most amateur of historians

Hello all, I created this account because I get some ideas from my reading about ww2 and want to discuss them. I get quite influenced by particular authors, and they sort of set my view of the how and why things play out; but then I'm easily influenced in a different direction by another author's point of view or thesis or even lack of one.

I know a fair bit about the eastern front and that is the main thing I focus my reading and learning on, but I'm looking to expand to other parts of the European theatre as well as the Pacific too.

I made my account because I want to start a discussion about David Stahel's thesis that the Germans basically lost the war with the failure of Operation Barbarossa; and that Barbarossa itself was failed or, stopped by the Soviets, in the opening 8 weeks or so (it's been a while since I read his books). Glantz seems to believe something similar while not (as far as I know) going so far as to make a thesis of it. And we are, after all, in the Glantz era.

I'll save the rest for the actual thread when I make it. But that right there is a good introduction to me, what I read, and what I'm interested in. I've taken a long break from my years of very heavy ww2 reading, and been more casually doing audiobooks mixed in with a lot of other topics (and have even gone over to fiction which I almost never read). But I want to get back into studying about the war and increasing my understanding and knowledge of the war. I think that having people to discuss it with will help me stay focused and get motivated to keep reading.

I'm also looking to expand my reading list, because I'm currently planning on re-reading some of my favorites (they tend to be so information-packed that you can read them a dozen times and still learn new things). I'm particularly interested in high-quality German and American memoirs (I've done most of the classics and have a few unread in the library). I especially like the German memoirs, but I've had some good experiences with the American memoirs, it's just a bit less exciting as it's all a bit more familiar to me as an American. I also have some Soviet memoirs in the library, but have yet to read them. I'm planning on doing 'Rzhev Slaughterhouse' which is not a Soviet memoir but would be my first book from a Soviet or Russian author with a more Russian point of view and access to Russian sources.

I'm currently doing "From the Realm of a Dying Sun" on Audible. It's definitely not going to be as useful in that format and I can't really take notes, but it's a little too boring for me to read and not fall asleep. A similar type of tome I'm planning on reading is Glantz's "Barbarossa Derailed" volumes, but again, boring. I won't list my whole reading list here, but I have a feeling some things might be recommended that are on it! Anyway I'm looking to get THAT level of detail and understanding, but in a more engaging format; so perhaps books with a little more narrow of a focus, or a less scholarly and more narrative prose.

 

Welcome to the forum. Rich A. in Pa.

 

Welcome to the forums!

 

Another drive by...

 

in Special Tasks Sudaplatov mentions that the German studies of the '30s showed the German invasion of Russia would run out of supplies. Soviet spies got this info back to USSR.

Can anyone confirm any study by the Germans in the '30s?

 

I know this was shown in the pre-invasion planning, they only had fuel for about July if I recall right. I don’t remember who was raising the alarm bells. But this was 40-41.

They couldn’t have known in the 30s if they’d have run out of supplies in 1941. They weren’t really planning to invade the soviets in the 30s so I’d say this isn’t true. Someone may have pointed this obvious fact out, but it would be irrelevant in the 30s.

They knew damn well they would run out of supplies in 41. That’s why they planned a 6 week war, and subsequent railroad advance. They didn’t even have WINTER CLOTHING.

 

It's important to remember that Hitler in the 30s was thinking that he would have the entire West basically, including Britain, backing his eventual invasion of the Soviet Union. This didn't pan out of course. He didn't think France and Britain would declare war when he invaded Poland. And the West also looked the other way as the Soviets also invaded along with the Nazis, which is a little crazy.

Another thing to remember is that Germany didn't really rearm until the late 30s, and their military even at the invasion of Poland wasn't even that great. And when they invaded the Soviet Union, their tanks were laughably ridiculous, already obsolete, without high-velocity guns and barely any armor.

