Strong point Hillman and Caen?

"For the 1st Suffolk Regiment D-day had started quite well, they had landed on Sword beach at around 08:25 and had maid their way to a pre arranged assembly point about 1 km from the beach. By 09:30 the battalion was at strength in the woods near Hermanville, clearing the village as the went. The area had also been cleared earlier by the 6th Airborne.

They attacked the German Gun position "Morris" at around 13:00 and moved onto attack "Hillman".
This attack was repelled by the Germans and a second attack, using tanks from the Hussars was successful. By nightfall the command post surrendered with forty Germans being taken prisoner.

This delay in taking "Hillman" allowed the Germans time to reinforce their positions further inland and some historians claim that if "Hillman" could have been taken earlier in the day, Caen itself might have fallen in days rather than weeks."

http://www.atlantikwall.org.uk/hillman.htm

More info on the "Hillman" question; would Caen have fallen if "Hillman" had been taken sooner?

 

Maybe, but its possible that the Brits would have been exhausted after capturing the strongpoint and still failed to make Caen.

We'll never know.

I feel the better chance was a wheeling from the Canadian landings along thwe Courselles-Caen Rn & the Creully-Caen Rd rather than a push straight up from the 3rd Div position.

Many have commented that the troops were happy to have survived the day and considered their task completed.

 

There were more reasons to Caen not being taken on D-day than Hillman, even though Monty's intel did not know how heavily defended this site was.

Source: L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West: Volume I: The Battle of Normandy (History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1962), pages 183 to 213.

"It is impossible to say when the first beach exits were open. People were too busy to keep looking at their watches and some exits, opened fairly quickly, were later blocked by knocked-out vehicles or traffic jams. It had been foreseen that the rate of landing would be governed by the availability of exits and it had been planned to open twenty-eight in the first hour [on the British and Canada beaches]. The 3rd Division and the 50th [on Gold beach] appear to have had their first exits opened not much later but not nearly all that were needed; two hours or more elapsed before the first was opened on the Canadian beaches. The delay in each case had slowed the landings of the reserve brigades and this inevitability had far-reaching effects on the day's progress...."


The 185th Brigade Group had landed nearly up to time and the infantry were assembled in woods half a mile inland by about eleven o'clock. The brigade was to be the spearhead of the division's attack inland; it was to advance with all speed and if possible capture Caen and the ground immediately south of it that day. The advance was to be led by a mobile column of the 2nd King's Shropshire Light Infantry, riding on tanks of the Staffordshire Yeomanry and supported by the 7th Field Regiment, R.A.; but at noon the infantry's heavy weapons and vehicles were still not clear of the congestion on the shore and the tanks that had succeeded in getting through were being held up by a minefield."

Another reason for things not going to plan

Norman Scarfe Assualt division

"This is from Assualt division by Norman Scarfe page 274 Appendix C

Justice and truth seem not to have been near the forefront of David Belchem's mind in 1980 when his book "victory in Normandy" appeared. While the late Eric Lummis was at work on an account of the 1st Suffolk's undaunted D-day assualt on Hillman, I was able to show him the correspondance I had had with Carlo D'Este when he was writing " Decision in Normandy, the first serious description of the whole Normandy campaign which revealed a true understanding of the 3rd div's actions on that day. We agreed that none of the neighbouring assualt divisions was confronted by a headquarters bunker so formidably strong and well sited as Hillman, which the Suffolks had overcome by the end of that day. Nor did the other assualt divs meet a panzer attack as threatening as 21st Panzer divs, which Bill Eadies Staffirdshire yeomanry and the other 3 div support units so decisively drove off. Then, when we examined the speed of advance on the 3rd Canadian div and 50 div fronts, we found their performance closely comparable with ours.

So Lord Lovat's sneer at 8 brigades achievment in his complacent account of his own ( with its revealing title, March past 1978,p311) was ill informed and ill judged. The official verdict ( Victory in the west1962 p213) was properly appreciative of the two British and one Canadian seabourne assualts on that stormy sea shore, to have swept away all but a few isolated fragments of Hitlers atlantic wall and to have fought their way an average depth of four to six miles on most of a twenty four miles front was surely a notable feat of arms.

Michael Howard has persuasively suggested that 3 div's D-day plan to capture Caen, nine miles inland and with vital river crossings, was in the nature of things
"aspirational". This was demonstrated about an hour after midday when 9 brigade, our reserve brigade, lost its commander, intelligence officer and other staff, soon after coming ashore, all seriously injured, and one killed, by one mortar bomb. At once, the corps commander, Lt Gen Crocker, changed 9 brigades plan, and with it the whole divisions. Instead of heading boldly for Carpiquet airfield alongside 3 Can div, 9 brigade was switched to shield our left flank along the Orne and Caen canal. That was the end of any hope of taking Caen on D-day. It had nothing to do with slow advances that afternoon alleged by Wilmot, Belchem, et al.

Clearly, the corps commander was not determined to take Caen at all costs on D-day, and was anxious about the active presence of 21st panzer div. As the days passed, there was a curious silence in the national press about the presence of 3 div in Normandy. Divisions that had led the assualt were not pleased to see those that had made their name in North Africa and put up understandably stale performances in Normandy continuing to get "star" treatment in the newspapers. Our own men naturally felt indignant and wondered what their families would be thinking. Ill informed journalists followed Wilmots lead and hinted at our infantrys slowness on D-day, and at their brigadiers and their commanders lack of driving power, for not being in Caen that night. If this book has done nothing else, it will I hope have nailed that journalism as unpardonable calumny."

