Japan takes Port Moresby

Thank you JW....

I am not very well learned about the war in that area, but it is an interesting subject. I will give it a go to start with, with what little I do know. For one, the Japanese would have been able to construct airfields in the area. That would have put much more of Australia and some shipping lanes within range of land bombers. Next, available Allied assets would have more than likely have been diverted to the re-taking of New Guinea, as opposed to going into the Solomon Islands area. The Japanese would have probably been able to solidify their gains in the Solomons and beyond in that region. I don't think the Japanese had enough forces available to take New Caladonia, or to invade Australia, but enough to finish the conquest of New Guinea and the Solomons. As far as changing the course of the war, the Allies would have eventually been able to re-take the area at a later time, delaying the progression of the war substantially. That's my angle.

 

Depends on if theis occurs before or after Operation Watchtower is launched. If long enough before then the US strategy may be altered to accomodate the new Japanese position. If later then the battle in the Solomons develops similar to what it did and the Japanese airpower is crippled in the long running attritional battle over the Solomons, and the fleet draws off critical fuel from Jaanese industry and sea transport for military operations.

Japans fundamental problem was its overextention of military operations. Its pool of trained pilots was too small for a extended war and its pilot trainig system to ineffcient to replace a high attrition rate. The long running air battles in the Solomons & South Pacific in finish off the remainder of the superb group of pilots Japan started with.

Japans merchant fleet was inadaquate for its peacetime needs. At a bit over seven million tons displacement the cargo fleet of 1942 was about 40% of what was used to clear imports and exports across Japans docks in 1940. The loss of use of forigen ships meant Japan could not supply its industry or supply a distant military campaign.

Capturing Port Morsby means Japan is yet another step beyond what it could sustain and in the long run it drains off its military power even faster.

 

Not necessarily. The Japanese airbase on Guadacannal was equally well positioned to threaten the supply route to Australia. And the US Navy snatched it away from the Japanese. As with Gudacannal the Japanese could not provide enough aircraft or other supplies to hold the position let alone do anything damaging with it.

You are correct the threat caused consernation in the US command. Reinforcements and supplies were diverted from the "Europe First" plan to aid the Australians, and a coutner attack was made in the Solomons. This counter offensive on Guadacannal also drew resources away from the Europe First policy. Which is a illustration of how seriously the US command took the Japanese efforts in New Guinea and the Solomon islands. As it turned out the Jpanese were at the end of their rope and unable to put up the same sort of fight as they could a few months earlier.

As for Australia falling, the Japanese could not even support two divsions on Guadacannal. Thousands of their soldiers there literally starved to death. How could they expect to sustain the several dozen divsions required to overun Australia?

 

Exactly. The essential thing here is the ability to hold and fully utilize the gains. The Japanese were fully stretched bringing oil, supplies, and other war-essential needs to their far-flung territories.

New Guinea was already far. Trying to take Australia would be like trying to swim the English Channel with one leg. The only effect I could see would be the loss of whatever Australian forces were in New Guinea, as well as bombing raids on Darwin, and other northern Australian provinces.

 

Might've bought em some time as it would add an extra thorn for the US & Aussies to remove. But beyond that I have to agree, Japan's Barbarossa was moving into Pacific & SE Asia simultaneously. Concentrating on one or the other would be less taxing. I dunno any real war winning strategies that involve confrontations with Uncle Sam. Take Manchuria & Korea, then Phillipines & Taiwan perhaps & call it a day. They got victory fever though, would never happen that way.

 

A couple of points here.

First is that the Battle of Milne Bay was a a major development in that time frame, repulsing a jap attempt at establishing a presence in far eastern PNG. This was a done deal well before Guadalcanal was finalised, and that alone would have left a jap held Port Moresby under constant threat.

Also, Port Moresby was ONLY an advantage from a bombing/fighter point of view. It was a LOUSY sea-port, and its position made it equally vulnerable to Allied attack as it was as a threat to Australia.

The Great Barrier Reef extends all the way to the PNG coast, and thus NO sea-borne threat can be sustained without many experienced sea-pilots in that area. Passage through the Reef, and the Torres Strait, would have been impossible.

Sea-borne supply of Port Moresby would also have been an extremely hazardous undertaking.

20-20 hindsight is a wonderful thing.


John.

 

Some excellent points!

The timing of the Australian militia's stand on the Kokoda Trail was late July, 1942 before the Guadalcanal Campaign was launched. The reason the Japanese even tried to take Port Moresby form the landward side was because the seaborne attempt in May, 1942, had been thwarted by the USN in the Battle of the Coral Sea. The Battle of Midway in June, 1942, meant that the IJN was in no position to attempt another seaborne invasion of Port Moresby in 1942, but the Japanese Army still wanted the port.

