Popular history tells us the Mulberry harbour idea was a massive success and essential for Overlord to have been successful but is this the case? In ‘Supplying War – logistics from Wallenstein to Patton’, Martin van Crefeld points out that once the rules on not beaching of craft at low tide was disregarded (D+2) it was possible to dispense with much of the laboriously assembled boats, floating piers, pontoon causeways etc. In ‘Overlord’ Max Hastings suggests that the Allied landings could have been shielded from the sea just as effectively by sinking the screen of blockships and creating a network of piers, rather than devoting the labour of some 45,000 men to building the Mulberries In ‘Engage the Enemy More Closely’ Corelli Barnett comments on problems involving the construction and use of the Phoenix caissons and concerns (justified as it turned out) that the Bombardons would protect or demolish piers. Are these views justified?
Max Hasting also suggests that the US delivered more supplies after the mulberry was destroyed than before. Whilst he suggests this was because the Mulberry was inefficiant he provides little evidence. FNG
The Mulberry harbours were shielded from currents by proper wave-breakers, and the piers they involved were definitely better for handling cargo than were the mere beach sands. I reckon these artificial ports, while not essential, made things easier and therefore faster for the Allies in supplying much needed things to the ground troops. When after the storm (was it June 29th?) the Mulberry at Omaha was destroyed, supplying went on but it was probably harder (I have no numbers to prove this, though).
I found this book in my local library – ‘A Harbour Goes to War – the story of Mulberry and the men who made it happen’ compiled and edited by J Evans, E Palmer and R Walter. (Printed 2000) Here is a section from the conclusion. In December 1944, Sir Walter Monckton began his analysis of the Mulberry harbours. He and his staff conducted interviews for several months before the report was finally published in September 1945. His task was a difficult one and reading the evidence, there is considerable conflict of opinion concerning the success, or otherwise, of the various components. At the time the report was drafted, this was more than mere accounting. The Japanese war was still on and serious consideration was being given to the use of artificial ports in the Far East. Despite the conflicting accounts, a consensus seems to have emerged. Blockships were definitely a good thing and would be used again without hesitation, although some reinforcement of the superstructure was recommended. Phoenix units did a good job but their construction was not ideally suited to the environment. The modifications to provide ‘swim ends’ had a marginal benefit in terms of towability but also encouraged basal scour as the ends created gaps between the units. The addition of decking to later models was an improvement but lack of strength in tension, despite metal reinforcement, was a problem. Whale piers and roadways were useful but in the opinion of some not essential except for the handling of awkward and heavy loads such as bulldozers. They also came into their own for the evacuation of casualties. The decision to use concrete for the beetles was widely criticised. Everyone was impressed with the abilities and usefulness of the DUKWs No one had anything good to say about the Bombardons Any plan to deploy a floating harbour in the Far East based on the ‘tow and assemble’ Mulberry model were out of the question without extensive design changes and on-site manufacture or certain components. E.g. Phoenix
In war, if something makes the job easier, then go with it. It may not be absolutely essential, but any advantage should be capitalized on. If these artificial harbors made landing supplies and materiel in France easier, then they were worth the effort. And as for the Mulberries requiring the labor of 45,000 men, so what? Britain and America had manpower (and womanpower) up the wazoo; diverting some of it to the Mulberry project hurt nothing.
America, yes; Britain, no. For Britain any diversion of manpower could be critical; throughout the war the British were forced to disband divisions to replace losses in others, which shows how short they were on trained military personell, despite the post-Dunkirk reorganization of drafting and training. I don't know what the nationality was of the 45,000 people who "operated" the Mulberry harbour but if these were British, this means the harbour was much less of an advantage than I said it was in my previous post.
What people seem to forget, is the fact that the Mulberry's greatest assett, was that it enabled the Allies to invade where they chose along the northern coast of France & not where the Germans expected (knew) they had to, ie a large harbour. Hitler & his Generals knew that to sustain an initial successful invasion, a large port had to be quickly captured. They sensibly built all their coastal defences around this precept. The idea that the Allies would be bringing their own pre-fabricated harbour across the Channel with them was incomprehensible. The net result being that the landings were achieved with a far lower loss of life for the Allies, than if they had to take Cherbourg, Calais or any of the other Channel ports. Ironically, it was out of the scale of the Dieppe disaster, that the concept of Mulberrry was born.
