DUKW's: effective or waste

The DUKW's that landed on Normandy made it ashore, unlike the DD tanks but were they effective inland during the real fighting, what was their purpose.

 

If your'e ever in Pittsburgh, PA, USA look for "Just Ducky" tours. You get to ride in a real DUKW from WWII while touring our beautiful and interesting city.

Later

 

To my knowledge DUKWs were not used in the first (or later main) waves of the assault on D Day as they were basically only softskin vehicles and not designed for assaults or attacks. They were mainly used to transfer troops between ships and LICs / landing craft and transfer stores and equipment. They were rarely used inland, although they did come in to full scale use again in the British Army during the Rhine battle in 1945 when much of the ground was flooded and they were an ideal sort of transport.

 

There must have been some with 30 Corps during 'Market Garden' - I've read somewhere of one getting to Driel but then sliding off the road into a ditch.

 

The DUKW was a very efficent vehicle for what it was designed to do. In the initial D-day landings DUKW's brought 105mm howitzers, their crews and, ammunition ashore with the landing waves. The cannon was loaded in the cargo bed. As I recall (I cannot find the reference on this right off so don't absolutely quote me on this) the 105 could be fired (with no doubt dubious accuracy) while afloat.
The truck also proved very efficent at moving supplies ashore both on D-day and after. In fact, it was found more efficent at doing so than tying up ships at the piers installed in the Mulberry harbors. The DUKW simply swam out to the cargo ship, took on a load and, then swam in and drove to a supply dump inland to unload.

 

The dukw was a useful supply tool but would never have been much use in assault. But then you have buffalos to assault with...

 

Where any used in re invasion of Burma? Seem to remember a pic one some crossing Irrawaddy (sp?)

 

i dont recall any dukw's being used in Burma and searches on the internet come up diddly squat so i wouldnt think that their were any there.

 

Is that you back, URQH ? .. or urqhi, urqhtobesure..it's all very confusing....

 

Martin....Urqh, Urqhi, Urgh...all same guy, all me..password..fish and chips so definately me, and Ive just looked in my suit jacket for a name tag but it says Burtons....

Im off to search me books for a pic of a Dukw on Burma, Im sure I saw one...Apart from the one on Thames for day trips, Ive been on the one on Formby beach in Merseyside...That one is a beauty, no added extras and scarey when in the water.

 

Hi Onthefield, seems they were there, If I get a chance Ill try and get a pic up, dont do pics usually but this one impressive, line of Dukws crossing under fire.

BRITISH 2 DIV
Report in SEAC Souvenir Newspaper (Price 1 Anna)
With the end of the Monsoon in 1944 came the long-awaited moment for the British to return in force to Burma, liberate Mandalav, its ancient capital, and link up with the American and Chinese fighting to re-open the Burma Road to China.

To supply the divisions for this great task, the Ye-Shwebo group of air­fields was required early. Air dropping alone could not maintain the forces and produce the build-up ­for the crossing of the Irrawaddy.

The British 2nd Division was given the task of capturing these vital air­fields. On 16 December 1944 the 2nd Division moved out of the East African’s Chindwin bridgehead. Their objective to break through the Jap screen, seize the Kabo Weir which controls the irrigation to the fertile Shwebo Plain. before the Jap could demolish it, and to capture the air­fields. The keynote was speed, and 2 Div met this demand.

In twenty days the infantry march­ed 130 miles from the Chindwin to Shwebo. On Christmas Day the Royal Berkshire Regiment forced Wainggyo Gorge. On New Year’s Eve a Flying Column of Royal Welsh Fusiliers, with tanks, captured Kabo Weir intact.

By January 6 Ye-U and its airfields were firmly in our hands. Against desperate Japanese resistance the Mu river was crossed by Dorsets and Camerons aided by tanks waterproof­ed over-night by the Divisional REME.

On 8 January the first Dakota landed at Ye-U. On 11 January Shwebo fell to the Worcestershire Regiment supported by tanks of the Carabiniers.