It's very possible that someone did do some study about invading the Soviet Union (which remember in the 30s, would mean AFTER an invasion of Poland). And they would have definitely seen that they run out of supplies almost immediately (especially in the 30s). It's probable that Soviet spies gathered intelligence in the 30s and told Stalin not to worry about a German invasion because, well, they didn't need to worry about it AT ALL. The Soviets would have CRUSHED the Germans in the 30s. Especially if we are talking pre officer purge.

Hitler's plan of getting the West to support him by bullying them, calling their bluffs, and uniting them against a common enemy (they did all hate bolshevism you know..) well... that didn't work. So Hitler first had to deal with France and Britain before turning East. But he failed to bring Britain to the table. Hitler didn't really want to invade Britain, he just wanted them to be on their side economically or at the very least, stop blockading and harassing the Germans around the world. That would have been a big help to Germany. And if he could have gotten the British to give him oil? Well.. anyway it didn't happen.

Hitler's early logic for planning an invasion, or early excuse, was this what was needed to get Britain to the table. He saw the Soviets as Britain's last hope, which isn't exactly true. He thought if he finally knocked out his arch-nemesis Stalin and colonized the East well, Britain would finally come to the table. This probably still wouldn't have happened but, it wouldn't have mattered because if Hitler won in the East then there would be no way to dislodge the Germans from Europe, they would have won the war, period.

So after that initial excuse that invading the Soviets was an extension of the battle of Britain, it started to take on its own meaning as it was realized just how important the war was. But they still kept that mindset that the Soviet-German war would be some kind of sideshow to the real war with Britain. They thought they would just roll up the Soviets in weeks time, that the whole country would collapse like 1917, yada yada ya.

The issue of why they lost the war isn't even so much a supply issue or oil issue, it's the fact that the Soviets never collapsed as they reasonably could have been expected to do. The supply situation didn't help things, but that's not what stopped them from reaching Moscow by September. Not having oil didn't destroy the 6th army, and it didn't lose them the battle of Kursk. It's quite impressive that the Soviets didn't collapse, considering that they lost their standing army and basically ran out of food so everyone was starving.. but they had an iron grip and brilliantly kept the war economy going. Also another key thing was that Japan did NOT invade Eastern Russia like Hitler wanted, and Hitler likely declared war on the US after Pearl Harbor because he DESPERATELY needed Japan to start another war with Russia which they didn't.

Stalin was warned multiple times that the Germans were invading on 22 June, but he'd also been warned of other invasion dates because the invasion was postponed a few times. So he ignored the warnings. We can bet the Soviets knew a lot about the Germans, and the Germans didn't know much about the Soviets. They actually created the first high-altitude spy planes (about 30k feet which is high by those days' standards).

 

It's important to remember that Hitler in the 30s was thinking that he would have the entire West basically, including Britain, backing his eventual invasion of the Soviet Union. This didn't pan out of course. He didn't think France and Britain would declare war when he invaded Poland. And the West also looked the other way as the Soviets also invaded along with the Nazis, which is a little crazy.

Another thing to remember is that Germany didn't really rearm until the late 30s, and their military even at the invasion of Poland wasn't even that great. And when they invaded the Soviet Union, their tanks were laughably ridiculous, already obsolete, without high-velocity guns and barely any armor.

It's very possible that someone did do some study about invading the Soviet Union (which remember in the 30s, would mean AFTER an invasion of Poland). And they would have definitely seen that they run out of supplies almost immediately (especially in the 30s). It's probable that Soviet spies gathered intelligence in the 30s and told Stalin not to worry about a German invasion because, well, they didn't need to worry about it AT ALL. The Soviets would have CRUSHED the Germans in the 30s. Especially if we are talking pre officer purge.

