Ardennes and gettin/being wounded

Was just watching a video about "The Bulge".
It was pretty sad. It implied the allies were desperate for "replacements" and that doctors were under big pressure to send guys back to the front. "If you can see and walk, you are going back"... was what one of the doctors said...regardless of their mental state or other "minor" injuries.
Quite a contrast to what the troops had been told just up to that time...that they were their to relax, regroup...get use to being a soldier...The Germans were done fighting.
Also...there was a guy...curator of The Nuts Museum..said that Bastogne had almost no value to The Germans...but when it became a rally cry for The Allies that then they wanted to destroy it. Is that right.?
Thank You

 

At the beginning of German assault Bastogne supposed to fall in first day according to German timetable. 1940 Army Group B scouts captured it on first day in Ardennes. Instead German advance was so slow in 1944 December German scouts got close to Bastogne only in fourth day and before they marched the city 101st Airborne Division arrived and hold the town. 5th Panzer Army's priorty like 6th SS Panzer Army was racing west , getting and crossing Meuse. So they besieged the town by by passing outflanking north and south and left a besieging force. It was a mistake because Bastogne was the major road artery of region (six roads converged there) Once German advance was stopped short of Meuse Hitler after much deliberation decided to agree "small solution" his generals proposed instead : elimination of Allied forces east of Meuse including Bastogne pocket. It was too late though. By the time sufficent forces were gathered by Germans Patton's tanks already relieved Bastogne and 101st Airborne and created a dangerous flank inside German bulge.

 

The battle of the bulge was over in strategic terms before Bastogne even started.

The Germans sent two armies in; a northern wing (6th Panzer Army) and southern wing (5th Panzer Army). The northern wing was the main thrust of the attack and the southern wing (which ended up fighting at Bastogne) was in place to protect the flank of the main northern thrust. The northern wing, 6th Army, was halted and defeated by about the 20th of December ending any chance of a strategic victory. No further advances were made after that date, in the northern sector.

Meanwhile, down south, the 5th Panzer Army continued to fight and the eyes of news reporters shifted there. In allied eyes, this sideshow became the main fight. The overall German plan wasn't really understood until after the war, but by then allied reporters had already cemented the notion that the battle was won at Bastogne.

 

That explains a lot.
It happens with ALL topics, but sense this is a WWII Forum.....it is amazing how many things you think you know, because they have been repeated over and over for many years...but it turns out to be "wrong", or only partially true.
From videos I see on Youtube...it often seems the bulk of the battle was fought to keep Bastogne because it was a do or die locale for The Germans.
Per usual, there is a lot more to it than that.
Thank for the info..

 

The Germans needed petrol and bad weather conditions. When it became clear they could not get enough petrol even with their personnal jerrycans (which was a desperate move from the start) and considering the weather would allow allied aircrafts to take off soon or late, it was just a matter of time before the allies would start moving east again.
Suppose Antwerp would have been reached. Well the RAF and the USAAF would have obliterated it within days ....
The allies would have kept their supplies coming from France for a while, and the Germans they would have faced in the Hürtgen Forest, would have been captured at a different place. But the issue of the war not altered.
It would be an interested "what if" topic.
Facts are that : had Germany won the Battle of the Bulge, they would not have invaded France again , nor would they have had enough supplies. It would have given Ivan some extra time in the east though...
After all this could have been a good move from a diplomatic point of view. It gave the allies the impression the Germans still had fighting capacities (which wass good for negociating ) and yet allowed the liberation of Germany from the west (which was good to prevent Stalin from going too far westward). It also gave the army the impression they would not give in after an "honarable last stand". Those who serioulsy thought it would reverse the tide in case odf a German victory were fools. In a nutshell Bastogne was not strategic and neither were other places, they were just a last spark in the middle of a fire that was doomed to die soon .

 

I think the real significance of Bastogne was as a public focus for the battle of Bastogne. It was a plot the media and public could follow, one familiar from dozens of Westerns. The good guys in the waggonn train surrounded by Injuns while the US Cavalry come ot the rescue.

 

The Bastogne story was given additional impetus in the public eye by the fact of War Correspondent Fred McKenzie being present throughout the battle.

 

There were three german Armies attacking in the Ardennes. The 7th Armee of Brandenberger had as a mission to protect the southern flank, roughly on a line Echternach-Neufchâteau-Givet. The main thrust was to be made in the north by the 6th SS Panzerarmee. The 5th Panzerarmee had a much bigger mission then just protect Dietrich's left flank, they were supposed to cross the Meuse, take Namur, then Brussels and finally push to the Schelde to a point south-west of Antwerps. Even if the american propaganda effort made a heroic, "injun" like,crucial effort out of the defense of Bastogne. One can not deny the highly important strategic value of Bastogne, it is a road hub where six major and three secondary roads meet, the more there is a railway line crossing the city. If you are familiar with the terrain of the Ardennes you can not but see the strategic importance of such a traffic node. IMHO the Battle of the Bulge was lost or won, depending from whose perspective you look at it, in many places! Elsenborn Ridge, Ambléve valley, Hosingen, Clervaux, Bastogne etc. etc........, every action was part of big jig saw puzzle that spellt, once completed: INEVITABLE GERMAN DEFEAT!