For this speedy advance credit to the Royal Engineers. One hundred and eighty diversions were made round blown bridges, fifty bridges re­paired to take our heavy traffic, five hundred road blocks were cleared and seven light aircraft strips built.

Credit also to the RASC who worked shifts of 72 hours on and 12 hours off to supply what the air could not. Credit to the REME and Provost who kept the roads clear and vehicles running, and to the RAOC who satisfied every demand for stores, spares and c1othing.

In record time, by team work of the highest order, the 2nd Division had set the stage for the capture of Mandalay. The 33 Ind Corps plan to capture Mandalay was now be­coming clear on the maps. 20 Ind Div was to come in as a right hook from the West, to cross the Irrawaddy between the Mu and the Chindwin.

19 Ind Div was the left hook, to link up on the East with 36 Div - from NCAC- cross the Irrawaddy at Singu, and move on Mandalay from the North. The British 2nd Division in the centre was to contain the enemy in the Sataing Hills sec­tor and to prepare to cross the Irra­waddy to drive on Mandalay from the West; Commander 33 Ind Corps was to control the timing of this crossing, which was to prove a decisive factor in the battle of Mandalay.

As a deception plan the 2nd Reconnaissance Regiment fooled the Japs into the belief that an armoured brigade was preparing to attach Sagaing while the 4th Infantry Brigade inflected server reverses on the Japs with the Royal Norfolks at Saue, the Lancashire Fusiliers at Kyaukse and the Royal Scots at Ywaithitgyi, aid and abetted by the Gordon Highlanders.

Thus the Japanese, expecting an attack on Sagaing, kept large num­bers of troops and guns on the wrong side of the Irrawaddy - for them - while the British 2nd and 20th Indian Divisions were really prepar­ing to cross the Irrawaddy between Ngazun and Myinmu and to advance on Mandalay front the West, cutting off all escape to the South.

On 25 February, 2nd Div crossed the Irrawaddy with men of the Cameron Highlanders, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Worcesters, - and Manchesters in the lead. The crossing was opposed. many boats were sunk, but thanks to the determination of the infantry and the outstanding efforts of RASC drivers with DUKWS and home-made rafts, and to the Royal Engineers who made entrances and exits to and from the river banks and built and operated the heavy rafts the bridgehead was made good.

Within 24 hours the 5th and 6th In­fantry Brigades were over complete and one troop of tanks. Within 48 hours 4th Infantry Brigade were also in action on the East bank and a complete squadron of the Carabiniers.

Though the British 2nd and the 20th Indian Divisions were faced by the greatest concentration of Jap artillery so far met in this theatre, it was made ineffective by the splendid work of the Royal Artillery Regiments and the co-operation of the RAF and USAAF. Doctors and men of the RAMC, helped by L 5 pilots, worked all hours to ensure that wounded were back in a comfortable hospital under care of surgeons and nurses within 4 hours.

With the Japanese pulling troops from the North to meet new threats from West and South the race quickened towards Mandalay so fast that it now fell to the British 2nd and 20th Indian Divisions not to capture Mandalay, but to seal all escape routes to the West and South and so combine with 19 led Div to destroy the Japanese forces trapped in the Sagaing - Mandalay area.

In a matter of days 5th Infantry Brigade captured Ava the South end of Ava Bridge and Amarapura, and made contact with 19th Ind. Div at the Police Station in the centre of Mandalay. 6th infantry Brigade by­passed Tada-U and with the Durham Light infantry captured Paleik, cutting the last main road and rail link between Mandalay and the South, while 4th Infantry Brigade crossed the Myitnge River to capture the main rail workshops and depots of North Burma.

So ended Act II of the liberation of Burma. In 110 days, 2 Div killed 1,112 counted Japs, took 67 prisoners and captured or destroyed 38 guns.

