos a major battle well worth high prase
best krieg

 

I'd have to go by Bataan. Though tactically this was a defeat, strategically it can be termed as a victory because holding out for six months wrecked the Japanese time table. The defense of Bataan served as a massive roadblock that forced the Japanese to divert troops and resources in order to clear the road. Had that roadblock not been there, the other battles mentioned as decisive or important would probably not have happened.
Just imagine what Japan could've done with the extra six months if Bataan had folded up quickly.
My view, I think, is similar to how the Battle of Coral Sea is generally seen today. Tactically, the battle was roughly a draw but it was a strategic victory because it prevented the Japanese from achieving their prime objective.