The book does in my view

This is from the I Corps Operation Order No.1 this dates from April/May 1944

"20. 3 British Division

a) The task of 3 British Division is to capture CAEN and secure a bridgehead over the R ORNE at that place.

b ) The enemy may develop his counter-attack--

i) Through CAEN
ii) Across R ORNE at RANVILLE - BENOUVILLE having established himself in the area East of R ORNE from which he can dominate the beaches West of OUISTREHAM and the Northern approaches to CAEN.
iii) West of Caen, between R MUE and the CAEN Canal
iv) Any combination of the above

In cases (ii) and (iii) using CAEN as a pivot, if he suceeds in forestalling us there.

c) To counter these enemy measure 3 British Division should, before dark on D-Day, have captured or effectively masked CAEN and be disposed in depth with brigade localities firmly established.

i) North-West of BENOUVILLE, in support of 6 Airborne Division operating East of R ORNE (having relieved the airborne troops West of the canal and taken over the defence of the BENOUVILLE-RANVILLE crossings.
ii) North-West of CAEN, tied up with the LEFT forward brigade locality of 3 Canadian Division.

Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defences prove to be strongly organised thus causing us the fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of its forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit its usefulness and to make its retention a costly business.

Andy

 

Hi Andy,

I just checked your site, great stuff there! I wonder if you are still in contact with Mr. Eric Patience of the 8 Bn Rifle Brigade. I am researching the life and death of a Lt of that unit in Holland in 1945, but am completely stuck. I wonder if you are able to help me out here.

Regards,

Stevin

 

Hi Stevin, I certainly am, and hopefully paying Eric a visit soon. Ill send you his addy through a message. He a lovely old fella, very softly spoken.

When I went to Normandy this June, I went to Bayeux war cem for Eric to find 4 of his mates that were all killed by the same MG42 at a place called St Martins. Eric told me that he was amazed that the CWGC had buried them altogether in the same order that his platoon had after they had been killed.

Andy


Im sure in your research you will have come across the name of Noel Bell?

 

Thanks Andy, Got your PM. I appreciate it.

Stevin

 

Thanx guys for the info and especially Andy!!

 

Just to elaborate a bit more, on some reasons why 3rd Div did not reach or take Caen on D-day. Despite some claims, 3rd div had a pretty rough landing, 29 out of 38 assualt landing craft were lost. The landing was more strongly opposed than they had expected. Underwater and shore obstacles were more numerous than the 1943 photos taken of the beach defenses. These factors caused considerable congestion on the beaches which derailed the carefully planned time table for the landings. This had a knock on effect and slowed the thrust inland.

Although by 11am 3 infantry batt's were ashore and ready to move inland (KSLI, Norfolks, Warwicks) the armour on which the KSLI were to hitch a ride and have as cover were still back on the beach. Which by mid morning was chaotic at times. One of the reasons being was that as the tide came in, it was estimated that 30 yards of sand would be left exposed to continue landing vehicles and supplies, but as the tide came in it was only 10 yards of sand, and very soft sand at that.

The only way the LC's could beach and unload thier cargos were to land exactly opposite the beach exits. This was not easy as the beach was by now full of debris, burt out DD tanks, hit LC's, RE armoured vehicles and so on. To make things even worse the German coastal batteries were now ranging in on the beaches, which was made easier as they used the AA barrage ballons anchored off shore to do this.

So the KSLI were awaitng the Staff's yoemanry but they were stuck nose to tail getting off the beach. It got so bad at one point that landing was halted for half an hour to clear the exits. It was the KSLI that were to lead the assualt on Caen and the Norfolks and Warwicks (although some Warwicks went to reinforce the airborne bridghead) moping up the gains as they captured them.

On the way 185 brigade encountered the 2nd battalion of the 192 PZ grens on Periers ridge who were supported by SP guns.

Also on the rear slope there were 6 Russian 12.2cm howitzers firing for all they were worth, these should have been knocked out on H hour by fighter bombers or by the heavies.

Beuville and Bieville were reached with the latter around 4pm. Y company KSLI and a troop of Staffs yeo were immediately sent on to Lebisey wood, recce units soon saw 24 (more like around 40) German tanks advancing fast from the direction of Caen. The order was given to dig in and defensive posisitions were taken up.

D+1 and the 3rd div formed a kind of wedge shape pointing towards Caen which lay around 3 miles away. Another set of problems now faced 3rd div, there was a 2 mile wide gap between them and the Canadian 3rd div. This gap was used the evening before by the 21st PZ divs attack (the only one which the allies faced on D-day) between this gap were some German strongpoints still holding out. Also on the Eastern flank 6th airborne were being frequently attacked and being a lightly armed div this caused great concern for Crocker.

Crocker either put the bulk of 3rd div into an all out assualt on Caen, or he could pause and consolidate, as he did not have the strength to do both. He decided to consolidate and closed the gap between both Brit and Canadian 3rd divs and so linking all the British beachheads.

Andy