Who ordered the bombing of Stalingrad that would reduce it to "a fortress of rubble?

This is the second time I have posed this question, however, last time I recieved no response. Who ordered such severe bombing of Stalingrad that it was reduced to a "fortress of rubble"? This was not a lengthy process, rather it happened in roughly two days. Was it Richtofen himself, or did Paulus request that he obliterate the city?

 

Not 100% sure but I think Paulus ordered it because they[6th Army] came under counter-attack by 62 Army with tanks pouring out of the tank factory.Paulus had accomplished the original goal of surrounding Stalingrad and cutting off the Volga. Hopefully the city would surrender or at least evacuate.Even if the Luftwaffe did'nt bomb it,a frontal attack of a city would have been costly. Tanks,Paks hidden inside buildings.Paulus' artillery and tanks would have demolished them anyway.

 

Do you happen to know where you found that peice of information, because I have been looking for months and cannot find a book that clearly states who ordered the bombings. The sources I have viewed acknowledge that it took place and give the results, but not who ordered it. Do you really think that tanks and artillery could do the amount of damage to a city that the Luftwaffe did? Check out the aerial photographs of the damage done to the city, the desolate landscapes and the view from the other side of the Volga. If tanks and artillery could do that, it would have taken a hell of alot longer than two bloody days!

 

You probably have the book,"Stalingrad.Infernal Caulron". As you said the book does'nt say "who"ordered the bombing.Seems logical Paulus would have made the call.The Luftwaffe can't just come in on their own,not knowing if "friendlies" are in the area.

 

Unfortunately cannot remember who ordered this although on Leningrad and Moscow Hitler´s order was to crush them down to earth and in the case of Moscow put an artificial lake instead.

So I guess it was Hitler in the end...

But anyway I´ll see for data in my books on this but here´s something interesting on Richthofen´s doings in the area...

http://stonebooks.com/archives/980721.shtml

"Richthofen aimed to ensure success by reinforcing his old Fliegerkorps, VIII, now commanded by his protege, Martin Fiebig, with the bulk of the aircraft from Luftflotte 4's other Fliegerkorps, Pflugbeil's IV, in the Caucasus. This concentration of airpower at a single schwerpunkt -- Richthofen's hallmark -- resulted in the 23 August raid on Stalingrad which matched the intensity and civilian casualties of a typical Allied strategic bombing mission against Germany in 1944, leaving much of the city gutted by fire and as many as 20,000-40,000 dead. As usual, though, most of Richthofen's sorties were in direct support of the advancing infantry and panzers clawing through the streets of the city. Confident that his flyers' exertions had opened the way through the city in the last days of August, the air chief (never one to underplay his own achievements) dispatched his operations officer to complain to Goering and Hitler that the army was not moving fast enough or decisively enough to take advantage of the golden opportunities his Luftflotte was handing them."

 

Actually I missed that part at the end of the article...

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Fliegerkorps VIII performed well against its primary target, Stalingrad, pounding it into rubble during heavy raids, but its continued bombardment of the ruins in accordance with Hitler's insistence that every street be cleared of the enemy led to a great waste of resources. For two months, Fiebig's units rained hundreds of tons of bombs on the ruins each day, turning small heaps of large rubble into large heaps of small rubble, but achieving nothing substantial. This was neither Fiebig's or Richthofen's fault. Hitler wanted Stalingrad taken, and he insisted that all efforts be directed to that end. Even after he realized that the oil fields could not be gained in 1942 and ordered Richthofen to destroy them from the air, he still insisted that the destruction and capture of Stalingrad remained his highest priority.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is now reasonable to argue that Richthofen's air fleet could have dealt the Soviet economy a major blow, from which it would have taken at least several months to recover, if it had unloaded as many bombs on Baku as on Stalingrad. Heavy damage to that oil metropolis, which alone accounted for 80 percent of all Soviet production, was possible during August and September. Richthofen still possessed a strong bomber force and airfields within striking range, and the VVS's presence in the Caucasus was still relatively weak. By October, when Hitler finally ordered attacks on oil fields, Richthofen's bomber fleet was much reduced and most forward airfields had been badly damaged by VVS forces, which were now far stronger. The opportunity had been missed.

 

On Beevor´s Stalingrad it is claimed Richthofen got the order for Stalingrad from Hitler´s HQ to deliver all his planes to Stalingrad battle.Not literally to destroy it to pieces (?) however but what else would it mean...

