Battle of Leyte Gulf and the Capture of the Philippines

Hi All,

The Battle of Midway was won because the United States intercepted Japan's messages and knew exactly what they were planning. This enabled the United States to place their aircraft carriers in the most advantageous position without any knowledge of this to the Japanese.

The Japanese were able to plan for the invasion of the Philippines well before it occured. They planned for a rather risky sea battle that involved the sacrifice of their aircraft carriers.

How did they know ahead of time of our plans and dates to invade the Philippines which enabled them to plan for this invasion? Did they break our codes?

Thanks in advance,

Bob Guercio

 

That's partially correct. I highly recommend Shattered Sword as it is probably the best account out about Midway and goes into things from the Japanese side in considerable detail.

Tully goes into this in his new book on the Battle of Surigao Strait. The basically analyzed the situation and concluded that there were three areas where the US might attack and prepared variants of the plan for each.

 

The Japanese realized that sooner or later the US forces would re-take the Philippines. The Japanese set up five plans called the Sho-go plans. They did not know when or precisly where the US would strike. The considerable delay it took for the Japanese warships to reach Leyte indicates that the Japanese did not know when the invasion would take place until it happened.

 

This is an accurate statement.

To elaborate a bit, the Japanese Sho-go plan required that Japanese naval forces attack the American invasion beaches within 24 hours of the start of the landings and destroy the ground troops and their supplies before a beachhead could be secured.

The Japanese had no idea where or when the invasion of the Philippines would take place until it actually commenced. That is why it took FIVE DAYS for main Japanese force, Kurita's command, to arrive at Leyte Gulf. This was the fatal flaw in the plan, and it meant that the American beachhead was already secured, and enough supplies had been landed to last through any disruption of the American supply line the Japanese could effect.

The Sho-Go plan did not initially involve the sacrifice of the Japanese carriers as a diversion to lure Halsey's Third fleet away from the immediate area of the American landings. This was Admiral Ozawa's idea; he realized he could not guarantee that Halsey's fleet would be neutralized by his carriers, and suggested that they be used as bait to draw off the main American naval strength.

In essence, the Sho-Go plan was a typical Japanese operational plan, influenced by committee, hopelessly complex, requiring precise timing among widely dispersed elements, depending on intelligence not likely to be available, and realistically doomed to failure. But, as Admiral Kurita remarked at a meeting of senior Japanese naval officers just prior to his departure on the mission, "Miracles do happen!"

 

This sounds like the Japanese had already thrown in the towel and were figuring out the best and easiest way to commit suicide.

I say this because what they were hoping for was totally impossible and ludicrous. I cannot believe that the Japanese military leaders did not realize that to respond to an invasion within 24 hours without knowing where or when it was going to take place is impossible.

Bob Guercio

 

Bob, I understand where you're coming from and I used to have the same mindset. However, I have to respectfully disagree in describing the Japanese preparations as ludicrous.
As pointed out by DA earlier, these were contingency plans. If the US did this, the Japanese would do that.
Think of it this way if you will: when one is has a large area to defend, one puts up pickets or outposts at certain areas. These could be likened to trip wires. At the same time, the available forces are assigned to locations where they could respond quickly to what the planners perceive as likely areas where the enemy will likely stage a penetration.
Once the wire is tripped, then the appropriate contingency plan is followed. Responding doesn't in 24 hours doesn't necessarily mean that the responding forces would be there in 24 hours. That's impossible due to the distances involved. For me, this means that within 24 hours of the attack, the available forces are alerted and beginning to move to meet the penetration. Anyway, that's my two-cents worth.

 

Nevertheless, that was one of the assumptions of the Sho-Go plan. It was hoped that intelligence and air and submarine reconnaissance would detect American intentions in sufficient time to determine the invasion site, and dispatch an attack force to deal with the invasion. It didn't happen. The Japanese ships were simply too scattered and too far from the point of attack due to lack of fuel to keep them concentrated in the Philippines

There was considerable debate among senior Japanese naval officers as to whether the plan made much sense, and some advocated alternative plans such as hit and run attacks on American logistical bases and routes. As always, there were elements of illogic and emotionalism in Japanese planning to counter the American invasion. Paul Dull in his book "Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy" calls Sho1 (the Sho plan if the Philippines were invaded) an "exercise in utter stupidity". But Dull points out that the IJN had little choice; they knew that if the Philippines were lost, the Japanese empire would effectively be cut in two, and the Japanese Navy cut off from it's source of fuel in the NEI. In that case, there was no point in saving the remaining IJN ships in Home waters since they wouldn't be able to move, and any Japanese ships in the NEI would be cut off from replenishment and repairs.

So yeah, in essence, the IJN did commit suicide at Leyte Gulf.