For the British 2nd Division it was a fitting culmination of a hard years fighting begun at Kohima in April 1944. They had halted the Jan at the Gates of India. They had chased him back into the wild hills to the Chindwin via Ukhrul. They were the first to cross the Burma border at Taniu. They hunted the Jap from the Chindwin to the Irrawaddy. They were in at the kill at Mandalay and blocked the exits by which the Jap had hoped to extricate remnants of his once proud army.

 

thanx urqh for clarifyin that for me. it seems the DUKW's were effective at both fronts. Was it Higgins or Hobart that designed the DUKW's for transport? Also was the DUKW ever used offensively or just for transportation

 

No, thanks to you Onthefield, made me dig out some old books from the shelves, thats what I love about this place.

Books linger on shelves some glanced at but never read in detail then someone brings summit up on here and its great to start looking thru old books again.

The Dukws at the Irrawaddy I beleive, were not used to force a crossing but crossed under fire I suppose a big difference.

I know your guys used them in quite large numbers too in the far east campaigns. But dont know of any use as a first wave craft sort of thing.

 

now the DUKW's seem to have been effective but were they duly used for ocean transport onto beaches as well as inland across rivers, streams etc. It seems the landed at Normandy however, they also were in Burma and French inland so how were they used?

 

Just did a quick search on assault dukws as a reference, and threw up 2 interesting times used in assault role though obviously not the norm for a dukw to go charging in I would have thought.

http://www.dnd.ca/site/Fourth_Dimension/2003/jul03/10_fd_e.htm

http://www.cyberport.co.uk/historyfile/portland_and_weymouth/d_day/rangers.htm

 

In Ambrose's book "Band of Brothers" the men of the 101st seemed to think the DUKW's were the best thing since sliced bread, if only because with their large low pressure tires it gave a very smooth ride, allowing them to get a comfortable rest

 

IIRC DUKW's were used quite effectivly by the Canadians a couple of times in Holland and at the crossing of the Scheldt

 

The DUKW is a General Motors design. It was developed in partnership with the National Defense Research Committee on request from the Quartermaster Service Corps. While GM did most of the design work, most DUKW's were produced by Yellow Truck and Coach Manufacturing.
The DUKW 353 (official title) means D= 1942 year of design acceptance, U = utility K = front wheel drive W = tandem rear driven axle (eg, 6 wheel drive)

 

thanks TA. now in light of the invasion of Normandy it seems that the DUKW's were a better design than the DD-tanks, being that they made it ashore and the tanks didn't. is this true? i my opinion the DUKW's were used in a more effective manner than the DD-tanks, the day of the invasion it was known not to be the best weather and the DD-tanks were still deployed, yet the DUKW's were also deployed, just as planned. The DUKW's reached the shore to provide ammunition/mortars/artillery? Another question is it seems the DUKW's weren't used much for the offensive yet were very effective in what they did. Were they ever tested to be an offensive weapon or strictly transport.

 

Onethefield, sorry there is no comparson due to the missions for the vehicles, the DD no matter what was a tank with a boom boom bang your dead gun, intended for assault, the Dukw was not.

The DD was used water just as a method of transportation to the beach and then off to fight as a the tank it was.

The DD was a transport, meant for water transport or boggy conditions and not as a fighting assault vehicle for supporting infantry.

And as you say you then have to take into account the weather, launching conditions, and even the seperate beach landings, the DD was successful in the Britsh and Canadian landings.

The currents in and conditions in the American sector and the launching times all added to the the disaster of the DD used by the Americans, and the whole DD mission was not in fact a failure in the American area of operations anyway.

I posted an article from the BBC on the Failed DD mission on Omaha a few months ago, Ill try and retreieve it.

The two were completely differently, after all the DD sherman was a tank, ok it made use of an amphibious skirt and water to get to the beach but once there it went back to its primary mission, that of a tank. The DD firing a gun the size of even the DD shermans would most probably have recoiled the thing back to Portsmouth in time for tea and biscuits, well what would be left of it after turning upside down a few times anyway.