Had Japan been able to take Port Moresby sometime in the latter half of 1942, it would have face an almost imossible task in supply any forces in Port Moresby. Supply by sea was the only feasible route and that would have been closed off by Allied air and naval forces. Operating an airbase at Port Moresby would have been impossible due to the logistical difficulties. The Japanese IGHQ staff probably didn't realize just how difficult supplying Port Moresby would have been; they thought, for instance, that the Kokoda Trail could support motorized transport when, in fact, it was nothing more than a footpath difficult even for pack animals.

Japan, as already mentioned, was badly over-extended in the South Pacific, but the peculiar geography of Port Moreby woyld have made it impossible for the Japanese to utilize the area for anything more than an advanced emergency airbase, and a very vulnerable one, at that. Bottom line; Port Moresby wouldn't have proved very useful to the Japanese.

 

The Europe First policy was bent quite a bit due to the emergency in the Pacific in the Spring and Summer of 1942. By the time Japan was overstreatched the momentum of reinforcements to the Pacific was difficult to stop, and it was not clear the emergency was over until the end of 1942.

 

The "Europe First" strategy endorsed by Churchill, Roosevelt,m and the US JCS referred more to the allocation of US war production than a firm rule about where offensives would be launched. It was mostly honored as evidenced by the fact that about 80-85% of US war production went to the build-up in Britain and only about 15-20% went to the Pacific Theater.

Guadalcanal was the first US offensive of any kind; the early carrier raids in the Pacific beginning in February, 1942 and extending through April were just that, raids, and not offensives. They were undertaken to keep the Japanese guessing as to US intentions and to afford combat operations experience to the USN air groups.

The Guadalcanal offensive was an exception to the "Europe First" policy, but was justified as taking advantage of the aftermath of the Midway battle when the Japanese temporarily lost the initiative. Even then, Operation Watchtower was, at best, a limited offensive and did not have the priority of say, the North African Campaign in terms of men and material. It was correctly dubbed Opeartion Shoestring by it's participants as a result.

Most historians will point out that in early 1942, more troops were sent to the Pacific than to the European theater, but this was because there was a real need to garrison islands in support of the minimum defensive positions defined in the US war plans and the fact that, in early 1942, there was no way to use large numbers of US troops in the European theater. In the fall of 1942, when the Guadalcanal campaign had reached a crisis point, Roosevelt made the decision to put whatever men and material were necessary into the Pacific to guarantee that Guadalcanal would be an allied success. However, this was a short-lived policy lasting not much more than a month and, thereafter "Europe First" continued to be a firm policy of Roosevelt and the JCS.

 

THe track was nothing more then a goat trail in parts, and there has been disputes over whether it is considered a trail or a track. Here are some pictures of the trail in ww2. You can clearly see how it was so hard to move supplies let alone men alone.

The steps on the trail were actually put there by the Australian and the Fuzzy Wuzzy angels to help with movement.

The Trail today is still a historical site, and people still continously go to the trail and to the same travels as to what the Australians did in ww2, except of course without the battle, disease, lack of supplies and heavy packs.

Kokoda Track - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

good photos here.
The Battle for Australia - The Kokoda Track

 

Also to do with the barrier reef, it can be navigated by small vessels such as patrol boats and amphibous craft, but due to the density and the height of the coral, larger ships as small as destroyers have a hell of a time getting through. A good example is a few years a go I remember a Modern British Destroyer actually got stuck in the reef.

 

That's all true. The Trail (or Track) was practically impassable in many places by anything but foot traffic, and then only with extreme difficulty.

But prior to WW II some maps issued by the Australian authorities identified the Kokoda Trail as the "Buna Road", and apparently the Japanese IGHQ staff planners assumed that anything called a "road" could accommodate vehicular traffic. It was a classic example of making erroneous assumptions based on map information. It certainly wasn't the first, or last, time military planners came to grief by relying on maps rather than actual on the ground recconnaisance.

 

this is one possible answer to what-if-the-americans-fail-to-take-guadalcanal? if moresby falls, then the japanese would have committed all of its south pac forces to occupy the whole new guinea island. and it would have been a monstrous mop-up for the americans during the drive back.

 

mac,


"it would have been a monstrous mop-up for the americans during the drive back."


A large part of the "mopping up" of the island of New Guinea was done by the Australian 7th and 9th Divisions, and that took into 1943 to complete.

In fact it was well into 1944 before Gen MacArthur had more Americans under his command than Australians.


John.

 

Tomcat,

There are only 4 navigable passages through the GBR, and all of these are easily mined and blocked.

Anyone trying to take an invasion force through it would be committing military suicide.

AFAIK, nobody takes a ship through the Torres Strait without an experienced pilot.


John.