 

Thanks alot Kai for your input. I have looked in Stopped at Stalingrad, Infernal Cauldron, Paulus and Stalingrad, the Beevor book, Hitler's Stalingrad Decisions, and several others but have not found mention of actual orders. But it is as you say Kai, if Hitler ordered all the strength of Richtofen's Air Fleet to Stalingrad, what else could it mean?

 

You´re welcome, Daniel!

And from the books I think it seems like Richthofen himself wanted to bomb the oil fields more than Stalingrad .

 

Just browsed into this thread as I'm in a Stalingrad-phase-of-interest just now.

Interestingly, it seems that Daniel Jones' original question still hasn't been definitively answered. Since those days, we've had some great books such as Joel Hayward's Stopped At Stalingrad and the Glantz two-of-three-volume magnum opus ; none of them provide an answer. ( In fact, Glantz barely mentions the initial air onslaught at all).

We can all make assumptions, but 2,000 sorties in a day is a lot, and one wonders who did give - what turned out to be - rather a fateful order ?

 

It doesn't seem that we're going to find a definitive, quotable order for this operation.

But I note that in Christer Bergstrom's 'Stalingrad - The Air Battle 1942-43' he states that ' .. Generaloberst von Richthofen had ordered these attacks to annihilate the Soviet defenders of Stalingrad.' He later viewed the results from his personal Storch and recorded with satisfaction in his diary that'...Stalingrad is completely destroyed'. ( All quotes from p.73 ).

We can perhaps see the background in a document which can be quoted - Richthofen's message to his units of August 23rd : -

' The battle of Stalingrad, the stronghold of the Reds, has begun. By dealing destructive blows against the enemy, the Luftwaffe will bring this battle to a victorious end. I expect all unit commanders in Luftflotte 4, in the air as well as on the ground, to give their utmost to bring us Final Victory'. ( Bergstrom, p.72 )

Richthofen was a notoriously strong-willed and forceful character ( OK - let's call it arrogant ) who barely tolerated those he saw as dullards in the infantry. It would be in character for him to initiate the attacks hoping for a decisive, smashing blow.

Instead, as we now know, it gave the Soviets a wonderful defensive position - much as happened at Caen two years later.

 

BTW, I recall reading that no Luftwaffe units were given the task to bomb the boats etc crossing the Volga. That sounds weird but maybe it has something to do with the number of planes usable and if the main aim was to destroy the city, this might as well explain that the bombs were not used for the boats.

 

OK - it's only taken me 17 years to arrive at an answer for this thread - give me a break !

I'm currently reading Richard Muller's fine 'The German Air War In Russia' ( Baltimore, 1992 ) which provides a good description and context of the air attack on Stalingrad.
The actual attack was indeed ordered by Hitler in Fuhrer Directive # 45, dated 23rd July 1942. This is a long, messy and rather muddled document whose instructions exceed the capability of the Luftwaffe, coming so soon after Crimea operations.

The key portion here is in paragraph B - 'Air Force'.

...the operations of Army Group B against Stalingrad and the western part of Astrakhan will be supported. The early destruction of the City of Stalingrad is especially important.' ( 'Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945' ed. Trevor-Ropr, London & New York 1964 ).

As Muller points out, absolute concentration of forces was almost an article of faith with Richthofen and on August 23rd 1942, the entire available force of Luftflotte 4 carried out the massive initial bombarment of Stalingrad.

With hindsight, we know this to be an error. But Richthofen and many others at the time would have considered that most Soviet resistance, if not destroyed, would have had its' morale shattered under the onslaught.

 

How feasible would it have been to attack Baku and other oil targets? It isn't just a question of the target being within the theoretical range of the bomber. You have to have airfields for a sufficient force, close enough to carry a reasonable bomb load, ground crew and equipment, and a steady supply of fuel and ordnance - all reasonably safe from air or ground attack. Could these conditions be met in the recently occupied regions of the Caucasus?

Air commanders and advocates consistently overestimated the effect of bombing, assuming that targets could be forever wiped off the map. Experience showed that damage was rarely total, facilities were soon repaired, and repeated attacks were necessary.

 

The Caucasus oilfields were within reach of the Luftwaffe, but again, Fuhrer Directive #45 goes on to say ; -

'Ib view of the decisive importance of the Caucusus oilfields for the further prosecution of the war, air attacks against their refineries and storage tanks, and against ports used for oil shipments on the Black Sea, will only be carried out if the operations of the Army make them absolutely essential' ( italics in the original ).

It seems that Hitler didn't want to destroy the big prize - and it was 'everything for Stalingrad'. A few He111 atatcks were carried out later but without great effect, and in any case, the oilfields were totally destroyed by the Russians before they fell into German hands.