Hitler's plan of getting the West to support him by bullying them, calling their bluffs, and uniting them against a common enemy (they did all hate bolshevism you know..) well... that didn't work. So Hitler first had to deal with France and Britain before turning East. But he failed to bring Britain to the table. Hitler didn't really want to invade Britain, he just wanted them to be on their side economically or at the very least, stop blockading and harassing the Germans around the world. That would have been a big help to Germany. And if he could have gotten the British to give him oil? Well.. anyway it didn't happen.

Hitler's early logic for planning an invasion, or early excuse, was this what was needed to get Britain to the table. He saw the Soviets as Britain's last hope, which isn't exactly true. He thought if he finally knocked out his arch-nemesis Stalin and colonized the East well, Britain would finally come to the table. This probably still wouldn't have happened but, it wouldn't have mattered because if Hitler won in the East then there would be no way to dislodge the Germans from Europe, they would have won the war, period.

So after that initial excuse that invading the Soviets was an extension of the battle of Britain, it started to take on its own meaning as it was realized just how important the war was. But they still kept that mindset that the Soviet-German war would be some kind of sideshow to the real war with Britain. They thought they would just roll up the Soviets in weeks time, that the whole country would collapse like 1917, yada yada ya.

The issue of why they lost the war isn't even so much a supply issue or oil issue, it's the fact that the Soviets never collapsed as they reasonably could have been expected to do. The supply situation didn't help things, but that's not what stopped them from reaching Moscow by September. Not having oil didn't destroy the 6th army, and it didn't lose them the battle of Kursk. It's quite impressive that the Soviets didn't collapse, considering that they lost their standing army and basically ran out of food so everyone was starving.. but they had an iron grip and brilliantly kept the war economy going. Also another key thing was that Japan did NOT invade Eastern Russia like Hitler wanted, and Hitler likely declared war on the US after Pearl Harbor because he DESPERATELY needed Japan to start another war with Russia which they didn't.

Stalin was warned multiple times that the Germans were invading on 22 June, but he'd also been warned of other invasion dates because the invasion was postponed a few times. So he ignored the warnings. We can bet the Soviets knew a lot about the Germans, and the Germans didn't know much about the Soviets. They actually created the first high-altitude spy planes (about 30k feet which is high by those days' standards).

 

Hitler used that as a rationale for embarking on a two-front war, but expansion to the east - not original with him of course - had been his fundamental goal ever since he started thinking about such things. From his point of view, fighting in the west was the distraction from the real war.

There was some satisfaction in paying the French back for 1918, but his preference with regard to Britain was an accommodation based on respecting each other's sphere of influence; he could never understand why the British would not accept such an arrangement.

 

Not challenging you guys, but here's the quote from pages 136-7:

German panzer forces were about 1455 (Dec. 1936) Pzkw I in service, 84 Pzkw II. Pzkw III were just coming into production (both from Speilberger books, Panzer I & II). Germany had yet to overrun Czechoslovakia (1938) and grab the Pz 35(t) and 38(t). As far as the Kreigsmarine was concerned, it had the three armored ships (pocket battleships) as its heaviest units and six light cruisers. The Scharnhorst and Bismarck classes were just being laid down. The U-boat fleet was still tiny in 1936 with most of them being of the small Type II. Type VII was just being launched in 1936-7. We're talking about 50 U-boats. So was the fuel reserve projections based on the forces thought to be neccessary for waging war or actual forces that existed?

Von Seeckt was in China from 1933-5 as part of the German Military Mission to the KMT. Any plans he may have had would pre-date the creation of the panzerwaffe.

Anybody have information on the German winter games of 1936-7 or was Sudoplatov spewing commie BS?

 

Well, if you look at Van Creveld, Supplying War he states the same thing. The German logistics system was poor. But, what Glantz, Van Creveld, et al., miss--and I chalk this up to their being historians not engineers or business types-- is that a bigger issue for the Germans invading Russia was they were poor civil engineers. What the Germans needed was a focus on construction engineering to improve basic infrastructure behind their armies as they advanced.