 

One must also factor in that the German army was a shadow of its former self compared with 1940. Attacking a built-up area such as Bastogne, defended by well-led and well trained troops that were dug in is a formidable proposition! The German troops of 1944 just didn't have the skill level of their 1940 counterparts. This showed in the many clumsy attacks made by the Germans.

 

Bombing Antwerp would not solve the problem of supplying 21st AG and US First and Ninth Armies. IIRC the only access to the North Sea would be through the "islands" the Canadians had just taken. Assuming only the First Army stocks were lost at Liege, there might be enough supplies for an offensive to re-open the routes south to the channel ports. Of course the Germans would be stretched to hold what they have, as would Patton to hold the line from the Saar to the coast.

I am not disputing Hitler's pipe dream but making the point of why the German military commanders went along with it. Many authors also cite that this crisis could cause a deep rift between the US and Britain. However with two US Armies existence at stake it seems unlikely.

If somebody wants to take this to the "What if ..." topics, I'm in.

 

Had they succeeded in taking Antwerp, it would have been the British/Commonwealth forces at risk. They were east and north of Antwerp and thus would have been cut off from all supply from France or elsewhere. That very scenario was part of the strategic goal; to leave half the allied force without gas and beans, along with the political strains that such an American failure would have brought about.

Of course, the Germans would have also been very extended and would need to rely on captured fuel in and around Antwerp, which likely would have been burned before they got there.

And I also agree that it wouldn't have changed the final outcome, other than perhaps delaying the date of German capitulation and giving the Soviets more territory.

 

I think if they let the Germans have Bastogne there would have been more "in the bag" than what was eventually there when Patton arrived. The assault was never going to work anyway so let them get as far as possible and then let Patton pinch the whole lot off. I think it says alot about how much respect the allies still had for the fighting ability of the wehrmacht that they did not take that calculated risk.

The Germans should have moved everything they had to the eastern front and let the west collapse. I do not understand why this was not done. I know there were almost all just lackeys left,




but at least some general should have taken some real action to save as much of the west as possible.

 

Ah, the Ardennes. The last desperate sally from the starving fortress.

The Germans on 16 Dec 44 were seeking a quick breakthrough of the thin US defences. Surprise and speed: 'On and over the Meuse'; the last thing they wanted was a prolonged battle in the Ardennes. The German offensive gained complete surprise, but never the desired speed. The American stand at Bastogne and St.Vith (!), among other factors, were instrumental in slowing down the pace of the advance and thereby thwarting the German plans.

 

I'll argue Bastogne was pretty important. St. Vith, Houffalize and Bastonge running from north to south were the three roadnet centers that controlled all communications in the Ardennes region, and the stand of 7th Armored at St. Vith and 101st Airborne at Bastonge prevented reinforcement and supply to the front or laterally between the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. The decision to hold St. Vith and Bastogne was, not coincidentally, an application of text book doctrinal solution against an enemy penetration: hold the shoulders and let the center wither before a counterattack to lop it off or push it back.

Yes, the German plan was doomed strategically, but since Hitler refused to recognize reality, the German army carried on with the offensive anyhow, and it had to be stopped. Also, the Germans bitterly disputed the possession of Bastonge even after the Fith Panzer Army was defeated east of the Meuse and the 4th Armored already relieved the paratroopers. If memory serves, the Germans committed in the days after Dec 26 what was left of the 1st & 12th SS Panzer, the Fuhrer Begleit Brigade, and a few infantry divisions there, a rather serious effort considering their draining strength at that stage of the campaign. I suspect this was because Model knew he could not safely extricate his troops and heavy equipment without holding open an escape corridor.

 

I think the reason why the generals went along with the plan is the same as ever. The threat to find someone else who would. The weakness of Nazi Germany was its leadership. No one could ever tell Hitler when to stop. The strength of the United Nations effort was in the relationship and procedures established between The British and US government and their political and military leaders. .I think that relationship was strngest when they were in the darkest stimes of 1942, but as victory became sure, the allies were falling out ona range of matters such as Eastern Europe, The Empire etc.

There is a book of what if scenarios about the Ardennnes. One of these has the Canadian army mounting a counter stroke across the battlefield of Waterloo. The weak point in the united nations was the divisions between its members. It may not have been quite so far fetched to imagine amore successful Ardennnes threatening the stability of the alliance. Look at the fall out of the decision by Eisenhower to abandon Strasbourg in Jan 1945 and the response by de Gaulle. Montgomery';s press conference after the Ardennes had been won caused enough damage to anglo american relations. Imagine the fall out and finger pointing if there had ever been an actual set-back.