BATTLE OF THE PACIFIC: The Face of Victory

Land based air was a non-factor at Midway.

 

I think that might be open to debate. I find it hard o believe that Nagumo would ignore B-17's and B-26's, Even the F2F's, F4F's and Devastators were effective as a distraction.

Besides that I think several times during the battle carrier planes landed at Midway to refuel and re-arm.

I wouldn't consider the land based air a "non factor" inthe strictest sense.

 

Sorry, I should have said IMO it was not a factor, in fact IMO land based air was not a factor against Japanese shipping at sea during the war. They certainly weren't effective and were only even a diversion until the Japanese learned how ineffective they were.
High level bombing against warships at sea was not a successful tactic.

 

I read it and saved it, thanks, Lou. I have an affinity for period writings.

On the other hand, if I may, I think a casual dismissal of Midway-based air is a bit too sharply focused on the B-17 piece of the equation.

Land based air at Midway was a force multiplier as it kept Nagumo's attention through repeated attacks on his forces, provided long range scouting, and performed rescue duties.

The Japanese pre-battle estimate of US airpower on the island, though noting that the estimated air strength could be doubled in an emergency with reinforcements from Hawaii, anticipated two squadrons of patrol aircraft, one squadron of army bombers and one fighter squadron. Their plan’s estimate of the situation clearly stated “The enemy is not aware of our plans” so one doubts that there was serious consideration given to the possibility of reinforcement.

Using typical organizational strengths for late 1941 to early 1942, what was actually present on the island were 32 patrol planes from various VP squadrons (slightly more than what one might find in two full strength squadrons); 17 B-17s from various squadrons (slightly less than 1½ times more than the typical 12 plane squadron); and 28 fighters (21 F2A & 7 F4F – while a number equivalent to what was going aboard carriers with the advent of the F4F-4, what the Japanese anticipated was probably the more typical 18 plane squadron, thus there were more than 1½ times the number of fighters they expected).

So, the Japanese estimate of anticipated US air strength was close in numbers of patrol aircraft, but short in both fighters and land bombers. Worse for them, the US, as we know, was aware of the Japanese plan and so there were many more aircraft than the Japanese expected: 6 TBFs from VT-8; 21 SB2Us and 19 SBDs from VMSB-241; and 4 B-26’s, 2 each from 18th RS(M) and 69th BS(M). The island complement, in total numbers, was more than twice what the Japanese anticipated. Yes, in the event of an emergency the numbers really could double.

While the initial Japanese strike effectively eliminated further action by the island based F2A and F4F fighters of VMF-221, none of the patrol or bombing aircraft (USN, USMC, or USAAF) was caught on the ground, nor was the airfield damaged so as to preclude further operations. The Japanese strike commander, LT Tomonaga may not have realized how many of the US planes had escaped his strike, but he was well aware that the results of the strike were inconclusive in terms of negating the utility of NAS Midway, hence his determination and message that a second strike was needed.

NAS Midway-based PBYs gave first notice of the approaching Japanese strike, insuring that the aircraft stationed there were not caught on the ground; the same PBYs gave the first “fix” on the location of the Kido Butai. The piecemeal attacks on the Japanese fleet, TBFs, B-26s, B-17s, SBDs, and SB2Us all from the island, or at least approaching his force from the direction of the island, coupled with Tomonaga’s repeat strike message, were sufficient to keep Nagumo’s attention, and thus operations, focused on the island.

This was the first contribution of Midway-based air. Without scoring a single hit, and with often obscene losses, their one-after-the-other attacks spoiled the Japanese timing, caused repeated recycling of CAPs, forced radical maneuvering which broke up the KBs formations, and, ultimately forced the delaying ordnance load-out changes which, while never preventing Enterprise and Hornet, yes, and even Yorktown, over the horizon from launching their strikes, at least could have, perhaps, and a big perhaps at that, allowed for a larger response to the presence of US carriers, and, an even bigger perhaps, altering, if not the final outcome, at least the box scores.

The second contribution of Midway-based air occurred in the days after the main event of 4 June. Located by VP aircraft from Midway, the cruisers Mikuma and Mogami, though attacked without result by B-17s and SB2Us and SBDs from the island on 5 June, their continued tracking led to attacks on the 6th which resulted in the sinking of Mikuma and additional bomb damage inflicted on the already collision damaged Mogami.

The third contribution of Midway-based air began at dawn on the 5th and continued through the 21st, locating and either picking up or directing rescuers to USN aviators in the water and even Japanese sailors left adrift behind as their ships moved away from the area.

So, no, Midway-based air was not inconsequential.

As far as refueling carrier-based aircraft was concerned, yes, that did happen with, I believe, without looking it up, 11 of the Hornet-based VB-8 SBDs, but it was not planned and the island’s use as a shuttle refuel/rearm point was never envisioned, much less mentioned, in the CinCPac 29-42 ops plan.

Fourteen of VB-8’s SBDs turned towards Midway over their commander’s concern for their fuel situation rather than risk trying to make it back to the ship – they could see the smoke from Midway and, YG-ZB homing system aside, better smoke they could see than a ship they could not. One might note, though, that the VS-8 strike, the CHAG section, and 3 VB-8 all turned back towards Hornet and made it. Three of the 14 Midway bound SBDs went down before reaching the island, one at sea (crew later rescued by a PBY), one near the outlying reef, and one in the lagoon (crews rescued by a crash boat and a PT boat, respectively). They had no radio contact with the island and, in fact, jettisoned their bombs off shore to demonstrate their friendly nature (actually initially having the opposite effect and causing some minor AAA peppering before identities were established). After refueling (and this was the first that many on the island even knew there were US carriers lurking in the area) and re-arming, these SBDs made their way back to Hornet with orders to strike Japanese carriers on their way back – stupid order, the Japanese were in one direction and Hornet in the other. Needless to say, for the second time that day, Hornet SBDs did not find the Japanese carriers, but they did make it back to their ship, finally, late in the afternoon, in time for, methinks, seven of them to participate in the attack on Hiryu.

Rich

 

I read the first page of the article, I'm posting from my phone and Times popups make it difficult to read the other pages.
I do know that right after the battle everyone thought the Army bombers sank the carriers based on the erroeous reports of the bomber pilots. Of course the navy knew their planes scored the major hits but the headlines the next day gave the credit to the army. It wasn't till years later, when IJN records were examined tha we knew all the level bombers bombs were easily evaded.

 

Right after the battle, the only ones who thought the Army sank the Japanese carriers were in the AAF. It was the AAF publicity machine that spread the "news" of their credit far and wide.

See http://www.ww2f.com/naval-warfare-pacific/34252-mitscher-midway.html

 

Excellent post (#7) Rich, my statement that land based air being a non factor was not correct. The indecision over the need for a second strike against Midway was key in the American victory.

 

TS,


"land based air was not a factor against Japanese shipping at sea during the war."


Battle of the Bismark Sea?



John.

 

That's certainly not the impression I'm left with after reading Shattered Sword.