I heard that the person who helped design the Tiger 1 tank had ideas for a chassis that he presented to the Americans, but he was rejected and instead went to the Germans, thus putting the Americans in the war with a tank far inferior to the high standards set by other tanks such as the Tiger and the T-34. I just wanted to check the validity of this. Thanks!
I believe he is talking about the "Christie"suspension system which Panthers,Tigers and T-34s used. Could be wrong though.
Apparnetly, although Patton and others admired it, Christie's suspension system was too expensive for the US, and it was ultimately rejected. Christie did present his chassis to other governments including Poland, England and Russia. The Russians developed the BT tanks based on the Christie designs, which ultimately led to the t-34. Christie did not work on the development of the Tiger or Panther. However, the Panther was directly influenced by the T-34 design - which used the "Christie" like system. The british also developed tanks based on Christie designs. However, whether the US could have had a tank as good as the T-34 and Panther if it had bought into the Christie system is a matter of debate. Both the Christie systme and the torion bar system used on american tanks were good for different reasons. Also, while the T-34 did use the Christie system, apparently all Russian medium tanks after the T-34, use the torsion bar system. Maybe that tells you something .... there's a lot more that goes into a good tank. The M4 was not inferior to the T-34 based only on it's suspension system. [ 09. July 2004, 08:19 AM: Message edited by: drache ]
It ought to be remembered that neither the Tiger nor the Panther was Germany's mainstay during the war, that position being taken by the Panzer IV.
Indeed the Tiger I suffered from various drive problems due to its design. A common problem was the shedding of tracks in on-spot turns and the build up of mud/dirt between the wheel groups. This is the reason you sometime see tigers in the field with some road wheels missing, although this caused weight distribution problems. The Panther suffered from excessive where on the wheel rims and this was a huge hinderance on the JagdPanther the was nose heavy. I would have to say that in terms of suspension the Sherman was of good design and highly reliable in that respect.
Thanks for the info, that helps a lot. What i though was that because its chassis, the Sherman could not have as much armor or amrmament as other tanks, but im not completely sure.
This isn't entirely true. The US was fully aware of torsion bar suspension systems like those used in the Tiger, Panther and, Pz III. The US also knew about the Christie system using large diameter vertically coil sprung suspensions. The US Army's ordinance department however settled on the use of the volute spring suspension system as their standard demanding its use on designs up through 1942. Thus, the Stuart, Grant and, Sherman all used the volute suspension system. For vehicles capable of speeds up to 20 mph cross country this system was adequite. On the other hand, claiming the Germans that "the Americans [were] in the in the war with a tank far inferior to the high standards set by other tanks..." is an absurd claim. The Sherman was a well thought out for 1940. It had a large enough turret ring to allow easy up gunning and new turrets that could take larger guns. The track system was far superior to anything the Germans used on their tanks in terms of life (about triple that of the German or Russian designs) and at road speeds reduced gasoline consumption giving tanks better mileage when travelling out of combat areas. The US also continually improved their metallurgy making their armor perform better for a given thickness than that of Germany or Russia too. US tanks also had excellent radios, the best turret power traverse systems, the first operational gun stabilizer systems (and, yes, they did work when crews bothered to learn to use them). The only real drawback to the early US designs was too narrow a track (something the Germans were also guilty of on their early tanks) and too high a silouette due to the original choice of radial aircraft engines for power plants. With the second generation vehicles like the M-24, and M-26 these problems were rectified and these vehicles were as good as anything the Germans produced. The M-25A1, of which 300 were produced prior to June 1944 but never saw combat, was essentially a US 'Panther'tank. It had equal or better armor, a 90mm gun, equal speed and cross-country performance and, was better equipped in details than the Panther. The ordinance department decided to by-pass its production in favor of the M-26 based on promises of the manufacturers to get the later in production within a few months (which, unfortunately, did not happen). The same went with a plan to equip M4A3 Shermans with the M-26 turret as an interm vehicle just before D-Day (both tanks have the same diameter turret ring....thanks to good design and engineering). As for the T-34 it had good armor a decent gun and good automotive performance on paper. The reality was it was severly handicapped by its 2 man turret and lack of vision devices which left it virtually blind except to events happening right in front of it. It's tracks and drive train were riddled with bugs and took several years to make reliable in service. The ammunition layout left much to be desired. All but 3 rounds were stored under the floor of the turret (which also lacked a basket) making loading slow and difficult. Lack of a radio and intercom system also made the crew less efficent. Basically, there is alot more to a tank than just its gun and armor. It is a complex weapon system that has many more parts that make it efficent than just its gun and armor. On that basis, the US didn't do any worse than any of the other major combatants and, in many ways did alot better.
