Arnhem 60th

Among the many upcoming items planned for the Market-Garden 60th, spotted this re-enactment announcement : -

http://home.wxs.nl/~peter.vrolijk/opscom.html

 

Should be great, Martin!

Here is another great site about the Dutch aprticipation in Market Garden. Check out this great site! http://get-me.to/september1944

 

Tahnk's both

Had not een this announcement anywhere yet but am sure to go have a look. Maybe see you there??

Cheers Popski

 

Watch this space, Popski !

Here's more ; -

http://www.airborne-herdenkingen.nl/

[ 28. August 2004, 04:28 PM: Message edited by: Martin Bull ]

 

Martin

Have a holiday that week and will be very busy. From Eindhoven onto Arnhem there will be many commemorations but I have only two wheels on my BSA. Have been asked to play the Last Post in Germany with some para vet's on friday , there's the race to the bridge and they show "A bridge too far "on a big screen, etc etc. Hope we have good weather that week. Will be sleeping in a tent at the Rhine river and maybe a good swim across the Rhine on Sunday. But we are looking forward to it.Just keep each other posted for the nice events

Cheers Popski

 

Well, it would be good to see you, Popsk....here's hoping !

 

Well Martin

I will be arriving on the 16th and camp near the Rhine, and be driving my BSA as much as possible.

Whoa Muhammed

BTW How is this yell written correctly??

Cheers Popski

 

I've seen it written the way you have it and also as 'Wohaa Mohammed'... I'll be checking some of my books for more detail. ( You can also hear it on the film 'Theirs Is The Glory' )

 

Also heard it in Band of Brothers in the Airborne evacuationscene.
Will you be taking a bath in the Rhine on Sunday, Martin??

Popski

PS Will have a battlefield tour at the Airbornemuseum tomorrow to get a good look around

[ 10. September 2004, 02:46 PM: Message edited by: Popski ]

 

I may just give the swim in the Rhine a miss, Popski - I'll leave that to the young whippersnappers among us ( ). BTW, you should post a picture of yourself in full gear so that we can recognize you.....?

 

Martin

I'll be on a BSA with 30Corps Signals and have a bugle with me. My mate will be 30 Corps Signals with a bugle but riding a Norton. Tried to get a photo on this forum but nogo for me. Will try later on again.

Pop

 

Anyone tell me why Ike "allowed" Montgomery to use the 1st Airborne Division in Arnhem instead of Eindhoven or Nijmegen? What I mean is apart from the two brigades from 1st Airborne that fought in Sicily, the unit never fought entirely together before Market Garden. Yes, I know that Market Garden was a British Operation, but does anyone else think it was possibly a bad decision, on Monty's part, to place a relatively unblooded Division at the head of the fighting. At least- and don't take it wrong since I'm an American- the 82nd and 101st were already seasoned, at least to some extent. What also compounds the question for me is the fact that intelligence even knew about the two SS Panzer Divisions there as well. I am not trying to question the courage with which Urquhart's men fought, and I know that the failure to hold the bridge was due to forces beyond his control; however, I do think Monty's vaingloriousness hindered what I believe was proper judgment. Who knows, the American Divisions may not have fared so well either, but then again I believe Ike's descision to give Monty carte blanche in the setting up of the operation was not in his best judgement either. Anyone care to educate me???

 

All the airborne forces were organized into the First Allied Aiborne Army commanded by Lt-Gen Lewis H Brereton and Brereton's staff were responsible for the 'Market-Garden' plan. This would be the first of their many planned operations to be actually put into effect so it could be argued that the planners needed more seasoning than the troops, particularly in view of the way the operation unfolded.

An early version of the M-G plan allocated the 101st to Arnhem but this was quickly altered ; the reason is almost universally accepted as being due to inter-Allied politics. The plan was fundamentally British but more importantly, overall success was dependent upon British ground forces relieving Arnhem bridge in time. Subjecting an American division to the risk of being stranded at the end of the Airborne corridor was deemed politically unacceptable.

In fact, a fair proportion of the 1st British Airborne Division had fought together in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. More importantly, the troops were 'fresh' having undergone a lengthy period of training ; Normandy was still a very recent experience for the the US Airborne.

However, I really don't think that criticism can be levelled at the fighting prowess of any of the Airborne forces involved whether US or British. Perhaps more curious was the choice of Urquhart to command with no airborne experience. And as for XXX Corps....?

