US Broad Front Doctrine

What was the doctrinal thinking behind the US Preference for continuous assaults on a broad front?

One of the big differences between US and British (and German) Doctrine was that the US Army have did not appear to have the same emphasis on concentration of effort at a single point.

One of the fundamental principles of the German way of war was for the commander to determine the point of mainn effort -the Schwehrpunkt.

The British under Montgomery famously developed tactics based on set-piece battles; Colossal Cracks (Stephen Hart). This firepower-based approach concentrated on a relatively narrow sector, capturing important ground prepared for the inevitable counter attack. Each operation was meticulously prepared with the intention of minimising casualties. There has been much criticism of this approach since Hart's 2004 (?) book. (I am not directly interested in any more detailed criticisms of Monty's methods. I have tons of them)

British commentators have criticised the US approach in Italy and Normandy for attacks over a wide frontage. (1st Cassino January 1944, Battle of the Hedgerows June/July 1944)

What was the logic behind the US Commanders' thinking, "Hey, I'll spread my troops along the line and order everyone to attack until the enemy breaks."

Can anyone recommend any primary sources for this US doctrine?
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dbl tap

 

Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe. The Broad Front was more of a political decision. Monty (historically) envisioned a narrow thrust and Pattton's gas was cut off for Market Garden. The same happened for Varsity-Plunder but the 9th Armor captured the Ludendorff Bridge first and advancement was throttled by limited advance. Then Patton crossed the Rhine and Varsity-Plunder lost its importance.

I mentioned historically. Monty's narrrow thrust (which would put him in the limelight) goes back to Tunisia with Americans playing a supporting role and again at Sicily with Patton playing a supporting role. Strategy wasn't bad but Monty was not the fellow to pull it off. Patton was.

I also think Monty prolonged the war. Alexander should have served in the Northern Europe and Monty left in Italy.

 

I was not thinking of the post break out dilemma. I was more interested in the broad push along the line adopted by Mark Clark in 1st Cassino and Bradley's Hedgerow fighting.

There are pros and cons of both approaches. As a Brit RMAS graduate and student of the German way of war, of course, I believe in concentration, economy of effort and the need to have an identifiable point of main effort. M< Montgomery's set-piece operations are a rational way to ensure success within acceptable casualties (see S Hart, JK Buckley et al)

What is the logic behind push everywhere along the line as if its 1864 and the enemy is the Army of North Virginia ?

 

Sorry for the misunderstanding.

As for Bradley, the only tihng that comes to mind is expanding the bridgehead so as create space for the breakout, Operation Cobra. Funny thing about the hedgerows, the Allies were aware of then but didn't train its soldiers to fight in them and didn't plan for them. The hedgerows in England could not be compared to those in Normandy.

Turning to 1864, heaavy concerted attack was tried by Hancock's II Corps at the Mule Shoe at Spottsylvania Court House. It was a slaughter. Then Grant resorted to flanking at the Anna River, and again when he was stopped at Cold Harbor, and again when he crossed the James and had Butler attack too at the Bermuda Hundred. This continued all along Petersburg and finally succeeded at Five Forks which made the Confederate ring of defenses around Richmond and Petersburg unfeasible.

 

A single thrust can only go so far before it starts to run out of steam. Troops get tired, vehicles need maintenance, they outrun their supplies, and of course the enemy eventually responds.

I think the strategy the Russians developed was ideal. They would carry a breakthrough as far as it could go, meanwhile building up strength for another attack on a different sector of the front, each blow leaving the enemy a little more off-balance for the next.

Eisenhower took the broad front strategy to the extreme, for example insisting that all his armies needed to close up to the Rhine before anyone attempted to cross. He was particularly adamant about 6th Army Group clearing the Colmar pocket, but if you're crossing to the east bank of a river, what better place for enemy troops to be than stuck on the west bank?

 

Thanks. Looking at fM100-5 It seems that commanders were expected to make one or two thrusts as a major axis and one or two others as minor or secondary attacks to pin the enemy. Given that most formations or units have between two and four subordinate formations, an interpretation might be that everyone is expected to attack, except not all with the full support from artillery engineers tanks etc.

 

The Soviets' strategy was deep penetration. This envisioned breraking thrrough the enemy's line and the armored thrusts which would race far into the enemy's territory and meeting up with another column that was coming from another direction. Operation Bagration is a good example of this.

It might incur initial heavy iosses in infantry and the Soviets felt that was cheaper than a prolonged attempt to penetrate enemy lines.

Patton certainly didn't believe in broad front an sought a weakpoint through which his men would pour through.

 

Evidence and sources for the claim for Patton's preferred tactics?