Lets not forget the poor quality steel used on late war German tanks and the fitting of the 17pdr to the Shermn in British service.
Late war German tanks suffered from poor steel that would splinter after non-penetrating hits. This is often cited as one reason for the popularity of the Tiger I which generally had better quality armour. The Sherman must have been a good tank, it had many years of post-war service and is still a second line tank in the Israeli army, the Isherman, I think... Not really my field! The Sherman may have been bettered by a diesel engine for all models but it was a good quality, mass produced tanks that had reasonable armour, good speed and x-country ability and a good rate of fire. Not a bad tank at all. It was certainly better than the CRomwell, although faster than the SHerman, with roughly the same armour and gun performance, the Cromwell could only go 4mph backwards... Well us Brits dont run away!!!
Indeed T.A. even with its faults and the bad Red Army tactics that did not use the T-34 in big numbers at first, the T-34 had a huge effect on the war in 1941. To think what would have happened if they had all these details fixed for the war? Here´s some interesting data on T-34 with commander cupola etc in 1941: http://www.battlefield.ru/t34m.html
Thanks a lot for the large amount of info. I have a few more questions, mainly about tactics. Do you think it was a fault to use the seperate tank battalions in the way they were used in the U.S. Army because of the fact that being split up, they had to be commanded by officers not experienced in armored combat? Could deploying the Sherman differently have brought out the better attributes of the tank better?
In which theatre are we talking??? As the terrain has a lot to do with deployment. In the bocage you are fairly limited in what you can do..
Some intial stuff from... US Army "The terrain in Normandy where the Allies would land consisted of small fields and pastures ringed by dense, tangled shrubbery, the so-called bocage. Each of them constituted a natural fortification and killing ground. In the same way, the overarching limbs of trees sheltered many rural lanes in the area. German commanders could use those byways as hidden corridors to move men and supplies." "Because they assumed that the Germans would withdraw toward the Seine and fight a delay along the river's lines, the invasion's planners had concentrated on the challenge of getting ashore and had paid scant attention to the impediments posed by the bocage. As a result, Bradley's First Army was unprepared for the difficulties it faced and paid a steep price for each foot of its advance into the region. The experience of the U.S. 90th Division was a case in point. Faced with hostile fire from an invisible enemy, the unit's commanders found the principles of fire and maneuver nearly impossible to apply in the hedgerows, especially the precept that an attacking force should move just behind its artillery in order to confront the enemy while he is still off balance. The division suffered heavy casualties as a result—150 officers and 2,315 enlisted men during June and 310 officers and 5,188 enlisted men during July. More experienced units also suffered terribly in the bocage. A U.S. Army survey of casualties in portions of the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions between 6 June and 31 July 1944 found that rifle companies lost nearly 60 percent of their enlisted men and over 68 percent of their officers." "With the enemy well concealed in the hedgerows, it took an average of five Americans to displace one German defender. Under normal circumstances, a ratio of three to one would have sufficed. "Prior to invasion33' he later wrote, "we had estimated that the infantry would incur 70 percent of the losses of combat forces. By August we had boosted that figure to 83 percent on the basis of our experience in the Normandy hedgerows." Bradley illustrated his point by noting that, in fifteen days of fighting around St. Lo, the 30th Division sustained 3,934 battle casualties, a loss rate of 25 percent for the unit as a whole but of 90 percent in its rifle platoons, where three out of every four casualties occurred." "Bradley's forces were nonetheless gradually learning how to fight in the bocage. Tank and infantry units began to support each other. The tanks supplied the heavy firepower needed to eliminate the enemy's well-sited firing positions while the infantry kept enemy soldiers with antitank weapons at bay. The tankers also found a way to cross the hedgerows without exposing their vehicles' vulnerable undersides to enemy fire. With huge iron teeth salvaged from German beach obstacles welded to the fronts of hundreds of tanks, they began to bull their way through the hedgerows, taking hours to advance through obstacles that would earlier have required days of fighting to overcome. From then on, the Rhinos, as the men named them, became an invaluable asset to Bradley. They allowed American armor to move across country at will while German tanks had to continue to make do with the roads."