But it's so easy for armchair people like me to criticize. Don't forget the famous - and true - incident after Arnhem when a para survivor shouted 'What took you so long ?' to XXX Corps soldiers.

'You've only been here a week - we've been fighting for three bloody months !'

( Most of the above thoughts are based on reading of Middlebrook, 'Arnhem 1944' and Tugwell, 'Arnhem - A Case Study' ).

 

Must say as well that the first time I read on the troops deployment for the ops I was wondering as well that earlier Monty was advised NOT to lose any more British soldiers because there would be no more reserves for him, and suddenly the British are dropped the longest distance behind the lines...?? Anyway, interesting change of view for Monty.

 

I think that what you're referring to meant the larger set-piece battles which were feared during the Normandy planning, Kai.

Market Garden was hoped to be a more specialised, coup-de-main type operation and, in the famous phrase, 1st British Airborne were 'coins burning holes in SHAEF's pockets'.....

 

A coup-de-main operation without a coup-de-main...

What they needed at Arnhem was a glider coup-de-main not a recce jeep one... Leave Browning behind on the first day and have another 36 gliders to use for the Arnhem drop and get the whole of 1st Airborne in on Day One with two air-lifts! Then advance with the whole division into Arnhem to join the coup-de-main glider-troops at the road bridge...

The What-Ifs of Arnhem are what make it so intriguing to study, a truly 'classic' battle. All the makings of an epic struggle against the odds. A struggle conducted in a typically 'english' manner. Arnhem was a 'Rorkes Drift' for a new century. It is often written about in the same way as Victorian writers portrayed the stalwart defenders of the Empire. Read an early account of Anrhem and those of Rorkes Drift or the last stand at Gandamack and the same language is used to describe the British soldier. 'Dogged', 'Tenacious', 'heroic'... The list is endless. Arnhem is a battle that has become part of the national concioussness. In the typical British manner, the greatest defeat is remembered, as it showed the British 'Tommy' at his best.

 

G'day

On my battlefield tour yesterday the guides of the Airborne museum could tell a lot of detailed story's of the battle from Veterans from British and German side. The Veterans come to Oosterbeek and can tell their story's to the Museumstaff that can fill in gaps in their puzzle's. I think because of the very strong fighting on such a small area there is so much to tell on each corner of the village that makes it so unique. Besides the fact so much still comes above groud each tie they dig there. Great finds being made all the time.

Cheers Popski

 

One more for the pot!

If two lifts on the first day wasn't possible, with the benefit of "hindsight", what if the Arnhem troop transport allocations could have been tinkered?

IMHO three units in particular served no effective purpose on the first day:

- 1st and 2nd Batteries RA (57 Horsas)
- 1st Airborne Recce Sqdn (8 C-47s, 22 Horsas)
- RASC (4 C47s, 34 Horsas)

The Recce and RASC alone take up the equivalent transport of 2 entire Parachute Bns (68 C-47s)!

Total up the above troop carrier and towing transports then add Browning's glider contingent (Mentioned by RB), I get a total of 161. Now I know that as these were principally glider tows, they would have been a mixture of C-47s, Stirlings, Halifaxes and Albermarles, but with slight modifications they could have all been used in a parachute drop roll.

161 transports would have been sufficient to bring in the entire 4th Parachute Brigade and the remainder of the South Staff's on the first day. Even if 1st Airlanding Brigade was tied to the DZs/LZs until the second lift, 2 Parachute Brigades free to go for Arnhem on the first day may have made a significant difference.

One mystery I've never been able to fathom is why the Polish Brigade couldn't come in with the second lift. The US Airborne divisions had the luxury of dropping 3 Parachute Infantry Regiments each on the first day. The remaining US lifts comprised a couple of glider battalions, remaining Artillery and other divisional troops only. Surely the aircraft were available and the Poles should have been given priority. Perhaps there was a certain complacency as to the necessity of the Polish Brigade during the planning stage.


Peter

 

Hi Peter

A number of points to mull over there - surely the Recce Squadron were supposed to have a starring role on the first day ( even though it wasn't what they were trained to do ), but of course it all went terribly wrong, thanks mainly to SS Battalion Krafft....

( Those Germans again ! )

 

I don't think combat experience of the British troops at Arnhem can be questioned. They fought as hard as any other unit would have so no, it wasn't a bad call. As for Urqhart, not an entirely understandable decision but I am not sure how much it can be criticised.