This would have become a force multiplier for the Germans. More trains per day further forward takes the strain off truck and wagon supply columns. Better roads mean trucks (in particular) wear out slower meaning fewer replacements are needed. Having simple to erect prefabbed buildings means your troops and supplies are less exposed to the weather.

It doesn't have to be on the mega scale the US did this stuff, just much better than the Germans actually did. Much of the German supply issues were really civil engineering issues as the roads, rail net, and other infrastructure in Russia was so poor to begin with.

 

All I know about is that someone pointed out the fuel issue during the direct planning for Barbarossa. Stahel in his thesis book writes extensively on the planning and that’s where I remember it from.

I don’t personally know about earlier planning, but I’m sure the oil situation was as bad or worse in the 30s

 

It's hard to project fuel requirements when you don't even know what future equipment would need. Bigger, heavier tanks, bigger, heavier ships, bigger heavier aeroplanes and more transport to move the fuel all mean more fuel needed. Also in 1936 the Luftwaffe still had biplane fighters, fewer overall aircraft. How do you project fuel requirements? More motorized or panzer divisions, more aircraft, more ships all need more fuel. Then there's the issue of storage and transport. It's like the necessity of building a dry dock before you build a bigger battleship. The dry dock comes first unless you don't want a facility to do maintenance and repair.

 

The problem is even more complicated. First, Russians used larger gauge rail stock. The Germans gambled on capturing soviet rolling stock which didn’t happen that much. Second, soviet tank engines carried a lot more fuel so refueling stations were too far apart to support German trains.

Perhaps the rail lines were poor. The issue was really they were different, and yes the infrastructure was poor too. The Germans literally had to rebuild the railroads and construct new refueling stations from scratch for their trains.

and here’s where soviet infrastructure was poor; roads. There was basically one road in Russia that led to Moscow. Everything else was a dirt track.

the roads not only slowed logistics but also increased fuel consumption. And it also made rain more consequential as the roads literally disappeared. This all increases oil consumption, which the Germans didn’t have enough of. WW2 has been basically proven as the first war for oil.

so yes, soviet infrastructure was poor to almost non existent. But they’re one decent infrastructure; which made it possible for the soviets to win the civil war; trains… well that didn’t jive with German trains. So the Germans gambled on capturing soviet trains and lost the gamble. This means re laying rail along the tracks, and new refueling stations from the ground up in a place with no electricity or plumbing basically anywhere.

The Germans did succeed by around 43 in bringing logistics infrastructure to Ukraine. It was the most developed colony in European history in a matter of months, years, instead of decades and centuries; because the Germans were desperate to supply the front lines and get food production up and running. As well as production in Donbas. Lots of resources in Ukraine that hitler got a lot of people killed defending when the war was lost anyway.

So yes you’re absolutely right, and the Germans didn’t properly factor this into fuel calculations. But even if they had roads and German trains, the Germans didn’t have enough oil to fuel the entire army operations past July.

The Germans ran low on fuel before reaching Moscow and that’s part of why the advance changed from a 3 point advance to 1 point. And the reasoning for operation Blau was getting more oil from the Caucasus

 

And all of that could have been anticipated.

Since the rail lines were poor and would have to be regaged, you stockpile ties ahead of time, along with having cars that can bring in new ballast where necessary. You have some rock crushing plants to make gravel and sand. These could run on kerosene or even wood gas. As the army advances, the engineers simply use old oil and other heavy petroleum products to coat dirt roads after a grading. You then dump gravel on that surface and let the vehicles and wagons grind it into the coating.

Where smaller bridges and culverts are needed you have sawmills produce the materials or use prefabricated lengths of steel corrugated pipe and cover these with soil and gravel. That way when the muddy season comes, the roads are still passable to some degree.

For coal and water stations, you have prefabricated buildings brought in by rail and trains using dump cars deposit the coal for initial use at the site.

It's all doable if you have some forward thinking civil engineers and military officers that understand the importance of this.